Judgment Dev Darshan Sud, J. 1. These two petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. It is unfortunate that the petitioner Shri Jagdish Thakur (since dead) who was working as Senior Clerk with the respondent had faced a long unending departmental proceedings relating to some inquiry held against him in the year 1989. The facts as disclosed are that the proceedings are inquisitorial in nature and under the garb of enforcing disciplinary proceedings had become interminable despite repeated requests by the petitioner for early disposal. 2. It is undisputed before me that the deceased petitioner (now represented by his wife) was charge sheeted on 31.8.1990. Two Articles of Charge had been framed against him. The gist of the charges were that (i) the petitioner while working as Senior Clerk and posted as Incharge of Sale Book Depot at Nahan in 1988 was called to Dharamshala for three days for verifying the adjustment of advance amounts and purported irregularities found during the inspection of the depot. The petitioner reported at Dharamshala on 28.11.1988 and some alleged irregularities having been found on inspection of the record. He was directed to report to the Head office at Dharamshala on 3.12.1988 but he did not do so. This act of the petitioner was found to be disobedience of the order passed by the respondents. 3. The second charge, which was more serious, was that during this period when the petitioner was posted at Nahan, he was responsible for embezzlement of ` 11,08,986.48 Ps. Vide letter dated 30.6.1990 the petitioner was directed to reconcile the differences within 15 days with the sale branch but he did not do so. This act of embezzlement etc. was attributed to the petitioner as being a pre-planned conspiracy. 4. What I need notice here is that the charge sheet was framed in the year 1990. The petitioner approached the Administrative Tribunal by way of Original Application No. 837 of 1999 which was decided on 22nd April, 1991 challenging his suspension. The petition was disposed of on the statement having been made on behalf of the respondent before the Tribunal that the suspension order of the petitioner had been revoked. After the issuance of the charge sheet, First Information Report No. 64/91 was lodged on 29.4.1991 on the basis of a complaint addressed by the respondent Board to the Superintendent of Police, Nahan. After the issuance of the charge sheet, First Information Report No. 64/91 was lodged on 29.4.1991 on the basis of a complaint addressed by the respondent Board to the Superintendent of Police, Nahan. In a nutshell, the case made out against the petitioner was that he was working as Senior Clerk with the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education and while he was posted in Sale Book Depot at Nahan, during the period from 1983 to 1988, he dishonestly misappropriated huge stock of text books entrusted to him by the Board for supply/sale to the authorized agents. These misdeeds came to the notice of the Board after inspection of the record and verification of stocks by the internal audit party on 18.12.1986. The petitioner was asked to produce the record at the head office at Dharamshala vide letter No. HB/Sale/S/88-4000-4009, dated 7.9.1988. The petitioner had attended the office on 29.11.1988 along with certain record. On checking the record, it was found that the same was not original record but was fabricated. He was detained for the next day for further verification along with the records but he applied for leave on 29.11.1988 with permission to leave station on the pretext that he had to go to Dehradun to attend some court case. He was permitted to go but directed to leave the record behind. But the petitioner left the office along with the record and thereafter he cooked up a story that when he was returning to Dharamshala, his brief case containing the record had been stolen. The First Information Report has been placed on record as Annexure A-2 with the petition, which is not disputed. A criminal case was filed against the petitioner. A cancellation report Annexure A-11 was filed by the police after detailed investigation in which it was stated that despite a number of opportunities, having been granted to the Board to produce the record, the same was not produced by it. The cancellation report was filed in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, who vide his order dated 28.9.1999 recorded that: “… The notice received back with the report that the service of the notice has been effect through W.T. but the complainant is not present. It appears that the complainant is not interested in the present case though he has been served through Chief Secretary. I have heard the Ld. It appears that the complainant is not interested in the present case though he has been served through Chief Secretary. I have heard the Ld. APP for the State and perused the record of the case. I do not see any reason to differ with the final report prepared by the investigating agency, I accordingly order that the case of FIR No.64/91 P.S. Sadar Nahanbe kept asunt raced. The police file be sent back to Superintendent of Police, Nahan and the Court file be consigned to records after completion…..” The case was closed at that stage. During this period, no action was taken by the respondent which according to them was in deference to the jurisdiction being exercised by the criminal Court. The petitioner again approached the Tribunal by way of Original Application No. 1 of 2000 which was decided on 23.3.2001. This was directed to be treated as a representation by the respondent. Prior to filing of this petition, the petitioner had requested the respondent Board to supply the documents to him as he was suffering considerable loss due to the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, which were pending against him and the same should and ought to have been concluded at the earliest. The third petition before the learned Tribunal being OA No. 221 of 2002 was instituted by the petitioner with a prayer that appeal against the disciplinary proceedings be decided at the earliest as possible. 5. These are facts which are borne out from the record. The petitioner, who was charged for acts of misappropriation of funds and embezzlement from the year 1983-1989 had been running to the Tribunal repeatedly claiming that the matter be concluded at the earliest but no action had been taken in the case. The petitioner requested (a) that suspension be recalled as no charge sheet has been issued; (b) that proceedings against him be concluded at the earliest; (c) the appeal be also disposed of expeditiously. 6. The proceedings against the petitioner commenced in the year 1989 when he was suspended and culminated in the order of dismissal on 5.4.2002, (Annexure A-23) but this punishment was reduced by the appellate authority on 23.8.2002 (Annexure A-25) modifying the punishment and directing that the pay of the petitioner be reduced by fifteen stages from Rs. 6400/- to ` 4020/- in the pay band which he was drawing. 6400/- to ` 4020/- in the pay band which he was drawing. The period of dismissal w.e.f. 6.4.2002 to 23.8.2002 was ordered to be treated as on duty for which the petitioner would be paid money equal to the leave salary which he would have drawn if he had been on leave on half average pay and in addition dearness allowance if admissible on the basis of such leave salary. It was also directed that he was not entitled for future increments. 7. The second petition is sequel to the first petition which was instituted in which recovery of ` 11,08,986.48 Ps. was directed to be recovered from the petitioner on the ground that some audit objection has been raised. It is in this background that the legality of the proceedings are being adjudicated by this Court. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the proceedings have been wrongly initiated and prolonged for no fault on the part of the petitioner who time and again has been approaching the authorities requesting them that immediate action be taken but they did not do so. This course of action of the respondents has seriously prejudiced the petitioner. He submits that at every stage the petitioner had been cooperating with the respondents/disciplinary authority and had been requesting for speedy trial, but of no avail. Learned counsel submits that this prejudice is writ large as in the cancellation report Annexure A-11 the police had given a detailed report that the record produced before them did not in any manner link the petitioner with the alleged criminality which in this case was a misappropriation/embezzlement of funds and stock etc. Referring to the cancellation report, learned counsel submits that the police had closed the case also because of non-cooperation and attitude of the respondents. He submits that this is further fortified by the fact that even the Court had summoned the respondents who were served through the Chief Secretary and despite that no appearance was put in before the criminal Court which left no option to the Court but to accept the cancellation report as also the submissions made before it by the District Attorney to the same effect. 9. During the interregnum, the inquiry officer was firstly appointed on 23rd October, 1990. Since the petitioner did not accept him as impartial and fair, the second inquiry officer was appointed on 26th December, 1990. 9. During the interregnum, the inquiry officer was firstly appointed on 23rd October, 1990. Since the petitioner did not accept him as impartial and fair, the second inquiry officer was appointed on 26th December, 1990. No proceedings were conducted against the petitioner and ultimately third inquiry officer was appointed on 6.1.2000 when some progress was made. 10. The second submission made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that inquiry initiated by the respondents was based on documents/material which were never relied upon in the charge sheet nor supplied to the petitioner. In particular, learned counsel refers to the preliminary inquiry report and documentary evidence Ext.P6 Ext.P6A and Ext.P7 the cash memos, bank pass books and receipt of books etc. which were found to be short in the year 1983-88 etc. Loss of `11,08,986.48 Ps was calculated by reliance upon and on the basis of Ext.P6, Ext.P7, Ext.P8, Ext.P9 and Ext.P10. The disciplinary authority observed that as regards the second charge, these exhibits are relevant, but the cash memos on the basis of which this loss has been arrived at have not been placed on record. There seems to be confusion on the basis of which this evidence was recorded. It is also urged by the petitioner that the entire documents on the basis of which the loss has been established have not been supplied to the petitioner. On this submission, he refers to the report of the inquiry officer, in particular para 5 of the report, which shows that out of 21 documents requested for, the disciplinary authority provided only six documents and expressed inability to provide the rest of the documents on different grounds. It is this unsatisfactory state of affairs by which the inquiry is completed. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan (1998)4 SCC 154 to urge that delay itself is fatal to the inquiry. In that case after considering the entire case the Supreme Court held: “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on thatground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case hastobe examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on thatground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case hastobe examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on hispart indelaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to su er a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” (at p. 165) He submits that this principle has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in P.V. Mahadevan vs. MD. T.N. Housing Board (2005)6 SCC 636 holding: “5. In the second case of N. Radhakishan 1998) 4 SCC 154 the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. T.N. Housing Board (2005)6 SCC 636 holding: “5. In the second case of N. Radhakishan 1998) 4 SCC 154 the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. A report dated 7-11-1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi-storeyed complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with Municipal Authorities. On the basis of the report, the State issued two memos both dated 12-12-1987 in respect of three officials including the respondent Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner. In this case, till 31-7-1995 the articles of charges had not been served on the respondent. The Tribunal, however, held that the memo dated 31-7-1995 related to incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the enquiry against the respondent and that there was no justification on the part of the State now conducting the enquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. This Court, in para 19, has observed as follows: (SCC p. 165) 19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations." This Court held that there was hardly any explanation worth consideration as to why the delay occurred. In the circumstances, this Court held that the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed. 11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time wi be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes commi ed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” (at pp. 638-641) 11. My attention has also been drawn by the respondents to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Coking CoalLtd. vs. Bibhuti KumarSinghand others, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 628in which the Supreme Court holds that standard of proof for criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings being different, discharge of the person from criminal case is immaterial and in this event, the inquiry can be continued. Similarly in Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad vs. Sachindra Nath Pandey and others, (1995)3 SCC 134 the Court holds that where the charges were of very serious nature, the inquiry could not be closed only on the ground that time of 16 years had elapsed from the date of commencement of departmental inquiry, when the appellant (Deputy Registrar) alone was not responsible for that. 12 I note that these authorities are confined to the facts of each particular case. True that the charges levelled are serious, but coupled with the fact that the documents were not supplied, prejudice to the delinquent is writ large. 13 On the aspect of non-supplying of documents, learned counsel refers to the decision in State Bank of India and others vs. D.C. Aggarwal and another (1993)1 SCC 13 holding: “4. Although correctness of the order passed by the High Court was assailed from various aspects, including the power of the High Court to interfere on quantum of punishment in writ jurisdiction, but wepropose to confine ourselves only to the question of effect of non-supply of CVC recommendations and if the order was invalid and void on this score only it is not necessary to decideany other issue. Law on natural justice is so well settled from a series of decisions of this Court that it leaves one bewildered at times that such bodies like State Bank of India, who are assisted by a hierarchy of law officers, commit such basic and fundamental procedural errors that courts are left with no option except to set aside such orders. Imposition of punishment on an employee, on material which is not only not supplied but not disclosed to him, has not been countenanced by this Court. Procedural fairness is as much essence of right and liberty as the substantive law itself.” (at p. 15-16) The second decision relied upon by the learned counsel is State of UP. Vs. Shatrughan Lal and another (1998)6 SCC 651 holding: “6. Preliminary enquiry which is conducted invariably on the back of the delinquent employee may, often, constitute the whole basis of the charge-sheet. Before a person is, therefore, called upon to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, he must, on a request made by him in that behalf, be supplied the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry particularly if those witnesses are proposed to be examined at the departmental trial. This principle was reiterated in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229 wherein it was alsolaid down that this lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence. 10. It has also been found that during the course of the preliminary enquiry, a number of witnesses were examined against the respondent in his absence, and rightly so, as the delinquents are not associated in the preliminary enquiry, and thereafter the charge- sheet was drawn up. The copies of those statements, though asked for by the respondent, were not supplied to him. Since there was a failure on the part of the appellant in this regard too, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice were violated and the respondent was not afforded an effective opportunity ofhearing,particularly as theappellant failed to establish that non-supply of the copies of statements recorded during preliminary enquiry had not caused any prejudice to the respondent in defending himself.” (atpp.653-654) 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioner was supplied all documents and in fact a statement was recorded to that effect which forms a part of inquiry report. In this eventuality, it was not open to the petitioner to complain about non-supply of documents. He further submits that the documents, the basis of inquiry, were available with the petitioner. He submits that it was because of the pendency of the criminal case, the proceedings of the inquiry were kept in abeyance from 1980 till the time of cancellation of the report and no fault can be attributed to the respondent Board. It was the investigating agency which caused the delay and the respondent has at every step co-operated the investigating officer or the agency. Learned counsel submits that it was because of the fact that documents were with the investigating agency, no proceedings could be conducted. The report submitted by the Investigating Officer is telling. He submits before the Court that he carried out a thorough probe but the necessary documents etc. were not supplied to him. I need not say anything more. Submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondents that departmental proceedings and criminal proceeding are distinct does not need reiteration as in General Manager, UCO Bank and another vs. M. Venu Ranganath, (2007) 13 SCC 251 the Supreme Court holds:- “8. There can be no doubt that criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings operate in different fields. Even though the person may have been acquitted in a criminal trial, there is no embargo on his being departmentally proceeded against……”(at p.253) 15. In the present case what I find is that initiation of criminal proceedings was a mere pretence and the case was delayed for reasons which are not attributable to the delinquent and there is no explanation as to why the respondent did not cooperate with the police. 16. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, I cannot accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents for the reason that record in the criminal case though distinct, but can be taken into consideration along with the other material. There is no explanation as to why the respondents did not join the investigation which fact finds corroboration from the cancellation report. There is no explanation as to why the respondents did not join the investigation which fact finds corroboration from the cancellation report. Even if it was the investigating agency which was at fault, there is no explanation as to why the respondents did not appear before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate when notice was sent and served on the respondents through the Chief Secretary. In this view of the matter, these acts create a serious doubt in my mind that the respondents were not prosecuting the case bonafide which was a total eye wash. 17. On the inquiry all that I need say is that the reports given by the inquiry officer as also the disciplinary proceedings are not in consonance with the principles as applicable in departmental proceedings. Why the documents were not made available to the petitioner on the basis of which the inquiry officer as also the disciplinary authority concluded that he was guilty is not clear from the record. On the submission that these documents in fact were taken away by the petitioner, there is no iota of evidence on record to support this submission. Looked from any angle, I find that the inquiry proceedings were unfair and based not on the basis of any material on record. Delay has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner for a period of more than 12 years. In these circumstances, I allow this writ petition and quash the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority and set aside the penalty imposed upon him. 18. Adverting to the second petition, the lesser said the better. It is a sequel to the first petition which holds the petitioner guilty for misappropriation. There is no application of mind. Having held that inquiry itself is vitiated for noncompliance of the principles of natural justice under Article 14 of the Constitution of India; the order of recovery is quashed and set aside. 19. Adverting to CWP(T) No. 9167 of 2010, the petitioner who was wife of the deceased, challenges order dated 9.12.2002, (Annexure A-3) stating: “…..Office Order” Shri Jagdish Kumar, Sr. Clerk, was posted as Incharge ofSaleBook Depot, Nahan, District Sirmour HP of H.P. School Education Board. During his posting he has caused a loss of Rs. 11,08,986.48 Paise to this Board, which was found true after conducting the enquiry under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Clerk, was posted as Incharge ofSaleBook Depot, Nahan, District Sirmour HP of H.P. School Education Board. During his posting he has caused a loss of Rs. 11,08,986.48 Paise to this Board, which was found true after conducting the enquiry under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Therefore, the recovery of loss amounting to Rs.11,08,986.48 Paise be effected from the salary of concerned employee as per Rules. In addition to it, the arrears of pay tobe paid to the employee in future be also deposited in the account of Board as recovery. These orders be treated implemented with immediate effect…….” 20. This is sequel to the inquiry proceedings, which were held against the petitioner and already stand quashed. The petition has been opposed by the respondents practically on the same grounds as in the other petition (supra). 21. This order manifests that it was the natural consequence of the inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCA and CCS Rules, 1965. Since the inquiry having been quashed, I find no reason to sustain this order. It is accordingly quashed and set aside. All consequential benefits shall follow. Costs of ` 11,000/- on the respondents in each petition.