R. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka Rep. by its Principal Secretary
2012-08-16
ASHOK B.HINCHIGERI
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners have raised the challenge to the first respondent’s order, dated 27.12.2010 (Annexure-P) withdrawing the de-notification, dated 13.01.2010 in respect of the lands in question. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the preliminary and final notifications were issued on 03.03.1977 and 02.08.1978 respectively for the acquisition of the lands in question and other lands for the formation of Rajmahal Vilas Extension II Stage Layout. The petitioners claim that the possession of the lands in question remained with their owners, as the scheme was not implemented. The Government issued the notification, dated 13.01.2010 (Annexure-M) in favour of the petitioner No.2 withdrawing the lands in question from acquisition, in exercise of its power conferred by Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the said Act’ for shot). The second petitioner sold the lands to the first petitioner by a registered sale deed, dated 02.07.2010. However, the Government issued the cancellation notification, dated 27.12.2010 (Annexure-P). The said impugned notification states that on reconsidering the matter, the earlier notification, dated 13.01.2010 dropping the acquisition proceedings is cancelled with immediate effect. The reason given for reconsidering the matter and issuing the impugned cancellation notification is that the layout is formed and the sites are allotted. 3. It is this cancellation notification, which is being assailed by Sri udaya Holla, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri K. Suman for the petitioners. 4. Sri Udaya Holla submits that the petitioners are the bonafide purchasers of the properties in question. The due diligence exercises were also undertaken by and on behalf of the first petitioner. A public notice was issued by the first petitioner’s advocate calling for the objections, if any, to the proposed sale of the properties from the petitioner No.2. No objections whatsoever are filed by anybody. He would particularly state that neither the Government nor the BDA nor the impleading applicants have filed any objections. He submits that the petitioner No.1 purchased the property by a registered sale deed executed on 02.07.2010. At that time, the status of the land acquisition was that the lands were freed from the acquisition proceedings. 5. Sri Udaya Holla submits that the petitioners’ predecessors-in-title even paid the betterment charges. They were also paying the property tax. At no point of time the possession of the lands was taken from the petitioners or from their predecessors-in-title. 6.
At that time, the status of the land acquisition was that the lands were freed from the acquisition proceedings. 5. Sri Udaya Holla submits that the petitioners’ predecessors-in-title even paid the betterment charges. They were also paying the property tax. At no point of time the possession of the lands was taken from the petitioners or from their predecessors-in-title. 6. The learned Senior Counsel submits that in more or less similar circumstances, this Court allowed W.P.No.10709/2009, by its order, dated 16.4.2012 by quashing the cancellation notification, dated 23.03.2009, as the authorities failed to establish that the possession of the lands, covered by the said writ petition, were taken over before 05.10.2007 on which date the notification withdrawing the land from acquisition was issued. 7. He also relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M/S. VIJAYA LEASING LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2005 KAR 2539 to advance the contention that once a notification under 48(1) of the said Act is issued, the land sought to be acquired stands reverted to the owner with the full bundle of rights. When this is the legal consequence, the attempt of the State Government again to acquire the very land by a short cut method by issuing the impugned notification cancelling the withdrawal of the land from acquisition is not permissible. If the de-notified land is required for any public purpose, the Government has to resort to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh. 8. The learned Senior Counsel refers to this Court’s decision in the case of MRS.POORNIMA GIRISH v. REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE AND OTHERS reported in 2011(2) Kar.L.J.142 for buttressing his submissions that the BDA has allowed the acquisition proceedings to lapse by its own inaction and lethargy in the implementation of the scheme. 9. Referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of B.A.BASAVAIAH AND OTHERS v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2000 SC 3403 (1), the learned Senior Counsel submits that it is impermissible for the impleading applicants to contend that the possession was taken. 10.
9. Referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of B.A.BASAVAIAH AND OTHERS v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2000 SC 3403 (1), the learned Senior Counsel submits that it is impermissible for the impleading applicants to contend that the possession was taken. 10. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the Division Bench’s judgment, dated 23.09.1996 passed in W.P.Nos.33404-406/1995 in support of his submission that once the land is withdrawn from the acquisition in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 48(1) of the said Act, it creates certain rights in favour of the land owners and that the same cannot be taken away without complying with the principles of natural justice. 11. Sri K.S. Mallikarjunaiah, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the Government submits that the physical possession of the land in question was not taken; what was taken was only a symbolic possession. He submits that, that is what the file discloses. 12. He states that on account of the pendency of the public interest litigation, the de-notification came to be withdrawn by the issuance of the impugned notification. 13. He submits that the erstwhile owner need not be heard before withdrawing the de-notification. In support of his submissions, he relies on the Apex Court’s decision in the case of UMA SHANKAR AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 3 AIR Kar. R3. He read out para 14, which is extracted here in below: “14. In the light of peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the Mysore Urban Development Authority v. Veer Kumar Jain, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 791 ): ( AIR 2010 SC 2153 ) may not be applicable. In the said matter, the order of de-notification was not void ab initio. Under such circumstances, the Apex Court held that, while withdrawing the order of de-notification the affected parties should have been heard. Whereas in the matter on hand, the order of de-notification is void ab-initio and therefore the petitioner cannot claim that he should have been heard in the matter while passing the impugned order recalling the order of de-notification”. 14. Sri B.M. Halaswamy, the learned counsel appearing for the impleading applicants submits that as per the Bangalore Development Authority’s records, the possession of the lands in question was taken by the Government on 29.12.1978 and 28.05.1981.
14. Sri B.M. Halaswamy, the learned counsel appearing for the impleading applicants submits that as per the Bangalore Development Authority’s records, the possession of the lands in question was taken by the Government on 29.12.1978 and 28.05.1981. He submits that as the possession was taken, layout was formed, the land ought not to have been withdrawn from the acquisition. The order withdrawing the land from the acquisition is void ab-initio. Therefore, the question of hearing the petitioners while passing the order withdrawing the de-notification would not arise at all. 15. He relies on the Apex Court ‘s judgment, in the case of MEERA SAHNI vs. LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF DELHI AND OTHERS reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 for buttressing his submission that a party, who purchases the land subsequent to the issuance of the acquisition notification, do not get the locus-standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. He read out para 17 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow: “17. When a piece of land is sought to be acquired, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is required to be issued by the State Government strictly in accordance with law. The said notification is also required to be followed by a declaration to be made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and with the issuance of such a notification any encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer made after the issuance of such a notification would be deemed to be void and would not be binding on the Government. A number of decisions of this Court have recognised the aforesaid proposition of law wherein it was held that subsequent purchaser cannot challenge acquisition proceedings and also the validity of the notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.” 16. He also relies upon the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of reported in SHANTI SPORTS CLUB AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2010 SC 433 . He read out para 43 of the judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow: “43.
He also relies upon the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of reported in SHANTI SPORTS CLUB AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2010 SC 433 . He read out para 43 of the judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow: “43. The appellants’ plea that the Government ought to have de-notified the land covered by the sports complex because the same has been built by spending crores of rupees and is being used by a large section of people sounds attractive, but, after having given serious thought to the entire matter, we are convinced that the Government rightly refused to exercise discretion under Section 48(1) of the Act for de-notifying the acquired land and the High Court did not commit any error whatsoever by refusing to fall in the trap of alluring argument that demolition of the sports complex built by spending substantial amount will be a waste of national wealth and nobody will be benefited by it. The appellants have not denied the fact that the land on which the sports complex has been constructed was acquired by the Government by issuing notification dated 23.1.1965 under Section 4(1) of the Act, which culminated in the making of award dated 22.12.1980. It is also not their case that the construction activity was started prior to initiation of acquisition proceedings. Rather, their admitted stance is that they came in possession of the land between 1990-1993, i.e., more than 10 years after finalization of the acquisition proceedings. This being the position, the appellants cannot plead equity and seek court’s intervention for protection of the unauthorised constructions raised by them. It is trite to say that once the land is acquired by following due process of law, the same cannot be transferred by the land owner to another person and that any such transfer is void and is not binding on the State. A transferee of the acquired land can, at best, step into the shoes of the land-owner and lodge claim for compensation – Gian Chand v. Gopala and others (1995) 2 SCC 528 : (1995 AIR SCW 1487); Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others (1997) 1 SCC 37: Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others, JT (1995) 8 SC 179: (1995) AIR SCW 4420) and Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Co-op.
Society, Jaipur and others (1996) 11 SCC 229 .” 17. He submits that the petitioners’ rights cannot be higher or better than those of their vendors, who had unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings. He submits that the Division Bench by its judgment, dated 25.01.2011 passed in W.A.No.20311/2010 recorded the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent Bangalore Development Authority that the de-notified land is reserved for a park and civic amenity, as per the modified layout plan, dated 13.10.2010. 18. He relies on the Apex Court’s judgment MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VEER KUMAR JAIN AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2010 SC 2153 for advancing the submission that in any case the impugned notification withdrawing the de-notification alone cannot be quashed and that the illegal de-notification is also required to be quashed. 19. Sri Chandrashekar Babu, the counsel for the respondent No.3 files counter. The same is taken on record. 20. The records are made available by the learned Government Pleader Sri K.S. Mallikarjunaiah. 21. On the request of the second petitioner for the deletion of the lands from acquisition, the second respondent, vide his letter, dated 13(14).10.2009 raised the following queries and called for the opinion of the third respondent: 22. In response to the aforesaid letter, the third respondent has replied vide its letter, dated 01.12.2009, which is as follows: “KANNADAM” 23. On the receipt of the afore-extracted letter of the B.D.A., Sri Ramachandra Murthy, the First Division Assistant in the Department of Urban Development, B.D.A. Section has written the note as follows: “KANNADAM” 24. This is followed up by the notings of the Sri Channabasappa, Section Officer, B.D.A. Section, Urban Development Department. What is mentioned in note Nos.5, 6, 7 and 8 of the noting sheet are extracted hereinbelow: “KANNADAM” 25. Thereafter, Sri C. Basava Raju, the Deputy Secretary, Urban Development Department has written mote No.9 as follows: “KANNADAM” 26. The names of the officials, who have made the above notings are furnished to the Court by the Government Pleader, Sri Mallikarjunaiah. 27. The perusal of the afore-extracted notings made by the F.D.A., Section Officer and the Deputy Secretary reveals that they have all opined that the land in question cannot be deleted from the acquisition. Thereafter the concerned Principal Secretary writes ‘please discuss’ in note No.10. 28. What discussion has transpired is not reflected in the file. On note Nos.
27. The perusal of the afore-extracted notings made by the F.D.A., Section Officer and the Deputy Secretary reveals that they have all opined that the land in question cannot be deleted from the acquisition. Thereafter the concerned Principal Secretary writes ‘please discuss’ in note No.10. 28. What discussion has transpired is not reflected in the file. On note Nos. 11 and 12, the ultimate decision-maker directs the deletion of the land in question from the acquisition. Note Nos.11 and 12 in this regard are extracted hereinbelow: “KANNADAM” 29. The final decision is not reflective of the consideration of the notings made by the F.D.A., Section Officer and the Deputy Secretary and also of the B.D.A.’s letter, dated 01.12.2009. This does not mean that the final decision-maker has to accept the views of the B.D.A. or of the officials of the State Government. It is open to him to take an independent decision but by considering the factual position, views, opinions, etc. Otherwise, it amounts to excluding the relevant material from consideration. On that ground alone, the impugned decision is liable to be quashed. 30. The existence of a basic factor for the deletion of the lands is not considered by the ultimate decision-maker. It is open to the Government to withdraw any land from the acquisition any time before its possession is taken. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is issued. Section 16(2) states that such a notification is conclusive proof of taking over the possession. But it is also possible that it is only a paper possession. In this regard, it is helpful to refer to the Apex Court’s judgment in the case PRAHLAD SINGH AND OTHERS vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 5 SCC 386 wherein it is held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act would be sufficient to constitute the taking of the possession of the acquired land. In the instant case, none of the parties have produced a copy of the mahazar to show that the actual and physical possession of the land was taken by the Government in the presence of the mahazardars.
In the instant case, none of the parties have produced a copy of the mahazar to show that the actual and physical possession of the land was taken by the Government in the presence of the mahazardars. Therefore, it is incumbent on the respondent No.1 to insist from all the concerned persons for the production of the relevant materials for ascertaining as to whether the possession of the land came to be taken by the Government. It is only on satisfying that the possession was not taken from the landowners that the first respondent can take a decision in the matter of withdrawing the land from acquisition. Merely because the land in question is not registered in favour of N.T.I. Society, it cannot be withdrawn from the acquisition. The relevant consideration is whether the possession of land was taken from the landowners. 31. If the possession is not with the petitioners, then the question of giving up the lands in their favour do not arise at all. The B.D.A’s letter, dated 01.12.2009 is also deficient in more than one respect. It does not state on what date the actual and physical possession of the land was taken by the Government before handing it over to the B.D.A., if at all the possession is taken. 32. The inescapable conclusion is that the first respondent was not posted with all the facts regarding the possession aspect. Further, whatever facts with which the first respondent was posted, were not considered in their proper perspective. 33. The Apex Court’s judgment in the case of MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (supra) is of immense help in deciding this case. In the said case the Government withdrew the land from acquisition at the instance of the “KANNADAM” landowners in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 48(1) of the said Act. On the beneficiary Mysore Urban Development Authority (‘MUDA’ for short) objecting to the same, the Government withdrew the de-notification. The Apex Court held that the notification withdrawing the de-notification is violative of the principles of natural justice. As the landowners were not heard before issuing the cancellation notification, it quashed the cancellation notification. But it also quashed the de-notification, as it also suffered from the same vice. The matter was remanded to the State Government to decide the matter afresh. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are extracted hereinbelow: “10.
As the landowners were not heard before issuing the cancellation notification, it quashed the cancellation notification. But it also quashed the de-notification, as it also suffered from the same vice. The matter was remanded to the State Government to decide the matter afresh. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are extracted hereinbelow: “10. There is no dispute that the land owners were not heard before issuing the cancellation notification dated 22.7.2002. Therefore, the order dated 22.7.2002 is illegal being opposed to principles of natural justice. In such a case, usually the cancellation of de-notification, being opposed to principles of natural justice, would be set aside and the Government would be directed to reconsider the matter after giving due opportunity to the affected parties (land owners whose lands were withdrawn from acquisition) to have their say in the matter. But then we face a dilemma. If the order dated 22.7.2002 is quashed as being violative of the principles of natural justice, it will result in the revival of the order dated 15.9.2001 which also suffers from the same vice, as that was also made in violation of the principles of natural justice, without hearing the affected party, that is MUDA. 14. We have already noticed above that the order dated 22.7.2002 is inextricably linked to order dated 15.9.2001 which was invalid for the same reasons as the order dated 22.7.2002. Further, the order dated 22.7.2002 was passed to set right the violation of the principles of natural justice in making the order dated 15.9.2001. It is possible for us to hold that the order dated 22.7.2002 did not call for interference in exercise of power of judicial review, as it merely cancelled an earlier invalid order, which was made without hearing the MUDA. But that may prejudice the landowners as they would have no forum to put forth their request for de-notification. We are of the view that the relief should be moulded appropriately so that the landowners should also have an opportunity to put forth their grievance. Interests of justice would be served if both the notifications dated 22.7.2002 and 15.9.2011 are set aside and the State Government is directed to consider the request of the land owners for withdrawal from acquisition afresh after giving due hearing to the land owners (and also the first respondent) and MUDA and then decide the matter in accordance with law. 15.
15. In view of the above, we allow this appeal and modify the orders of the High Court. Both the notifications dated 22.7.2002 and 15.9.2001 are quashed and the State Government is directed to hear the request of the landowners for de-notification afresh. It will be open to the landowners to place such material as is available to them to show that the possession was not taken in regard to lands in question and thereby rebut the presumption raised in view of Section 16(2) of LA Act; and then establish that circumstances warrant de-notification. On the other hand, it will be also open to MUDA also to establish that possession was in fact taken and that power under section 48(1) could not therefore be exercised. The State Government shall hear both the parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within four months. Status quo will be maintained in regard to lands in question by the parties till then”. 34. Following the aforesaid decision, a Division Bench of this Court by its judgment, dated 25.11.2010, passed in W.A.No.1862/2008 and other connected appeals, the subject matter of which was the acquisition of land for the purpose and benefit of the Holenarasipura Town Municipality, has quashed both the cancellation notification and the de-notification. Further it has directed the competent authority to hold the enquiry for arriving at the factual determination as to the vital aspect of the possession. The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: “16. Hence, in the instant case also, it would be appropriate for us to adopt the same procedure as adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision cited supra by quashing both the impugned notification dated 13.09.2007 as also the notification dated 22.07.2000 issued under Section 48(1) of the Act and remit the matter to the Competent Authority viz., the first respondent to reconsider the proceedings at the stage prior to exercise of the power contemplated under Section 48(1) of the Act. In this regard, the Competent Authority shall hear both the appellant/land losers as also the beneficiaries viz., the town municipality or such other authority, if any, which has succeeded them and also any other interested persons and after considering all the materials which would be placed by the rival parties an appropriate decision with regard to the aspect relating to taking over of possession of the land shall be taken.
………………….” 35. There is an additional reason in the case on hand for quashing the impugned cancellation notification. The petitioner No.1 purchased the lands in question during the interregnum after the issuance of the de-notification and before the issuance of the cancellation notification. The three material dates are that the de-notification was issued on 13.01.2010, the first petitioner purchased the lands in question from the second petitioner by registered sale deed executed on 02.07.2010 and the first respondent issued the cancellation notification on 27.12.2010. It is further pertinent to note that the first petitioner’s advocate issued the public notice in a daily calling for the objections from the persons interested in the land to the proposed sale by the petitioner No.2 in favour of the petitioner No.1. Further, nobody has filed objections. Neither the Government nor the B.D.A. nor the impleading applicants have filed the objections to the notice of the then proposed sale. 36. Considering all these aspects of the matter and following the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (supra), I quash both the impugned cancellation notification, dated 27.12.2010 (Annexure-P) and the de-notification, dated 13.01.2010 (Annexure-M). The Government is directed to hear all the persons interested in the lands in question and take a fresh decision in the matter. 37. Until such time that the Government takes a fresh decision in the matter, the parties are directed to maintain status-quo in respect of possession and in respect of the building on the land in question. Further, no party shall create any third party interest in the land in question. The Government shall take a fresh decision within an outer limit of four months from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today’s order. All the contentions regarding the possession aspect are left open. 38. This order shall be communicated by the BDA to all its allottees of the lands (sites) in question, if any, who are not parties to these proceedings. 39. In view of the quashing of both the de-notification and the cancellation notification and directing that all the parties, interested in the land in question, be heard by the Government before taking a fresh decision in the matter, no orders are required to be passed on the Misc.W.No.5848/2011 for the impleadment. Misc.W.No.5848/2011 is disposed of as having become unnecessary. 40. These petitions are accordingly allowed.
Misc.W.No.5848/2011 is disposed of as having become unnecessary. 40. These petitions are accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.