Judgment : CPK, J. 1. Challenging the order dated 21.03.2012, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench at Hyderabad in O.A.No.466 of 2010 the present Writ Petition is filed. 2. The facts in brief are that the first respondent herein while working as Loco Pilot (Goods) Grade-I at Vijayawada Railway Station, South Central Railway, committed misconduct by absenting himself unauthorizedly from duty for 84 days from 23.02.2005 to 17.05.2005 without prior sanction of leave and not observing the Railway Medical Attendance Rules. Because of his unauthorized absence, the respondent herein was issued a charge sheet dated 16.08.2005. The respondent was supplied with all the relevant material on his application and he had also sought for an opportunity of personal hearing before the authorities. However, the said case could not go on further as the respondent was involved in another case, which culminated in imposing a major penalty of removal from service with effect from 10.01.2007. However, on appeal made by him, the penalty of removal from service was reduced to that of reduction of pay in time scale. The respondent reported to duty on 26.05.2007 and at that point of time the present case was reopened. Pursuant to the charges levelled against him, the respondent herein had submitted his explanation on 22.09.2007. Not being satisfied with the explanation, by order dated 27.09.2007, an enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the allegations made against him. The enquiry officer after giving ample opportunity to the respondent and after giving reasons submitted his report on 17.07.2008, a copy of which was served on the respondent on 25.10.2008. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority directed the respondent herein to give his explanation within 15 days from the date of receipt of the enquiry report. The respondent herein had submitted his detailed explanation on 13.11.2008. The disciplinary authority by its order in proceedings No.B/E.150/TRSO/II/5/DAR/V/30 dated 01.05.2009 found that the charges are proved and as such imposed a penalty of removal from service with immediate effect. It is further observed in the said order which is as follows: “Sri Debashish Pal while functioning as Sr.Goods Driver/T.No.95/RJY, committed serious misconduct, in that; he absented himself unauthorisedly from duties for 84 days during the period from February 2005 to May, 2005 without prior sanction of leave or observing Railway Medical Attendance Rules. It is further observed in the said order which is as follows: “Sri Debashish Pal while functioning as Sr.Goods Driver/T.No.95/RJY, committed serious misconduct, in that; he absented himself unauthorisedly from duties for 84 days during the period from February 2005 to May, 2005 without prior sanction of leave or observing Railway Medical Attendance Rules. Thus he has filed to maintain devotion to duty and thereby contravened Rule 3(1) (ii) of Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965.” 3. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein filed an appeal before the Additional Divisional Manager, Railways. The appellate authority confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent herein filed O.A.No.466 of 2010 before the Tribunal and the Tribunal below by its order dated 21.03.2012 found that there is evidence in support of the charge levelled against the charged employee i.e. the respondent herein. However, the Tribunal disposed of the O.A. directing the disciplinary authority to impose upon the applicant a penalty less severe than removal from service. It is further mentioned in the said order that the order in that regard should be passed within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order passed by the Tribunal. Challenging the said order passed by the Tribunal, the present Writ Petition is filed. 4. We have perused the material placed before us and also heard the counsel for the petitioner and the respondent at length. 5. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that while directing the disciplinary authority to impose upon the applicant a penalty lesser than what has been awarded earlier by the authorities, no reasons have been given by the Tribunal for issuance of such a direction. It is further argued that the reason given by the respondent herein for absenting himself from duty for 84 days is not proved and no documents are filed in support of his defence. The learned counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn our attention to a decision reported in State of Meghalaya And Others Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580 ) and relied upon the Para Nos.13 to 17 of the said judgment, which read as under: “13. The learned counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn our attention to a decision reported in State of Meghalaya And Others Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580 ) and relied upon the Para Nos.13 to 17 of the said judgment, which read as under: “13. Under the circumstances the question arises whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of removal of the respondent from service and remitting the matter to the appellate authority, namely, the Inspector General of Police to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment, short of removal from service, commensurate with the gravity of the proven misconduct of the respondent. A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 15. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental inquiry, the court should also take into consideration, the mental set up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are in-built requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are in-built requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. 16. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. Not only he flouted the instructions but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent, who was a police officer failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the exchequer and society. (Underlined by us) 17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the Appellate Authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.” 6. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the plea of the respondent was consistent right from the beginning. He further contended that the respondent while working as loco pilot at Vijayawada railway station, on 22.02.2005 submitted a requisition to his controlling officer i.e. Chief Crew Controller (Traction), Vijayawada to issue a sick memo as he was not feeling well, so as to get himself treated at railway hospital, VIjayawada. He further contended that the respondent while working as loco pilot at Vijayawada railway station, on 22.02.2005 submitted a requisition to his controlling officer i.e. Chief Crew Controller (Traction), Vijayawada to issue a sick memo as he was not feeling well, so as to get himself treated at railway hospital, VIjayawada. The respondent made the said request pursuant to the procedure evolved by the authorities. It is further contended that the Chief Crew Controller not only refused to acknowledge the requisition made by the respondent but also did not issue a sick memo. As the respondent was suffering from viral fever and jaundice, the respondent took treatment in Government hospital at vijayawada from 22.02.2005 to 17.05.2005 and was declared fit to resume duty from 17.05.2005 by a competent doctor at Government Hospital, Vijayawada. The learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition since the Tribunal below has given sufficient reasons for giving such a direction to the disciplinary authority. 7. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision reported in KrushnakantB. Parmar Vs. Union of India and Another (2012) 3 SCC 178 )wherein the apex Court while dealing with the question whether unauthorized absence from duty amounts to failure to devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant observed that the same cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is willful or because of compelling circumstances. The Court held that if the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorized absence, but it does not always mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalization, etc, but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. It is further held that in a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorized absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 8. It is further held that in a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorized absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 8. In the case on hand, the charged employee was on unauthorized absence for 84 days from 23.02.2005 to 17.05.2005. At no point of time he made any effort to inform about his absence to the authorities concerned. Only on 18.05.2005 when he resumed to duty he intimated the authorities by way of a representation addressed to the CCC, Rajahmundry requesting them to treat the period of unauthorized absence as leave. 9. On appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal below, while recording a finding that the period of unauthorized absence is willful, held as under: “…………As noted above, the Railways in view of the peculiar nature of their functioning have their own set of rules and organizations. A railway employee is ordinarily expected to take medical treatment in a railway hospital. In the instant case the railway hospital was located nearby, but the applicant did not go to the same and instead chose to go to the Government General Hospital. No action was taken by him during the period of absence for 84 days to intimate his Controlling Officer about the circumstances of his absence. He did not submit documents to show the treatment he claims to have undertaken in the government Hospital. In such circumstance the period of unauthorized absence would be regarded as willful. Accordingly, we find that this is not a case of no evidence. There is evidence in support of the charge. The process of decision making has caused no prejudice to the charged employee. However, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the penalty of removal from service is disproportionate. In the reply statement our attention has been drawn to the past misconduct of the applicant including unauthorized absence. However, we note that the applicant was not put on notice in this regard by the disciplinary authority before imposition of penalty.” 10. The findings so recorded by the Tribunal that it is not a case of no evidence and that the period of unauthorized absence is willful have become final since the respondent has not chosen to challenge the same. The findings so recorded by the Tribunal that it is not a case of no evidence and that the period of unauthorized absence is willful have become final since the respondent has not chosen to challenge the same. Therefore, the only question that requires consideration is whether the Tribunal is justified in holding that the penalty of removal from service imposed on the charged employee was disproportionate to the charge. 11. In Mecken Singh N. Marak case (1 supra) the apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without cause. It is further held that the High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate cases, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has limited role to play. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscious of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. 12. In JagdishSingh Vs. Punjab Engineering College and others (2009) 7 SCC 301 ) the apex Court held as follows: “The courts and the tribunals can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority only when they are satisfied that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges alleged and proved against a delinquent employee and not otherwise. Reference can be made to the decision of this Court in V.Ramana V. APSRTC ( (2005) 7 SCC 338 wherein it is stated: (SCC p.348, paras 11-12) “11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed." 13. In the light of the legal position noticed above, it is clear that unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority shocks the conscience of the Court / Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. At any rate, the Tribunal cannot by itself reduce the quantum of punishment without assigning any reasons therefor. 14. In the case on hand, the Tribunal recorded a clear finding that the period of unauthorized absence is willful. It was also observed that even on earlier occasion the respondent was on unauthorized absence. Having recorded such a finding, the Tribunal below ought not to have given a positive direction to the disciplinary authority to impose a penalty less severe than removal from service. Such direction particularly in the absence of any reasons for reducing the penalty cannot be sustained. 15. In view of the above, we deem it appropriate to set aside the order dated 21.03.2012 in O.A.No.466 of 2010 and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for consideration afresh in the light of the legal position noticed above and to pass appropriate orders as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 16. The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.