JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Apprentice Development Officer on 1.9.1996 in Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short ‘ the Corporation’). After completing probation period he was confirmed on the said post. While he was posted at District Branch Office, the Divisional Office of the Corporation issued a notice dated 17.4.2011 to the petitioner alleging fraud committed by him whereby the Corporation suffered a loss of Rs. 267248.20 paise. Explanation was submitted by the petitioner before the Senior Divisional Manager (LIC), Divisional Office Jiwan Prakash Sanjay Place Agra, stating that Sri Devendra Singh Indauliya who was also a agent in the LIC by taking undue advantage of the circumstances that he was working with the petitioner procured some blank cheque books of the petitioner without his knowledge committed the fraud and has implicated him in the said fraud. 3. The charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner for committing fraud worth Rs. 2,97,728.30 paise belonging to the corporation and tarnishing the image of the Corporation amongst the policy holders. Smt. Anjana Sharma, Manager (Karmik), Divisional Office, Agra was appointed as the Enquiry Officer who submitted her report of enquiry dated 5.10.2005. It is stated that an application dated 6.5.2005 alongwith affidavits of seven witnesses was also submitted by the petitioner who had denied any kind of involvement of the petitioner in the alleged fraud. The Disciplinary Authority on receipt of enquiry report issued show-cause notice dated 27.12.2005 to the petitioner as to why the petitioner may not be removed from service and recovery of pecuniary loss caused by him to the Bank. The petitioner appears to have submitted an explanation on 20.1.2006 before respondent No. 3 alleging that the enquiry report was arbitrary and that he and his witnesses had not been afforded an opportunity of hearing. The Disciplinary authority after considering reply of the petitioner and evidence on record also found the charges of fraud proved against the petitioner and by punishment order dated 20.2.2006 he was imposed penalty from removal of service as well as recovery of pecuniary loss of Rs. 2,97,728.30 paise caused to the LIC by him. 4. The Disciplinary authority after considering reply of the petitioner and evidence on record also found the charges of fraud proved against the petitioner and by punishment order dated 20.2.2006 he was imposed penalty from removal of service as well as recovery of pecuniary loss of Rs. 2,97,728.30 paise caused to the LIC by him. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. respondent No. 2, Zonal Manager, LIC, North Central Zone Office, Jiwan Vikas 16/28, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Kanpur which was also rejected by him vide his order dated 12.2.2007. Aggrieved the petitioner has come up in this writ petition praying the Court to : “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned orders dated 12.2.2007 and 7.2.2006 (Annexures-2 and 3) passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively; (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling the records from respondents regarding the disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 against the petitioner and, it being vitiated, may be quashed; (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner to discharge his duties on the post of Development Officer and to pay regular salary with arrears under the law from the date of punishment; (iv) Issue any other order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case; and (v) Award the cost of the writ petition.” 5. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has exclusive statutory remedy provided by the Legislature under a Special Act known as “The Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance) Companies Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as ‘1949 Act’) by which all service disputes pertaining to the employees of Insurance Company are to be referred to the fact-finding adjudicatory machinery to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central). 6. 6. Replying to the preliminary objection learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner being an officer does not fall within the definition of “workman” as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act and that since counter and rejoinder-affidavit have already been exchanged in this case, hence the case may not be relegated to the Labor Court for adjudication at this stage after it has remained pending for more than five years in the High Court. 7. In support of this submission he has relied upon the decisions rendered in Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC and others, (2004) 8 SCC 387 and in S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and another, (1983) 4 SCC 214 . 8. We have perused the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court and find that it was not brought to the notice of the Apex Court in that case that a specific remedy has been provided by the legislature under the Special Act i.e. 1949 Act. Industrial Dispute in Section 2(a) leaves no room of doubt that any dispute between the Company (employer) and its officers or employee in an Insurance Company referable to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central) for the reason that an industrial dispute can be existed or can be apprehended between Employer and Employer (Officer in this case) & Employee and employee and employer and employee. 9. However, since the counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged and it is a old matter, hence this question to be decided in some appropriate case as to whether in the case where specific remedy is provided by the legislature by legislating a Special Act should the High Court in such cases enter into questions of findings of facts in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without relegating it to the proper forum of adjudication because the petitioner has chosen to file writ petition for exercise of its discretionary powers by the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders of removal from service of the petitioner and for recovery of the alleged loss are violative of the principles of natural justice as well as against the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Articles 14,21 and 309 of the Constitution of India, hence it deserves to be quashed as the petitioner was neither allowed to inspect the voluminous records relied upon by the Insurance Company for proving the charges nor opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. According to him, the enquiry is vitiated and no case for disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 is made against the petitioner also for the reason that affidavits of Bhudeo Singh, Bhudeo Sharma and Devendra Singh Indauliya and other witnesses submitted by the petitioner before the Disciplinary Authority were not considered as a part of the disciplinary proceedings; that Devendra Singh in his affidavit had averred that there is no involvement of the petitioner in refund of money to the policy holders as such it is a clear case of non-consideration of material facts and evidence of defence and no case of pecuniary loss to the Corporation has been made out. 11. It is stated that on perusal of the enquiry report it is apparent that none of the policy holders came to depose against the petitioner either before the Enquiry Officer or Disciplinary authority. On the other hand, some of them submitted affidavits bringing correct facts stating that the petitioner was not guilty but neither these affidavits were considered nor the policy holders were called by the Corporation to give evidence, hence in absence of evidence by complainants disciplinary proceedings could have been conducted against the petitioner as the foundation for its initiation does not exist at all. Therefore, the orders impugned passed on no evidence cannot be sustained in the eye of law as no case for penalty and initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 is made out against the petitioner and hence. the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in so far as the cases of LIC and Banking Companies etc. between the employee and employer are concerned, they can be referred to the Labour Court under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance) Companies Act, 1949. the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in so far as the cases of LIC and Banking Companies etc. between the employee and employer are concerned, they can be referred to the Labour Court under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance) Companies Act, 1949. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable as they do not decide the applicability of Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance) Companies Act, 1949, hence they are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is then stated that Devendra Singh Indauliya is said by the petitioner to be an agent of the LIC whereas Bhudeo Singh and Bhudeo Sharma in their affidavits have averred that Sri Ponia had appointed Devendra Singh in his private office for his own assistance; that the petitioner was paying monthly salary to Devendra Singh and that none of deponent to the affidavits have stated Devendra Singh Indaulia to be an employee or agent of the LIC. 13. It is argued that the Presenting Officer’s report dated 25.5.2005 and Enquiry Officer’s report dated 20.8.2005 were provided to the petitioner for submitting his written statement. He was also provided ample time and opportunities for producing evidence during the course of the disciplinary proceeding which had continued for more than 8-1/2 months and even during this long period the petitioner has failed to produce any witness in support of his case, rather prolonged the enquiry with ulterior motive in an effort to win over the policy holders unnecessarily and procured some affidavits in support of his case which he filed later on before the Disciplinary authority. 14. It is stated that once the Enquiry Officer had submitted its report, it was not permissible in law to submit any affidavits or material before him thereafter, hence there is no violation of the principles of natural justice till that stage as after closure of the enquiry proceedings; that after submitting his reply to the show-cause notice issued by the Disciplinary authority, he submitted affidavits which were found to be against the record, therefore, in the circumstances, these affidavits were rightly not relied upon. 15. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in case the address of Devendra Singh Indauliya was incorrect, he could have lodged an FIR against Devendra Singh Indauliya for misutilizing the blank cheques of the petitionerbut he did not do so as it is evident from the record that the misdeed and misconduct was committed by the petitioner himself who had signed the cheques himself. It is stated that disciplinary proceedings were conducted within the ambit of Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 and that the cheque book of the petitioner SB A/C No. 749 was used by him in payment of premium/fresh amount of various parties to the LIC with ulterior motive and fraudulent intention after receiving the amounts from the policy holders and depositing the same in his aforesaid Savings Bank Accounts. It was only after cheque of the petitioner issued by him his Savings Bank A/c aforesaid for depositing the premium of policy holder was not honoured by the Bank that fraud being committed by him came to light. These acts of the petitioner tarnish the image of the Corporation and in these circumstances the petitioner was rightly awarded the punishment of removal from service and recovery of the amount embezzled by him. 16. After hearing counsel for the parties and on perusal of record it appears that the petitioner used to take money from the policy holders to deposit the same in his aforesaid Savings Bank Account. Thereafter, he used to pay premium from it. A complaint was lodged as one of the cheques issued by the petitioner bounced for there not being sufficient amount in his account. Subsequently, on complaint having been lodged it came to light that the petitioner was committing such unlawful transaction, therefore, it is wrong to say that the Disciplinary authority was influenced by the Enquiry report or that the enquiry report was defective or made without appreciating the material and evidence of the defence. In fact the misconduct of the petitioner is proved on records and no evidence obliter it. 17. It also appears that the petitioner could not satisfactorily explain as to how he was paying money of policy holders from his SB A/c aforesaid by issuing his own cheques for payment of their premium. Therefore, the orders of removal from service and recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation to the extent of Rs. 17. It also appears that the petitioner could not satisfactorily explain as to how he was paying money of policy holders from his SB A/c aforesaid by issuing his own cheques for payment of their premium. Therefore, the orders of removal from service and recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation to the extent of Rs. 2,97,728.30 paise were rightly passed. There is no manifest error of law or non-application of mind is apparent from the record in the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that enquiry against the petitioner proceeded in accordance with the principles of natural justice and there is no violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Articles 14,21 and 309 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances of the case, as claimed by him. The petitioner an officer in LIC cannot deposit the premium recovered from the policy holders in his own Savings Bank A/c and after his cheque is bounced can claim that the recovery of the same is in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 309 of the Constitution of India. He has acted against the Rules and Regulations of the LIC with ulterior motive. The misconduct committed by him is of serious proportions. Such manner of financial illegalities cannot be tolerated by any employer much less an financial institution like LIC, a Government Company. He has been awarded the punishment which in our opinion is proportionate to the charges proved against him on basis of record in the Enquiry proceedings. The writ petition lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed. 18. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is, accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. ———————