JUDGMENT 1. - By way of this writ petition, the plaintiff-petitioner seeks to question the order dated 10.08.2010 as passed in Civil Appeal (Order) No.31/2007 whereby the learned District Judge, Merta has reversed the order dated 10.04.2007 as passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), Merta in Civil Misc. Case No.19/2007. 2. In the said order dated 10.04.2007, the learned Trial Court, dealing with a suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for cancellation of the gift-deed and for perpetual injunction, had considered an application made by the plaintiff-petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for temporary injunction against the construction of a school building on the land in question, said to be a part of joint property and having been transferred by the defendant No. 1 by way of gift of ⅕th out of her 1/32 share. The learned Trial Court was of opinion that the necessary ingredients for grant of temporary injunction existed in favour of the plaintiff; and accordingly, issued temporary injunction and directed the defendants to maintain status quo as per the Commissioner's report dated 24.03.2007. 3. The defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order dated 10.04.2007 while arraying only the plaintiff as the respondent therein. The appeal was filed after a delay of about 20 days but the learned Appellate Court considered it just and proper to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The learned Appellate Court found the order as passed by the learned Trial Court not in conformity with the legal principles and found no justification for issuing the temporary injunction in this matter where the defendants-appellants had obtained the land under the registered gift deed for the purpose of construction of a school building, meant for the purpose of the children of the village. 4. The order impugned was passed by the learned Appellate Court on 10.08.2010 and this writ petition seeking to question the same was filed in this Court on 07.10.2010 but, as per the office report dated 11.10.2010, it carried as many as 13 defects. The matter remained on the defect side for long. The defects were removed only on 15.12.2011 and hence, this petition has come up for admission today for the first time. 5. The matter remained on the defect side for long. The defects were removed only on 15.12.2011 and hence, this petition has come up for admission today for the first time. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the appeal as filed in this matter had been fundamentally incompetent where all the parties to the suit and the application for temporary injunction were not impleaded. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Appellate Court has approached the case from an altogether wrong angle where the Trial Court's considered order granting temporary injunction has been reversed without any justification. The learned counsel submitted that though the learned Appellate Court has cursorily observed about the necessary ingredients for grant of temporary injunction being not in favour of the plaintiff but has not assigned any reason in that regard. The learned counsel yet further submitted that the appeal was grossly belated and when the appellants failed to give out sufficient cause towards delay, the learned Appellate Court has acted wholly illegally in condoning the delay at the end of the order impugned in a cursory manner without any finding on sufficient cause. 6. The submissions as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner all relate essentially to the matter of form and not to the substance. The appeal was filed by the persons/authorities who were parties to the suit and who were directly affected by the temporary injunction issued by the learned Trial Court. Of course, it would have been proper if the other parties to the suit were joined as proforma parties in the appeal but then, so far the order for temporary injunction was concerned, that had been passed by the learned Trial Court only in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner and there was no other person in whose favour the said order was operating. In other words, absence of any other person on the record of the learned Appellate Court had no material bearing on the substance of the matter. Thus, the submissions about want of all the parties in the appeal do not make out a case for interference by this Court under supervisory jurisdiction. 7. In other words, absence of any other person on the record of the learned Appellate Court had no material bearing on the substance of the matter. Thus, the submissions about want of all the parties in the appeal do not make out a case for interference by this Court under supervisory jurisdiction. 7. So far the aspect of condonation of delay is concerned, again, the learned Appellate Court had the jurisdiction to condone the delay and it was shown by the appellants, the Head Master of the Government Primary School, the School Development and Management Committee, and the Senior Deputy District Education Officer that the term of the earlier Government Counsel came to an end and they were filing the appeal on personal responsibility. A short delay of 20 days in filing the appeal could not have been taken sufficient by the learned Appellate Court to deny consideration of the matter on merits. Even when the Appellate Court has condoned the delay without dilation on the cause, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the order cannot be said to be leading to failure of justice. 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Appellate Court has not assigned any reason for its finding about want of necessary ingredients for grant of temporary injunction does not appear correct when it is noticed that the learned Appellate Court has precisely observed that the aspect of the balance of convenience was definitely in favour of the defendants-appellants as they had obtained the land for the purpose of school and that the construction of school building was going on at the land in question for the purpose of the children of village. The Appellate Court has, inter alia, observed:- "(8). --------vkSj orZeku ekeys esa rks Ldwy dk fuekZ.k gks jgk Fkk tks tufgr dk dk;Z gSaA bl fuekZ.k dks jksd nsuk fdlh Hkh izdkj mfpr ugha FkkA pwafd izFke n`"V;k ekeyk o vU; nksuksa fcUnq izkFkhZ ds i{k esa ugha gSa cfYd lqfo/kk dk larqyu rks foi{khx.k ds i{k esa gS ftUgksaus iathd`r nku ls Ldwy gsrq Hkwfe izkIr dh vkSj xkao ds ckydksa gsrq fo|ky; dk fuekZ.k gks jgk FkkA " 9. The learned Appellate Court appears justified in observing that the necessary ingredient of balance of convenience was not at all in favour of the plaintiff because inconvenience likely to be caused by granting injunction would have been greater than the inconvenience likely to be suffered by the plaintiff particularly when public interest was pitted against the private claim on the basis of alleged rights as a co-sharer. 10. Apart from the above, it is noticed that the order vacating temporary injunction was passed by the Appellate Court way back on 10.08.2010, i.e., about 1½ years back; and this petition remained pending on the defect side and has come up for admission today only. There appears no justification to consider any interference in the order dated 10.08.2010 now at this stage. 11. For the reasons foregoing, this Court is not persuaded to entertain this writ petition.The petition stands dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******