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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 70 (MP)

Devashish Dutta v. Nepa Ltd. , Nepanagar

2012-01-13

RAJENDRA MENON

body2012
Judgment Challenging the order dated 27-1-1998, passed by the General Manager (In-charge) dismissing the petitioner from service and the order dated 25-4-1998 passed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Nepa Mills Ltd., rejecting his appeal, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 2. At the relevant time when the aforesaid action was taken, petitioner was holding the post of Senior Superintendent (Electrical) in the Nepa Mills Ltd., Nepanagar. 3. The petitioner was appointed in the establishment of the respondent as a Shift Engineer on 1-2-1978. On 2-3-1987, he was promoted to the post of Plant Engineer/Plant Superintendent. In the year 1998 he was elected as General Secretary of Nepa Mills, Supervisory Staff Association and it is the case of the petitioner that in the capacity as an office bearer of the aforesaid association, he was canvassing the cause of the employees, was exposing the corrupt and illegal activities of senior members of the staff, as a result certain officers were biased and prejudiced against the petitioner. Be that as it may be, it is stated that the petitioner was promoted as Superintendent (Personal) on 27-3-1993 and was finally promoted as Senior Superintendent on 15-4-1995. 4. While working as Senior Superintendent, In-charge General Manager namely, one Shri S. C. Sharma who was substantively holding the post of Deputy General Manager, issued a charge-sheet to the petitioner being Annexure P-1, dated 11-4-1997. In this charge-sheet, 13 allegations were levelled against the petitioner, most of the allegations pertain to instances that were very old and were of the years 1993 to 1996. The charge-sheet was issued for allegations more than 5 years old. The petitioner was granted 72 hrs. to submit his reply to the charge-sheet and simultaneously he was placed under suspension. As 12th of April was a Sunday and 13th and 14th of April were holidays, it is stated that the petitioner submitted an application on 15-4-1997, vide Annexure P-2, seeking 10 days time to submit his explanation and also requested for copies of the documents as are listed in Annexure P-1. Vide Annexure P-3, dated 16-4-1997, 72 hours further time was granted to the petitioner for filing reply and it was indicated that failure on the part of the petitioner, ex parte inquiry will be conducted against him. Vide Annexure P-3, dated 16-4-1997, 72 hours further time was granted to the petitioner for filing reply and it was indicated that failure on the part of the petitioner, ex parte inquiry will be conducted against him. On receipt of this communication (Annexure P-3) the petitioner on 17-4-1997 vide Annexure P-4 sought time for supply of documents and time to file reply. The documents were not given but vide Annexure P-5, dated 18-4-1997, the petitioner was directed to submit reply within 3 days. It is the case of the petitioner that even though this letter was dated 18-4-1997, it was only dispatched on 30-4-1997 and the petitioner received it on the same day, i.e., 30-4-1997. Accordingly, vide Annexure P-6, the petitioner sought for some more time along with documents to submit his reply. Vide Annexure P-7, dated 3-5-1997 the petitioner was informed that he should submit reply within 7 days and he was also informed that the documents will be given to him during the course of hearing in the inquiry. The petitioner again sought for documents and various other informations vide Annexure P-8, dated 19-5-1997 and records indicate that correspondence took place between the parties and finally vide Annexure P-11 the documents were supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner intimated that some of the documents were fabricated and manipulated and vide Annexure P-12, dated 8-8-1997 the petitioner sought for verification of the documents supplied to him. In the process no reply was filed by the petitioner and therefore, vide Annexure P-13 on 22-8-1997 one Mohan Lal Prajapati, an Advocate was appointed as Inquiry Officer and one Shri D. K. Sodhan as Presenting Officer. Vide Annexure P-14, dated 25-8-1997, Inquiry Officer Shri Prajapati fixed the inquiry for 1-9-1997. However, as the notice of this inquiry was served on the petitioner only on 4-9-1997, it is the case of the petitioner that he could not attend the inquiry and therefore, the inquiry was adjourned to 20-9-1998, notice in this regard was served on the petitioner vide Annexure P-15, dated 2-9-1997, which was received by the petitioner on 4-9-1997. The petitioner submitted representation and objected to appointment of Shri Prajapati as Inquiry Officer on the ground that under Rule 25(2) of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 1979') Shri Prajapati could not function as Inquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted representation and objected to appointment of Shri Prajapati as Inquiry Officer on the ground that under Rule 25(2) of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 1979') Shri Prajapati could not function as Inquiry Officer. This objection was rejected vide Annexure P-17 on 20-9-1997 and the inquiry was fixed for 1-10-1997. On this date vide Annexure P-19 the inquiry proceeding was adjourned as the petitioner wanted to engage a Defence Counsel. Thereafter the inquiry was adjourned for 25-10-1997 and on 25-10-1997, as is evident from Annexure P-20, the petitioner appeared along with his co-employee one Shri B. L. Maheshwari, Senior Lab Assistant. The prayer to take assistance of Shri B. L. Maheshwari was rejected on the ground that he does not come within the purview of an "employee" as defined under Rule 3 of 1979 Rules and inquiry was adjourned for 8-11-1997. Vide Annexure P-21, dated 4-11-1997 the petitioner requested the Competent Authority for verification of documents. Vide Annexure P-22 on 6-11-1997, the verification of the documents was rejected. In the inquiry that was held on 8-11-1997, vide Annexure P-23 the petitioner made certain requests for inspection and verification of the documents, these were rejected and the inquiry was fixed for recording of evidence on 14-11-1997. It is the case of the petitioner that on 14-11-1997 the petitioner fell ill and it was not possible for him to participate in the inquiry, he therefore, sent a medical certificate through his Defence Assistant Shri B. L. Maheshwari but on 14-11-1997 the medical certificate was not accepted. The appearance of Shri Maheshwari was also not permitted and therefore, the petitioner forwarded a letter along with affidavit of Shri B. L. Maheshwari. Annexures P-24 and P-25 are the medical certificate and affidavit of Shri B. L. Maheshwari. It is the case of the petitioner that on 14-11-1997 he was under treatment, hence could not appear before the Inquiry Officer in spite thereof, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex parte with the matter, conducted the inquiry and submitted report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-26 on 5-1-1997, a show-cause notice along with report of the Inquiry Officer was served on the petitioner. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-26 on 5-1-1997, a show-cause notice along with report of the Inquiry Officer was served on the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show-cause notice vide Annexure P-28 on 20-1-1998 and pointed out various discrepancies in the inquiry, these were not considered and vide Annexure P-30, dated 27-1-1998 the impugned order of dismissal was passed. The petitioner filed appeal before the CMD on 31-1-1998 and on 28-3-1998 vide Annexure P-32, the petitioner was directed to appear for personal hearing before the CMD on 4-4-1998. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-34, dated 25-4-1995 the appeal was also dismissed and the inquiry was conducted ex parte against the petitioner. It is seen from the record that after ex parte proceedings were drawn against the petitioner on 14-11-1997, the inquiry was held On 15-11-1997, 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997 and the report submitted. It is the case of the petitioner after 14-11-1997 he did not receive any notice with regard to the inquiry being conducted on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997 so also on 7-12-1997, according to the petitioner the ex parte inquiry was conducted without giving him any opportunity of defence and the entire inquiry was concluded, in an illegal manner. 5. Shri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner taking me through the pleadings and the documents available on record including the proceedings of the inquiry held on the dates as indicated hereinabove argued that as per the Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, 1979, Disciplinary Authority is defined in Rule 3(f) to mean the authority specified in the schedule appended to the rules and competent to impose the punishment as contemplated under Rule 23. Rule 24 also defines Disciplinary Authority to mean a person specified in the schedule annexed to the Rules. It is a common ground that the petitioner is an employee working in the pay scale of Rs. 3750-5950 and as per the Schedule annexed to the Rules of 1979 the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner is the General Manager. It is a common ground that the petitioner is an employee working in the pay scale of Rs. 3750-5950 and as per the Schedule annexed to the Rules of 1979 the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner is the General Manager. It is the first contention of Shri R. N. Singh that the charge-sheet in question and the entire action against the petitioner is taken by one Shri S. C. Sharma, who is not a General Manager but is only a Deputy General Manager and was officiating as General Manager, accordingly the first ground of attack is that the charge-sheet is issued by a incompetent person who is not authorised to initiate the Departmental Enquiry and punish the petitioner. It is also stated that the petitioner has filed some criminal case on the basis of a private complaint against Shri S. C. Sharma, therefore, Shri S. C. Sharma was biased against the petitioner and the action was motivated not only for this reasons but also because of the activities of the petitioner as a Secretary of the employee association, accordingly it is stated that the entire inquiry stands vitiated as it is initiated by an incompetent person. 6. The next ground canvassed by Shri R. N. Singh is to the effect that Shri Mohan Lal Prajapati, who was appointed as Inquiry Officer was an Advocate of the respondent establishment and subsequently he was made the Standing Counsel and retainer of the company and under sub-rule (2) to Rule 25 only a Public Authority/public servant can be nominated as Inquiry Officer, accordingly contending that Shri Prajapati is disentitled to proceed and conduct inquiry. The second ground on attack is that the appointment of Shri Prajapati as Inquiry Officer is illegal. The third ground of challenge is that the petitioner sought for appointing Shri M. K. Dawre and Shri B. L. Maheshwari as his defence assistant, both these requests were rejected and as the request is rejected illegally, it is stated that the right of the-petitioner to take assistance of a Defence Counsel was taken away. The third ground of challenge is that the petitioner sought for appointing Shri M. K. Dawre and Shri B. L. Maheshwari as his defence assistant, both these requests were rejected and as the request is rejected illegally, it is stated that the right of the-petitioner to take assistance of a Defence Counsel was taken away. The next ground of attack is that the documents were not supplied to the petitioner in spite of request and even though some documents were supplied vide Annexure P-11, they were fabricated documents and the complete documents were not supplied to the petitioner as a result the petitioner was handicapped in participating the inquiry effectively. It is stated that the inquiry stands vitiated due to non-supply of documents to facilitate the petitioner to submit his reply to the charge-sheet. Thereafter, it was argued that the inquiry was proceeded ex parte on 14-11-1997, on which date the petitioner was admitted in the hospital and in spite of the medical certificate being sent with Shri M. L. Maheshwari, the same was not taken on record and the inquiry proceeded ex parte. It is also stated that after proceedings ex parte in the inquiry on 14-11-1997 no notice with regard to the inquiry to be conducted on 15-11-1997, 23-11-1997 and 24-11-1997 was given and contending that the notices of the inquiry submitted by the respondent along with their return at Page Nos. 120, 121 and 122 were never supplied to the petitioner, they were fabricated and the endorsement made in these documents showing receipt of these notices by the petitioner is a fabricated documents only to deny the benefit to the petitioner. The argument is that the ex parte inquiry conducted against the petitioner is illegal. Finally the last ground canvassed was that even though the petitioner was suspended on 11-4-1997, subsistence allowance as per rule was not paid to him, it was only paid after intervention of the High Court and a contempt application filed by the petitioner in October, 1997 and thereafter also full payment was made. It is stated that the payment of subsistence allowance was denied to the petitioner, as a result the entire inquiry stands vitiated. Finally, Shri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that as the charges levelled against the petitioner are stale, vague and do not constitute misconduct, the action taken is vitiated. It is stated that the payment of subsistence allowance was denied to the petitioner, as a result the entire inquiry stands vitiated. Finally, Shri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that as the charges levelled against the petitioner are stale, vague and do not constitute misconduct, the action taken is vitiated. Inviting my attention to the following judgments:- (i) Steel Authority of India, Successor of Bokaro Steel Limited vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Bokaro Steel City, Dhanbad and another, (1980) 3 SCC 734 . (ii) Jagdamba Prasad Shukla vs. State of U. P. and others, (2000) 7 SCC 90 ; Capt. M. Paulanthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, (1999) 3 SCC 679 . (iii) Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, (1986) SCC 103. (iv) Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others vs. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . (v) Parthasarathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 3 SCC 459 . (vi) State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna and others, (2001) 2 SCC 330 . (vii) Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (1983) 2 SCC 442 . Shri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, argued that the action of the respondent is unsustainable. 7. Shri Rajneesh Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent refuted the aforesaid and pointed out that Shri S. C. Sharma' was General Manager (In-charge), even though he was substantively holding the post of Deputy General Manager but vide Annexure R-2, the powers of General Manager (Works) was conferred upon him and therefore, the proceedings initiated by Shri S. C. Sharma by virtue of the powers conferred upon him vide Annexure R-2, dated 18-3-1997 is justified and he is empowered to take action in the matter. As far as engagement of Shri Mohan Lal Prajapati, Advocate as Inquiry Officer is concerned, Shri Rajneesh Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent invites my attention to the provisions of Rule 25(2) and points out that apart from a public servant any other persons can be appointed as Inquiry Officer. Shri Rajneesh Gupta also invites my attention to the requirement of sub-rule (4) of Rule 25 to contend that apart from a public servant the rule contemplates for appointment of any other person as Inquiry Officer, therefore, there" is no illegality in the matter of appointing Shri Prajapati as Inquiry Officer. 8. Shri Rajneesh Gupta also invites my attention to the requirement of sub-rule (4) of Rule 25 to contend that apart from a public servant the rule contemplates for appointment of any other person as Inquiry Officer, therefore, there" is no illegality in the matter of appointing Shri Prajapati as Inquiry Officer. 8. As far as refusing permission to engage Shri B. L. Maheshwari as Defence Counsel is concerned, Shri Rajneesh Gupta, argued that only such person can be permitted to be a Defence Counsel who comes with the purview of an employee as defined in the Rule of 1979. Inviting my attention to the definition of an "employee" as contained in Rule 3(a) and the fact that Shri B. L. Maheshwari is a person to whom standing orders apply, Shri Rajneesh Gupta, argues that Shri B. L. Maheshwari could not be granted permission to assist the petitioner as provided under Rule 25(6), accordingly, it is stated that in refusing permission to engage Shri B. L. Maheshwari, no error is committed. Finally taking me through the proceedings of inquiry as has been filed by the respondents with the return, Shri Rajneesh Gupta argued that after the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 11-4-1997 right upto 22-8-1997, when the Inquiry Officer was appointed, the petitioner refused to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, on one pretext or the other. Inviting my attention to the procedure contemplated under Rule 25(3) and Explanation thereto, Shri Rajneesh Gupta argued that the documents listed with the charge-sheet are not to be supplied at the stage of issuing charge-sheet, they are to be supplied during the first hearing of the inquiry, which is conducted in accordance to sub-rule (8) of Rule 25 and as the documents were supplied to the petitioner before the said date, it is argued that on the ground of non-supply of documents, the petitioner cannot have any grievance and no rule is violated in this regard. 9. 9. As far as proceedings with regard to the inquiry is concerned, it is argued by Shri Rajneesh Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent that the first sitting of the inquiry was conducted on 1-9-1997 and even though the petitioner initially participated in the inquiry upto 8-11-1997, but in spite of notice he remained absent on 14-11-1997 and therefore, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex parte in the matter and in spite of notice the petitioner did not appear in the inquiry that was fixed on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997 and 7-12-1997 and therefore, there can be no error in the, matter of conducting inquiry. As the petitioner himself is to be blamed for not having participated in the inquiry in spite of granting him opportunity, finally it was submitted by Shri Rajneesh Gupta that the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance after the order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 15-10-1997 and as the petitioner was not coming to the office for affixing his signature, the petitioner was not entitled to payment of subsistence allowance. It was argued by Shri Rajneesh Gupta that appearing in the headquarters for signature every day is a pre-condition for grant of subsistence allowance to a suspended employee and as the petitioner did not do so, it is stated that he cannot have any grievance. Even otherwise, it was argued by Shri Rajneesh Gupta that after 15-10-1997 the entire subsistence allowance is paid to the petitioner. Accordingly, it was submitted by Shri Rajneesh Gupta that in the facts and circumstances of the case there cannot be any grievance for the petitioner and as the action taken against the petitioner is on the basis of a properly conducted Departmental Enquiry in which all opportunities were granted to the petitioner, the petitioner cannot have any grievance, accordingly seeking rejection of the prayer made by the petitioner, Shri Rajneesh Gupta submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. 10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and on consideration of the rival contentions, this Court is of the considered view that the following questions arise for determination in this writ petition :- (i) Whether the charge-sheet in question and the dismissal order dated 27-1-1998 are issued by the Competent Authority or the entire proceedings stand vitiated in view of the fact that the proceeding is initiated by an incompetent person and the punishment is also imposed by the same authority which has issued the charge-sheet? (ii) Whether the appointment of Shri Mohan Lal Prajapati, Advocate as an Inquiry Officer is proper or is vitiated due to appointment of an unauthorised person to conduct the inquiry ? (iii) Whether proper opportunity of defence is denied to the petitioner as he was not granted the assistance of defence Counsel of his choice ? (iv) Whether the inquiry stands vitiated due to non-supply of documents at the time of filing reply to the charge-sheet or during the course of inquiry ? (v) Whether the proceedings with the inquiry, ex parte, was proper in the facts and circumstance of the case or the inquiry stands vitiated due to the ex parte proceeding conducted ? (vi) "What is the effect of non-payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner ? (vii) Whether initiation of Departmental Enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner and the action taken against the petitioner stands vitiated because it is a mala fide action undertaken only to harass the petitioner because he was an office bearer of an employees association ? (viii) Whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate or shocking to the conscious of this Court and therefore, warrants consideration ? (ix) What is the effect of past record of the petitioner being considered while punishing the petitioner, without notice to the petitioner ? 11. (viii) Whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate or shocking to the conscious of this Court and therefore, warrants consideration ? (ix) What is the effect of past record of the petitioner being considered while punishing the petitioner, without notice to the petitioner ? 11. As far as the first ground with regard to the competency of the Deputy General Manager to initiate the departmental proceedings by issuing charge-sheet and thereafter imposing the punishment is concerned, it is an admitted position that the charge-sheet was issued by Shri S. C. Sharma, who was substantively holding of post of Deputy General Manager, vide Annexure R-2, charge was given to Shri S. C. Sharma after transfer of one Shri S. K. Ghosh who was substantively holding the post of General Manager, In the order (Annexure R-2), it is clearly stated that Shri S. C. Sharma, Deputy General Manager (O) will take charge of General Manager (Works) and will exercise all powers of General Manager and he was designated as General Manager (In-charge) (Works). Therefore, it is an admitted position that the charge-sheet was issued by the person who was not substantively appointed as General Manager but was only made In-charge General Manager and that also given the duties of General Manager (Works). Both the charge-sheet and the impugned order of punishment are issued by this authority. 12. Under the Nepa Limited Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979, Disciplinary Authority is defined in Rule 3(f) to mean a person specified in the Schedule appended to these rules and competent to impose any of the penalty contemplated under Rule 23. Again in Rule 24, it is stated that the Disciplinary Authority is one as is specified in the Schedule, or any authority higher than it who may impose any of the penalties specified in the Rules to an employee. It is therefore, clear that imposition of penalty specified in Rule 23 can only be \ undertaken by the Disciplinary Authority as specified in the Schedule. That apart under Rule 25 pertaining to procedure for imposing major penalty, under sub-rule (2), it is indicated that it is the Disciplinary Authority who shall initiate the departmental proceedings to inquire into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or mis-behaviour against an employee. That apart under Rule 25 pertaining to procedure for imposing major penalty, under sub-rule (2), it is indicated that it is the Disciplinary Authority who shall initiate the departmental proceedings to inquire into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or mis-behaviour against an employee. Thereafter, in sub-rule (3), it is stated that when it proposed to hold an inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges and initiate the inquiry. Complete reading of the provisions pertaining to the definition of Disciplinary Authority, the powers of the Disciplinary Authority and the procedure for imposing major penalty clearly indicates that the Departmental Enquiry has to be initiated by the Disciplinary Authority, charge-sheet has to be issued by the Disciplinary Authority, and the punishment contemplated under section 23 is also to be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In the Schedule annexed to the rule the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority with regard to various grades are indicated, as far as the petitioner is concerned, it is an admitted position that the Disciplinary Authority is the General Manager, the Appellate Authority is the Functional Director and the Reviewing Authority is the Chairman and Managing Director of the Company. Accordingly from the Rules in question, it is crystal clear that it is only the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the General Manager who can initiate Departmental Enquiry, issues charge-sheet and punish an employee like the petitioner. In the present case, the respondents contend that Shri S. C. Sharma, who was substantively holding the post of Deputy General Manager and who was made In-charge General Manager (Works) exercised the powers of Disciplinary Authority by virtue of the office order issued by the Chairman Cum Managing Director, vide Annexure R-2. If Annexure R-2, order dated 18-3-1997 is taken note of it only says that consequent to the transfer of one Shri S. K. Ghosh, General Manager (Works) as General Manager (Technical) Shri S. C. Sharma, Deputy General Manager (O) will take over charge of General Manager (Works) and will exercise all the powers of General Manager and he is designated as In-charge General Manager. This office order only confers the powers on Shri S. C. Sharma, Deputy General Manager to discharging the duties of General Manager (Works) and to exercise all the powers of that post. This office order only confers the powers on Shri S. C. Sharma, Deputy General Manager to discharging the duties of General Manager (Works) and to exercise all the powers of that post. This order does not designate him nor does it empowers him to discharge the functioning of an Appointing Authority or the Disciplinary Authority as contemplated under the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of the company. The Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of the Company are formulated by the Board of Director of Company and the Competent Authority, which has formulated the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules has not delegated any power to the General Manager (Works) to discharge the function of Disciplinary Authority or Appointing Authority with respect to Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. That being so Shri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner is right in contending that the Departmental Enquiry initiated against the petitioner, the charge-sheet issued to him and the punishment imposed is by an authority who was incompetent to do so. At this stage, it would be appropriate to take note of certain legal principles in this regard. In the case of Marathwada University vs. Sheshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, (1989) 3 SCC 132 , similar questions have been considered. In that case, the Vice Chancellor of the University initiated Departmental Enquiry and took disciplinary action against the employee concerned, even though under the Rules it was the Executive Council, which was empowered to take action. When the authority of Vice Chancellor to take decision was challenged it was argued that the Executive Council has authorized the Vice Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of the officers working under him and therefore, it was stated that the Vice Chancellor was authorised to take action. In the present case also, similar arguments are being advanced by referring to Annexure R-2. The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in the case of Marathwada University (supra), and it was held that when under rule, a particular authority is delegated the power of Appointing Authority or the Disciplinary Authority then power can be exercised only by the said authority and not by anybody else. The resolution passed by the Executive Council giving authority to the Vice Chancellor to regulate conduct of the employee was said to be insufficient to empower the Vice Chancellor to take disciplinary action. The resolution passed by the Executive Council giving authority to the Vice Chancellor to regulate conduct of the employee was said to be insufficient to empower the Vice Chancellor to take disciplinary action. It has been held that when the statutory provisions prescribed a particular body or the authority to exercise power, it is only the said body, which can exercise power and nobody else. In Para 20 of the said judgment, the principle has been crystallised in the following manner :- "20. Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the Vice Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the University implies as well the power to take disciplinary action against officers. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the power and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly, the Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally included the power to remove. This power is located under section 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the Vice Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act prescribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 1, 4th Edn., Para 32) summarises these principles as follows :- (Emphasis supplied) 32. Sub-delegation of powers.- In accordance with the maxim delgatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. 1, 4th Edn., Para 32) summarises these principles as follows :- (Emphasis supplied) 32. Sub-delegation of powers.- In accordance with the maxim delgatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. There is a strong presumption against constructing a grant of Legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind." If the said principle is applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be seen that in this case also under the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules in question the powers to initiate disciplinary action and the power to punish a person like the petitioner is conferred on the General Manager,: admittedly the person who initiated the charge-sheet and took action, in the present case, Shri S. C. Sharma was a Deputy General Manager, was not a General Manager, the office order (Annexure R-2) did not authorise/delegate to} him the power of a Disciplinary Authority as contemplated under the; Disciplinary and Appeal Rules nor is the office order issued by a Competent Authority who is authorised to delegate such power, accordingly the entire action initiated against the petitioner in the present case and the order of punishment issued is by any competent person. In this regard, the principles laid down by the Bench of this Court in the case of Shardul Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 1966 MPLJ 145 = AIR 1966 MP 193 , may also be taken note of wherein it has been held that the charge-sheet can only be issued and the Departmental Enquiry initiated by the authority authorised under the Rules and in the absence of any delegation in accordance with law, action taken by unauthorised officer vitiates the entire proceedings. In the present case also the position is similar. The General Manager, who is the Competent Authority to initiate the Departmental Enquiry, issue charge-sheet and punish the delinquent employees has neither initiated the inquiry nor issued the charge-sheet nor is the final order of punishment imposed by the said authority, accordingly the entire action initiated against the petitioner being by an unauthorized person stands vitiated. The General Manager, who is the Competent Authority to initiate the Departmental Enquiry, issue charge-sheet and punish the delinquent employees has neither initiated the inquiry nor issued the charge-sheet nor is the final order of punishment imposed by the said authority, accordingly the entire action initiated against the petitioner being by an unauthorized person stands vitiated. Further the principles laid down in the case of Steel Authority (supra), relied upon by Shri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner also lays down the said principle. Accordingly, on the aforesaid ground, i.e., on the ground of the charge-sheet being issued by a incompetent person and the order of punishment also being passed by the incompetent person the entire action taken against the petitioner is liable to be quashed as the same is unsustainable and stands vitiated due to the act by an unauthorised person. 13. Once it is held by this Court that the entire action and the punishment imposed on the petitioner stands vitiated on the grounds as indicated hereinabove, it is not normally necessary to deal with the other grounds canvassed at the time of hearing instead the petitioner can be granted relief prayed for in this writ petition. However, as the parties have advanced arguments on all grounds, it is thought appropriate to consider and decide all the grounds in accordance with law. 14. As far as second ground is concerned the objection of the petitioner is that Shri Mohan Lal Prajapati was an Advocate and therefore, he was incompetent to be appointed as the Inquiry Officer. According to Shri R. N. Singh under Rule 25(2), the inquiry has to be conducted by an officer appointed who has to be a public servant. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 reads as under :- "25. According to Shri R. N. Singh under Rule 25(2), the inquiry has to be conducted by an officer appointed who has to be a public servant. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 reads as under :- "25. (2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or mis-behaviour against an employee, it may itself inquire into or appoint any public servant ('hereinafter called the Inquiry Authority) or any other person to inquire into the truth thereof')." Referring to the words starting from "hereinafter called" and ending with "truth thereof contained in bracket, Shri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner argued that it only refers to a public servant who can be an Inquiry Officer and the 'words' or any other person also refers to a public servant as it is also within the bracket, per contra it is the case of the respondents that 'word' any other person refers to any person which includes a lawyer. Apart from sub-rule (2) of Rule 25, sub-rule (4) contemplates that on receipt of the written statement of the employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified an inquiry may be held by the Disciplinary Authority itself, or by any other public servant or any other person appointed as an Enquiring Authority under sub-clause (2). In this rule, there is no bracket as is there in sub-rule (2). Be that as it may the mention of words any other person after the word "or" clearly indicates that option is given to the Disciplinary Authority either to appoint a public servant as Inquiry Officer or any other person of his choice. That being so, the Inquiry Officer can be any other person as per the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority merely because a person appointed happens to be a lawyer appearing in some cases on behalf of the Company, it cannot be held that the inquiry stands vitiated. Similar question with regard to a lawyer discharging duties of an Inquiry Officer has been considered by the Supreme Court in various cases and similar argument as has been advanced has been rejected in the absence of any personal bias or prejudice shown due to appointment of a Lawyer as Inquiry Officer, interference into the matter is not called for. Similar question with regard to a lawyer discharging duties of an Inquiry Officer has been considered by the Supreme Court in various cases and similar argument as has been advanced has been rejected in the absence of any personal bias or prejudice shown due to appointment of a Lawyer as Inquiry Officer, interference into the matter is not called for. The principles in this regard is laid down in the cases of E. R. Shankaran vs. Mettor Govt. Servants Co-operative Society Ltd., 2001 Labour Law Reporter Page 132, so also in the case Indian Telephone Industries vs. Devishankar Kumar Shukla, 2000(1) Labour Law Journal Page 531. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles and the fact that the rules permit appointment of an outsider as Inquiry Officer, second objection raised by the petitioner with regard to Mohan Lal Prajapati discharging duties of Inquiry Officer is found to be unsustainable and the said objection is rejected. 15. As far as third objection with regard to providing defence assistant is concerned, the petitioner wanted to take assistance of Shri B. L. Maheshwari, who does not fulfil the criteria laid down to come within the purview of an "employee" as defined in Rule 3(a) of the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. Under sub-rule (6) of Rule 25, it is stated that the employee may take the assistance of any other employee within the meaning of these rules but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose. An employee is defined in Rule 3(a) in the following manner:- "3 (a). Employee :- "Employee " means a person in the employment of the company other than Casual, Badli, Work Charged, Contingent Staff, Workmen covered under the Standing Orders of the Company, but includes a person in whose case the President of India or Government of India is the Appointing Authority and also a person on deputation to the Company." Shri B. L. Maheshwari is a workman to whom the Standing Orders of the company are applicable, therefore, he will not fall within the purview of an "employee" and it is because of the reason that prayer to appoint Shri Maheshwari as defence assistant was rejected and in doing so, the respondents have not committed any error warranting interference. Even though during the course of hearing, it was tried to emphasise that apart from Shri B. L. Maheshwari, the petitioner had initially sought for appearing in the inquiry along with one M. K. Dawre and this was also refused vide Annexure P-17, dated 20-9-1997. But a perusal of Annexure P-17 indicates that it pertains to rejecting prayer of the petitioner with regard to appointment of Shri Mohan Lal Prajapati as Inquiry Officer and there is nothing to indicate that by this order prayer for engaging Shri M. K. Dawre was rejected. Even though in the communication (Annexure P-19), dated 1-10-1987 the petitioner had referred to the inquiry proceedings and has indicated Shri Manohar Dawre as his representative. But submission of this document and refusal by the Inquiry Officer in this regard is not established by the petitioner, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that he was denied legal assistance by engaging defence Counsel for his choice was rejected cannot be accepted. 16. As far supply of documents is concerned, the petitioner insisted upon the documents being supplied to him for submitting his reply to the charge-sheet. Supply of documents at the stage of issuing charge-sheet is not contemplated under the rule. In the procedure for imposing major penalty as is contained in Rule 25 and Explanation to sub-rule (3) of Rule 25, it is clearly stipulated that at the stage of submitting reply to the charge-sheet listed documents with the charge-sheet are not to be shown they are to be shown at the first sitting of the inquiry and in the present case records indicate that much before commencement of the inquiry all the documents were supplied to the petitioner but the petitioner raised certain objections to the effect that the documents are fabricated, except for contending that the documents are fabricated or that the documents were not supplied, no cogent material or evidence is adduced before this Court to show as to which documents were not supplied to the petitioner. Records indicate that the documents were supplied to the petitioner at the first sitting of the inquiry and in the absence of any prejudice being shown due to non-supply of the documents interference into the matter on the said count is not warranted. Accordingly this ground canvassed is also unsustainable. 17. Records indicate that the documents were supplied to the petitioner at the first sitting of the inquiry and in the absence of any prejudice being shown due to non-supply of the documents interference into the matter on the said count is not warranted. Accordingly this ground canvassed is also unsustainable. 17. The next ground of attack is with regard to the inquiry being proceeded against the petitioner ex parte. From the record, it is seen that the petitioner participated in the various proceedings and the inquiry, which was held prior to 14-11-1997. In fact the order sheet of the inquiry filed along with the return upto 8-11-1997 indicate that the petitioner participated in the inquiry and till that date discussion took place in the inquiry with regard to supply of documents. Objection with regard to engagement of defence Counsel, objection of the petitioner with regard to non-grant of subsistence allowance and various other technical objections with regard to the documents being fabricated. Thereafter the inquiry was fixed for 14-11-1997 and the intimation and notice about this inquiry was given to the petitioner. However, on 14-11-1997 admittedly the petitioner did not appear in the inquiry and it is his case that on the said date he was sick and could not appear in the inquiry, according to the petitioner he sent a medical certificate indicating that he is admitted in the hospital and unable to come in the inquiry. The medical certificate filed by the petitioner is P-24, wherein he is advised two days bed rest on 14-11-1997 and 15-11-1997. According to the petitioner the medical certificates were sent by him along with Shri B. L. Maheshwari and when Shri B. L. Maheshwari appeared he was not permitted to appear and the medical certificate was not taken on record. However, in the order-sheet and proceedings held on 14-11-1997 there is no mention of Shri B. L. Maheshwari appearing and refusal to permit his appearance and the medical certificate being given. However, in the order-sheet and proceedings held on 14-11-1997 there is no mention of Shri B. L. Maheshwari appearing and refusal to permit his appearance and the medical certificate being given. The question with regard to petitioner's appearance in the inquiry on 14-11-1997, and the contention that Shri B. L. Maheshwari went with his medical certificate, his presence was not marked and the objection was not noted in the order sheet are disputed questions of fact and on the basis of rival affidavits submitted by both the parties in this regard, it is very difficult for this Court to decide this disputed question of facts only on the basis of affidavits. However, it is a fact that on 14-11-1997 ex parte proceeding was held against the petitioner, certain witnesses were examined and thereafter inquiry was adjourned to 15-11-1997 on which date certain proceedings took place but after 15-11-1997 the Inquiry Officer adjourned the inquiry to 23-11-1997 and thereafter to 24-11-1997 and according to the respondents notice of the inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997 and 24-11-1997 was issued to the petitioner and in spite of this the petitioner did not appear. From Pages 117 upto 122 of the paper book the respondents have filed documents to show that the notice with regard to inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997 and 24-11-1997 and thereafter on 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 was issued to the petitioner and in spite of notice the petitioner did not appear and therefore, the proceedings of inquiry held against the petitioner ex parte between 23-11-1997 upto 13-12-1997 is justified, the petitioner has filed counter-affidavit by way of additional rejoinder and has pointed out that no such notice was ever issued to the petitioner, he was not at all informed about any inquiry being held after 14-11-1997 or 15-11-1997. It is categorically stated by him that the contention of the respondents that the notices were issued to the petitioner to appear in the inquiry on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 is incorrect. On the contrary, it is the case of the respondents that notices were issued to the petitioner and the copies of the notices are filed from Page Nos. On the contrary, it is the case of the respondents that notices were issued to the petitioner and the copies of the notices are filed from Page Nos. 117 to 122 and it is stated that in the endorsement of the notices, it is clearly indicated by the process server that the petitioner's wife refused to accept the notice on one occasion and on the another occasion the petitioner himself refused to accept notices. However, it is the case of the petitioner that all these documents are fabricated and prepared after filing of the writ petition only to justifying the ex parte proceedings. 18. In this connection, if the record is scrutinised, it would be seen that in the proceedings held on 15-11-1997, the Inquiry Officer has held that even though he has proposed to proceed ex parte in the matter on 14-11-1997 but in the interest of justice he has indicted that the notice be issued to the petitioner and the petitioner asked to participate in the inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997. Similar notices are issued after making note in the order sheet in the inquiry to be held on 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and again on 13-12-1997 and according to the respondents these notices are filed from Page No. 117 to Page No. 122 of the paper book. 19. In this regard, if the entire documents available on record are taken note of it would be seen that Annexure R-1-B from Page 108 onwards upto Page 122 are communication made by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner, informing him about the dates of the inquiry along with time and also communication with regard decision on the objections of the petitioners. If all these documents are scrutinised a very peculiar feature emerges, all communication made prior to issuance of notice from Page No. 117, i.e., with regard to inquiry being held prior to 23-11-1997, all the communications are made by the Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and the registered postal receipt and acknowledgments have been filed by the respondents. At Page No. 108 is a notice issued with regard to the inquiry to be held on 1-9-1997, it is addressed to the petitioner and it is sent by the Regd. Post Acknowledgment Due and it is indicated at the top of this communication that it is a notice in accordance to Rule 25(7) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. At Page No. 108 is a notice issued with regard to the inquiry to be held on 1-9-1997, it is addressed to the petitioner and it is sent by the Regd. Post Acknowledgment Due and it is indicated at the top of this communication that it is a notice in accordance to Rule 25(7) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. The postal receipt of sending this notice bearing serial from 6423 has been filed and the acknowledgment of the petitioner is also produced. Apart from sending this notices by the Regd. Post Acknowledgment Due, the document at Page No. 110 is about sending of this notice to the petitioner by UPC. Similarly, at Page No. III is an order passed by the Inquiry Officer with regard to deciding certain objections of the petitioner so also communicating to the petitioner that next date of inquiry fixed for 20-9-1997 at 11 a.m. This notice is also sent by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and in the top of the notice it is indicated that it is notice under Rule 25(7) of the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules at Page 112 is the postal receipt of sending this notice bearing Serial No. 6418 along with acknowledgment of the petitioner, Similarly, communication is made to the petitioner at Page No. 113 again with regard to certain proceedings of the inquiry. This is also sent by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and at Page No. 114 the postal receipt and acknowledgment is available. Thereafter an amended notice with regard to inquiry is available at Page Nos. 115 and 116 and in both these notices it is indicated that these notices are sent by the Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Surprisingly at Page No. 117 the notice dated 15-11-1997 sent with regard to the inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997 and 24-11-1997 and Page No. 116 is further notice with regard to inquiry to be held on 7-12-1997, this notice is dated 24-11-1997 and Page No. 119 is another notice dated 7-12-1997 with regard to inquiry to be held on 13-12-1997, at Page Nos. 117, 118 and 119 of the paper book, three notices are available with regard to inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 respectively. 117, 118 and 119 of the paper book, three notices are available with regard to inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 respectively. Surprisingly none of these notices bear the head note like the previous notices with regard to their issuance under Rule 25(7) of the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules nor are these sent by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, but even in the notice it is not indicated that they are being sent for service through process server and there is no mention of any dispatch number for service by hand. However, at Page Nos. 120, 121 and 122 are copies of these notices, on these notices in the bottom certain endorsements are made by one person, namely one Mansaram indicating that either the petitioner's wife informed the process server that the petitioner is not available and therefore, she cannot take notice and in one case the petitioner himself is said to have refused to take notice. It is surprising that the Inquiry Officer has proceeded ex parte on the basis of these material and the following discrepancies are seen in the matter of intimating the petitioner about inquiry to be held on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 9-12-1997 and 13-12-1997. The discrepancies are :- (a) On all other previous occasion notices are sent by the Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and the postal receipt and acknowledgments are available on record. However, notices from 23-11-1997 to 13-12-1997 are not sent by the Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. (b) The notices are served by hand but dispatch number is not mentioned and the fact all these notices being issued by hand are not indicated, nor any record produced to show that these notices were dispatched to be served by hand. (c) The person who went to serve these notices was not examined by the Inquiry Officer and there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner received or refused these notices and in spite of notice refused to accept then, non-examination of the process server who served these notices has to be taken note of and an adverse inference drawn and benefit granted to the petitioner, particularly when the procedure followed for sending the inquiry notice earlier was by the Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. 20. 20. Accordingly due to aforesaid reason and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even though inquiry was held on various dates even after 15-4-1997 as indicated hereinabove, notices of these inquiry were not sent to the petitioner, the petitioner was not informed and in an illegal manner and arbitrary manner ex parte proceedings was held 'against the petitioner on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 and opportunity of defence was not given to the petitioner. 21. Contention of the petitioner that the documents appearing from page Nos. 117 to 127 are false and fabricated documents and have been produced only to substantiate the contentions made in the return has much force and if the fact of notice sent earlier in the manner as indicated hereinabove are taken note of it has to be held that inquiry proceedings held on 23-11-1997, 24-11-1997, 7-12-1997 and 13-12-1997 stand vitiated due to no notice being issued to the petitioner and as the inquiry on these dates was held ex parte without notice to the petitioner, the entire inquiry stands vitiated on this count. 22. As far as payment of subsistence allowance is concerned, it is seen that the petitioner was suspended on 11-4-1997 vide Annexure P-1. After suspension no subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner. The petitioner therefore, raised objection and when the subsistence allowance was not paid to him, he filed writ petition before this Court. This writ petition came up for hearing and this Court has directed for payment of subsistence allowance, in spite thereof subsistence allowance was not paid and therefore contempt action was initiated against the respondents. In spite of the contempt action being initiated when the subsistence allowance was not paid to the petitioner in the inquiry proceedings held on 25-10-1997, which is available at Page No. 155 of the return filed by the respondents, the petitioner submitted interlocutory application being IA. No. 4, wherein it is stated that the subsistence allowance has not been paid to him and in the absence of subsistence allowance being paid it was stated that he was not in a position to defend in the inquiry. The order sheet of the inquiry dated 25-10-1997 indicates that after the order dated 15-10-1997 available at Page No. 165 of the return was passed by the General Manager (Works) on 15-10-1997, a sum of Rs. The order sheet of the inquiry dated 25-10-1997 indicates that after the order dated 15-10-1997 available at Page No. 165 of the return was passed by the General Manager (Works) on 15-10-1997, a sum of Rs. 798/- only was paid to the petitioner as subsistence allowance by demand draft on 17-10-1997. Thereafter the order-sheets indicate that the subsistence allowance could not be paid due to financial crisis in the company. It is not known as to why after 17-10-1997 subsistence allowance was not paid. During the course of hearing of this writ petition Shri Rajneesh Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents has stated that the subsistence allowance was not paid to the petitioner because as per Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, the petitioner did not appear in the office for marking his attendance and therefore, subsistence allowance was not paid to him. In this regard, no Rules or Regulations are brought to the notice in respect of marking attendance by an employee for payment of subsistence allowance. On the contrary Rules 20 and 21 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules pertain to suspension and payment of subsistence allowance indicate that on suspension, the employee is entitled 50% of his basic pay subsistence allowance for the first period of 6 months and thereafter 75%. There is nothing in this rule to show that subsistence allowance is paid subject to marking attendance by the delinquent employee. It is a case where the employee is suspended on 11-4-1997 except for showing payment a sum of Rs. 798/- as subsistence allowance on 17-10-1997 there is nothing to indicate that the subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner at any point of time. In the case of Capt. M. Paulanthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another (supra), relied upon by Shri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner it has been held that if an ex parte inquiry is held and if the employee is compelled to participate in the inquiry without providing him subsistence allowance during the period of suspension the inquiry stands vitiated. The Supreme Court in Para 33 held as under:- "33. Since in the instant case, the appellant was not provided any subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates. The Supreme Court in Para 33 held as under:- "33. Since in the instant case, the appellant was not provided any subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates. Was refused resulting in ex parte proceedings against him, we are of the opinion that the appellant has been punished in total violation of the principles of natural justice and he has literally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Moreover, as pleaded by the appellant before the High Court as also before us that on account of his penury occasioned by non-payment of subsistence allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer at such proceedings, which were held ex parte, stand vitiated." 23. Similarly principles are also laid down in the cases of Jagdamba Prasad Shukla vs. State of U. P. (supra); State of Punjab and others vs. K. K. Sharma, (2002)9 SCC 474 ; and Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava vs. State of M.P., 1974 MPLJ (S.C.) 194 = (1973) 1 SCC 656 . It has been held in all these cases that if a suspended employee is not paid subsistence allowance during the pendency of the Departmental Enquiry, the same amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity of defence, accordingly it has to be held that in this case subsistence allowance was not paid to the petitioner in accordance to the rules, as a result the petitioner suffered and therefore, it can be held that reasonable opportunity to participate and defend in the inquiry was denied to the petitioner on this count. 24. As far as the ground with regard to mala fides of the respondents is concerned, once it has been found by this Court that the inquiry stands vitiated, on the ground of it being initiated by an incompetent person and being proceeded ex parte in the illegal manner the ground of mala fide needs not to be looked into, even otherwise ground of mala fides is urged only by contending that the petitioner was an office bearer of an association of employees and he was being harassed because of his union activities, now at this stage, I am not inclined to go into this question. 25. 25. As far as the perversity in the finding of the Inquiry Officer and the question of delay in issuing the charge-sheet and punishing the petitioner in the vague charge-sheet are concerned, if the charge-sheet (Annexure P-I), dated 11-4-1997 is taken note of it would be seen that even though 13 charges are levelled against the petitioner, most of the charges pertain to the period 1993 to 1996 and the charges are vague and not specific in nature. For example, Charge No. 1 makes an allegation that between 1993 to 1996, the petitioner used to come to the office when the office was closed (holiday) and used to indulge in some illegal activities. It is not known as to why for the incidents that took place in the years 1973 to 1976, the charge-sheet is issued after a period more than 3 years. Similarly, charge No. 2 pertains to complaint made by the petitioner on 9-2-1973, due to which one General Manager of the company was trapped and criminal prosecution lodged against him which ultimately resulted in his acquittal. Another charge levelled against the petitioner pertains to various activities of the year 1993. The manner in which charges are levelled, it seems to be an attempt to somehow punish the petitioner for various activities, which he was indulging for more than 5 years. Some of the activities pertain to press conference held by the petitioner and publication of news items with regard to activities of the company. Be that as it may be when this Court is of the considered view that the entire inquiry stands vitiated further deliberation into these aspect of the matter is not warranted. Finally, if the action taken against the petitioner is taken note of, it would be seen that the punishment order indicates that the petitioner is being punished not only for the misconduct alleged and proved against him but also for the past act of commission and omission or his past conduct. What was the past conduct, which was taken note of and in what manner the same amounted to misconduct by the petitioner and what punishment was imposed in the past has neither been indicated nor pointed out to this Court. What was the past conduct, which was taken note of and in what manner the same amounted to misconduct by the petitioner and what punishment was imposed in the past has neither been indicated nor pointed out to this Court. It is a case where past conduct of the petitioner is not indicated either to the petitioner or to this Court but action is taken on the basis of the past conduct without notice to the petitioner and without granting him any opportunity to explain his stand. Accordingly, the punishment order stands vitiated as the past conduct of the petitioner is taken note of for punishing him without indicating the nature of the past conduct and misconduct if any and the fact about non-grant of hearing to the petitioner on this count. 26. Considering all these aspects of the matter and taking note of the totality of the circumstances and the reasons and grounds indicated hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that this petition has to be allowed. 27. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 27-1-1998 dismissing the petitioner, the order dated 25-4-1998 passed by the Appellate Authority are quashed. The respondents are directed to pay all consequential benefits to the petitioner with backwages accruing to him. In case, the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation the petitioner be deemed to be in service till the age of superannuation and retired after attaining the age of superannuation and, thereafter all his claims be settled treating him to have retired from service after attaining the age of superannuation. 28. The petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.