I.A. Ansari, J;- Alleging that the appointment of respondent No. 4 herein (hereinafter referred to as the 'private respondent'), as Primary Teacher (Telegu), in Railway School of the NF Railway, at Maligaon, was in violation of the Employment Notice, dated 12.06.2004, issued by the Railway Recruitment Board, Guwahati, the present petitioner filed an Original Application in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench. As the learned Tribunal has dismissed the said application, by its judgment and order, dated 16.06.2008, holding the same to be devoid of any merit, the writ petitioner has impugned the findings, reached by the learned Tribunal, and the dismissal of the said Original Application by way of this writ petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. We have heard Mr. M. K. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, and Mr. U. K. Nair, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. We have also heard Mr. A. Sarma, learned counsel for the private respondent. 3. Let us, first, take note of the material facts, which are not in dispute. These facts are, in a nutshell, set out as under: (i) The Railway Recruitment Board, Guwahati, published an Employment Notice, on 12.06.2004, inviting applications from intending candidates, having required minimum educational/technical qualification of High Higher Secondary with two years JBT or its equivalent, or Intermediate with one year JBT or its equivalent, or Senior Secondary (Plus II) examination with one year JBT or its equivalent with competence to teach in Telegu Medium fluently, for filling up of, amongst others, one post of Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium) in the Railway School of the N.F. Railway, at Maligaon. (ii) The writ petitioner applied for the said post and, in course of time, appeared in the written test and viva voce, held on 03.04.2005 and 09.09.2005, respectively, along with other candidates including the private respondent. (ii) The writ petitioner applied for the said post and, in course of time, appeared in the written test and viva voce, held on 03.04.2005 and 09.09.2005, respectively, along with other candidates including the private respondent. Since the private respondent was appointed as Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium), in the said railway school, by Office Order, dated 04.01.2006, the writ petitioner filed, as indicated above, an Original Application in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, contending to the effect, inter alia, that he was the only candidate holding two years diploma in Education, granted by the Board of Secondary Education of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, which is equivalent to TTC (Teacher Training Certificate) and PTTC (Primary Teacher Training Certificate), but the private respondent, who was holding a B. Ed. Degree, and had no requisite training for teaching children, at primary level, was selected and appointed, as Primary Teacher, in violation of the conditions of recruitment, as announced by the Employment Notice aforementioned and also the law relevant thereto. The applicant, therefore, not only sought for setting aside the selection and appointment of the private respondent as Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium), but also sought for issuance of an order commanding the respondents to appoint the applicant, as Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium), in the said railway school, pursuant to the said Employment Notice. (iii) The application, so made, gave rise to Original Application No. 30/2006, wherein the respondents filed their written statement contending to the effect, inter alia, that the selection of the private respondent was entirely on merit on the basis of the written test as well as viva voce. The respondents also contended that the educational qualification, mentioned in the Employment Notice, was clearly described as 'the minimum qualification' and, hence, there was no bar for a person possessing 'higher degree' to apply for the post, in question. It was further contended by the respondents that since the selected candidate holds B.Ed. Degree, which is a higher qualification than the Higher Secondary with two years JBT, or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with one year JBT, there was no illegality in selecting the private respondent and in appointing him as Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium). (iv) In the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has taken the view that since a holder of B. Ed. (iv) In the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has taken the view that since a holder of B. Ed. Degree was not specifically barred from applying for the post, in question, the private respondent, who was holding B. Ed. Degree, was qualified to apply for the post and, having been selected on the basis of merit, his selection and appointment did not call for any interference. With the conclusion, so reached, the Original Application was dismissed. (v) Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Tribunal, the applicant is before us as the writ petitioner. 4. While considering the present writ petition, it need to be pointed out, at the very outset, that while calling for applications from the intending candidates, the Employment Notice prescribed the 'minimum educational qualification' for appointment to the post of Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium) in the said railway school. The relevant portion of the Employment Notice reads as under: Cat. No. Name of post Minimum Educational/Technical qualification 1. ---- 9. - - - - Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium) ---- (1) Higher Secondary with 2 years JBT or its equivalent or Intermediate with 1 year JBT or its equivalent or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with 1 year JBT or its equivalent, (2) Competence to teach through Telegu Medium fluently. 5. As the Employment Notice prescribed “(1) Higher Secondary with 2 years JBT or its equivalent or Intermediate with 1 year JBT or its equivalent or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with 1 year JBT or its equivalent, (2) Competence to teach through Telegu Medium fluently” as the minimum educational qualification for the post of Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium), the question is whether B. Ed. Degree can be considered as a higher degree to the prescribed qualification ? A higher degree will, obviously, mean a degree, which a person holds after he had already held the degree/certificate, which was prescribed as the 'minimum educational qualification'. Can the B. Ed. degree be considered as a higher degree to Higher Secondary with 2 years JBT or Intermediate with 1 year JBT or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with 1 year JBT ? 6. Presenting the case on behalf of the writ petitioner, Mr. Can the B. Ed. degree be considered as a higher degree to Higher Secondary with 2 years JBT or Intermediate with 1 year JBT or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with 1 year JBT ? 6. Presenting the case on behalf of the writ petitioner, Mr. M. K. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, has drawn the attention of this Court to the Employment Notice, dated 12.06.2004, aforementioned and contended that as far as the writ petitioner is concerned, he, being eligible, in all respects, for appointment as a Primary Teacher by completing two years of diploma in education, which is equivalent to Junior Basic Training, applied for the said post, but his candidature was ignored and the private respondent was selected and appointed to the said post of Primary Teacher (Telegu Medium) on the untenable ground that he (i.e., private respondent) had higher qualification inasmuch as he was holder of B. Ed. degree. It is also contended by Mr. Choudhury that the school, in which the private respondent has been appointed, is a school, with students up to Class-IV, and, hence, the petitioner, with the qualification, which he held, was the sole eligible candidate and not the private respondent inasmuch as a B. Ed. Degree cannot be held to be a higher degree than JBT. It is further contended by Mr. Choudhury that JBT and B. Ed. degree are not one and the same and, while JBT is meant exclusively for Primary Teachers, B. Ed. degree qualifies a person to teach in the higher classes. A B. Ed. degree, reiterates Mr. Choudhury, is not a substitute for the Junior Basic Training. Reliance in support of this contention is placed by Mr. Choudhury on a letter, dated 03.03.2006, issued by the Member Secretary, National Council for Teachers' Education, addressed to the Secretary, Department of School Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh. 7. Referring to the National Council for Teachers' Education (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001 (in short, 'Regulations'), Mr. Choudhury on a letter, dated 03.03.2006, issued by the Member Secretary, National Council for Teachers' Education, addressed to the Secretary, Department of School Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh. 7. Referring to the National Council for Teachers' Education (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001 (in short, 'Regulations'), Mr. Choudhury submits that the Schedule to the Regulations makes it clear that as per the Regulations, Elementary Education is divided into two parts, namely, (i) Primary Education and (ii) Upper Primary Education and, as far as the Primary Education is concerned, diploma or certificate in 'basic teachers training' of not less than two years is adequate qualification for appointment, or Bachelor of Elementary Education (B.Eld.); whereas graduate with Bachelor of Education (B. Ed.) or its equivalent is eligible for appointment as teacher of Upper Primary School. There is, therefore, clear distinction between a Bachelor of Elementary Education (B. Eld.) and a Bachelor of Education (B. Ed.) and, while a Bachelor of Elementary Education (B. Eld.) is qualified to teach primary education in a school, a Bachelor of Education (E. Ed.) is qualified to teach in Upper Primary schools. 8. Mr. Choudhury points out that considering the fact that the writ petitioner had satisfied the eligibility criteria of having acquired two years Basic Teachers' Training, he ought to have been appointed to the post, in question, inasmuch as the private respondent's appointment, for the purpose of teaching, in the primary section of the school concerned, was bad in law, because the field of education of B. Ed. is quite distinct and different from Basic Teachers' Training. While the Basic Teachers' Training qualifies a person, according to Mr. Choudhury, to be appointed as a teacher of the Primary section of a School, a B. Ed. degree holder can be appointed as a teacher to Upper Primary section of the school. 9. In support of his contention that the eligibility criteria for appointment as Primary Teacher are different from the eligibility criteria for appointment to Upper Primary and Secondary section of a school, Mr. Choudhury places reliance on P.M. Latha and another vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 541 , Yogesh Kumar and others vs. Govt. 9. In support of his contention that the eligibility criteria for appointment as Primary Teacher are different from the eligibility criteria for appointment to Upper Primary and Secondary section of a school, Mr. Choudhury places reliance on P.M. Latha and another vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 541 , Yogesh Kumar and others vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 548 , Smt. Jayashree Sunil Chavan, Pune, Petitioner v. The State of Maharashtra and others, reported in AIR 2000 BOMBAY 394 (FB), Dilip Kumar Ghosh and others v. Chairman and others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 567 . 10. Opposing the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. U. K. Nair, learned counsel for the respondents, referring to the decisions, in Munna Roy v. Union of India and others, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 283 , has submitted that B. Ed. is a 'higher qualification' than JBT and there was no impediment in appointing the private respondent as a Primary Teacher, particularly, when the advertisement clearly mentioned what the 'minimum qualification', shall be and this meant that a candidate, with higher qualification, was also eligible to apply for the said post. In short, according to Mr. Nair, B. Ed. Degree is a degree higher than that of Junior Basic Training and, hence, the appointment of the private respondent is not bad in law. 11. What has been additionally submitted by Mr. Nair is that the school, to which the private respondent was appointed, was a school, which had up to Class IV, and the said school has, now, been abolished inasmuch as there is no longer any teaching in Telegu Medium in any of the schools under the N.F. Railway. 12. To a query, made by this Court, as to whether the private respondent is still in service of the N.F. Railway, Mr. Nair submits that on abolition of the school, to which the private respondent was appointed, the private respondent, being a B. Sc. Degree holder, has been appointed in another school of the N.F. Railway for teaching mathematics. 13. Reacting to the submissions, made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Nair submits that on abolition of the school, to which the private respondent was appointed, the private respondent, being a B. Sc. Degree holder, has been appointed in another school of the N.F. Railway for teaching mathematics. 13. Reacting to the submissions, made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. M. K. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, submits that the writ petitioner has been unjustifiably denied appointment to the post of Primary Teacher in the school, which has, now, been abolished and since there cannot be a wrong without remedy, this Court may compensate the writ petitioner for the wrongful loss, which he has been made to sustain, because of the illegal acts and/or omission of the State respondents. 14. While considering the present writ petition, it needs to be noted that in P.M. Latha and another Vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 541 , the Supreme Court has, in no uncertain words, observed that B. Ed. qualification is not a higher qualification than the TTC and that the holder of a B. Ed. degree cannot be held eligible for a post of primary school teacher, because Trained Teacher Certificate is given to those, who are specifically trained to teach small children in primary classes; whereas B. Ed. degree trains a person to teach the student of classes above the primary section. B. Ed. degree holders cannot, therefore, held the Supreme Court, in P.M. Latha (supra), be held to be holding qualification suitable for appointment as teachers in primary schools. It has been made clear, in P.M. Latha (supra), that whether for a particular post, source of recruitment should be from the candidates with TTC qualification or B. Ed. qualification is a matter of recruitment policy and the State is justified in prescribing qualification for the post of primary teachers as holder of TTC and not B.Ed. The relevant observations, made in this regard, which appear at para 10 of P.M. Latha (supra), read as under: “10. We find absolutely no force in the argument advanced by the respondents that B.Ed. qualification is a higher qualification than TTC and therefore, the B.Ed. candidates should be held to be eligible to compete for the post. On behalf of appellants, it is pointed out before us that Trained Teachers Certificate is given to teachers specially trained to teach small children in primary classes whereas for B.Ed. qualification is a higher qualification than TTC and therefore, the B.Ed. candidates should be held to be eligible to compete for the post. On behalf of appellants, it is pointed out before us that Trained Teachers Certificate is given to teachers specially trained to teach small children in primary classes whereas for B.Ed. degree, the training imparted is to teach students of classes above primary. B.Ed. degree holders, therefore, cannot necessarily be held to be holding qualification suitable for appointment as teachers in primary schools. Whether for a particular post, the source of recruitment should be from the candidates with TTC qualification or B.Ed. qualification, is a matter of recruitment policy. We find sufficient logic and justification in the State prescribing qualification for post of primary teachers as only TTC and not B.Ed. Whether B.Ed. qualification can also be prescribed for primary teachers is a question to be considered by the authorities concerned but we cannot consider B.Ed. candidates, for the present vacancies advertised, as eligible.” 15. The same view, as in the case of P.M. Latha (supra), has been expressed in Yogesh Kumar and others Vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 548 , wherein the Supreme Court, referring to the decision of P.M. Latha (supra), has held that B. Ed. qualification cannot be treated as a qualification higher than TTC, because the nature of training imparted for grant of the said certificate and for the said degree is totally different and between the two, there is no parity whatsoever. 16. Notwithstanding the fact that the decision in P.M. Latha (supra) as well as Yogesh Kumar (supra) have been rendered in the light of the relevant rules framed by the State Governments, the fact of the matter remains that even in the case at hand, the employment notice clearly prescribed the eligibility criteria for appointment as primary teacher and the eligibility criteria was Higher Secondary with 2 years JBT or its equivalent or Intermediate with 1 year JBT or its equivalent or Senior Secondary (Plus 2) examination with 1 year JBT or its equivalent. 17. In the face of the eligibility criteria, which were mentioned in the employment notice, it is clear that the private respondent, as holder of B. Ed. degree, could not have been considered eligible for appointment as a primary teacher inasmuch as B. Ed. degree, as rightly contended by Mr. 17. In the face of the eligibility criteria, which were mentioned in the employment notice, it is clear that the private respondent, as holder of B. Ed. degree, could not have been considered eligible for appointment as a primary teacher inasmuch as B. Ed. degree, as rightly contended by Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, is distinct and different from JBT and in the light of the decisions, in P.M. Latha (supra) and Yogesh Kumar (supra), one can have no escape from the conclusion that while a person with JBT is specially trained for teaching small children, B. Ed. degree holder is qualified to teach students of higher classes. In the light of the decisions in P.M. Latha (supra) as well as Yogesh Kumar (supra), since B. Ed. degree cannot be considered a higher degree than the JBT, the private respondent could not have been appointed as a primary teacher because the field of training and education in both the cases are different and one is not substitute for the other. 18. One may pause here to point out that even in Dilip Kumar Ghosh and others Vs. Chairman and others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 567 , the Supreme Court has taken the same view as in the cases of P.M. Latha (supra) and Yogesh Kumar (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out that in B.Ed. curriculum, there is no subject of child psychology; whereas JBT/PTTC has child psychology as a subject. The Supreme Court has also pointed out, in Dilip Kumar Ghosh (supra), that B. Ed. curriculum is generic in nature and deals with subjects like the principles of educational curriculum studies, educational psychology, development of education in modern India, social organization and instructional methods, etc. 19. The Supreme Court has agreed, in Dilip Kumar Ghosh (supra), that the holders of JBT/PTTC are trained teachers meant for imparting proper education to the primary school students. 20. So far as the decision in Munna Roy Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 283 , relied upon by Mr. 19. The Supreme Court has agreed, in Dilip Kumar Ghosh (supra), that the holders of JBT/PTTC are trained teachers meant for imparting proper education to the primary school students. 20. So far as the decision in Munna Roy Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 283 , relied upon by Mr. Nair, learned counsel, is concerned, it needs to be noted that the eligibility criteria, prescribed for the post of Craft Teacher (Bengali Medium), was a matriculate; whereas Munna Roy, i.e., the candidate, in Munna Roy (supra), was a graduate and the Supreme Court, in such a factual scenario, took the view that since the minimum qualification required was a matriculate, a graduate cannot be its equivalent inasmuch as graduation is a qualification higher than the required qualification of matriculation. 21. What is noticeable, in the case of Munna Roy (supra) is that in order to be a graduate, a person has to be a matriculate and, hence, graduation can be regarded as a higher qualification than matriculate, but the same is not true in the case of JBT vis-à-vis B. Ed. inasmuch as a person, in order to hold the degree of B.Ed. need not hold the certificate of JBT and, hence, a B. Ed. degree holder cannot be regarded as a person holding higher degree than the holder of JBT. 22. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the present petitioner, being holder of JBT certificate, was eligible to be appointed as primary teacher; whereas the private respondent, as holder of B. Ed. degree, was not eligible for appointment as primary teacher. 23. Situated thus, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the appointment of the private respondent could not have been sustained and there would have been no impediment, on the part of this Court, in issuing a writ of mandamus commanding the NF Railway to appoint the writ petitioner as a primary teacher, in the school to which the private respondent was appointed. However, with the abolition of the school to which the private respondent was appointed, this writ petition has really become infructuous inasmuch as the school, in question, being not in existence any longer, this Court cannot issue any mandamus commanding the NF Railway to appoint the petitioner to a non-existent post. 24. It is true, as contended by Mr. However, with the abolition of the school to which the private respondent was appointed, this writ petition has really become infructuous inasmuch as the school, in question, being not in existence any longer, this Court cannot issue any mandamus commanding the NF Railway to appoint the petitioner to a non-existent post. 24. It is true, as contended by Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, that there cannot be a wrong without a remedy. At the same time, one has to also bear in mind that a bona fide mistake is distinct and different from an action taken mala fide. 25. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the appointment of the private respondent to the school, in question, was out of any favour or bias or suffers from mala fide. There was, undoubtedly, an error in the appointment of the private respondent; but this, by itself, does not make it such a grave wrong, which would entitle the petitioner to exemplary compensation, particularly, in the absence of any material showing any bias in favour of the private respondent and/or any ill-will or ill motive or mala fide as against the petitioner. 26. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we hold, if we may reiterate, that this appeal has become infructuous and the appointment of the private respondent to the school, which no longer exists, cannot be set aside. At the same time, the school having seized to exist, no writ, in the nature of mandamus, can be issued directing the N.F. Railway to appoint the petitioner to the post for which the employment notice, in question, was published and the selection process was resorted to. As far as the subsequent appointment of the private respondent to another school of the N.F. Railway is concerned, the same is not under challenge in the present writ petition and the petitioner is hereby left at liberty to put to challenge the appointment of the private respondent to the new school under the N.F. Railway. 27. Considering, however, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, we are of the view that apart from the cost, the petitioner needs to be suitably compensated for denial of his appointment to the post of primary teacher in the school, which no longer exists. 27. Considering, however, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, we are of the view that apart from the cost, the petitioner needs to be suitably compensated for denial of his appointment to the post of primary teacher in the school, which no longer exists. In the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be satisfied if the petitioner is directed to be paid compensation of a sum of Rs.50,000/- in addition to the cost of the proceeding, the cost of the proceeding being Rs. 5,000/-. 28. Ordered accordingly. Let the payment of compensation with cost be paid to the writ petitioner by the N.F. Railway within two months from today. 29. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of.