Judgment Mrs. Mridula Bhatkar, J. 1. Since common point is involved in both these petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. So far as Writ Petition No. 2787 of 2002 is concerned, the same is filed by one Zulash Clearing and Shipping Agency and another by which it is prayed that the first respondent, the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, may be directed to forthwith withdraw the resolution dated 25th June, 2002, a copy of which is annexed at Exhibit-E to the petition, and the subsequent communication dated 27th July, 2002, a copy of which is also annexed at Exhibit-G to the petition. In so far as Writ Petition No. 2850 of 2002 is concerned, the same is filed by the Bombay Stevedores’ Association wherein the same resolution which is under challenge in Writ Petition No. 2787 of 2002 is under challenge. In the second petition, the petitioners have prayed that the respondents may be directed to grant stevedoring licenses to the individual members of the petitioner association for the purpose of carrying out their stevedoring business in the Mumbai Port. 3. In order to decide the controversy raised in these petitions, the factual aspects and submissions in Writ Petition No. 2787 of 2002 is taken as a basis. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that earlier stevedores used to engage their own private workmen to perform various jobs. In the year 1948, the Dock Workers (Regulation and Employment) Act, 1948 was enacted (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Under the said Act, the Mumbai Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the Scheme”) was framed to regulate the employment of workers engaged in stevedoring work. Under the said Act, the stevedores were required to engage registered workmen who were registered with the Mumbai Dock Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) and accordingly various stevedores were allotted gangs of workmen by the Board. In 1994 the Board established under the Act was superseded by the Government of India and all the powers and functions exercised or performed by the Board were exercised and performed by the first respondent. In 1994 the Board established under the Act was superseded by the Government of India and all the powers and functions exercised or performed by the Board were exercised and performed by the first respondent. It is the case of the petitioners that as per the memorandum of settlement dated 25th January, 1994, under Section 2 (p) and Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the registered workmen of the Board who were working within the premises of the first respondent were absorbed by the first respondent and the stevedores were required to engage the absorbed workmen as a condition of the license. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners from time to time entered into private contracts for stevedoring activities. It is further the case of the petitioners that by virtue of the license granted by the first respondent, the petitioners are performing stevedoring work at the Mumbai Port and are providing services to ship owners/agents and no grievance of any nature whatsoever had been raised against the work of the petitioners. On 25th June, 2002, the first respondent passed a resolution to the effect that the existing stevedoring licenses would be renewed upto 31st October, 2002 and that from 1st November, 2002, the stevedoring operations would be taken over by the first respondent. The petitioners objected to the said resolution on the ground that if the said resolution is implemented, the petitioners who are doing stevedoring work at the Port will be deprived of their business of stevedoring and the first respondent has no authority to pass such resolution to stop the private stevedores from doing their business. The said resolution is challenged on various grounds raised in the petition. It is also the case of the petitioners that the Board has no power to prohibit stevedoring which is being undertaken by private stevedores and at the most the Board also can continue their function along with other private stevedores. The petitioners submit that the resolution of the first respondent seeking to discontinue the renewal of the license and to take over the business of stevedoring is a clear infringement of the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on the business of stevedoring. It is the case of the petitioners that there is a provision for cancelling or suspending the licenses on individual case basis. It is the case of the petitioners that there is a provision for cancelling or suspending the licenses on individual case basis. It is submitted that the first respondent has no power whatsoever to perform the activity of stevedoring by private parties or to do the said work exclusively. The petitioners submit that by passing the impugned resolution, an unreasonable restriction is imposed on the petitioners right to carry on business and, therefore, the same is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid resolution is accordingly challenged in both these petitions by which it was decided to stop the private stevedoring at the port premises. 5. Mr. Cama, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2787 of 2002, argued that it is not open for the first respondent to abolish private stevedoring as it has power only to regulate the business of stevedoring activities in the Port Trust area. It is submitted that the Board has at the most power to regulate the stevedoring within the area of Port Trust but it has no power to abolish or cancel the stevedoring system. It is submitted by Mr. Cama that in any case such a decision could not have been taken by passing a resolution or by way of executive fiat. According to Mr. Cama, source of power is available only under the Act and the Rules and the Board cannot act beyond the powers prescribed under the Act and the Rules. It is argued by Mr. Cama that the stevedoring activity cannot be allowed to be stopped as there is no provision in the Act for abolishing stevedoring activities. It is submitted by Mr. Cama that the Board has no power to stop private stevedoring activity as the Port Trust is only a regulating authority and it can regulate the business but it cannot abolish or cancel the stevedoring business undertaken by private stevedores. It is submitted that assuming that the Board has such power, said power should be in consonance with Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and it is not open to the Board to prohibit such activity which can be done by the Central Government by taking appropriate decision and the first respondent has no jurisdiction to pass such resolution abolishing stevedoring. In order to substantiate his submission, Mr. In order to substantiate his submission, Mr. Cama has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of GodawatPan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others ( 2004 (7) SCC 68 ). It is argued by Mr. Cama that the action of the Board is in violation of the principles of natural justice and before taking such a drastic step, at least the say of the petitioners was required to be taken into account by giving hearing to them. It is submitted by Mr. Cama that the petitioners are doing their stevedoring business since 1945. He submits that there is no power either in the said Act or the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder to prohibit stevedoring by private parties. He submits that the power conferred on the Board to make Regulation is a piece of subordinate legislation. The powers exercised by the Board have to be strictly within the scheme and the provisions of the said Act. It is submitted that the action is not taken under Section 123 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (“the Act of 1963”) but the same has been taken by way of resolution which is not permissible. 6. Mr. Makhija, the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that there is absolutely no substance in these petitions as, according to him, after proper application of mind a policy decision has been taken by the Board discontinuing private stevedoring as the Board wanted to carry out the said activity on its own. It is submitted that in future if the Board is of the opinion that private stevedores also should be allowed to be continued, such decisions can be taken. At present, since the policy decision has been taken by the Board not to continue with private stevedores, such decision of the Board is not justiciable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted by Mr. Makhija that reliance placed on Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India is highly misplaced as the business of stevedoring is not being abolished and the petitioner can continue their stevedoring in other parts of the Ports in the country. It is submitted by Mr. Makhija that reliance placed on Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India is highly misplaced as the business of stevedoring is not being abolished and the petitioner can continue their stevedoring in other parts of the Ports in the country. It is submitted that since the port area is under the administration of the first respondent, it is always open to the first respondent to consider as to whether which activity may be permitted to be carried out and by whom. It is submitted that simply because license was given, it is not the mandate of the Board that the Board must renew the license and may not take a policy decision not to continue private stevedoring activity. It is submitted by Mr. Makhija that this is not a fit case in which this Court may interfere with the policy decision taken by the Board. The first respondent is successfully carrying on stevedoring activities on their own since the resolution is passed, as the said resolution is not stayed by this Court and by this time about nine years have passed. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2850 of 2002 has supported the argument of Mr. Cama and states that this Court may direct the Board to issue license to stevedores for continuing their stevedoring activity. He submits that Section 42 of the Act of 1963 does not empower the port to provide stevedoring services. He submits that the resolution passed by the respondents is an unreasonable restriction imposed on the petitioners’ right to carry on the business and is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. In any event he submits that the impugned resolutions and actions of the respondents are illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, unjustified and violative of the fundamental rights of the individual stevedores, who are members of the petitioner association. 8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at great length. At this stage reference is required to be made to certain provisions in the Act of 1963. Section 42 of the Act of 1963 provides as under: “42. Performance of services by Board or other person. 8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at great length. At this stage reference is required to be made to certain provisions in the Act of 1963. Section 42 of the Act of 1963 provides as under: “42. Performance of services by Board or other person. – (1) A Board shall have power to undertake the following services:- (a) landing, shipping or transhipping passengers and goods between vessels in the port and the wharves, piers, quays or docks belonging to or in the possession of the Board; (b) receiving, removing, shifting, transporting, storing or delivering goods brought within the Board's premises; (c) carrying passengers by rail or by other means within the limits of the port or port approaches, subject to such restrictions and conditions as the Central Government may think fit to impose; (d) receiving and delivering, transporting and booking and despatching goods originating in the vessels in the port and intended for carriage by the neighbouring railways, or vice versa, as a railway administration under the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890); (e) piloting, hauling, mooring, remooring, hooking, or measuring of vessels or any other service in respect of vessels; and [(f) developing and providing, subject to the previous approval of the Central Government, infrastructure facilities for ports.] (2) A Board may, if so requested by the owner, take charge of the goods for the purpose of performing the service or services and shall give a receipt in such form as the Board may specify. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Board may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, authorise any person to perform any of the services mentioned in sub-section (1) on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. (3A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), a Board may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, enter into any agreement or other arrangement, whether by way of partnership, joint venture or in any other KPP -11-WP Nos. (3A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), a Board may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, enter into any agreement or other arrangement, whether by way of partnership, joint venture or in any other KPP -11-WP Nos. 2787 of 2002 & 2850 of 2002 manner) with, any body corporate or any other person to perform any of the services and functions assigned to the Board under this Act on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon.] (4) No person authorised under sub-section (3) shall charge or recover for such service any sum in excess of the amount [specified by the Authority, by notification in the Official Gazette.] (5) Any such person shall, if so required by the owner, perform in respect of goods any of the said services and for that purpose take charge of the goods and give a receipt in such form as the Board may specify. (6) The responsibility of any such person for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which he has taken charge shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, be that of a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (7) After any goods have been taken charge of and a receipt given for them under this section, no liability for any loss or damage which may occur to them shall attach to any person to whom a receipt has been given or to the master or owner of the vessel from which the goods have been landed or transshipped”. Section 123 of the Act of 1963 provides thus: “123. Section 123 of the Act of 1963 provides thus: “123. General Power of Board to make regulations.-Without prejudice to any power to make regulations contained elsewhere in this Act, a Board may make regulations consistent with this Act for all or any of the following purposes, namely:- (a) for the times and places of the meetings of its committees and for the procedure to be followed for the transaction of business at such meetings; (b) for the form and manner in which contracts shall be made by the Board; (c) for the form of receipt to be given under sub-section (2) of section 42; (d) for the period within which notice may be given under sub-section (2) of section 43; (e) for the guidance of persons employed by the Board under this Act; [(f) for the safe, efficient and convenient use, management and control of the docks, wharves, quays, jetties, railways, tramways, buildings and other works constructed or acquired by, vested in, the Board, or of any land or foreshore acquired by, or vested in, the Board under this Act; (g) for the reception, porterage, storage and removal of goods brought within the premises of the Board, for the exclusive conduct of these operations by the Board or persons employed by the Board; and for declaring the procedure to be followed for taking charge of goods which may have been damaged before landing, or may be alleged to have been so damaged; (h) for keeping clean the port, river or basins or the bank of the river and the works of the Board, and for preventing filth or rubbish being thrown therein or thereon; (i) for the mode of payment of rates leviable by the Board under this Act. (j) for regulating, declaring and defining the docks, wharves, quays, jetties, stages and piers vested in the Board on which goods shall be landed from vessels and shipped on board vessels; (k) for regulating the manner in which, and the conditions under which, the loading and unloading of all vessels within the port or port approaches shall be carried out; (1) for regulating the lighterage of cargo between ships or between ships and shore or between shore and ships; (m) for the exclusion from the premises of the Board of disorderly or other undesirable persons and of trespassers; (n) for ensuring the safety of the port; (o) generally, for the efficient and proper administration of the port. 123A. Power of Authority to make regulations.-The Authority may make regulations consistent with this Act for all or any of the following purposes, namely:- (a) the times and place of meetings of the Authority and the procedure to be followed at such meetings under section 47E; (b) the salaries and allowances payable to and the other conditions of services of officers and other employees of the Authority under sub-section (2) of section 47H.” 9. For the purpose of giving license to stevedores, Regulations have been framed by the first respondent known as Bombay Port Trust (Licensing of Stevedores and Allied Matters) Amendment Regulations, 1989. It is not in dispute that the licenses have been given to the private stevedores under the said Regulations. In the said Regulation, “Act” is defined to mean the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. “Board” is defined to mean the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay as constituted under the Act. Stevedore is defined in Regulation 3 (vi) which reads thus: “Stevedore: means a person to whom a stevedoring license has been given under Regulation 4 and includes a person who is a stevedore by virtue of Regulation 15.” As per the said Regulation 4.2, no stevedore shall be allowed to work on board any vessel in the Port except under such license. Considering the scheme of the Act, it is clear that so far as Port Trust area is concerned, nobody can enter the port area without valid license from the Port Trust. In order to carry out stevedoring activity, one is required to have license from the first respondent. The petitioners were given license under the Regulation framed by the Board. 10. In order to carry out stevedoring activity, one is required to have license from the first respondent. The petitioners were given license under the Regulation framed by the Board. 10. The question which requires consideration is whether the activity which the Port has entrusted in the port area to the private stevedores can be undertaken by the Board itself or not? 11. Considering the provisions of the Act, it is clear that the existence of private stevedores was due to licenses issued by the Port Trust under the Licensing Act. In fact, it is the duty of the Board to operate the Port in a particular manner and stevedoring is also one of the activities which has undertaken by the Board. If, on the basis of the past experience, a policy decision has been taken by the Board, in our view, it cannot be said that such policy decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. It is required to be noted that by not renewing the license, the Board has ultimately decided to carry out the work of stevedoring on its own. If an authority gives permit to somebody to do a particular work by giving a license, such authority has all the implied powers to carry out such work on its own. In the instant case, before passing the resolution, the Board has considered the pros and cons of the matter. 12. In our view, it cannot be said that the Board has no authority to take policy decision as to whether the license given for doing stevedoring work should not be renewed and the said work should be done by the Board itself. With a view to streamlining on board and on shore cargo handling operations and to ensure that the workers are paid their legitimate dues in time as also to enable the Port to efficiently manning the labour force, it was considered appropriate for the Port to take over the stevedoring operations. With a view to streamlining on board and on shore cargo handling operations and to ensure that the workers are paid their legitimate dues in time as also to enable the Port to efficiently manning the labour force, it was considered appropriate for the Port to take over the stevedoring operations. It is stated in the affidavit in reply that the first respondent has taken all the relevant facts and aspects of the case that in the interest of the workers, port users, Mumbai Port and also the national exchequer, the first respondent had taken a conscientious decision to stop issuance/renewal of stevedoring licenses with effect from November, 2002 and take over the said stevedoring operations in the Port. The reasons for take over of the stevedoring operations, as stated in the affidavit in reply, are (i) competition from nearby ports, (ii) non-existence of stevedores at newer ports, (iii) high cost of handling (iv)non-transparency of stevedoring rates and (v) internal constraints in the effective implementation of stevedoring work. It is stated in the affidavit in reply that the stevedores backed by their association had created a monopolistic atmosphere in the field of stevedoring inasmuch as they were not adhering to the orders of administration in respect of the compliance with the orders of Tariff Authority, timely payment of outstanding dues, etc. Considering the said fact, it cannot be said that such a policy decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India as ultimately it is for the Board to decide whether a particular activity is to be carried out by the Board on its own or it should be given to somebody else. By allowing the petitioners by license to carry out stevedoring activity, the Board is not prevented from reviewing its decision as the existence of the petitioners at the port is due to the regulation framed by the Port Trust by which stevedoring activity has been regularised by issuance of license. Mr. Cama has frankly pointed out that without license, petitioners cannot carry on stevedoring activity nor they can enter the premises. It is also required to be noted that the stevedores are not prohibited to do their business in any other ports in the country but they cannot insist that the first respondent must continue to allow them to do private stevedoring work. It is also required to be noted that the stevedores are not prohibited to do their business in any other ports in the country but they cannot insist that the first respondent must continue to allow them to do private stevedoring work. It cannot be said that it is only the Central Government under the Act of 1963 can take decision and the Board who has framed the regulation has no power even to take such a decision. In our view, it hardly makes any difference as stevedoring creation is in view of the regulation framed by the first respondent and the first respondent has all the inherent power not to continue with the policy of issuing licenses as provided under the Regulation. Ultimately the Board is the supreme authority within the area in connection with regulating a particular activity and has power to regulate and in a given case may also include power to carry on the activity on its own. 13. Mr. Cama has strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Godawat(supra). In the aforesaid case, the sale of tobacco was regulated by the Cigarettes and other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003. The State Government issued a notification under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 prohibiting sale of tobacco for particular years. As per the scheme of the Tobacco Act, the Supreme Court has held that the State Government has no power to issue such notification as sale of tobacco product is regulated by the Tobacco Act. In the instant case, the Board has decided to carry on the work of stevedoring on its own. It cannot be said that the Board lacks any power in this behalf. The decision cited by Mr. Cama in the case of Godawat has no relevance worth the name so far as the facts of the present case is concerned. Mr. Cama submitted that before taking such decision by the first respondent, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner by the first respondent. In support of his submission, Mr. Cama has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Raj Restaurant and another vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1982) 3 SCC 338 ). 14. Mr. Makhija, learned counsel for respondent Nos. In support of his submission, Mr. Cama has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Raj Restaurant and another vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1982) 3 SCC 338 ). 14. Mr. Makhija, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that the action on the first of the Board in taking over the stevedoring operations is fair, proper and in fact in the interest of the Port, port users and the labour force of the first respondent. Mr. Makhija drew our attention to the note at page 98 of the petition regarding taking over stevedoring by the Mumbai Port Trust and submitted that the Board has taken into consideration the circumstances which persuaded the Board to take the decision, which is subject matter of the petitions herein. Mr. Makhija submits that the Port Trust would fall within the extended definition of the State under Article 12. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of R. Sarangapani and another vs. The Port Trust of Madras (AIR 1961 Madras 234). In paragraphs 13 and 14 the Madras High Court has held as under. “13. Having regard to our conclusion on the first point, the second point really does not arise. It is true that Article 19(1)(g) confers on all citizens the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. But, obviously, this right cannot entitle a citizen to carry on his occupation trade or business on the premises of another person or body. A citizen may have a right to carry on the business of selling fruits and vegetables; but ho has no right to carry on his business in the compound of a private person, except, of course, with his leave and consent. The decision' of this court in W. P. No. 648 of 1951:, in re Nagalingam Servai, furnishes an analogous instance. It was held in that case that no fundamental right was infringed, because certain persons who had been for' a long number of years vending various articles on the platform of the Madura junction with the permission of the South Indian Railway Co., Ltd.| were not allowed to continue to carry on their business. 14. It was held in that case that no fundamental right was infringed, because certain persons who had been for' a long number of years vending various articles on the platform of the Madura junction with the permission of the South Indian Railway Co., Ltd.| were not allowed to continue to carry on their business. 14. Even assuming that Art. 19 (1) (g) confers a right on the petitioners, Art. 19 (6) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, is a complete answer to the contention based on Art. 19 (1) (g). That clause inter alia provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of Art. 19 (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, the carrying on by the State or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Article 12 defines the State as including the Government and Parliament of India and the Government under the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Law includes any by-law, rule, regulation, notification, having the force of law (Art. 13 (3). There can be no doubt that the Port Trust will fall within the meaning of the term State in Art. 19 (6). It is a Corporation certainly controlled by the State. Even otherwise, the Port Trust would fall within the extended definition of the State under Art. 12, because it would be a local authority. Article 367 of the Constitution provides that the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply for the interpretation of the Constitution. So, it is permissible to go to that Act for a definition of local authority. In Sec. 3 (31) Local Authority is thus defined: “Local authority shall mean a municipal committee, District Board, body or port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund.” We are clearly of opinion that the resolution in question cannot be impugned on the basis of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. This would be so, as regards both the petitioners, that is, the shipping agent as well as the owner of the goods.” In order to support the contention that the action of the first respondent being reasonable and having taken only upon lawful and relevant considerations which cannot be arbitrary and unreasonable, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Halar Maritime Agencies vs. Gujarat Maritime Board and others (1992 (2) Gujarat Law Reporter). In the said case it has been held that the Board has the power to make regulations. In the said matter, challenge was against the action of the Gujarat Maritime Board in appointing landing and shipping contractor for the purpose of loading and unloading the goods at Bedi Port and in further insisting upon the clearing and forwarding agents and stevedoring agents to employ the servants of such duly appointed landing and shipping contractor. After considering all the relevant and germane factors, the single Judge has held that the Board can itself perform various services and, therefore, the said action of the Board was not arbitrary and unreasonable. 15. As stated above, by virtue of Section 42 of the Act of 1963, the Board can perform the services by itself. The Board may give permission to outsiders to carry on a particular operation for certain period and then it has the power to withdraw such permission. In fact, refusal of license is an act covered under the regulatory powers of the Board. Considering the factual aspect of the matter as stated above, it cannot be said that the decision taken by the first respondent is in any way illegal or arbitrary or that there is non-application of mind. In our view, the Board after taking into consideration all the relevant and germane facts took a policy decision to take over the stevedoring operations at the Mumbai Port by the first respondent itself. Since it is a policy decision, there is no question of giving any hearing to the petitioners. In our view, the Board after taking into consideration all the relevant and germane facts took a policy decision to take over the stevedoring operations at the Mumbai Port by the first respondent itself. Since it is a policy decision, there is no question of giving any hearing to the petitioners. So far as cancellation of license is concerned, it stands on different footing as in the instant case, if the decision is taken not to renew the license, it would not amount to cancellation of license as such policy decision is taken on the basis of appropriate objective criterion and as such decision cannot be interpreted by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In our view, it cannot be said that the decision of the first respondent is without jurisdiction and was contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is also not possible for us to agree with the submission of Mr. Cama that the first respondent as well as the petitioner be allowed to continue with the stevedoring activity at the port premises, as it is not for this Court to regulate the working of the Board. We accordingly do not find any substance in these petitions. The same are accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged.