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2012 DIGILAW 700 (GAU)

Sagar Chakraborty v. State of Tripura

2012-06-06

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT Subhasis Talapatra, J. 1. This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C. in short) for quashing the FIR in the West Agartala P.S. Case No. 276 of 2011 under Section 498A/34 of IPC. The fact, essential for appreciating the case of the petitioners, may be noticed briefly. The respondent No. 5, the wife of the petitioner No. 1, lodged a complaint in the West Agartala Police Station on 11.08.2011, alleging that on her marriage having been solemnized with the petitioner No. 1 on 03.08.2011, they started their conjugal live in the residence of the petitioner No. 1 from 04.08.2011 to 08.08.2011. The respondent No. 5 stayed in the house of the petitioner No. 1 and on 08.08.2011 she left for her parental house to observe "Firajatra Ceremony." On 08.08.2011 the petitioner No. 1 left the house of the informant. The entire complaint is reproduced hereunder:- ENGLISH RENDERING OF THE COMPLAINT Dated – 11.08.2011 IN WEST AGARTALA PS CASE No. 276/2011U/S498-A AND 34 IPC To, The officer in Charge Women P.S. West Tripura Agartala. Smt. Sima Acharjee W/o Sri Sagar Chakraborty D/o Sri Bijoy Acharjee, Village: Patunagar, P.O. Durjoynagar – Petitioner (Complainant) Subject: – Prayer for G.D. Entry. Madam, I beg to state that on last 03/08/2011 my marriage has been performed with Sagar Chakraborty, S/o Sri Sukumar Chakraborty as per Hindu Rites and Custom. As per demand of bride groom my father gave Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand) only in cash, wooden furniture, gold ornaments and colour TV in my marriage but on the next day of marriage i.e. 04/08/2011 when I went to the house of Sagar Chakraborty then his mother and his other relatives custard blame upon my father, that my father has given all ordinary articles in my marriage and he has not spent money in the marriage. Be it mentioned here that with my full consent and consent of my family members the marriage was held. On the night of "Suvaratri" I came to learn that my husband Sagar Chakraborty is not capable to perform intercourse he has been suffering from various disease and with eccentric behaviour and he is not normal like other man. I informed the matter to my mother and my mother advised me to wait up to next day. On the night of "Suvaratri" I came to learn that my husband Sagar Chakraborty is not capable to perform intercourse he has been suffering from various disease and with eccentric behaviour and he is not normal like other man. I informed the matter to my mother and my mother advised me to wait up to next day. On the next day of "Suvaratri" i.e. 07/08/2011 my husband was not coming near to me at about night 2 PM I waited for him and then became asleep. At about night 2:30 PM my husband entered into our room and switched on the TV which was given in my marriage, in full volume and as a result I awake from sleep and told him to tuned off the TV. He turned off the TV with anger and thrown articles of the room scatteredly in different directions to make some fear in my mind. Perhaps on that night my husband would have killed me. If my two sisters who came with me were not present there. Then he started music in his mobile phone in front of my ear passed away the night on 07/08/2011 with extreme fear of my life. Note – My mother in-law gave me conch bangle and gold ring after giving me blessings and then removed those and taken away in her custody and kept it under lock and key. On the next day in informed what happened in the previous night to my mother in-law Smt. Dipali Chakraborty and hearing that she became furious and started abusing me with her words and whole day my two sisters and I was not given any food and not only that my mother in-law custated some blank upon me and told me that I have some relation with some other person it also mentioned here that if my two sisters were not present along with me then my husband and mother in-law would have killed me. On last 08/08/2011my husband Sagar came to my house with me for the purpose of "Firayatra" after my repeated request and persuasion and staying one night and he left the house keeping me in my father's house and before leaving the house he threatened me subsequently became ill and he never enquired about me and without completing "Firayatra" he left. On last 08/08/2011my husband Sagar came to my house with me for the purpose of "Firayatra" after my repeated request and persuasion and staying one night and he left the house keeping me in my father's house and before leaving the house he threatened me subsequently became ill and he never enquired about me and without completing "Firayatra" he left. On 10/08/2011 my father and Sri Harekrishna Adhikari the local Panchayat member made a telephone call to Sagar's mother but she did not give any positive reply. That day my younger brother Ashis informed the mother of Sagar over telephone that I was seriously ill and I was crying. Then due to fear his mother came to our house and told me that she will sent Sagar and also medical report of Sagar after conducting medical examination of Sagar but till today she has not sent medical report and also not made any telephone call. Therefore Sagar Chakraborty and his mother Smt. Dipali Chakraborty have committed offence u/s 420 and 498A of IPC during the said marriage and they should be punished exemplary and I also need their prosecution. I, therefore, pray before you to take necessary legal steps against Sri Sagar Chakraborty and his mother Smt. Dipali Chakraborty, and for this act of kindness I shall remain ever grateful. 2. On the basis of the said complaint a case under Section 498A/34 IPC was registered by West Agartala P.S. against the petitioners. 3. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that in the complaint no criminal offence has been made out against either of the petitioners. Apart that he, with sufficient emphasis, submitted that this is a dispute of civil nature. The respondent No. 5, indisputably, filed one petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the Court of learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura, being T.S.(Divorce) No. 296 of 2011. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the averments of that petition and submitted that even there is no allegation of cruelty as explained in Section 498A, IPC. The allegation as surfaced in the FIR as well as in the petition filed for dissolution of marriage is of impotency of the petitioner No. 1. Mr. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the averments of that petition and submitted that even there is no allegation of cruelty as explained in Section 498A, IPC. The allegation as surfaced in the FIR as well as in the petition filed for dissolution of marriage is of impotency of the petitioner No. 1. Mr. Roy Barman draw attention of this Court to paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said petition. Profitably, those averments may be extracted: 22. That being curious she looked at the genetic organ of the husband and found the penis so small in size that can not be compared with 7/8 years old body. 23. That the petitioner being a law graduate had the occasion to study Modi's medical jurisprudence and have little knowledge more particularly for the reason that being a law graduate she is to study case of rape where physical conditions are related matters. 24. That seeing the penis condition of her husband she fully understand that her husband is a impotent one and thereby physically incapable of entering into sexual intercourse depriving the petitioner to have her beautiful conjugal life as well as to become the mother of any child in future. 25. That on the following morning she informed such fact to the mother of the respondent and also asked why such fact of impotency was suppressed by them to the guardian of the petitioner. She also informed such fact to her parent over phone. 26. That at this the mother of the husband became extremely angry and furious and started abusing language as well as blaming the petitioner by uttering filthy language in presence of her tow younger sister Mumpi and Krishna. 27. That the petitioner tried to make her mother in law understand the situation but the mother in law was not ready to hear from the petitioner rather accusing the petitioner as to why she divulged such fact without medical treatment of the same and taking the responsibility of medical treatment in future and also told that with such organ her son was capable of entering into sexual intercourse. The respondent also join his mother and also abused her blaming the petitioner with such words that the petitioner feel shame to narrate here. 4. Mr. The respondent also join his mother and also abused her blaming the petitioner with such words that the petitioner feel shame to narrate here. 4. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners quite candidly submitted that even though the petitioner No. 1 is capable of doing sexual intercourse, as would be evident from the certificate issued by the Sr. Resident, Department of Surgery, dated 11.08.2011, as appended in this petition at page-21, he realized that he would not be able to lead conjugal life with the respondent for her attitude as reflected in paragraph 4 of that petition. In a nutshell, the petitioner No. 1's allegation in his application filed under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the Court of learned Family Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, being T.S.(Judicial Separation) No. 285 of 2011, is based on the allegation that the respondent No. 5 was resisting consummation of the conjugal life and was insisting upon a relation to be maintained at her whims. Moreover, without any probable cause she launched a criminal prosecution on inflicting severe mental cruelty and social harassment. Mr. Roy Barman, in support of his contention, relied on a few decisions to demonstrate the settled position of law on quashing the complaint to ensure ends of justice. The complaint as filed by the respondent No. 5 is required to be quashed for securing justice. In Shakson Belthissor vs. State of Kerala and another as reported in (2009)14 SCC 466 , the Apex Court enunciated the law as under:- 14. The scope and power of quashing a first information report and charge-sheet under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is well settled. The said power is exercised by the court to prevent abuse of the process of law and court but such a power could be exercised only when the complaint filed by the complainant or the charge-sheet filed by the police did not disclose any offence or when the said complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court on the aforesaid issue wherein the law relating to quashing of a complaint has been succinctly laid down. 15. 5. A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court on the aforesaid issue wherein the law relating to quashing of a complaint has been succinctly laid down. 15. 5. ......In Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976)3 SCC 736 , it was held that the Magistrate while issuing process against the accused should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations[made] in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. It was held that the order of Magistrate for issuing process against the accused could be quashed under the following circumstances: (SCC p. 741, para 5) (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused. (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 16. In the case of Drugs Inspector vs. Dr. B.K. Krishna (1981) 2 SCC 454 it was held by this Court that: (SCC p.455, para 5) 5. In a quashing proceeding, the High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition, if proved, make out a prima facie offence and that the accused has prima facie committed the offence. In the said decision this Court refused the prayer for quashing of the complaint on the ground that there were sufficient allegations in the complaint to make out a case that the accused persons were responsible for the management and conduct of the firm and, therefore, the extent of their liability could be and should be established during trial. 17. In the said decision this Court refused the prayer for quashing of the complaint on the ground that there were sufficient allegations in the complaint to make out a case that the accused persons were responsible for the management and conduct of the firm and, therefore, the extent of their liability could be and should be established during trial. 17. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983)1 SCC 1 it was held that when on the allegation made in the complaint, a clear case was made out against all the respondents (accused persons), the High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence. 18. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983)1 SCC 1 , this Court observed as follows in para 8: (SCC p.5) 8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976)3 SCC 736 where the scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was considered and while laying down the guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC p.741, para 5 SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12] 5. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:- (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, which is alleged against the accused. (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. 19. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, a question came up for consideration as to whether quashing of the FIR filed against the respondent Bhajan Lal for the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was proper and legal. Reversing the order passed by the High Court, this Court explained the circumstances under which such power could be exercised. Apart from reiterating the earlier norms laid down by this Court, it was further explained that such power could be exercised where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 20. The Court observed as follows in para 102, (Bhajan Lal case (supra), SCC pp. 378-79):- 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 21. However, in para 108 at SCC p.381 of the judgment, this Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) 335 referred to and relied upon it earlier judgment in Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar (1987)1 SCC 288 wherein it has been held as under:- 16. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. Thus, in such circumstances, the issue of mala fide becomes irrelevant. 22. The above decision was followed by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and other (1998)5 SCC 749 . In para 28 of the said judgment this Court held thus: (SCC p.760, para 28) 28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 23. Further, this Court observed in S.W. Palanikar vs. State of Bihar (2002)1 SCC 241 that every breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent misappropriation. It observed as follows: (SCC pp. 246-47, paras 8-11) 8. Before examining respective contentions on their relative merits, we think it is appropriate to notice the legal position. Every breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent misappropriation. It observed as follows: (SCC pp. 246-47, paras 8-11) 8. Before examining respective contentions on their relative merits, we think it is appropriate to notice the legal position. Every breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person wronged may seek his redress for damages in a civil court but a breach of trust with mens rea gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. 9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach of trust are: (i) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property, (ii) that person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting that property to his own use; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that property or willfully suffering any other person so to do in violation (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust. 10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000)4 SCC 168 on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) 15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed. 24. This Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. (2006)6 SCC 736 , at Pp. 747-48 has observed as under: (SCC para 12) 12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988)1 SCC 692 , State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995)6 SCC 194 , Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996)5 SCC 591 , State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla (1996)8 SCC 164 , Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi (1999)3 SCC 259 , Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. (2000)3 SCC 269 , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000)4 SCC 168 , M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh, (2001)8 SCC 645 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005)1 SCC 122 . The principles, relevant to our purpose are:- (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. Sharaful Haque (2005)1 SCC 122 . The principles, relevant to our purpose are:- (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 25. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 25. This Court has recently in R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta and other (2009)1 SCC 516, observed as follows: (SCC p.523, paras 15-16) 15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are:- (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. 16. It is furthermore well known that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint. The same view has been taken by this Court in Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna and another vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu (2009)11 SCC 203 ; and V.V.S. Rama Sharma and other vs. State of U.P. (2009)7 SCC 234 . 5. On the other hand, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 submitted with sufficient vehemence that it would be apparent that the cruelty was meted to the respondent No. 5. 5. On the other hand, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 submitted with sufficient vehemence that it would be apparent that the cruelty was meted to the respondent No. 5. He even faintly referred that a case under Section 406 of IPC can well be made out from the complaint. In support of his contention he referred a decision as referred by the Apex Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Romesh Chander & other as reported in (1997)1 SCC 90 , wherein it is held:- It is now settled law that the charge-sheet constitutes prima facie evidence constituting the offence for proceeding in the matter. Necessarily, therefore, the Court has to look into the relevant law and the allegations made in the charge-sheet and then consider whether any offence has been committed to frame charges for trial before discharging the accused. Since the High Court has not done that, we think it proper that the High Court should reconsider the matter and dispose of it in accordance with law. All the contentions raised by the learned counsel on either side are left open. It is open to the counsel to argue the matter in the High Court. 6. This said decision is does not lay down an inflexible principle but a general proposition applicable to in a fact situation as referred in the said case. After filing of the charge sheet learned trial Judge, on consideration of the materials available thereof, discharged all the accused from the liability of the prosecution. Being aggrieved, the State filed a revision in the High Court against the order of discharging the accused but the High Court affirmed the order of the learned trial Judge, and accordingly, a special leave petition was filed where the said decision was given. There is no resemblance of that case with the case in hand. 7. In a decision as rendered by the Apex Court in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. K.M. Sharan as reported in (2008)4 SCC 471 , the law was further enunciated. 18. The scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr PC have been elaborately dealt with by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs. State of Uttaranchal and other (2007)12 SCC 1 . 18. The scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr PC have been elaborately dealt with by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs. State of Uttaranchal and other (2007)12 SCC 1 . This Court held that: (SCC pp.10-11, paras 23-28) 23. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the court exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power [of the court] under Section 482 Cr PC can be exercised [in the following categories of cases]: (i) To give effect to an order under the Code. (ii) To prevent abuse of the process of court. (iii) To otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr PC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly vs. Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Humphrys 1977 AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 26. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 26. In R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 , this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 27. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. 28. This court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and other (1977)2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr PC entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts. 19. This Court in State of Bihar and another vs. J.A.C. Saldanha and other (1980)1 SCC 554 has disapproved the exercise of the extra-ordinary power of the High Court in issuing a prerogative writ quashing the prosecution solely on the basis of the averments made in the affidavit in the following words: ( SCC p.574, para 28) 28. The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more. 20. The classic exposition of the law is found in State of West Bengal and other vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and other (1982)1 SCC 561 . In this case, Chandrachud, CJ in his concurring separate judgment has stated that: (SCC p.577, para 21) 21 If the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. Justice A.N. Sen who wrote the main judgment in that case with which Chandrachud, CJ and Varadarajan, J. agreed has laid the legal proposition as follows:- 65. The legal position is well-settled. The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them. An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interests of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the detriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. 66. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. 21. This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and other vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and other (1988)1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under:- 7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage. 22. In State of Bihar vs. Murad Ali Khan and other (1988)4 SCC 655 this Court observed that the jurisdiction Under Section 482 Cr PC has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. 23. Mr. Sushil Kumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the case of State of Haryana and other vs. Bhajan Lal and other 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335. He particularly laid stress on para 1 of the guideline in which this Court observed that allegations incorporated in the FIR or the complaint, even if are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, would not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. On analysis of this case, in our opinion, it really does not support the case of the respondent. The ratio of the judgment is clear that the extraordinary powers of the court under Section 482 Cr PC can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where all allegations incorporated in the FIR or the complaint do not prime facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 24. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Cr. 24. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Cr. P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This court in the said judgment made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. According to this judgment, the High Court would be justified in exercising its power in cases of following categories:- 102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 25. This court in Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and other (1992)4 SCC 305 observed thus: 132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 26. This court in Roy V.D. vs. State of Kerala (2000)8 SCC 590 observed thus: 18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 26. This court in Roy V.D. vs. State of Kerala (2000)8 SCC 590 observed thus: 18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice. 27. This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and other vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and another (2005)1 SCC 122 observed thus: 8. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in to. 32. In Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. and other (2006)6 SCC 736 , this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/ creditors. The court further observed that: 13. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 8. The court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/ creditors. The court further observed that: 13. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 8. K.M. Sharan (supra) has extensively surveyed all the decisions enunciating the law where the High Court would exercise its inherent powers as conferred under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. for quashing a complaint. This Court would not refer any other case in this regard as by this time it has been well crystallized that the principles as laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal as reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, are the guiding principles for the High court quashing a complaint by invoking its inherent powers. At this stage, this Court would find whether the complaint as lodged by the respondent No. 5 falls under any of the categories as enumerated in the celebrated case of Bhajan Lal (supra). On the basis of the admitted materials available on record it is required to examine whether any case against the petitioner under Section 498A read with Section 34 of IPC has been made out or not. 9. Section 498A of IPC reads:- 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, cruelty means- (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 10. (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 10. In the light of the aforesaid language used in the section, the provision would be applicable only to such a case where the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects the said woman to cruelty. When the ingredients of the aforesaid section are present in a particular case, in that event the person concerned against whom the offence is alleged would be investigated and tried in accordance with law and if found guilty the accused would be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 11. Section 498A cannot be read in isolation to its explanation, which defines "cruelty". In order to understand the meaning of the expression "cruelty" as envisaged under Section 498A, there must be such a conduct on the part of the husband or relatives of the husband of woman which is of such a nature as to cause the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman. When this Court examined this aspect of the matter in the FIR, there is no such allegation. Moreover, when the respondent No. 5 filed the petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, she did not refer anything relating to the cruelty in the said petition save and except some pleadings in relation to impotency. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner No. 1 is impotent then also the cruelty as explained under Section 498A is not constituted on the basis of the allegation as made in the complaint. There is no allegation that there is any such conduct on the part of the petitioner No. 1, which could be said to be amounting to cruelty of such a nature as is likely to cause respondent No. 5 to commit suicide or to cause any injury to her life. There is no allegation that there is any such conduct on the part of the petitioner No. 1, which could be said to be amounting to cruelty of such a nature as is likely to cause respondent No. 5 to commit suicide or to cause any injury to her life. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Explanation (a) of Section 498A IPC are not at all mentioned either in the FIR or in the said petition for dissolution of marriage. When this Court examined to find out whether the allegations made in the case fell under Explanation (b) of Section 498A of IPC constituting cruelty, it is found that there was no allegation of harassment on the respondent No. 5 with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. When the allegations made in the FIR are examined in the light of the said provisions, (see Section 498A, IPC) it is found that no prima facie case is made out under Section 498A, IPC. As such, if the investigation is permitted liberty of the petitioners would unnecessarily be put to jeopardy. 12. In a recent decision as referred by the Apex Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat as reported in (2011)7 SCC 59 , the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that:- 17. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of property or breach of trust by the appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against the appellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation. In such type of cases, it is necessary to draw a distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong as has been succinctly held by this Court in Devendra vs. State of U.P. 2009(7) SCC 495 , relevant part thereof is reproduced herein below:- 27. A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. In such type of cases, it is necessary to draw a distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong as has been succinctly held by this Court in Devendra vs. State of U.P. 2009(7) SCC 495 , relevant part thereof is reproduced herein below:- 27. A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the courts would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of the offence has been made out. 13. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by the Apex Court in the celebrated judgment of Bhajan Lal (supra) where seven cardinal principles have been carved out where the High Court shall unhesitatingly interfere with and quash the investigation or proceeding. The Apex Court further held at paragraph 19 of Joseph Salvaraj (supra) as under:- The Appellant cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole of a criminal prosecution for long number of years, even when admittedly a civil suit has already been filed against the appellant and Respondent 4 complainant, and is still subjudice. In the said suit, the appellant is at liberty to contest the same on grounds available to him in accordance with law as per the leave granted by trial court. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the complainant has not been able to show that at any material point of time there was any contract, much less any privity of contract between the appellant and Respondent No. 4 complainant. There was no cause of action to even lodge an FIR against the appellant as neither the complainant had to receive the money nor he was in any way instrumental to telecast "GOD TV" in certain areas of Ahmedabad. He appears to be totally a stranger to the same. The appellant's prosecution would only lead to his harassment and humiliation, which cannot be permitted in accordance with the principles of law. 14. In the case in hand, even if all the allegations taken together do not constitute a criminal offence, and as such, this complaint as it appears has been fled to wreak personal vengeance against the petitioners for the reasons whatsoever may be. 14. In the case in hand, even if all the allegations taken together do not constitute a criminal offence, and as such, this complaint as it appears has been fled to wreak personal vengeance against the petitioners for the reasons whatsoever may be. In this regard, this Court refrains from making any observation as the two civil suits are still sub-judiced in the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura. 15. Mr. P. Bhattacharjee, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State submits that the charge sheet has been filed in the case on prima facie materials found in the investigation against the petitioners. When the respondent No. 5 is the solitary person on the basis of whose personal account of allegations this prosecution has been lodged against the petitioners and when it is found that there is no material to make out a criminal offence against the petitioners, the charge sheet as filed will not stand in the way for this Court to quash the entire criminal proceeding. This Court has not directed any new material to support its finding, rather the admitted records made part of the petition overwhelmingly speak of absence of any criminal offence against the petitioners. The disputes, whatever might exist between the petitioners and the respondent No. 5, are of civil nature. The petitioners in view of the above cannot be allowed to go rigmarole of the criminal prosecution inasmuch as the respondent No. 5 has not been able to show during the period from 04.08.2011 to 08.08.2011 that she was ever subjected to cruelty as explained in Section 498A of IPC by the petitioners or either of them. 16. Accordingly, the criminal prosecution as launched by the complainant in the FIR vide West Agartala P.S. case No. 276/2011 under Section 498A/34 of IPC, is hereby quashed. It is made clear that the charge sheet or any proceeding there from shall also not be acted upon and the petitioners shall be treated as discharged from the allegations/charges for all purposes. The petition is accordingly allowed. Petition allowed.