Judgment :- P. JYOTHIMANI, J. 1. These appeals arise from a common order dated 29.4.2011 passed by a learned Single Judge in Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 in C.S.No.83 of 1965 and Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000. While appellant filed Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 in C.S.No.83 of 1965 for impleading itself, namely Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited, formerly known as "The Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited", as the 64th defendant in the suit stated above and to implead or substitute the appellant either in the place of Andiappan (7th defendant) or VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant) or M.Veerappan (26th defendant) respectively, Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000 has been filed by the appellant, which was arrayed as 10th defendant in the said suit, to transpose it as the third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000. All the applications came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge, against which the present appeals are filed. 2.1. Originally, the land property called Edamallapatti land in Pratiyur, Trichy comprising of 77.39 Acres belonged to one Late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, who is stated to have sold a portion of the said property in the year 1960 to one Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) under a registered sale deed. The said T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar died on 18.8.1964, leaving behind him his widow – CT.Sivagami Achi (4th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), who also died subsequently on 26.11.1988, apart from three sons, namely PL.CT.Subramaniam Chettiar, PL.CT.Palaniappa Chettiar and PL.CT.Senthilnathan Chettiar, arrayed as defendants 1 to 3 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, and three daughters, namely Umayal Achi, L.Velliammai Achi arrayed as defendants 5 and 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, and K.R.Meenakshi Achi, who filed C.S.No.83 of 1965 for partition. 2.2. The first son of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, namely the 1st defendant, also died leaving behind him his two wives, namely Dhoniprathambal Achi (48th defendant) and Umayal Achi (49th defendant), who also subsequently died, and their sons and daughters have been impleaded as defendants 50 to 62 in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.3. Likewise, Umayal Achi (5th defendant), one of the daughter of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, also died, who was succeeded by her husband VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant), who also subsequently died and thereafter his son – M.Veerappan has been impleaded as 26th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.4. 2.3. Likewise, Umayal Achi (5th defendant), one of the daughter of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, also died, who was succeeded by her husband VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant), who also subsequently died and thereafter his son – M.Veerappan has been impleaded as 26th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.4. Some of the left out properties while filing the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965 were subsequently added by an application filed by the plaintiff and third parties, including Andiappan (7th defendant), were impleaded by order dated 24.11.1967. 2.5. A preliminary decree by consent of the parties was passed on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. However, it appears that there was no decision regarding the item of properties stated to have been purchased by the said Andiappan (7th defendant). 2.6. It appears that Andiappan (7th defendant) has sold away various portions of the properties under registered sale deeds to and in favour of VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram (husband of the 5th defendant), Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi (wife of the 3rd defendant) and one Rangasamy Gounder, who was not related to the sharers. The plaintiff in the suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed Application No.3220 of 1975 to implead the said purchasers and the said application for impleadment came to be dismissed by this Court on 12.3.1976 on the ground that they are pendentelite purchasers and, therefore, the doctrine of lispendens would apply. The order is as follows: "Admittedly the property in relation to which injunction is sought does not form part of the preliminary decree in C.S.No.83 of 1965. Nevertheless, that the applicant contends is that the 7th defendant is only a servant of the deceased father who has sold away the property in favour of respondents 2 to 5 sought to be impleaded as parties. Admittedly the sale is pending C.S.No.83 of 1965 in which even the doctrine of lis pendens can be invoked by the applicant as and when he succeeds in establishing his right to these survey numbers forming the subject amtter of the application. In this view, I see no need to continue the interim injunction. Admittedly the sale is pending C.S.No.83 of 1965 in which even the doctrine of lis pendens can be invoked by the applicant as and when he succeeds in establishing his right to these survey numbers forming the subject amtter of the application. In this view, I see no need to continue the interim injunction. Accordingly that will stand vacated and application No.3220 of 1975 will also stand dismissed." Accordingly, the application for impleadment as well as the injunction application came to be dismissed by this Court. 2.7. After the conclusion of trial, by a second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, it was held that the transfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham and nominal and, therefore, the said property also formed part of the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The operative portion of the said judgment is as under: "... Therefore, even in the case of the 7th defendant, I had to accept the case of the plaintiff and I hold that the sale in favour of the 7th defendant was a sham and nominal transaction and that no title passed in respect of item (a) of III Schedule and the same remained as part of the estate of Chidambaram Chettiar. Accordingly, issue No.1 is found in favour of the plaintiff." 2.8. As against the said portion of the judgment, Andiappan (7th defendant) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and that appeal came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 14.8.1984. Thereafter, the above said four purchasers from Andiappan (7th defendant), who are not sharers in the joint family property, have filed various applications to set aside the order dated 14.8.1984 made in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all the said applications were dismissed on 23.12.1986 by a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench has, in fact, held that it was these purchasers who have resisted the application filed by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead them as parties based on the doctrine of lispendens and, therefore, they are estopped from taking a different stand. 2.9. As against the said order of the Division Bench in the applications filed by the pendentelite purchasers, there was no further appeal, obviously because it was barred by limitation by that time. 2.9. As against the said order of the Division Bench in the applications filed by the pendentelite purchasers, there was no further appeal, obviously because it was barred by limitation by that time. Instead the said pendentelite purchasers filed C.S.No.674 of 1987 praying to annul the order dated 21.11.1977, by which the second preliminary decree was passed by this Court in C.S.No.83 of 1965 holding that the subject matter of properties stated to have been purchased by Andiappan (7th defendant) are sham and nominal, and benami. It was that suit which was subsequently transferred to the City Civil Court, Chennai based on monetary limit and was thereafter transferred to this Court and re-numbered as C.S.No.686 of 2000. 2.10. The said pendentelite purchasers earlier filed application for injunction against the sharers from proceeding further, which came to be dismissed by this Court on 9.1.1989, and the said order was also confirmed by a Division Bench in O.S.A.No.40 of 1989 on 22.2.1989. It appears that there was an Advocate Commissioner appointed to identify the properties for division by metes and bounds, apart from the appointment of a Receiver in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.11. It is also relevant to point out at this stage that the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, having come to know about the purchase made by the appellants, has filed Application No.2034 of 1992 to implead the purchasers, including the Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited, and there was also an order of injunction obtained in O.A.No.285 of 1992 restraining them from trespassing into the property. Ultimately, the plaintiff withdrew the application seeking impleadment on 16.4.2010. 2.12. Ultimately, the plaintiff withdrew the application seeking impleadment on 16.4.2010. 2.12. The appellant herein, being the third party to the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965 and stated to have been called as "The Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited" (10th defendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000), claiming itself to have purchased about an extent of 26.49 Acres from Meenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant), who subsequently died and is represented by M.Veerappan (26th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi (wife of the 3rd defendant) and Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6th defendant) under various registered sale deeds, which are as follows: has filed the above said applications on the grounds that it is a bon fide purchaser having paid the amount of full consideration to its vendors; that the plaintiff and sharers in collusion with the vendors of the appellant have obtained preliminary decree; that by collusion they entered into an arrangement among themselves and there is likelihood of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to withdraw the same on the basis of a compromise and execute the decree passed in the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965, apart from many other grounds. 2.13. The applications filed by the appellant were resisted by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 on the ground that the purchase stated to have been made by the appellant from non-sharers is fraudulent in nature and in any event, the validity of the appellant's purchase depends upon the rights of Andiappan (7th defendant) and inasmuch as it has been settled and become final that the transfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham and nominal, the appellant or its vendors cannot claim any better title. 2.14. It was after considering the rival contentions, the learned Judge has dismissed the applications on the ground that the appellant is pendentelite purchaser of a portion of the property forming part of C.S.No.83 of 1965 and, therefore, under the legal concept of lispendens, it is not necessary party to decide the lis, and also on the ground that the rights of the appellant are limited, since the partition suit between the members of the family can be decided even in the absence of the appellant and hence, the appellant is not a necessary and proper party. 2.15. 2.15. It is as against the said order of the learned Judge, the applicant before the learned Single Judge has filed the present appeals on various grounds, including that the appellant is necessary and proper party to the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965, as any decision in the partition suit will result in dispossession of the appellant, who is in possession; that the learned Judge ought to have appreciated the implication of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity, "the CPC"); that the reason given by the learned Judge that the appellant is pendentelite purchaser is not correct; that the learned Judge has not taken into consideration the application filed by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead the appellant, which was withdrawn on 16.4.2010 and, therefore, she cannot now say that the appellant is not necessary and proper party; that the appellant is bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and its right is protected under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and that no valid reason has been given for dismissing all the three applications, especially when the presence of the appellant will facilitate effective adjudication of the entire issue. 3. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend as under: i. that the dismissal of Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to transpose the appellant, who was arrayed as 10th defendant, as the third plaintiff in the said suit is unsustainable; ii. that the appellant should be given opportunity to continue the suit filed by its vendors to set aside the decree in C.S.No.83 of 1965, consequent to the withdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by Andiappan (first defendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000), insofar as it relates to schedule properties in the suit measuring 77.39 Acres in Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District, especially when the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000, who are near relatives to the sharers, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, are attempting to withdraw the suit and arrive at a compromise final decree, in which event the appellant will be losing its valuable right; iii. that it has been the judicial precedent, as held in BhupendraNarayan Sinha Bahadur v. Rajeswar Prosad Bhakat and others, AIR 1931 PC 162 and in the latest judgment of this Court in R.Dhanasundari@ R.Rajeswari v. A.N.Umakanth and others, 2006 (5) CTC 440 , that right of transposition under Order I Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC is to be decided on two factors, namely complete adjudication of disputes and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings; iv. that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable only if it is not a collusive suit and since the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 have already approached the court on the basis that the decree obtained in C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive, the appellant, being the bona fide purchaser from the said plaintiffs, must be given opportunity to continue the suit in the absence of the efforts taken by the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to proceed with the case; v. that the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 themselves have no objection for transposition except raising objection now and, therefore, that creates a strong suspicion that they are not interested in prosecuting the suit, in which event the appellant will be the affected party; vi. that the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 having filed an application to implead the appellant and other subsequent purchasers realizing that they are necessary parties, has chosen to withdraw the application with a view to collusively file a compromise memo in order to deprive the appellant its right; vii. that the withdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and declining efforts to restore O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 was on the facts of that case and that does not mean that the subsequent purchaser has no right to continue the litigation; viii. that even if the appellant is pendentelite purchaser, if it comes under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act proving that the suit is collusive in nature, it is entitled to be impleaded and in this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions in Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 and RajKumar v. Sardari Lal and others, (2004) 2 SCC 601 , following the earlier judgment of the Four Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in SailaBala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 ; ix. that insofar as it relates to the sale effected by Meenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant) after the death of his wife who is a sharer, namely Umayal Achi (5th defendant), he has actually inherited the share and after his death, his son M.Veerappan (26th defendant) having inherited the share, cannot go back from the sale executed by his father and likewise, defendants 3 and 6 are also bound by the sale made by their respective wife and daughter; and x. that the order of this Court in 11.7.1989 supports his case that the appellants should be made as parties and in this regard, he placed reliance on the decision in T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC). 4. Per contra, Mr.K.Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, who is the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, submits: i. that the appellant, being third party, is neither a necessary nor proper party; ii. that the appellant – Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited has never been in the scene and the appellant has never stated that Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited has been converted as Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited and, therefore, the status of the appellant is dubious; iii. that inasmuch as indisputably the share has been identified in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968 giving 1/7th share to each of the sharers and subsequently, since the wife of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar died, it has been made as 1/6th, and there is nothing to be adjudicated; iv. that 77.39 Acres in Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District stood in the name of Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), who is not a sharer and was only a servant of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, and the transfer effected to him was held to be sham and nominal by the second preliminary decree which was passed on 21.11.1977; v. that when proceedings were pending, Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) has fraudulently sold the properties to the non-sharers, who are not entitled to any share in the estate, under two sale deeds dated 10.2.1970 and 9.6.1970 and at the time of sale, the properties which were sold were in custodialegis, namely within the custody of the court appointed Receiver; vi. that when the first respondent herself filed an application for impleading the appellant and also the purchasers, it was they who resisted their impleadment on the ground of lispendens and they cannot now take a contrary stand; vii. that the order passed by this Court dated 12.3.1976 refusing impleadment has become final and the appeal filed by Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) having been withdrawn, the appellant, who purchased lands from the vendors to whom Andiappan has sold the property, has no right and even the vendors of the appellant have filed applications to set aside the withdrawal order and that also came to be dismissed on 23.12.1986; viii. that pendentelite purchasers have no right of getting themselves impleaded and in this regard, he would rely upon the decisions in SarvinderSingh v. Dalip Singh and others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 , BibiZubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another, (2004) 1 SCC 191, Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, 2007 (2) CTC 562 and T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC); ix. that even as per the decisions of the Supreme Court in AmitKumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 and Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 , only in cases where there is none to defend the title except the pendentelite purchaser, the pendentelite purchaser may be impleaded and such impleaded party will only get what is allotted to his vendors in a partition suit, and inasmuch as the appellant has purchased from non co-sharers, they are not entitled even on equity; x. that during the pendency of the suit for partition, which according to him is not collusive, no transfer of property subject matter of partition suit can be effected without permission of the Court and the allegation of collusion should be raised at the earliest point of time; and xi. that the plaintiff, being the admitted sharer, having filed the suit as early as in the year 1965, even in her advanced years is not able to get her right in respect of the property due to vexatious litigation. 5. Mr.S.Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent (Senthilnathan Chettiar) would elaborate his contention on custodialegis stating that the Division Bench has, in fact, appointed a Receiver. He would also very strongly repudiate the contention that there has been collusion. 5. Mr.S.Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent (Senthilnathan Chettiar) would elaborate his contention on custodialegis stating that the Division Bench has, in fact, appointed a Receiver. He would also very strongly repudiate the contention that there has been collusion. It is his submission that by the efforts of the Receiver, one of the properties, which is a theatre in the city of Chennai, came to be sold and, therefore, on the principle of custodialegis, when the property is in the custody of the Court, if a purchaser has not obtained any permission from the Court, he cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser and in this regard, he would rely upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in ArumughaGounder v. Ardhanari Mudaliar and others, AIR 1975 Madras 231. To substantiate his contention about constructive res judicata, he would rely upon the decision in M.Nagabhushanav. State of Karnataka and others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 and to show that benami transaction has been effected, which is fraudulent in nature, he would rely upon the decisions in R.RajagopalReddy (dead) by Lrs. and others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (dead) by Lrs., (1995) 2 SCC 630 . 6. Mr.Rahul Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the 27th respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011 – M.Veerappan, would submit that the conduct of the appellant would amount to approbation and reprobation and it is not a necessary and proper party. He would submit that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel by relying upon a judgment in Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) and others v. Director General of Civil Aviation and others, (2011) 5 SCC 435 . It is his submission that the title of the third parties is traceable to their vendors and inasmuch as Andiappan is not a sharer and his position has already been decided by this Court holding that the transfer effected to him is sham and nominal, which has become final, the appellant cannot go beyond that and can never claim itself to be a necessary and proper party and in this regard, he would rely upon the decision in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417 . It is his submission that no person has any right to insist that he has to be impleaded as a party merely because he is a proper party, by relying on the decision in RameshHirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524 . It is his submission that inasmuch as the appellant is a rank outsider, it cannot have interest over the partition suit. He further submitted that the appellant cannot even claim any equitable allotment, as it was held by the Apex Court in T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC). In respect of transposition of the appellant as the third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000, it is his submission that when the issue has been determined in entirety, such transposition would amount to abuse of process and re-litigation, as it was held by the Supreme Court in K.K.Modiv. K.N.Modi and others, (1998) 3 SCC 573 . According to him, none of the grounds required for transposition is satisfied in the present case. Mr.M.Sriram, counsel appearing for the 7th respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 to 187 of 2011 and counsel appearing for various parties also adopted the above said contentions. 7. We have heard the elaborate submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as the respective counsel appearing for various respondents, referred to the impugned order of the learned Judge, and given our anxious thought to the issue involved in this case. 8. At the outset, it has to be made clear that admittedly C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the plaintiff therein, who is the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, is still pending for passing final decree. It is also not in dispute that the first preliminary decree passed in the said suit for partition on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has become final. It is also not in dispute that the first preliminary decree passed in the said suit for partition on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has become final. In the second preliminary decree passed in the said suit on 21.11.1977, while confirming the entitlement of the plaintiff in respect of her 1/7th share, in respect of the other properties which were left out in the first preliminary decree, including the properties which are subject matter in these proceedings situated at Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District, a finding has been given by this Court that the transaction effected between T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar and Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) under various sale deeds is sham and nominal. 9. It is against the said preliminary decree, Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, which was subsequently withdrawn by him and it is also not in dispute that after such withdrawal of the appeal by Andiappan, four persons who have purchased from him, who are the vendors of the appellants, have filed C.M.P.Nos.15248 and 15249 of 1984 and 6836 of 1985 to implead them as appellants in the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all those three petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench on 23.12.1986 and the said four persons, who are non-sharers, have also not filed any appeal against the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977. Even otherwise, filing of such appeal is totally time barred. It was in the above said background we have to consider the appeals filed by the appellant for impleadment, transposition, etc. 10. The appellant cannot claim better title than their transferors. Their transferors (vendors), in their turn, having purchased from Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), cannot claim better title than Andiappan. Now that the transactions in the year 1960 between Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) and T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar have been held by this Court as sham and nominal, which has become final, it is yet to be seen as to whether the second suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed by the vendors of the appellant, in effect to annul the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977, is maintainable in the light of the dismissal of their own applications to implead themselves in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. 11. 11. As far as the implead petition filed by the appellant to implead in C.S.No.83 of 1965, which is a suit for partition in which the shares of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 have been ascertained in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968, it is to be seen as to whether in the absence of the appellant the final decree can be passed effectively (or) as to whether the presence of the appellant will facilitate the proper adjudication of the partition suit, so as to come to a conclusion that the appellant is either a necessary or proper party. 12. On the face of it, it is clear that the presence of the appellant is neither necessary for adjudication nor it is a proper party for arriving at a proper conclusion in the partition suit. It is not as if by not impleading the appellant, the appellant is left in the lurch. The contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant has parted with huge amount of consideration in respect of the purchase and, therefore, it cannot be denied relief, even though appears to be attractive, in our considered opinion, is without substance. It would have been different if the appellant has paid the consideration to the sharers. Having paid consideration to the non-sharers in the joint family property, it is certainly not open to the appellant to make a hue and cry that enormous amount has been parted with. Even if some of the vendors of the appellant, being the relatives of the sharers, receive any share ultimately in the final decree to be passed in the partition suit, by virtue of inheritance due to the death of the sharers, the appellant can always proceed against their respective shares. Even in the absence of such shares having been received by the vendors of the appellant, there are other remedies available. If it is taken as a commission of cheating by a non-owner, the larger issue to be decided is as to whether the doctrine of caveat emptor will be applicable against the appellant. 13. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not a pendentelite purchaser, but the case of the appellant, as contended by Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel, is that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only if the suit is not a collusive suit. 13. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not a pendentelite purchaser, but the case of the appellant, as contended by Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel, is that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only if the suit is not a collusive suit. The case of the appellant is that the suits are collusive in nature and, therefore, the transfer effected in favour of the appellant is not affected by lispendens. 14. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which refers to the transfer of property pending suit, is as follows: “Section 52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.— During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.” A reading of the said provision, no doubt, shows that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only in respect of the transfer effected pending suit which is not collusive. But in the present case, it is pending the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, to which she is certainly entitled to being a sharer, in which no final decree has been passed so far, the appellant has purchased a portion of the property forming part of the estate. But in the present case, it is pending the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, to which she is certainly entitled to being a sharer, in which no final decree has been passed so far, the appellant has purchased a portion of the property forming part of the estate. In the light of the declaration in the form of the first preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968 identifying the shares of the plaintiff as well as each of defendants 1 to 6, it is not known as to how anybody can come to a conclusion that there is collusion. Even the suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed by the vendors of the appellant cannot be termed as collusive for the simple reason that the vendor of the plaintiffs in the said suit himself has lost his right by virtue of the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977, wherein his purchase from T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has been held to be sham and nominal. There cannot be any remote possibility of collusion between the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 and the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965. Merely because the appellant has purchased one of the properties of the family, it does not mean that it becomes a necessary party in the suit for partition, especially when the appellant has admittedly purchased from non-sharers. Therefore, the contention that doctrine of lispendens would have affect only in cases of non-collusive suit has no applicability to the facts of the present case. 15. Further, even on going through the pleadings in C.S.No.686 of 2000, one cannot come to a conclusion that the suit is collusive in nature. The averment contained therein only shows that the first defendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, posed as the owner under the sale deed of the year 1960 and after the second preliminary decree was passed on 21.11.1977, he has assured the plaintiffs therein that he would file appeal to take appropriate steps, however in collusion with defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in the said suit, he has withdrawn the appeal, namely O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. Further, the pleading shows that while withdrawing O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, the first defendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, in collusion with defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, has stated that the suit property was that of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The paragraphs which dealt with the so-called collusion in the plaint in C.S.No.686 of 2000 are as follows: "38. Even then, the first defendant assure the plaintiffs and the 9th defendant that he would take up the matter on appeal and requested the first plaintiff to provide funds for filing appeal; and accordingly with the funds provided by the plaintiffs, O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 was filed by the 1st defendant herein. In the said appeal originally on 11.10.1979, interim stay was granted in C.M.P.No.10061 of 1979 and subsequently on 17.9.1980, interim stay granted in C.M.P.No.10061 of 1979 was made absolute. 39. Thereafter it appears that some of the defendants had purchased the 1st defendant and he having sold all properties, evidently fell into the trap and colluding with other defendants and in particular defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, he had actually taken steps to withdraw the appeal O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. 40. The Plaintiffs, and in particular the first plaintiff, having come to know of the move of the first defendant, opposed the said withdrawal. It appears that while withdrawing the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, the first defendant, in collusion with the other defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, had stated that the suit property was that of the Chidambaram Chettiar." Therefore, in filing C.S.No.686 of 2000 by the plaintiffs there is no collusion at all and collusion is attributed to Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) and defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in C.S.No.686 of 2000. Hence, it cannot be said that C.S.No.686 of 2000 or C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive in nature and, therefore, it is clear that the appellant is a pendentelite purchaser. 16. Hence, it cannot be said that C.S.No.686 of 2000 or C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive in nature and, therefore, it is clear that the appellant is a pendentelite purchaser. 16. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant should be considered as necessary and proper party based on the decision in Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 cannot be accepted for the simple reason that, on fact, in the said case the appellants have purchased undivided share from the co-sharers, namely respondents 2, 3, 4 and 6, and it was on the said facts the Apex Court has held that the appellants having purchased from the co-sharers are entitled to come on record to workout equity. In paragraph (5) of the said judgment, it was held as follows: "5. Section 52 deals with a transfer of property pending suit. In the instant case, the appellants have admittedly purchased the undivided shares of Respondents 2, 3, 4 and 6. It is not in dispute that the first respondent P. Mohan has got an undivided share in the said suit property. Because of the purchase by the appellants of the undivided share in the suit property, the rights of the first respondent herein in the suit or proceeding will not affect his right in the suit property by enforcing a partition. Admittedly, the appellants, having purchased the property from the other co-sharers, in our opinion, are entitled to come on record in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. In our opinion, the appellants are necessary and proper parties to the suit, which is now pending before the trial court. We also make it clear that we are not concerned with the other suit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings. But on the facts of the present case, admittedly, the purchase by the appellant is not from the co-sharers and it is from third parties. 17. We also make it clear that we are not concerned with the other suit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings. But on the facts of the present case, admittedly, the purchase by the appellant is not from the co-sharers and it is from third parties. 17. The reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the judgment in AmitKumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 to support his contention that for granting leave under Order XXII Rule 10 or Order I Rule 10 CPC read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no elaborate enquiry is required and the purchaser should be made a party in the pending proceedings, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. That was a case where two items of properties were obtained by the appellants before the Supreme Court, one by way of deed of assignment dated 15.12.1995 and other by way of a sale deed dated 15.12.1995 from Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey respectively, who have become owners of the property by the transfer effected by the original owner Khetra Mohan Das. There was a litigation between the original owner, namely Khetra Mohan Das, and the said Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and a suit was filed and ultimately, a second appeal was pending at the time when the said assignment and sale were effected in favour of the appellants. It was in those circumstances, when the appellants came to know later about the pendency of the appeal, they filed application for impleading themselves as parties. It was in the light of the above said facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that on a combined reading of Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that the object of the said provisions is to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The observation made by the Supreme Court is extracted here under: "8. The observation made by the Supreme Court is extracted here under: "8. On a combined reading of Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, can an application for substitution by a subsequent transferee be rejected and the subsequent purchaser be non-suited altogether is the prime question for consideration in these appeals. 9. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases: (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or (2) when, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided." Ultimately, the Supreme Court has held that the transferee pendentelite to the extent he has acquired the property is vitally interested in the litigation, thereby meaning a transferee from a sharer. In this regard, it is relevant to extract paragraph (16) of the judgment, which is as follows: "16. The doctrine of lispendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendentelite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendentelite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lispendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendentelite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lispendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendentelite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that a transferee pendentelite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case." The heavy reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the above said portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court, in our view would be applicable to a case where the transferee claims right from the sharer. Unfortunately, on the facts of the present case, the appellant is not claiming any transfer of right from the co-sharers of the family and, therefore, it cannot be said that the claim of the appellant is bona fide. 18. Again, the Four Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court in SailaBala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 relates to a case where an owner of the property at Calcutta executed mortgage in favour of Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who instituted a suit on mortgage and obtained a preliminary decree on 8.3.1935 and final decree was passed on 20.4.1936. As per the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, a person in whose favour a decree is passed has to apply for drawing up of the decree within four days. However, the said Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who has hurriedly filed a suit and obtained decree, has not taken steps to draw up a decree for 18 years and it was in those circumstances, the second respondent (Sudhir Kumar Mitter), namely the owner of the property, has sold the property and the purchaser under the said sale wanted to participate in the execution proceedings and it was in those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "9. It remains to consider whether, on the merits, there should be an order in favour of the appellant. It remains to consider whether, on the merits, there should be an order in favour of the appellant. Of that, we have no doubt whatsoever. The proceedings in which she seeks to intervene arise in execution of a mortgage decree. She has purchased the properties comprised in the decree for Rs.60,000 under a covenant that they are free from encumbrances. And after her purchase, the first respondent has started proceedings for sale of the properties, nearly 18 years after the decree had been passed. The appellant maintains that the execution proceedings are barred by limitation, and desires to be heard on that question. It is true that P.B. Mukharji, J., has rejected this contention, but a reading of his judgment shows — and that is what he himself observes — that there are substantial questions of law calling for decision. Even apart from the plea of limitation, there is also a question as to the amount payable in discharge and satisfaction of the decree obtained by the first respondent in Suit No.158 of 1935. Both the respondents claim that they have settled it at Rs.17,670. But it is stated for the appellant that under the decree which is sought to be executed the amount recoverable for principal and interest will not exceed Rs.6000. In the affidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20, 1956, filed on behalf of the first respondent, particulars are given as to how the sum of Rs.17,670 was made up. It will be seen therefrom that a sum of Rs.7200 is claimed for interest up to March 8, 1956, calculating it not at the rate provided in the final decree but at the contract rate. Then a sum of Rs.5000 is included as for costs incurred by the mortgagee in suits other than Suit No.158 of 1935 and in proceedings connected therewith. The appellant contends that the properties in her hands could, under no circumstances, be made liable for this amount. A sum of Rs.1750 is agreed to be paid for costs in the sale reference, in the proceedings before P.B. Mukharji, J., and in Appeal No. 152 of 1955. Asks the appellant, where is the settlement in this, and how can it bind me? It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested, and indeed is the only person interested. Asks the appellant, where is the settlement in this, and how can it bind me? It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested, and indeed is the only person interested. As a purchaser pendente lite, she will be bound by the proceedings taken by the first respondent in execution of her decree, and justice requires that she should be given an opportunity to protect her rights." Judgment :- P. JYOTHIMANI, J. 1. These appeals arise from a common order dated 29.4.2011 passed by a learned Single Judge in Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 in C.S.No.83 of 1965 and Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000. While appellant filed Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 in C.S.No.83 of 1965 for impleading itself, namely Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited, formerly known as "The Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited", as the 64th defendant in the suit stated above and to implead or substitute the appellant either in the place of Andiappan (7th defendant) or VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant) or M.Veerappan (26th defendant) respectively, Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000 has been filed by the appellant, which was arrayed as 10th defendant in the said suit, to transpose it as the third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000. All the applications came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge, against which the present appeals are filed. 2.1. Originally, the land property called Edamallapatti land in Pratiyur, Trichy comprising of 77.39 Acres belonged to one Late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, who is stated to have sold a portion of the said property in the year 1960 to one Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) under a registered sale deed. The said T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar died on 18.8.1964, leaving behind him his widow – CT.Sivagami Achi (4th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), who also died subsequently on 26.11.1988, apart from three sons, namely PL.CT.Subramaniam Chettiar, PL.CT.Palaniappa Chettiar and PL.CT.Senthilnathan Chettiar, arrayed as defendants 1 to 3 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, and three daughters, namely Umayal Achi, L.Velliammai Achi arrayed as defendants 5 and 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, and K.R.Meenakshi Achi, who filed C.S.No.83 of 1965 for partition. 2.2. 2.2. The first son of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, namely the 1st defendant, also died leaving behind him his two wives, namely Dhoniprathambal Achi (48th defendant) and Umayal Achi (49th defendant), who also subsequently died, and their sons and daughters have been impleaded as defendants 50 to 62 in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.3. Likewise, Umayal Achi (5th defendant), one of the daughter of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, also died, who was succeeded by her husband VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant), who also subsequently died and thereafter his son – M.Veerappan has been impleaded as 26th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.4. Some of the left out properties while filing the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965 were subsequently added by an application filed by the plaintiff and third parties, including Andiappan (7th defendant), were impleaded by order dated 24.11.1967. 2.5. A preliminary decree by consent of the parties was passed on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. However, it appears that there was no decision regarding the item of properties stated to have been purchased by the said Andiappan (7th defendant). 2.6. It appears that Andiappan (7th defendant) has sold away various portions of the properties under registered sale deeds to and in favour of VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram (husband of the 5th defendant), Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi (wife of the 3rd defendant) and one Rangasamy Gounder, who was not related to the sharers. The plaintiff in the suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed Application No.3220 of 1975 to implead the said purchasers and the said application for impleadment came to be dismissed by this Court on 12.3.1976 on the ground that they are pendentelite purchasers and, therefore, the doctrine of lispendens would apply. The order is as follows: "Admittedly the property in relation to which injunction is sought does not form part of the preliminary decree in C.S.No.83 of 1965. Nevertheless, that the applicant contends is that the 7th defendant is only a servant of the deceased father who has sold away the property in favour of respondents 2 to 5 sought to be impleaded as parties. Nevertheless, that the applicant contends is that the 7th defendant is only a servant of the deceased father who has sold away the property in favour of respondents 2 to 5 sought to be impleaded as parties. Admittedly the sale is pending C.S.No.83 of 1965 in which even the doctrine of lis pendens can be invoked by the applicant as and when he succeeds in establishing his right to these survey numbers forming the subject amtter of the application. In this view, I see no need to continue the interim injunction. Accordingly that will stand vacated and application No.3220 of 1975 will also stand dismissed." Accordingly, the application for impleadment as well as the injunction application came to be dismissed by this Court. 2.7. After the conclusion of trial, by a second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, it was held that the transfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham and nominal and, therefore, the said property also formed part of the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The operative portion of the said judgment is as under: "... Therefore, even in the case of the 7th defendant, I had to accept the case of the plaintiff and I hold that the sale in favour of the 7th defendant was a sham and nominal transaction and that no title passed in respect of item (a) of III Schedule and the same remained as part of the estate of Chidambaram Chettiar. Accordingly, issue No.1 is found in favour of the plaintiff." 2.8. As against the said portion of the judgment, Andiappan (7th defendant) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and that appeal came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 14.8.1984. Thereafter, the above said four purchasers from Andiappan (7th defendant), who are not sharers in the joint family property, have filed various applications to set aside the order dated 14.8.1984 made in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all the said applications were dismissed on 23.12.1986 by a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench has, in fact, held that it was these purchasers who have resisted the application filed by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead them as parties based on the doctrine of lispendens and, therefore, they are estopped from taking a different stand. 2.9. The Division Bench has, in fact, held that it was these purchasers who have resisted the application filed by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead them as parties based on the doctrine of lispendens and, therefore, they are estopped from taking a different stand. 2.9. As against the said order of the Division Bench in the applications filed by the pendentelite purchasers, there was no further appeal, obviously because it was barred by limitation by that time. Instead the said pendentelite purchasers filed C.S.No.674 of 1987 praying to annul the order dated 21.11.1977, by which the second preliminary decree was passed by this Court in C.S.No.83 of 1965 holding that the subject matter of properties stated to have been purchased by Andiappan (7th defendant) are sham and nominal, and benami. It was that suit which was subsequently transferred to the City Civil Court, Chennai based on monetary limit and was thereafter transferred to this Court and re-numbered as C.S.No.686 of 2000. 2.10. The said pendentelite purchasers earlier filed application for injunction against the sharers from proceeding further, which came to be dismissed by this Court on 9.1.1989, and the said order was also confirmed by a Division Bench in O.S.A.No.40 of 1989 on 22.2.1989. It appears that there was an Advocate Commissioner appointed to identify the properties for division by metes and bounds, apart from the appointment of a Receiver in C.S.No.83 of 1965. 2.11. It is also relevant to point out at this stage that the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, having come to know about the purchase made by the appellants, has filed Application No.2034 of 1992 to implead the purchasers, including the Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited, and there was also an order of injunction obtained in O.A.No.285 of 1992 restraining them from trespassing into the property. Ultimately, the plaintiff withdrew the application seeking impleadment on 16.4.2010. 2.12. Ultimately, the plaintiff withdrew the application seeking impleadment on 16.4.2010. 2.12. The appellant herein, being the third party to the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965 and stated to have been called as "The Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited" (10th defendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000), claiming itself to have purchased about an extent of 26.49 Acres from Meenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant), who subsequently died and is represented by M.Veerappan (26th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi (wife of the 3rd defendant) and Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6th defendant) under various registered sale deeds, which are as follows: has filed the above said applications on the grounds that it is a bon fide purchaser having paid the amount of full consideration to its vendors; that the plaintiff and sharers in collusion with the vendors of the appellant have obtained preliminary decree; that by collusion they entered into an arrangement among themselves and there is likelihood of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to withdraw the same on the basis of a compromise and execute the decree passed in the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965, apart from many other grounds. 2.13. The applications filed by the appellant were resisted by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 on the ground that the purchase stated to have been made by the appellant from non-sharers is fraudulent in nature and in any event, the validity of the appellant's purchase depends upon the rights of Andiappan (7th defendant) and inasmuch as it has been settled and become final that the transfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham and nominal, the appellant or its vendors cannot claim any better title. 2.14. It was after considering the rival contentions, the learned Judge has dismissed the applications on the ground that the appellant is pendentelite purchaser of a portion of the property forming part of C.S.No.83 of 1965 and, therefore, under the legal concept of lispendens, it is not necessary party to decide the lis, and also on the ground that the rights of the appellant are limited, since the partition suit between the members of the family can be decided even in the absence of the appellant and hence, the appellant is not a necessary and proper party. 2.15. 2.15. It is as against the said order of the learned Judge, the applicant before the learned Single Judge has filed the present appeals on various grounds, including that the appellant is necessary and proper party to the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965, as any decision in the partition suit will result in dispossession of the appellant, who is in possession; that the learned Judge ought to have appreciated the implication of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity, "the CPC"); that the reason given by the learned Judge that the appellant is pendentelite purchaser is not correct; that the learned Judge has not taken into consideration the application filed by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead the appellant, which was withdrawn on 16.4.2010 and, therefore, she cannot now say that the appellant is not necessary and proper party; that the appellant is bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and its right is protected under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and that no valid reason has been given for dismissing all the three applications, especially when the presence of the appellant will facilitate effective adjudication of the entire issue. 3. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend as under: i. that the dismissal of Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to transpose the appellant, who was arrayed as 10th defendant, as the third plaintiff in the said suit is unsustainable; ii. that the appellant should be given opportunity to continue the suit filed by its vendors to set aside the decree in C.S.No.83 of 1965, consequent to the withdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by Andiappan (first defendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000), insofar as it relates to schedule properties in the suit measuring 77.39 Acres in Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District, especially when the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000, who are near relatives to the sharers, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, are attempting to withdraw the suit and arrive at a compromise final decree, in which event the appellant will be losing its valuable right; iii. that it has been the judicial precedent, as held in BhupendraNarayan Sinha Bahadur v. Rajeswar Prosad Bhakat and others, AIR 1931 PC 162 and in the latest judgment of this Court in R.Dhanasundari@ R.Rajeswari v. A.N.Umakanth and others, 2006 (5) CTC 440 , that right of transposition under Order I Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC is to be decided on two factors, namely complete adjudication of disputes and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings; iv. that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable only if it is not a collusive suit and since the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 have already approached the court on the basis that the decree obtained in C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive, the appellant, being the bona fide purchaser from the said plaintiffs, must be given opportunity to continue the suit in the absence of the efforts taken by the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to proceed with the case; v. that the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 themselves have no objection for transposition except raising objection now and, therefore, that creates a strong suspicion that they are not interested in prosecuting the suit, in which event the appellant will be the affected party; vi. that the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 having filed an application to implead the appellant and other subsequent purchasers realizing that they are necessary parties, has chosen to withdraw the application with a view to collusively file a compromise memo in order to deprive the appellant its right; vii. that the withdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and declining efforts to restore O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 was on the facts of that case and that does not mean that the subsequent purchaser has no right to continue the litigation; viii. that even if the appellant is pendentelite purchaser, if it comes under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act proving that the suit is collusive in nature, it is entitled to be impleaded and in this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions in Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 and RajKumar v. Sardari Lal and others, (2004) 2 SCC 601 , following the earlier judgment of the Four Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in SailaBala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 ; ix. that insofar as it relates to the sale effected by Meenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant) after the death of his wife who is a sharer, namely Umayal Achi (5th defendant), he has actually inherited the share and after his death, his son M.Veerappan (26th defendant) having inherited the share, cannot go back from the sale executed by his father and likewise, defendants 3 and 6 are also bound by the sale made by their respective wife and daughter; and x. that the order of this Court in 11.7.1989 supports his case that the appellants should be made as parties and in this regard, he placed reliance on the decision in T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC). 4. Per contra, Mr.K.Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, who is the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, submits: i. that the appellant, being third party, is neither a necessary nor proper party; ii. that the appellant – Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited has never been in the scene and the appellant has never stated that Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited has been converted as Good Shepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited and, therefore, the status of the appellant is dubious; iii. that inasmuch as indisputably the share has been identified in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968 giving 1/7th share to each of the sharers and subsequently, since the wife of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar died, it has been made as 1/6th, and there is nothing to be adjudicated; iv. that 77.39 Acres in Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District stood in the name of Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), who is not a sharer and was only a servant of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, and the transfer effected to him was held to be sham and nominal by the second preliminary decree which was passed on 21.11.1977; v. that when proceedings were pending, Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) has fraudulently sold the properties to the non-sharers, who are not entitled to any share in the estate, under two sale deeds dated 10.2.1970 and 9.6.1970 and at the time of sale, the properties which were sold were in custodialegis, namely within the custody of the court appointed Receiver; vi. that when the first respondent herself filed an application for impleading the appellant and also the purchasers, it was they who resisted their impleadment on the ground of lispendens and they cannot now take a contrary stand; vii. that the order passed by this Court dated 12.3.1976 refusing impleadment has become final and the appeal filed by Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) having been withdrawn, the appellant, who purchased lands from the vendors to whom Andiappan has sold the property, has no right and even the vendors of the appellant have filed applications to set aside the withdrawal order and that also came to be dismissed on 23.12.1986; viii. that pendentelite purchasers have no right of getting themselves impleaded and in this regard, he would rely upon the decisions in SarvinderSingh v. Dalip Singh and others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 , BibiZubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another, (2004) 1 SCC 191, Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, 2007 (2) CTC 562 and T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC); ix. that even as per the decisions of the Supreme Court in AmitKumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 and Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 , only in cases where there is none to defend the title except the pendentelite purchaser, the pendentelite purchaser may be impleaded and such impleaded party will only get what is allotted to his vendors in a partition suit, and inasmuch as the appellant has purchased from non co-sharers, they are not entitled even on equity; x. that during the pendency of the suit for partition, which according to him is not collusive, no transfer of property subject matter of partition suit can be effected without permission of the Court and the allegation of collusion should be raised at the earliest point of time; and xi. that the plaintiff, being the admitted sharer, having filed the suit as early as in the year 1965, even in her advanced years is not able to get her right in respect of the property due to vexatious litigation. 5. Mr.S.Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent (Senthilnathan Chettiar) would elaborate his contention on custodialegis stating that the Division Bench has, in fact, appointed a Receiver. He would also very strongly repudiate the contention that there has been collusion. 5. Mr.S.Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent (Senthilnathan Chettiar) would elaborate his contention on custodialegis stating that the Division Bench has, in fact, appointed a Receiver. He would also very strongly repudiate the contention that there has been collusion. It is his submission that by the efforts of the Receiver, one of the properties, which is a theatre in the city of Chennai, came to be sold and, therefore, on the principle of custodialegis, when the property is in the custody of the Court, if a purchaser has not obtained any permission from the Court, he cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser and in this regard, he would rely upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in ArumughaGounder v. Ardhanari Mudaliar and others, AIR 1975 Madras 231. To substantiate his contention about constructive res judicata, he would rely upon the decision in M.Nagabhushanav. State of Karnataka and others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 and to show that benami transaction has been effected, which is fraudulent in nature, he would rely upon the decisions in R.RajagopalReddy (dead) by Lrs. and others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (dead) by Lrs., (1995) 2 SCC 630 . 6. Mr.Rahul Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the 27th respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011 – M.Veerappan, would submit that the conduct of the appellant would amount to approbation and reprobation and it is not a necessary and proper party. He would submit that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel by relying upon a judgment in Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) and others v. Director General of Civil Aviation and others, (2011) 5 SCC 435 . It is his submission that the title of the third parties is traceable to their vendors and inasmuch as Andiappan is not a sharer and his position has already been decided by this Court holding that the transfer effected to him is sham and nominal, which has become final, the appellant cannot go beyond that and can never claim itself to be a necessary and proper party and in this regard, he would rely upon the decision in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417 . It is his submission that no person has any right to insist that he has to be impleaded as a party merely because he is a proper party, by relying on the decision in RameshHirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524 . It is his submission that inasmuch as the appellant is a rank outsider, it cannot have interest over the partition suit. He further submitted that the appellant cannot even claim any equitable allotment, as it was held by the Apex Court in T.G.AshokKumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC). In respect of transposition of the appellant as the third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000, it is his submission that when the issue has been determined in entirety, such transposition would amount to abuse of process and re-litigation, as it was held by the Supreme Court in K.K.Modiv. K.N.Modi and others, (1998) 3 SCC 573 . According to him, none of the grounds required for transposition is satisfied in the present case. Mr.M.Sriram, counsel appearing for the 7th respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 to 187 of 2011 and counsel appearing for various parties also adopted the above said contentions. 7. We have heard the elaborate submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as the respective counsel appearing for various respondents, referred to the impugned order of the learned Judge, and given our anxious thought to the issue involved in this case. 8. At the outset, it has to be made clear that admittedly C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the plaintiff therein, who is the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, is still pending for passing final decree. It is also not in dispute that the first preliminary decree passed in the said suit for partition on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has become final. It is also not in dispute that the first preliminary decree passed in the said suit for partition on 22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has become final. In the second preliminary decree passed in the said suit on 21.11.1977, while confirming the entitlement of the plaintiff in respect of her 1/7th share, in respect of the other properties which were left out in the first preliminary decree, including the properties which are subject matter in these proceedings situated at Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, Trichy District, a finding has been given by this Court that the transaction effected between T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar and Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) under various sale deeds is sham and nominal. 9. It is against the said preliminary decree, Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, which was subsequently withdrawn by him and it is also not in dispute that after such withdrawal of the appeal by Andiappan, four persons who have purchased from him, who are the vendors of the appellants, have filed C.M.P.Nos.15248 and 15249 of 1984 and 6836 of 1985 to implead them as appellants in the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all those three petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench on 23.12.1986 and the said four persons, who are non-sharers, have also not filed any appeal against the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977. Even otherwise, filing of such appeal is totally time barred. It was in the above said background we have to consider the appeals filed by the appellant for impleadment, transposition, etc. 10. The appellant cannot claim better title than their transferors. Their transferors (vendors), in their turn, having purchased from Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), cannot claim better title than Andiappan. Now that the transactions in the year 1960 between Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) and T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar have been held by this Court as sham and nominal, which has become final, it is yet to be seen as to whether the second suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed by the vendors of the appellant, in effect to annul the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977, is maintainable in the light of the dismissal of their own applications to implead themselves in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. 11. 11. As far as the implead petition filed by the appellant to implead in C.S.No.83 of 1965, which is a suit for partition in which the shares of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 have been ascertained in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968, it is to be seen as to whether in the absence of the appellant the final decree can be passed effectively (or) as to whether the presence of the appellant will facilitate the proper adjudication of the partition suit, so as to come to a conclusion that the appellant is either a necessary or proper party. 12. On the face of it, it is clear that the presence of the appellant is neither necessary for adjudication nor it is a proper party for arriving at a proper conclusion in the partition suit. It is not as if by not impleading the appellant, the appellant is left in the lurch. The contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant has parted with huge amount of consideration in respect of the purchase and, therefore, it cannot be denied relief, even though appears to be attractive, in our considered opinion, is without substance. It would have been different if the appellant has paid the consideration to the sharers. Having paid consideration to the non-sharers in the joint family property, it is certainly not open to the appellant to make a hue and cry that enormous amount has been parted with. Even if some of the vendors of the appellant, being the relatives of the sharers, receive any share ultimately in the final decree to be passed in the partition suit, by virtue of inheritance due to the death of the sharers, the appellant can always proceed against their respective shares. Even in the absence of such shares having been received by the vendors of the appellant, there are other remedies available. If it is taken as a commission of cheating by a non-owner, the larger issue to be decided is as to whether the doctrine of caveat emptor will be applicable against the appellant. 13. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not a pendentelite purchaser, but the case of the appellant, as contended by Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel, is that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only if the suit is not a collusive suit. 13. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not a pendentelite purchaser, but the case of the appellant, as contended by Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel, is that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only if the suit is not a collusive suit. The case of the appellant is that the suits are collusive in nature and, therefore, the transfer effected in favour of the appellant is not affected by lispendens. 14. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which refers to the transfer of property pending suit, is as follows: “Section 52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.— During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.” A reading of the said provision, no doubt, shows that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only in respect of the transfer effected pending suit which is not collusive. But in the present case, it is pending the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, to which she is certainly entitled to being a sharer, in which no final decree has been passed so far, the appellant has purchased a portion of the property forming part of the estate. But in the present case, it is pending the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, to which she is certainly entitled to being a sharer, in which no final decree has been passed so far, the appellant has purchased a portion of the property forming part of the estate. In the light of the declaration in the form of the first preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968 identifying the shares of the plaintiff as well as each of defendants 1 to 6, it is not known as to how anybody can come to a conclusion that there is collusion. Even the suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed by the vendors of the appellant cannot be termed as collusive for the simple reason that the vendor of the plaintiffs in the said suit himself has lost his right by virtue of the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977, wherein his purchase from T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has been held to be sham and nominal. There cannot be any remote possibility of collusion between the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 and the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965. Merely because the appellant has purchased one of the properties of the family, it does not mean that it becomes a necessary party in the suit for partition, especially when the appellant has admittedly purchased from non-sharers. Therefore, the contention that doctrine of lispendens would have affect only in cases of non-collusive suit has no applicability to the facts of the present case. 15. Further, even on going through the pleadings in C.S.No.686 of 2000, one cannot come to a conclusion that the suit is collusive in nature. The averment contained therein only shows that the first defendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, posed as the owner under the sale deed of the year 1960 and after the second preliminary decree was passed on 21.11.1977, he has assured the plaintiffs therein that he would file appeal to take appropriate steps, however in collusion with defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in the said suit, he has withdrawn the appeal, namely O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. Further, the pleading shows that while withdrawing O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, the first defendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, in collusion with defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, has stated that the suit property was that of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The paragraphs which dealt with the so-called collusion in the plaint in C.S.No.686 of 2000 are as follows: "38. Even then, the first defendant assure the plaintiffs and the 9th defendant that he would take up the matter on appeal and requested the first plaintiff to provide funds for filing appeal; and accordingly with the funds provided by the plaintiffs, O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 was filed by the 1st defendant herein. In the said appeal originally on 11.10.1979, interim stay was granted in C.M.P.No.10061 of 1979 and subsequently on 17.9.1980, interim stay granted in C.M.P.No.10061 of 1979 was made absolute. 39. Thereafter it appears that some of the defendants had purchased the 1st defendant and he having sold all properties, evidently fell into the trap and colluding with other defendants and in particular defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, he had actually taken steps to withdraw the appeal O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. 40. The Plaintiffs, and in particular the first plaintiff, having come to know of the move of the first defendant, opposed the said withdrawal. It appears that while withdrawing the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, the first defendant, in collusion with the other defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, had stated that the suit property was that of the Chidambaram Chettiar." Therefore, in filing C.S.No.686 of 2000 by the plaintiffs there is no collusion at all and collusion is attributed to Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) and defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in C.S.No.686 of 2000. Hence, it cannot be said that C.S.No.686 of 2000 or C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive in nature and, therefore, it is clear that the appellant is a pendentelite purchaser. 16. Hence, it cannot be said that C.S.No.686 of 2000 or C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive in nature and, therefore, it is clear that the appellant is a pendentelite purchaser. 16. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant should be considered as necessary and proper party based on the decision in Dhanlakshmiand others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 cannot be accepted for the simple reason that, on fact, in the said case the appellants have purchased undivided share from the co-sharers, namely respondents 2, 3, 4 and 6, and it was on the said facts the Apex Court has held that the appellants having purchased from the co-sharers are entitled to come on record to workout equity. In paragraph (5) of the said judgment, it was held as follows: "5. Section 52 deals with a transfer of property pending suit. In the instant case, the appellants have admittedly purchased the undivided shares of Respondents 2, 3, 4 and 6. It is not in dispute that the first respondent P. Mohan has got an undivided share in the said suit property. Because of the purchase by the appellants of the undivided share in the suit property, the rights of the first respondent herein in the suit or proceeding will not affect his right in the suit property by enforcing a partition. Admittedly, the appellants, having purchased the property from the other co-sharers, in our opinion, are entitled to come on record in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. In our opinion, the appellants are necessary and proper parties to the suit, which is now pending before the trial court. We also make it clear that we are not concerned with the other suit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings. But on the facts of the present case, admittedly, the purchase by the appellant is not from the co-sharers and it is from third parties. 17. We also make it clear that we are not concerned with the other suit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings. But on the facts of the present case, admittedly, the purchase by the appellant is not from the co-sharers and it is from third parties. 17. The reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the judgment in AmitKumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 to support his contention that for granting leave under Order XXII Rule 10 or Order I Rule 10 CPC read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no elaborate enquiry is required and the purchaser should be made a party in the pending proceedings, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. That was a case where two items of properties were obtained by the appellants before the Supreme Court, one by way of deed of assignment dated 15.12.1995 and other by way of a sale deed dated 15.12.1995 from Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey respectively, who have become owners of the property by the transfer effected by the original owner Khetra Mohan Das. There was a litigation between the original owner, namely Khetra Mohan Das, and the said Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and a suit was filed and ultimately, a second appeal was pending at the time when the said assignment and sale were effected in favour of the appellants. It was in those circumstances, when the appellants came to know later about the pendency of the appeal, they filed application for impleading themselves as parties. It was in the light of the above said facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that on a combined reading of Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that the object of the said provisions is to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The observation made by the Supreme Court is extracted here under: "8. The observation made by the Supreme Court is extracted here under: "8. On a combined reading of Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, can an application for substitution by a subsequent transferee be rejected and the subsequent purchaser be non-suited altogether is the prime question for consideration in these appeals. 9. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases: (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or (2) when, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided." Ultimately, the Supreme Court has held that the transferee pendentelite to the extent he has acquired the property is vitally interested in the litigation, thereby meaning a transferee from a sharer. In this regard, it is relevant to extract paragraph (16) of the judgment, which is as follows: "16. The doctrine of lispendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendentelite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendentelite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lispendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendentelite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lispendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendentelite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that a transferee pendentelite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case." The heavy reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the above said portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court, in our view would be applicable to a case where the transferee claims right from the sharer. Unfortunately, on the facts of the present case, the appellant is not claiming any transfer of right from the co-sharers of the family and, therefore, it cannot be said that the claim of the appellant is bona fide. 18. Again, the Four Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court in SailaBala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 relates to a case where an owner of the property at Calcutta executed mortgage in favour of Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who instituted a suit on mortgage and obtained a preliminary decree on 8.3.1935 and final decree was passed on 20.4.1936. As per the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, a person in whose favour a decree is passed has to apply for drawing up of the decree within four days. However, the said Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who has hurriedly filed a suit and obtained decree, has not taken steps to draw up a decree for 18 years and it was in those circumstances, the second respondent (Sudhir Kumar Mitter), namely the owner of the property, has sold the property and the purchaser under the said sale wanted to participate in the execution proceedings and it was in those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "9. It remains to consider whether, on the merits, there should be an order in favour of the appellant. It remains to consider whether, on the merits, there should be an order in favour of the appellant. Of that, we have no doubt whatsoever. The proceedings in which she seeks to intervene arise in execution of a mortgage decree. She has purchased the properties comprised in the decree for Rs.60,000 under a covenant that they are free from encumbrances. And after her purchase, the first respondent has started proceedings for sale of the properties, nearly 18 years after the decree had been passed. The appellant maintains that the execution proceedings are barred by limitation, and desires to be heard on that question. It is true that P.B. Mukharji, J., has rejected this contention, but a reading of his judgment shows — and that is what he himself observes — that there are substantial questions of law calling for decision. Even apart from the plea of limitation, there is also a question as to the amount payable in discharge and satisfaction of the decree obtained by the first respondent in Suit No.158 of 1935. Both the respondents claim that they have settled it at Rs.17,670. But it is stated for the appellant that under the decree which is sought to be executed the amount recoverable for principal and interest will not exceed Rs.6000. In the affidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20, 1956, filed on behalf of the first respondent, particulars are given as to how the sum of Rs.17,670 was made up. It will be seen therefrom that a sum of Rs.7200 is claimed for interest up to March 8, 1956, calculating it not at the rate provided in the final decree but at the contract rate. Then a sum of Rs.5000 is included as for costs incurred by the mortgagee in suits other than Suit No.158 of 1935 and in proceedings connected therewith. The appellant contends that the properties in her hands could, under no circumstances, be made liable for this amount. A sum of Rs.1750 is agreed to be paid for costs in the sale reference, in the proceedings before P.B. Mukharji, J., and in Appeal No. 152 of 1955. Asks the appellant, where is the settlement in this, and how can it bind me? It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested, and indeed is the only person interested. Asks the appellant, where is the settlement in this, and how can it bind me? It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested, and indeed is the only person interested. As a purchaser pendente lite, she will be bound by the proceedings taken by the first respondent in execution of her decree, and justice requires that she should be given an opportunity to protect her rights."