JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri P.K. Khare and Sri Shirish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Nirmal Seth, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sachin Garg Advocate for opposite party No. 1 as well as learned Standing Counsel and perused the record. 2. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that for construction of commercial Complex at 6, Cooper Road, Lucknow, petitioner/M/S U.P. Cooperative Federation Limited entered into an agreement on 20.12.1995 with M/S K.S.M. Bashir Mohammad & Sons (hereinafter referred to as ‘Contractor’). Thereafter some dispute and deferences have arisen between the parties arising out of the agreement so for adjudication of the same referred to the Arbitrator Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.C. Saksena(former judge of this Court) under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) and the sole Arbitrator on 24.10.2000 has given an interim award in favour of the Contractor, challenged by way of appeal (F.A.F.O. No. 530 of 2000) by the petitioner, dismissed by judgment and order dated 30.11.2000 again challenged before Hon’ble the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 5215 of 2001 etc. dismissed by order dated 10.5.2001. The said order on reproduction reads as under : “SLP(C) No. 5215/2001 This Matter will be heard only on the merits of the interim award. So far challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator is concerned, we decline to exercise our powers. List this matter for final hearing after four months on a non miscellaneous day. Parties may exchange any additional documents, if they are so advised. SLPNO. ...CC 3015/2001 The Special Leave petition is dismissed both on the ground of delay as well as on merit.” 3. In view of the said facts, contractor/respondent No. 1 filed Execution case under Section 36 of the Act before opposite party No. 2/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lucknow in which notice have been issued to petitioner who put his appearance and file objection regarding maintainability of the execution proceedings. 4. The Executing Court/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lucknow passed an impugned order dated 22.5.2001 in Execution Case No. 3 of 2001 challenged by way of present writ petition filed before this Court. 5. 4. The Executing Court/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lucknow passed an impugned order dated 22.5.2001 in Execution Case No. 3 of 2001 challenged by way of present writ petition filed before this Court. 5. Sri P.K. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order submits that opposite party No. 2 has got no jurisdiction to entertain the application for execution as he is not a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in view of the provisions under Section 2 (1) (e) of the Act which reads as under : “2 (1) (e) “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 6. Accordingly, Sri P.K. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner with the add of definition as given in Section 2 (1) (e) of the Act submits that the “District Judge” is the “Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction” in a district thus the opposite party No. 2 has no authority to entertain the execution proceedings so the order dated 22.5.2001 (Annexure 1) passed by opposite party No. 2 is non est and without jurisdiction liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, Sri Khare has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court given in the case of M/s I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad v. District Judge, Allahabad and others, AIR 1998 All 313 . 7. Sri N.K. Seth, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sachin Garg Advocate for opposite party No. 1, in rebuttal, submits that as per the admitted facts on record principal amount has already been paid to the Contractor on the basis of interim award given by the Arbitrator However, the interest has not paid to opposite party No. 1 by the petitioner for which he is otherwise entitle to get in view of the order passed by Hon’ble Apex Court but on one or other pretext petitioner is lingering the matter without any jestification or reason. However, he fairly admits the legal position that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lucknow has got no jurisdiction to entertain the execution proceedings. 8. However, he fairly admits the legal position that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lucknow has got no jurisdiction to entertain the execution proceedings. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. A plain reading of the clause (e) of Section 2(1), the ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a District, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original Civil Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not 3 include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court or any Court of small causes. Thus, the expression ‘Court’, therefore means— (a) Principal Civil Court or original jurisdiction in a District; (b) High Court in exercise of its ordinary original Civil Jurisdiction; (c) Such Courts must have jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. (d) Any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, is not included in the definition of “Court”; (e) Any Court of Small Causes is also not included in the definition of “Court”.(See: National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel and Fabrications, (2004) 1 SCC 540 : 2004(1) RAJ 1 : 2003 (10) Scale 1062 : 2003(8) Supreme 876 : 2004(1) SLT 336 : 2004 (3) SRJ 471 : 2004 (1) Arb LR 67) 9. In the case of M/s Nilachkra Constructions v. State of Orissa and another, 2005 (1) RAJ 209, after referring to Section 2(1) (e) of the Act which defines the ‘Court’ and Section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Orissa High Court held that a plain reading of both the definitions makes it manifest that the Principle Court of Original jurisdiction means the district Court in as much as District Judge is the presiding officer of that Court. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid Sections, it is obvious that the Court of “District Judge” is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid Sections, it is obvious that the Court of “District Judge” is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. The definition, as given under Section 2(1) (e) of the Act expressly excludes any other Civil Court or any Court of small Causes.(see: Patel Roadways Limited v. Prasad Trading Company, (1991) 4 SCC 270 and Khalil Ahmad Dakhani v. Hatti Gold Mines Company Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 755 ) In view of the facts stated above as well as the law as laid down by this Court in the case of I.T.I. Ltd, Allahabad (Supra), opposite party No. 2 has got no jurisdiction to entertain the application for execution proceedings in the matter in question hence the order dated 22.5.2001 is without jurisdiction, liable to be set aside. For the forgoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 22.5.2001 passed by opposite party No. 2/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lucknow is set aside. —————