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2012 DIGILAW 694 (PAT)

Shankar Tiwary v. State of Bihar

2012-04-30

RAMESH KUMAR DATTA

body2012
ORAL ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner by this writ petition and an interlocutory application filed therein, seeks a direction for quashing the Resolution dated 1.7.2010 issued by the Government of Bihar in the Panchayati Raj Department by which in exercise of powers conferred by Section 158(1) and (2) of the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006, all the Ghats which were being settled by the Zila Parishads from before, have been released from settlement with effect from 1.7.2010 with a further direction that no settlement shall be made of the Ghats under the control of Zila Parishad in terms of the said decision of the State Government for the settlement year 2010-11 and where such Ghats have been settled till March, 2011, in their cases also the settlement is cancelled in exercise of powers conferred under Section 158(1) and (2) of the said Act. The petitioner also seeks quashing of the circular letter dated 1.7.2010 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar to all the Deputy Development Commissioners-cum-Chief Executive Officers of Zila Parishads, Bihar communicating the said decision of the State Government, the office order dated 5.7.2010 issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Bhojpur Zila Parishad, Ara cancelling, inter alia, the settlement made of Lakshman Chapra (Sheopur, Mahuli, Dokati) Ghat settled with the petitioner, and the letter dated 14.8.2010 issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Bhojpur Zila Parishad, Ara to the Block Development Officer/Circle Officer, etc., intimating the fact of cancellation of settlement and to ensure that the order is immediately carried out. 3. The facts of this case lie within a narrow compass and are not in dispute. The petitioner was given settlement of a public ferry known as “Lakshman Chapra (Sheopur, Mahuli, Dokati)” having fixed boundary on the river Ganges in Bhojpur district for a period of three years from 1.4.2009 to 31.3.2012. The said Ghat on the river Ganges is an old public ferry declared as such under the Bengal Ferries Act, 1885 since before the Indian independence. The settlement was made to the petitioner by public auction in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act for a total bid amount of Rs. 31,10,000/-. The petitioner thereafter was in peaceful possession of the said Ferry Ghat for collection of tolls and, accordingly, collecting the tolls. The settlement was made to the petitioner by public auction in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act for a total bid amount of Rs. 31,10,000/-. The petitioner thereafter was in peaceful possession of the said Ferry Ghat for collection of tolls and, accordingly, collecting the tolls. Subsequently, on 5.7.2010 on the basis of the aforesaid Government Resolution steps were taken by the authorities and acting under the office order dated 5.7.2010 of the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Bhojpur Zila Parishad, the petitioner was restrained from collecting the tolls from the passengers crossing the river through the said Ferry Ghat. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the settlement having been made with the petitioner by the Zila Parishad, the State Government has no authority under the Bengal Ferries Act to give any direction with respect to a public ferry to the District Magistrate/Zila Parishad in matters relating to the settlement of the ferry. It is thus, submitted that the decision of the State Government in the Resolution dated 1.7.2010 is de hors the powers conferred under the Bengal Ferries Act with respect to public ferry and such a direction is contrary to the legal provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act and fit to be quashed. 5. It is further submitted by learned counsel that under Section 9 of the Bengal Ferries Act, the collection of tolls of any public ferry have to be leased by public auction for such term as the District Magistrate may with the approval of the Commissioner direct and the District Magistrate can refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder and may accept any other bid or may withdraw the tolls from auction for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. It is pointed out by learned counsel that under the relevant notification dated 29.4.1926 of the Government of Bihar issued as per Section 35 of the Bengal Ferries Act, the power of maintenance of the public ferry within a jurisdiction of Zila Parishad has been vested in the concerned Zila Parishad including the powers under Section 9 for the settlement of the ferries by public auction. It is urged that the State Government has no authority to issue any such direction as has been sought to be done to the Zila Parishad with respect to a public ferry as has been sought by the Resolution dated 1.7.2010. 6. It is urged that the State Government has no authority to issue any such direction as has been sought to be done to the Zila Parishad with respect to a public ferry as has been sought by the Resolution dated 1.7.2010. 6. In support of the aforesaid stand, learned counsel relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rambharosa Singh Vs. The Government of the State of Bihar and others: AIR 1953 Patna 370, in paragraphs 8 and 11 of which it has been held as follows:- “8. I may state here an argument advanced by Sir Sultan Ahmad on behalf of opposite party No.5. He argued that, although the words “public auction” are used in Section 9, yet in effect it is no auction at all. He contended that, ordinarily, at an auction it is the offer of the highest bidder which is accepted and not that of any other bidder, so that, when the District Magistrate has been given the power to refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder and to accept any other bid, it is not an auction and the District Magistrate may well extend the lease of a previous lessee without holding any auction at all. I do not feel disposed to accept this argument in face of the words of the section itself. Section 9 enjoins the tolls to be leased by public auction; but the District Magistrate has been given the power “for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing” to refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder and to accept any other bid or even to withdraw the tolls from auction. One can understand why the Legislature has given such power to the District Magistrate: it may be that the highest bidder may not be a desirable person to whom the tolls should be leased out, and for other similar reasons. On the wording of section 9, it seems to be clear to me that the District Magistrate is not authorized to withdraw the ferry from public auction under orders of the State Government: he can do so on his own initiative but he must record sufficient reason for doing so. The District Magistrate has not done so in the present case. 11. The District Magistrate has not done so in the present case. 11. The learned Advocate General referred to the form of agreement which a lessee has to execute under S. 9 of the Act. Rule 10 of the rules framed under the Act says:- “The contract which the lessee will be required to execute under Section 9 of the Act shall be in the form attached to these rules.” “The form shows that the parties to this agreement are the State and the lessee. The learned Advocate General, therefore, argued that, since the State is a party to the agreement which the lessee has to execute, it should be inferred that the State can give directions to the District Magistrate as its agent. I cannot accede to this argument in view of the fact that the Act and the rules framed thereunder give the sole control of the ferries to the District Magistrate, subject only to the direction of the Commissioner, and I do not think that the State Government can give directions to the District Magistrate. The learned Advocate General also suggested that an extension of the lease is permissible under Rule 7(d). I have already stated that Rule 7(d) fixes the maximum period for which a lease may be granted as not exceeding three years at a time. I cannot read into this Rule the power to extend a lease. It may be that the previous lease may again be granted a lease for a period not exceeding three years at a public auction held under the provisions of the Act; but that does not amount to an extension of the lease: it will be a fresh lease. I do not think, therefore, that the withdrawal of the settlement of the tolls of the ferry from public auction by the District Magistrate under the orders of the State Government or the extension of the lease in favour of opposite party No. 5 can be held to be legal.” 7. The above decision of this Court has been affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of the Government of State of Bihar and others Vs. Ram Bharosa Singh and another: AIR 1956 SC 640 . 8. Learned Counsel also relies upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Bihar & ors: AIR 1987 Patna 138, in paragraph nos. Ram Bharosa Singh and another: AIR 1956 SC 640 . 8. Learned Counsel also relies upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Bihar & ors: AIR 1987 Patna 138, in paragraph nos. 18,19 and 26 of which it has been held as follows:- “18. The aforesaid “resume” makes it manifest that the relevant provisions of the Act and the statutory rules framed thereunder vests the control, leasing and management of the public ferries in the Magistrate of the district subject to the direction of the Commissioner. The State Government as such does not inter into or in any way figure in this statutory scheme. Learned counsel for the petitioner was thus on a somewhat firm footing in his submission that any frontal interference by the State Government in the control, management and the settlement of public ferries under the Act is not warranted in the eye of law. 19. It would bear repetition that the aforenoticed provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have prescribed somewhat meticulously for the mode and procedure of the settlement of public ferries under the Act. Once it is held as above that it is permissible to make a composite settlement of a public ferry and a sairat ferry, the significant question that necessarily follows is as to what would be the procedure for making such a composite settlement? It is to be exclusively governed by the provisions of the Act or only by the administrative instructions for the settlement of sairats or a mixture of the two? To my mind, the answer to the query is clear and categoric that if there has to be a composite settlement then the procedure applicable to the same would be exclusively statutory as prescribed under the Act and the Rules. This flows from the basic proposition that no mere exclusive instruction or Governmental circulars can possibly override or erode the mandates of the Legislature itself and the subordinate legislation framed thereunder. As has been noticed already and indeed this was not disputed that so far as public ferries under the Act are concerned, they have to be exclusively governed by the statutory procedure. When such a public ferry is joint in a composite settlement with the sairat ferry the statutory procedure applicable to its settlement would continue to apply with the same rigour. 26. When such a public ferry is joint in a composite settlement with the sairat ferry the statutory procedure applicable to its settlement would continue to apply with the same rigour. 26. In the light of the aforesaid conclusions it necessarily follows that the order of the Government (Annex. 5) must fall. It is common ground that the Commissioner in his exhaustive order (Annex. 3) held that the lease was not to extend beyond one year and his finding on this point was categoric and unequivocal. As noticed above, finality is attached to the same and his minor deviation of purportedly referring the matter for the approval of the State Government would not in the least detract from the clear cut legal position. It may also be noticed that the learned counsel for the petitioner both in the stand before us and even in the pleadings supported the order of the Commissioner that the period of the lease must be for one year only. Under the Act the Government has no jurisdiction to override the final decision of the authorities on whom the power of settlement is conferred by the Statute. In varying and extending the period of the lease to three years by a cryptic order the State Government acted without jurisdiction and its impugned order (Annex. 5), therefore, must be and is hereby quashed and that of the statutory authority, namely, the Commissioner, is consequently maintained. 9. It is also the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in exercise of powers conferred under Section 158 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 the said resolution dated 1.7.2010 has been issued. It has thus no relevance so far as the settlement of public ferry is concerned and relying upon the powers conferred under the said Section the State Government could not have put to an end the settlement having been made for public ferries by the Zila Parishad under the Bengal Ferries Act. It is submitted that the power to settle a public ferry is contained only in the Bengal Ferries Act. It is urged that as a matter of fact, there is no whisper in the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act so far as the exercise of powers and settlement of public ferries are concerned. 10. It is submitted that the power to settle a public ferry is contained only in the Bengal Ferries Act. It is urged that as a matter of fact, there is no whisper in the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act so far as the exercise of powers and settlement of public ferries are concerned. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid propositions learned counsel submits that no executive order can take away the rights of the petitioner conferred by the Act to participate in the auction and get settlement of public ferry in his favour and any settlement already made in favour of the petitioner could not have been cancelled on the basis of any executive order issued by the State Government. 11. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has sought to support the resolution dated 1.7.2010 on the basis of Section 73(21) (h) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 stating that under the said provision the Zila Parishad may take over the maintenance and control of any rural bridge, tank, ghat, well channel or drain belonging to a private owner or any other authority on such term as may be agreed upon and thus the said powers of the Zila Parishad are subject to the withdrawal of the same under Section 158 of the Panchayat Raj Act. 12. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the State that all such matters of public interest has to prevail over private interest and decision has been taken by the State Government to put an end to the settlement of all Ghats being settled by the Zila Parishad in the public interest. In such a situation the private interest of the petitioner cannot be permitted to override the public interest. It is also contended that the action of the State is within the bounds of reasonableness and the reasonableness of it can easily be inferred from the fact that it is in the interest of general public as compared to the interest of private persons like the petitioner in such matter and that being the position the policy decision of the State Government in the resolution dated 1.7.2010 ought not to be interfered with by this Court. 13. In support of the aforesaid stand learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. 13. In support of the aforesaid stand learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. International Trading Co.and anr.: (2003) 5 SCC 437 , in paragraph nos. 12, 22 and 23 of which the aforesaid proposition has been laid down as follows: “12. Doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot come in the way of public interest. Indisputably, public interest has to prevail over private interest. The case at hand shows that a conscious policy decision has been taken and there is no statutory compulsion to act contrary. In that context, it cannot be said that the respondents have acquired any right to renewal. The High Court was not justified in observing that the policy decision was contrary to statute and for that reason direction for consideration of the application for renewal was necessary. Had the High Court not recorded any finding on the merits of respective stands, direction for consideration in accordance with law would have been proper and there would not have been any difficulty in accepting the plea of the learned counsel for the respondents. But having practically foreclosed any consideration by the findings recorded, consideration of the application would have been a mere formality and grant of renewal would have been the inevitable result, though it may be against the policy decision. That renders the High Court judgment indefensible. 22. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities and adopt trade policies. As noticed above, the ultimate test is whether on the touchstone of reasonableness the policy decision comes out unscathed. 23. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved; the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the relevant time, enter into judicial verdict. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved; the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the relevant time, enter into judicial verdict. The reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of even a specified individual is reasonable where the interests of the country are concerned or where the business affects the economy of the country. 14. Learned counsel also relies upon the observations of the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, etc. Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and another: AIR 1980 SC 1992 , in para 11 of which it has been observed as follows:- “11. So far as the first limitation is concerned, it flows directly from the thesis that, unlike a private individual, the State cannot act as it pleases in the matter of giving largess. Though ordinarily a private individual would be guided by economic considerations of safe-gain in any action taken by him, it is always open to him under the law to act contrary to his self-interest or to oblige another in entering into a contract or dealing with his property. But the Government is not free to act as it likes in granting largess such as awarding a contract or selling or leasing out its property. Whatever be its activity, the Government is still the Government and is, subject to restraints inherent in its position in a democratic society. The constitutional power conferred on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprincipled manner, it has to be exercised for the public good. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid.” 15. So far as the power of the State Government, under Section 6 of the Bengal Ferries Act is concerned, the said issue being no longer res integra, may not detain us any further in view of the clear enunciation of law by the Division Bench of this Court in Rambharosa Singh’s case (supra) as affirmed by the Apex Court as also by the Full Bench in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) holding that the District Magistrate has been constituted as a statutory authority under the Act subject only to the control of the Commissioner of the Division and it is not open to the State Government to interfere with the exercise of power on his behalf in any manner. It has further been held that with respect to public ferry the District Magistrate is not authorized in terms of Section 9 of the Bengal Ferries Act to withdraw the ferry from auction under the orders of the State Government. Even if he chooses to do so on his own then he is required to record reasons and not to act on the command of the State Government. It has also been clearly held that the Act and the Rules framed therein give the sole control of the ferries to the District Magistrate subject to the direction of the Commissioner and the State Government cannot give direction to the District Magistrate. 16. It has also been clearly held that the Act and the Rules framed therein give the sole control of the ferries to the District Magistrate subject to the direction of the Commissioner and the State Government cannot give direction to the District Magistrate. 16. Similarly, in the Full Bench decision in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act and the statutory Rules framed thereunder it was held by this Court that the control, leasing and management of the public ferries vest in the District Magistrate subject to any direction of the Commissioner and the State Government as such does not enter into or in any way figure in this statutory scheme. It has also been specifically held that under the Act the Government has no jurisdiction to override the final decision of the authorities on whom the power of settlement is conferred by the statute and cannot be permitted to extend the period of lease. 17. The aforesaid being the position with respect to a public ferry under the Bengal Ferries Act, the further issue that remains to be considered is as to whether what was stated in the aforesaid decisions with regard to powers of the District Magistrate would apply with equal force to the powers of the Zila Parishads where such powers have been vested in them by the application of Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 clearly states that the District Board shall have all the powers vested in the Magistrate of the District under the said Act except the powers specified in Section 7, 17 and 32 and accordingly the ferries shall be managed. It is thus, evident that the power of settlement of ferry of the Zila Parishad in exercise of the powers under Section 9 of the Act shall be unfettered as that of the District Magistrate exercising the said powers and the application of the principles of the aforesaid Division Bench and Full Bench decisions can lead to the only conclusion that the State Government is prohibited from issuing any direction to the Zila Parishad in this regard. 18. The only issue to be now considered is as to whether the State Government can exercise any such powers as it claims to in exercise of powers under Section 158 (1) and (2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. 18. The only issue to be now considered is as to whether the State Government can exercise any such powers as it claims to in exercise of powers under Section 158 (1) and (2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. Since learned counsel for the State relies upon Section 73(1) (21) (h) of the Act, the same is quoted hereinbelow:- “Section 73. Functions and Powers of Zila Parishad.- (1) Subject to such condition as may be prescribed by the Government from time to time, the Zila Parishad shall perform following functions- 1. …………………………………………… 21. In addition, the Zila Parishad may- (a) .................................... (h) Take over the maintenance and control of any Rural bridge, tank, Ghat, well channel or drain, belonging to a private owner or any other authority on such term as may be agreed upon.” 19. It may also be useful to quote Section 158 of the said Act which is in the following terms: “Section 158. Withdrawal of powers and functions from the Panchayats.- (1) Notwithstanding the transfer of any power, functions and duties in respect of any matter to a Panchayat under this Act, the Government on a proposal from the Panchayat in that behalf or where it is satisfied that by reason of a change in the nature of the matter, such as the conversion of a primary health centre into a secondary health centre or hospital or the conversion of a seed multiplication farm into an agricultural research firm or a road becoming a part of a highway, the matter would cease to be a matter on the relevant Panchayat Functions List and it is deemed to be necessary to withdraw from the Panchayat the powers, functions or duties in respect of such matters, may, by notification in the Official Gazette withdraw such powers, functions and duties with effect from the date specified in the notification and make such incidental and consequential orders as may be necessary to provide for matters including the taking over of the property, rights and liabilities, if any, vesting in the Panchayat and of the staff, if any, which may have been transferred to the Panchayat as the case may be. (2) The Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette amend or add any activity, programme or scheme assigned to a Panchayat under this Act. (2) The Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette amend or add any activity, programme or scheme assigned to a Panchayat under this Act. On the issue of such notification, the relevant Panchayat Functions List shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly. 20. From a reading of the relevant provisions of Section 73 it appears that after enumerating the different functions and powers of the Zila Parishad it has further been provided under Sl. No. 21(h) that in addition the Zila Parishad may take over maintenance and control, inter alia, of any Ghat belonging to a private owner or any other authority on such term as may be agreed upon. From a consideration of the functions and powers enumerated to the Zila Parishad one does not find any reference to control, leasing and management of any public ferry having been granted to it under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. Even the provisions of Sub-Clause 21 (h) only provide for the Zila Parishad taking over the maintenance and control of any Ghat belonging to a private owner or any other authority if there is a mutual agreement between the parties. It is not even a unilateral power conferred upon the Zila Parishad to exercise and take over the Ghats. Further the language of the said Section makes it clear that the same does not pertain to any public ferry as understood and the same is concerned only with a private Ghat which the Zila Parishad may maintain and control subject to agreement with the owner of the Ghat. 21. Again, in Section 158 of the Act, I find that the same relates to withdrawal of powers, functions and duties from the Panchayat in respect of such matter as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette decide. Before exercising any such power, the State Government can act either on the proposal from the Panchayat in that behalf or in the absence of the same on its own where it is satisfied that by reason of a change in the nature of the matter, the matter would cease to be one of the relevant Panchayat functions. It is not the case of the respondents that any such proposal had come from the Panchayat to the Zila Parishad in this regard nor can it be said that there has been any change in the nature of the matter. It is not the case of the respondents that any such proposal had come from the Panchayat to the Zila Parishad in this regard nor can it be said that there has been any change in the nature of the matter. The public ferry declared under the Bengal Ferries Act continues to be a public ferry. Moreover, Section 158 is confined to withdrawal of powers, functions and duties with respect to any matter given to a Panchayat under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. Evidently, the power of the Zila Parishad over the public ferries is conferred only under the provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act and not under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. In the said circumstances, there could have been no exercise of powers under Section 158 of the 2006 Act by the Government of Bihar with respect to the power of the Zila Parishad over the management and settlement of the public ferries under the Bengal Ferries Act. 22. I may here also refer to Section 156 of the Bihar Panchyat Raj Act which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, it shall be lawful for the Government to issue any orders relating to State and national policies, government programmes and any other matter of public importance and such directions shall be binding on the Panchayat. Even if it is to be held that the notification is in fact in exercise of the wider powers conferred by Section 156, from a proper interpretation of the said provision it is evident that it starts with a non-obstante clause with respect to any provision of the Panchayat Raj Act only and it does not relate to any exercise of powers with respect to statutory enactment under the Bengal Ferries Act. 23. So far as the reliance by the learned counsel for the State upon the principle of public interest overriding the private interest is concerned, it is evident that the same would only apply where the matter is purely in the realm of public policy of the executive without there being any statutory provisions to the contrary. The same has also been noted by the Apex Court in the case of International Trading Company (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the State that the public interest has to prevail over the private interest provided there is no statutory compulsion to act to the contrary. The same has also been noted by the Apex Court in the case of International Trading Company (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the State that the public interest has to prevail over the private interest provided there is no statutory compulsion to act to the contrary. The present matter being clearly governed by statutory provisions, it is not open to the State Government to override the will of the legislature by relying upon public interest overriding the private interest. 24. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid discussions it is evident that the impugned resolution no. 4735 dated 1.7.2010 being beyond the powers of State Government and contrary to the provisions of the Bengal Ferries Act cannot stand. It is, accordingly, quashed. The other impugned letters and orders as contained in Annexures 2, 3 and 4 shall, accordingly, also stand quashed. 25. Consequently, the petitioner would be entitled to refund of the settlement amount for the period from 5.7.2010 to 14.5.2011 after which he was permitted to collect the tolls on the interim direction of this Court. The petitioner would also be entitled to compensation for the loss and damages for the said period during which he was not permitted to collect the tolls and for which he has already filed representation before the District Magistrate/Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad. The District Magistrate is directed to determine the quantum of compensation to the petitioner for the loss and damages by disposing of the said representation in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 26. The writ application is, accordingly, allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions.