Judgment B.S. Verma, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 2. Since the controversy involved in both these two writ petitions is similar, therefore, for the sake of convenience, they are being heard and decided together by this common judgment. 3. By means of Writ Petition No. 2284 of 2012, the petitioner has sought a writ for setting aside the impugned order dated 6-9-2012 (Annexure-6) passed by the Additional District Judge, Kashipur (Udham Singh Nagar) in Rent Control Appeal No. 1 of 2011 Rajkumar Vs. Vishal and others and further to set aside the order dated 21-12-2010 (Annexure-4) passed by Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kashipur (U.S. Nagar) (for short the Prescribed Authority) in Rent Case No. 3 of 2006 Vishal and others Vs. Rajkumar. The petitioner has also prayed to dismiss the release application of the landlords-respondents, moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (for short the Act). 4. By means of Writ Petition No. 2285 of 2012, the petitioners have sought quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 6-9-2012 (Annexure-5) passed by the Additional District Judge, Kashipur (Udham Singh Nagar) in Rent Control Appeal No. 2 of 2011, Satyaveer Vs. Vishal and others and also quashing of the order dated 21-12-2010 (Annexure-3) passed by the Prescribed Authority in Rent Case No. 4 of 2006. Petitioners have further prayed that the release application of the landlords-respondents, moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 5. By the order dated 21-12-2010, the Prescribed Authority had allowed the release applications moved by the landlords and directed the petitioners to vacate the premises in question. By order dated 6-9-2012, the appeals preferred against the order dated 21-12-2010 have been dismissed by the appellate Court. 6. At the outset it may be mentioned that the premises in question is the one and the same residential building, owned by the landlords. The petitioner in writ petition no. 2284 of 2012 is a tenant in the first floor of the building, while the petitioners in writ petition no. 2285 of 2012 are the tenants in the ground floor of the same residential building. 7. The petitioner in writ petition no. 2284 of 2012 is a tenant in the first floor of the building, while the petitioners in writ petition no. 2285 of 2012 are the tenants in the ground floor of the same residential building. 7. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petitions are that the respondent-landlords moved two separate applications for release of the premises in question against the tenant-petitioners on the ground of bona fide need of the landlords and their family before the Prescribed Authority, which were registered as Rent Case No. 3 of 2006 and Rent Case No. 4 of 2006, referred to above. In the release applications, it was stated that originally, there were three co-sharers in the premises in question, namely Smt. Rammurti, Smt. Janki and Sri Pradeep Kumar. The applicant-landlords acquired 2/3rd of House No. 167 situated in Mohalla Thana Savik Kashipur by inheritance from their mother, who received that share through will of original co-sharer Smt. Rammurti and Smt. Janki, while the rest 1/3rd share was purchased from Shri Pradeep Kumar by registered sale deed. The landlords has sought release of the premises in question so as to settle applicant no. 3-Ravi in the ground floor and to settle applicant no.2-Vicky in the first floor. The tenancy of the petitioners was terminated by the landlords by separate notice dated 26-7-2006. 8. The release application in each case was resisted by the opposite parties-petitioners by filing their written statements mainly on the ground that there was no bona fide and genuine need of the applicants and they do not require the premises in question for their personal need and that they have sufficient accommodation in the ancestral house and also in the ground floor of the building in question. 9. Both the parties have adduced evidence by filing affidavits before the Prescribed Authority in support of their respective claims. The Prescribed Authority after hearing learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the evidence brought on record recorded a finding of fact that the landlords-respondents have bona fide need for the premises in question. On the point of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation is available to the petitioners in Kashipur city, therefore, the balance of hardship also tilted in favour of the landlords-respondents. On the point of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation is available to the petitioners in Kashipur city, therefore, the balance of hardship also tilted in favour of the landlords-respondents. Ultimately, by a detailed order dated 21-12-2010, passed separately, the release applications were allowed and three months’ time was granted to the petitioners to vacate the premises in question. 10. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 21-12-2010, the tenants, namely Raj Kumar and Satyaveer preferred separate appeals before the appellate Court. It appears that during the pendency of appeal, tenant Satyaveer died leaving behind him the petitioners of writ petition no. 2285 of 2012 as his legal heirs, who were substituted in the appeal. 11. The learned appellate court recorded its independent findings on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship and recorded a finding of fact that the landlords have bona fide and genuine need for the premises ion question. Learned appellate Court also found that the tenants-appellants have not made any sincere effort to search alternative accommodation during the pendency of the proceedings and ultimately by a detailed judgment, dismissed the appeals by order dated 6-9-2012, which gave rise to the present writ petitions. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the entire material placed before this Court. 13. The present writ petitions have been filed mainly on the ground that the two courts below have not considered the provisions of law and lost sight of the fact that 1/3rd share was purchased by the landlords-respondent on 16-1-2006 and the notice for eviction was given to the petitioners on 26-7-2006, while the release application was moved on 6-9-2006 before expiry of the said period of six months. 14. It may be mentioned that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 15. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 15. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 16. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under:- “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 17. In that case, the Apex Court in paragraph no. 47 has further observed as under:- “47. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 17. In that case, the Apex Court in paragraph no. 47 has further observed as under:- “47. In the case on hand, a finding had been recorded by the appellate authority that requirement of the landlord for doing business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of Applicant 6 was bona fide and genuine. Thus, the requirement of the landlords was established. The said finding stands today. The High Court by a cryptic order, without disturbing the said finding which was based on appreciation of evidence, set aside the order of eviction against the tenant, inter alia, observing that Matloob Ahmad was a “retired person” and was getting pension and was living in his village at a distance of five kilometers from Dehradun. It is no doubt true that the tenancy was created before about fifty years but that should not be a ground for depriving the landlord for doing business if the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable.” 18. In view of the case-law of Shamshad Ahmad (supra), it is also obvious that where the need of the landlord is established to be bona fide and genuine for doing business, as in the case at hand, the tenancy created earlier in favour of the petitioner would not be a ground to deprive the landlord from doing business by his son in the disputed shop. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the learned Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate Court has committed a manifest error of law in entertaining the release application since the release application was premature for the reason that 1/3rd share of the building in question was purchased on 16-1-2006 while the release application was moved on 6-9-2006 without waiting for expiry of three years’ period. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that mandatory notice of six months’ notice was also not given to the petitioners as has been prescribed under first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 20. It finds place to mention here that this plea was raised by the petitioners before the Prescribed Authority and the same has already been considered. 20. It finds place to mention here that this plea was raised by the petitioners before the Prescribed Authority and the same has already been considered. The Prescribed Authority relying upon the verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd. Vs. VI Additional District Judge and others [(1998), 1 Supreme Court Cases, 732] has held that in the case at hand, the application for release had been moved prior to the expiry of the period of three years but it does not make any difference because the application for release was disposed of by order dated 21-12-2010 much after the expiry of the period of three years. The Prescribed Authority has not accepted the contention of the petitioners. 21. I have perused the cited case of Martin & Harris Ltd. (supra). In the case before the Apex Court, the property was purchased on 30-6-1985, while the decree of the trial court was passed on 23-5-1990. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, it has been inter alia held that “In fact the trial court had taken up the application for consideration of the aforesaid grounds more than three years after 20-12-1985 from 1988-89 onwards. Consequently it must be held that the application for possession on the grounds under Section 21(1)(a) was entertained by the trial court after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the suit property by the respondent-plaintiff. Hence it cannot be said that the said decree was a nullity being without jurisdiction.” 22. The Apex Court in a larger Bench decision rendered in the case of Nirbhai Kumar Vs. Maya Devi and others [(2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases, 399] while considering two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court in Martin & Harris litd. V. District Judge (supra) Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi [(2001) 8 SCC, 540] on the point of six months’ eviction notice under Section 21(1)(a) first proviso has inter alia held in paragraph no. 4 as under:- “A three years’ period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years’ period is a short of moratorium intended for the tenant’s protection. It is to be noted that the crucial expression in the proviso is “and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years”. 4 as under:- “A three years’ period becomes relevant when there is a change of ownership. This three years’ period is a short of moratorium intended for the tenant’s protection. It is to be noted that the crucial expression in the proviso is “and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years”. In other words, notice can be given either before or after the three years’ period. After expiry of the three years’ period the protection given to the tenant from being evicted has no further relevance. Thereafter it is only the question of notice.” 23. The Apex Court in that case has held that the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd. case (supra) expressed the correct view. It was also observed that the said decision does not appear to have been placed before the Bench which heard Anwar Hasan Khan case (supra). Since the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd. Case has been approved by a larger Bench of the Apex Court and since the decree of eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been passed on 21-12-2010 much after the expiry of the period of three years by the Prescribed Authority, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not acceptable for other reasons also, as detailed below. 24. In the case at hand, the petitioners have not denied the relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties as well as the rate of rent as mentioned in paragraph no.4 of the application for release. This conduct of the petitioners is also a strong circumstance against their contention. Undisputedly, the 1/3rd share of the building in question was purchased on 16-1-2006 from Pradeep Bhardwaj. The petitioners in their written statement has nowhere stated worth the name that the applicants are not the landlords or co-landlords of the building in question. It is also not their case that being co-landlords of the building in question, the release application on their behest is not maintainable. Even otherwise the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners does not help them for the simple reason that the petitioners did not press this plea of compliance of first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act at the preliminary stage of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. Even otherwise the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners does not help them for the simple reason that the petitioners did not press this plea of compliance of first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act at the preliminary stage of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. In addition to that, in the case at hand, admittedly the respondents were already co-landlords of the building in question by inheritance, therefore, also the release application could not be rejected on this ground alone. 25. While parting with the order, it may be mentioned here that the petitioners have no where challenged the finding of the Prescribed Authority that the petitioners have already got alternative accommodation to live in the town of Kashipur. In the case at hand, there is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that the respondents-landlords have bona fide and genuine need for the premises in dispute. The Prescribed Authority in each case has recorded a finding of fact that the petitioners have alternative accommodation to live in the town of Kashipur, therefore, the point of comparative hardship was answered in favour of the landlords. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the learned appellate Court are fully based on appraisal of evidence. 26. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as by a perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, I am of the considered view that there is concurrent finding of fact on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. Both the courts below have discussed the entire controversy in detail after perusal of the evidence led by the parties and have recorded independent finding on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. The ground of long standing tenancy would be of no help to the petitioner in view of the Apex Court verdict in the case of Shamshad Ahmad (supra), because the bona fide need of the landlord has been fully established. The evidence relating to bona fide need and comparative hardship cannot be reappreciated in exercise of writ jurisdiction, like an appeal, since it is a finding of fact. The release applications have been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeals have also been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. The evidence relating to bona fide need and comparative hardship cannot be reappreciated in exercise of writ jurisdiction, like an appeal, since it is a finding of fact. The release applications have been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeals have also been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. There is no merit in these writ petitions, which are liable to be dismissed outright at the threshold. 27. Both the writ petitions are dismissed summarily. Costs easy. However, to do complete justice, the tenant-petitioners in each case are granted one year’s time to vacate premises in dispute, provided the petitioners in each case furnish a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of eight weeks from today to the effect that they shall vacate the premises in dispute before the expiry of the aforesaid period and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-landlords. It is further provided that the petitioners shall pay/deposit monthly rent regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the landlord-respondent would be at liberty to get the shop in dispute vacated in accordance with law.