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2012 DIGILAW 701 (GAU)

Prembala Das v. Laxmi Charan Das

2012-06-06

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT Subhasis Talapatra, J. 1. By challenging the judgment and order, dated 30.04.2009, passed by learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura in Misc. (FC) 83 of 2008 this petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has been filed by the wife. The genesis of the case can be traced in refusal of the respondent in maintaining the petitioner herein. The petitioner (wife) filed one petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when all her endeavours to get maintenance was foiled. In the said petition, as filed under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. the petitioner alleged that the respondent (husband) married her 35 years back by observing Hindu rites and rituals. After marriage the petitioner had been living with her husband at the matrimonial home in Madhupur, within District West Tripura. In the wedlock 3 (three) daughters and 2 (two) sons were born. It has been further alleged that the respondent contracted second marriage to one Smt. Sipra Das about 15(fifteen) years back while the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists. The petitioner left the matrimonial home and started living in her brother's house at Aralia, P.S. East Agartala, District West Tripura. The petitioner was under care of his brother, but after some years she found herself unable to maintain and she was confronting the hardships for having no income of her own. By efflux of time, the petitioner has become aged and now she is suffering from various ailments. The respondent is a well-established businessman having his wholesale business at Madhupur Market area. His monthly income is Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- per month. The petitioner prayed for maintenance @ Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) per month from the respondent. It has been also stated in the said petition that before approaching the learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura the petitioner wanted a negotiated settlement for alleviating her hardships and she approached Tripura Commission for Women against the respondent. The respondent appeared before the Tripura Commission for Women but refused to pay any maintenance. 2. The respondent i.e. the opposite party in the proceeding drawn under Section 125 of Cr. P.C. being Misc. (FC) 83 of 2008 filed a written statement refuting the allegations as brought by the petitioner. The respondent appeared before the Tripura Commission for Women but refused to pay any maintenance. 2. The respondent i.e. the opposite party in the proceeding drawn under Section 125 of Cr. P.C. being Misc. (FC) 83 of 2008 filed a written statement refuting the allegations as brought by the petitioner. The crux of the respondent's case, as projected before the learned Judge, Family court, Agartala, may be encapsulated as under:- The petitioner's attempt for having the maintenance per month from the respondent is solely intended to abuse the process of the Court and not for any other purpose and the said proceeding has been catapulted on the basis of some baseless, concocted and fabricated allegations. However, the respondent lodged a complaint to the Bishalgarh Police Station vide BLG PS GDE No. 557, dated 12.10.1990, as the petitioner was found missing, on 29.09.1990 and thereafter, it is stated by the respondent that he learnt that the petitioner eloped with one Jiban Chowdhury to Kashmir where the petitioner get married with him and in support of this contention the respondent also filed one petition before the Chairperson, Tripura Commission for women. 3. The respondent submitted the written statement stating that the petitioner left matrimonial home leaving behind three minor daughters and two minor sons with the respondent. It has been, however, admitted that at the pressure of mother and sister-in-law of the petitioner the respondent married second time for purpose of providing necessary care to his children. In the written statement the respondent has stated as under:- Be it also mentioned here that the petitioner with ill motive lodged this instant petition after 18 years just only to harass the opposite party as because it is very much clear that the petitioner after left her husband (opposite party) in the year 1990 and fled with one Jiban Chowdhury in Kashmir and after return back to Tripura she filed this instant case in the year 2008. It is further stated that now the respondent has no business. The business whatever he had has been given to his sons for running the same. He denied and disputed the claim of his income to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- per month and prayed before the Court for dismissal of the petition. 4. It is further stated that now the respondent has no business. The business whatever he had has been given to his sons for running the same. He denied and disputed the claim of his income to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- per month and prayed before the Court for dismissal of the petition. 4. Since there could not any negotiated settlement on the issue of maintenance per month the inquiry was taken up by the learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala. The petitioner herein appeared as PW.1 where she stated. My marriage was solemnized 35 years back with the O.P. Out of our wedlock 2 sons and 3 daughters were born. Around 15 years back, my husband contacted second marriage with one Shipra Das. Since then, I have been living in my paternal house. I did not file case considering the fact that the marriage of my daughters may get affected. Around 4 years back, I approached the Tripura Commission for Women for maintenance but my husband refused to pay any maintenance. My sons are now helping my husband in his business. My husband deals in cloth at Madhupur Bazar, Agartala. I have no earning. I claim for maintenance. One of the daughters namely, Smti Usha Das, appeared as PW.2 and stated thus:- Around 16/17 years back, my father contacted second marriage and my mother was compelled to leave the marital home. Around 13 years back, I was given marriage. My father runs a grocery shop at Madhupur Bazar. On the other hand, the respondent examined himself as DW.1. He has admitted that the petitioner is his wife. He stated further that they have been living separately for last 19 years. In elaborating the backdrop the respondent, as DW.1, deposed before the Court as follows:- The petitioner is my wife. We have been living separately for last 19 years. I contacted 2nd marriage about 16 years back. Out of my 2nd wedlock one daughter has born. I have given marriage of my three daughters after my wife deserted me. My mother in law also used to stay with me. She eloped with one Jiban Chowdhury to Kashmir. My mother in law persuaded me to contact 2nd marriage so that my children are groomed properly. Since then I met at Mahila Commission for the first time. I informed everything to the Chairperson, Tripura Mahila Commission. My mother in law also used to stay with me. She eloped with one Jiban Chowdhury to Kashmir. My mother in law persuaded me to contact 2nd marriage so that my children are groomed properly. Since then I met at Mahila Commission for the first time. I informed everything to the Chairperson, Tripura Mahila Commission. I have submitted a copy of my petition submitted before the Tripura Commission for Women. I have given my business to my sons. I have no income at present. Before the Commission my sons also appeared and stated everything. Hence, Commission gave no relief to her. DW.2, namely Smt. Sumati Das, is the wife of the elder brother of the respondent and incidentally the elder sister of the petitioner also. She stated amongst other things that the petitioner eloped with one Jiban. It is around 19 years back she went to Kashmir but she could not say when Prema Bala had return to Agartala. From the representation, as made by the respondent to the Tripura Commission for Women and as considered by the learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, it appears that "thereafter 20/25 days later it is learnt from hearsay that Smti Prembala Das has gone to Kashmir with one named Shri Jiban Chowdhury of the resident of Viil. Khamarhati. From the records as produced from Tripura Commission for women it appears that the respondent did not agree to give maintenance to the petitioner. On the face of such situation, Tripura Commission for Woman advised the petitioner to take shelter of law. 5. Learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura after appreciating the rival contentions of the parties as well as the evidence on record held by the impugned judgment dated 30.04.2009 that the petitioner eloped with one Sri Jiban Chowdhury to Kashmir about 19 years back leaving behind 5 children in careless condition with the respondent. After 3 years from the date of desertion and elopement from the petitioner, respondent married again at the pressure of the mother-in-law and the younger sister-in-law. It has been observed that the petitioner herself was responsible for her present fate and she could not be given any maintenance by the respondent. On the basis of such findings, the learned Family Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to get maintenance from the respondent rather observed that notwithstanding her conduct the 2(two) financially sound sons can maintain her. On the basis of such findings, the learned Family Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to get maintenance from the respondent rather observed that notwithstanding her conduct the 2(two) financially sound sons can maintain her. Accordingly, the sons were directed to look after the present petitioner in future even though the sons were not impleaded in that proceeding. 6. Mr. A K Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner submitted that the provision of Section 125 of Cr. P.C. has been engrafted in the statute for saving the married wife in particular from the vagrancy and for that reason the provision of maintenance are to be interpreted with sufficient latitude. Even Section 125(4) cannot be used liberally to disentitle the wife from getting maintenance in the subsistence of the marriage. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, relied on the few decisions of the various High Courts to show that even a lapse by the wife which might have the colours of the adultery cannot be pressed to disentitle the wife from getting the maintenance. In Sau Chanda P. Wadate vs. Preetam G. Wadate and another reported in 2002 CRI. L.J. 1397, Bombay High Court held:- 16. The applicant has in this application raised a question of law that the courts below have misunderstood the scope and effect of the expression, "living in adultery" in Sub-section (4) of Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code. It is urged that the said expression speaks of a continuous course of conduct, but does not include stray instance of adultery or one or two lapses from virtue. In support of his argument, learned Advocate for applicant has placed reliance on a number of rulings. I shall, therefore, now refer to the rulings upon which learned Advocate for applicant has placed reliance in this respect. 17. In Udaivir Singh vs. Smt. Vinod Kumari, wife was living separately from husband and chastity of wife was doubted by husband. The High Court held that the wife was justified in living separately from husband and claiming maintenance. 18. I shall, therefore, now refer to the rulings upon which learned Advocate for applicant has placed reliance in this respect. 17. In Udaivir Singh vs. Smt. Vinod Kumari, wife was living separately from husband and chastity of wife was doubted by husband. The High Court held that the wife was justified in living separately from husband and claiming maintenance. 18. In Chhagan Led Devman vs. State of Maharashtra and other, 1990(1) DMC 533 this Court has held that the expression living in adultery as used in Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code is to mean a continuous course of adulterous life as distinguished from one or two lapses from virtue and the burden to prove allegations of adultery against the wife lies on the husband. 19. In Khem Chand vs. State and another, (1990)1 DMC 38 it has been held that the cardinal principle is that in matrimonial or maintenance cases solitary evidence of a spouse attributing unchastity or adultery to the other party, should not be relied upon because such spouse is extremely interested in the case. 20. In Ravindra Singh vs. Kapsi Bai, (1991)2 DMC 422 it has been laid down that it is for the husband to prove that the wife is continuously committing violation of the marriage bed indulging in adulterous life, i.e. living in quasi permanent union with another. It has been further observed that to establish this, more than one instance of adultery has to be brought home to the knowledge of the wife, thereby constituting the term living in adultery within the meaning of Sub-section (4) of Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code. In this case, it was found that considering the evidence in totality, barring the two instances of which husband had condoned one and except the second one which then took place or isolated act of adultery, there was no other evidence to infer that wife was living in adultery. 21. In Baishnab Charan Jena vs. Ritarani Jena, it has been laid down that merely proving one or more instances of lapses in character of wife is not sufficient to absolve her husband from liability to pay maintenance to her and even assuming that the instances alleged by the husband are held to have been established, still he will not be entitled to succeed to deny his liability for payment of maintenance. It was further pointed out that the very allegation by the husband to castigate the wife as a person living in adultery entitles her to live separately from her husband and claim maintenance from him. 22. In Chandrakant Gangaram Gawade vs. Sulochana Chandrakant Gawade and other, 1996(3)BomCR603 this Court, after taking into consideration a number of rulings on the subject held that it is for the husband to prove that wife is living in adultery and a mere stray or single lapse on the part of the wife is not sufficient to bring her conduct within the meaning of the expression living in adultery as used in Section 125(4), Criminal Procedure Code and that it should be a continuous course of adulterous conduct. It is further pointed out that the husband cannot get over his liability to pay maintenance merely proving one or more instances of lapses on the part of the wife and he will have to produce additional evidence to establish continuous course of adulterous behaviour to wife. 23. In Narnath Thazhakuniyil Sandha vs. Kottayat Thazhakuniyil Narayanan, the wife was actually found indulging in sexual intercourse with another person on one occasion and it was held that the words living in adultery under Section 125(4), Criminal Procedure Code contemplate continuous course of conduct on the part of wife with paramour and it would be improper to refuse maintenance to wife on the evidence adduced by husband showing only a single act of unchastity or few lapses from virtue on the part of wife. In this judgment also, a number of judgments, taking the same view on the subject, have been referred by the Kerala High Court. 24. Thus, the expression living in adultery in Section 125(4), Criminal Procedure Code has to be a continuous course of adulterous conduct and stray instances of departure from virtue would not be sufficient to deny maintenance to wife. The fact that wife is living in adultery has to be established by the husband. In quasi-criminal proceedings, the standard of proof would be preponderance of evidence. 25. The fact that wife is living in adultery has to be established by the husband. In quasi-criminal proceedings, the standard of proof would be preponderance of evidence. 25. Now, coming to the case under consideration, the argument of the learned Advocate for the applicant is that the courts below have misunderstood the scope and ambit of expression living in adultery which has to be a continuous course of conduct and on account of the said misunderstanding, the courts have come to the conclusion that the husband has been able to establish that the applicant is living in adultery, but from the evidence on record, the husband has failed to prove that the wife is living in adultery. 26. On the other hand, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 has urged that there was no challenge to the evidence of husband on the question of adultery and that the adultery had been duly proved. 27. Learned A.P.P. urged before me that the finding on record does not stand the test of living in adultery required to be established under Section 125(4), Criminal Procedure Code. 28. In order to establish that the applicant was living in adultery, the respondent No. 1 examined himself and his father. According to the respondent No. 1, the behaviour of the applicant along with his younger brother Madhu was somewhat suspicious and objectionable and that he suspected the character of the applicant and that there might be illicit relations between his brother and the applicant. According to the respondent No. 1, when said Madhu was at Pandharkawda, the applicant used to send him letters but no such letters have been produced. According to him, on 2-3-1989, he returned early from the field and found the applicant and his younger brother in one bed in naked condition. He stated that he shall be examining his younger brother Madhu as a witness, but he was not examined. He further stated that after the incident of 2-3-1989 his younger brother was sent at Pandharkawda for education, but the evidence on record is that he was at Pandharkawda much prior to this date. In fact, he himself admitted that at the time of their marriage, his younger brother took education at Pandharkawda. According to the respondent, he had told the incident to his father, but there was no mention of this fact in the pleading. In fact, he himself admitted that at the time of their marriage, his younger brother took education at Pandharkawda. According to the respondent, he had told the incident to his father, but there was no mention of this fact in the pleading. Father of respondent who was examined as P.W. 2 went to the extent of saying that the respondent No. 1 had told him that Madhu and his wife were in naked condition and were committing sexual intercourse with each other. Respondent No. 1 did not say in his deposition that he had seen Madhu having sexual intercourse with his wife/applicant. According to P.W. 2, he had asked the applicant about the intercourse with Madhu, but the applicant kept mum and assured that she will not commit such act again. This evidence can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be sufficient to fall within the' ambit of expression "living in adultery" as used in Section 125(4), Criminal Procedure Code so as to deny maintenance to the applicant on that ground. Therefore, the findings of the two courts below to the effect that the applicant was living in adultery, cannot be sustained. In Pandurang Barku Nathe vs. Leela Pandurang Nathe and another reported in 1997 CR L.J. 3976 Bombay High Court held:- In view of the expression living in adultery in the sense in which it is used in Section 125 Cr. P.C. connotes a wife living perpetually or semi perpetually as a wife with a mate, other than her husband and having sexual relations with him. Sporadic instances of sexual relationship between a wife and a person other than her husband would not fall within the ambit of the expression living in adultery. Laymen invariably and men of law often treat the concept of wife living in adultery as synonymous with a wife occasionally committing adultery. The two are distinct and if the distinction is overlooked as it has been by the trial Court, the result would be gross miscarriage of justice. It is only a wife living in adultery who is not entitled for maintenance under Section 125(4) Cr. P.C. a wife who is occasionally guilty of committing adultery would not forfeit her claim for maintenance under said section. In Pandurang Barku Nathe (Supra) it was further held that:- 9. It is only a wife living in adultery who is not entitled for maintenance under Section 125(4) Cr. P.C. a wife who is occasionally guilty of committing adultery would not forfeit her claim for maintenance under said section. In Pandurang Barku Nathe (Supra) it was further held that:- 9. I am fortified in my view by the observations of Tekchand, J., in the decision rendered in Ramsaran vs. Soman Wati, 1964 (1) Cri. L.J. 483. The said observation which are found at page 486 read thus:- Living in adultery is living together as husband and wife and exercising sexual rights and duties implied by such relation when legally created. Proof of occasional acts of illicit intercourse may fall short of what in intended by the expression living in adultery. It suggests a man and the wife of another living continually as husband and wife. An adulterous intercourse is a condition contemplating repetition of extra marital relationship when opportunity offers itself. It is a condition of cohabitation in contradistinction to occasional acts. The wife forfeits her right to be maintained on proof of repeated adulterous meetings. 10. It would be pertinent to point out that the said observations were approved by Maheswaran, J., in the case of Kasthuri vs. Ramasamy, reported in Maheswaran, J., observed as under. The term living in adultery has now been consistently held to mean an outright adulterous conduct when the wife lives in a quasi-permanent union with the man with whom she is committing adultery. 11. It is bearing in mind the above connotation expression living in adultery that it has to be decided whether the trial Court was justified in holding that since respondent No. 1 was living in adultery she had forfeited her claim for maintenance. My answer is in the negative. In Baishnab Charan Jena vs. Ritarani Jena reported in 1993 CR L.J. 238 the Orissa High Court held thus:- 9. I shall next consider the correctness of the findings of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned decided cases. My answer is in the negative. In Baishnab Charan Jena vs. Ritarani Jena reported in 1993 CR L.J. 238 the Orissa High Court held thus:- 9. I shall next consider the correctness of the findings of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned decided cases. From the facts of the case stated earlier, it is clear that right from the inception of the proceeding while admitting that the opposite party is his wife the petitioner had tried to avoid his liability to pay maintenance to her mainly on the ground that she was leading an adulterous life while living in his house and continued to lead such life after she had left his house. In support of the plea he relied on the alleged incident in which during the night Babuli Jena was seen in the bed room of the opposite party and that the opposite party after parting company with the petitioner had lived with Babuli Jena for a certain period. The petitioner had also alleged that the opposite party had an extra-marital affair with her brother-in-law, Laxmidhar Jena. On sifting the evidence led on behalf of the petitioner the learned Addl. Sessions Judge held, in my view, rightly, that the materials do not establish that the opposite party was leading an adulterous life at the material point of time. As held in the case of Smt. Rachita Rout (Supra) merely proving one or more instances of lapses in the character of the wife is not sufficient to absolve the husband from his liability to pay maintenance to her. Therefore even assuming that the instances alleged by the petitioner are held to have been established still he will not be entitled to succeed to deny his liability for payment of maintenance. The entitlement of the opposite party to maintenance which flows from the marital relationship, which is admitted in this case, subsists. Further, as held in the case of Smt. Pramila Dei alias Kuni (supra) the unsuccessful bid by the husband to castigate the wife as a person living in adultery entitles her to live separately from her husband andi claim maintenance from him. 10. Further, as held in the case of Smt. Pramila Dei alias Kuni (supra) the unsuccessful bid by the husband to castigate the wife as a person living in adultery entitles her to live separately from her husband andi claim maintenance from him. 10. Coming to the plea of the petitioner that notwithstanding the lapses on the part of the opposite party he had offered to take her back to his house but she refused the offer, it has to be held that on the fact and in the circumstances of the case she was fully justified in refusing the offer. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceeding serious allegations of extra-marital relationship with persons other than her husband were made against the opposite party. Indeed it was the case of the petitioner that when she and Babuli Jena were found in the same room during the night the opposite party insisted to be sent to her father's place. Such conduct in the situation has also to be held to be justified. The opposite party was entitled to lead a life of peace and harmony without insult and humiliation. The very allegation by the husband and members of his family that the opposite party is having extra-marital relationship with a person other than her husband is insulting and humiliating enough and in such situation if the wife refuses to remain in her house, she cannot be said to have forfeited her right to maintenance. In K. Veeriah vs. Muthulakshmi and others reported in 1999 CR. L.J. 624 the Madras high Court enunciated the law as follows:- 20. The essence of the judicial pronouncements is to the effect that when the husband challenges the claim for maintenance of his wife alleging that his wife is living in adultery, the husband should prove that there is continued adulterous conduct. The phrase living in adultery refers to course of guilty conduct and not a single lapse from virtue. 21. The term adultery is to be understood in the light of the social ideas of the community as being a serious breach of the matrimonial tie. Living in adultery - mere friendship with a man does not amount to adultery within the meaning of Section 125(4) Cr. P.C. Living in adultery means the following of a course of continuous adulterous conduct. 22. Living in adultery - mere friendship with a man does not amount to adultery within the meaning of Section 125(4) Cr. P.C. Living in adultery means the following of a course of continuous adulterous conduct. 22. While determining the factum of Living in adultery the Court must consider evidence on record to ascertain as to whether the wife was living in quasi-permanent union with man with whom she was allegedly committing adultery. It is for the husband to prove that the wife is continuously committing violation of the marriage bed, indulging in adulterous life, by living in quasi permanent union with her paramour. In other words, living in adultery means an outright adulterous conduct where the wife lives in a quasi permanent union with a man with: whom she is committing adultery, shortly before or after the petition for maintenance. 23. It is only when the husband proves satisfactorily beyond reasonable doubt that his wife was living in adultery, she will not be entitled to maintenance and not otherwise. When an allegation of adultery is made against the wife, the Court is bound to enquire into her conduct. In the said enquiry, the husband has to begin his case and the wife, must be given an opportunity for adducing evidence to rebut the allegation of "living in adultery. 24. The words living in adultery are merely indicative of the principle that a single or occasional lapse from virtue is not a sufficient reason for refusing maintenance. To reiterate the continued adulterous conduct is what is meant by living in adultery. 25. The question, therefore, for the Court to decide is whether there had been such continued adulterous conduct on the part of the wife at or about the time of the application. The continuous adulterous conduct on the part of the organ at or about (the time of the application would mean such conduct shortly before or shortly after the application was made, interpreting the word shortly in a reasonable manner. What is reasonable would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. The words living in adultery do not necessarily mean that the husband is to prove that his wife was living in adultery on the date of the application itself. What is reasonable would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. The words living in adultery do not necessarily mean that the husband is to prove that his wife was living in adultery on the date of the application itself. The words must be interpreted to mean that it is enough for the husband to prove that the wife has been continuously living in adultery shortly before the application was made. 7. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent, vehemently contended that for the last 19 years the petitioner's whereabouts were completely unknown to the respondent. Since the petitioner deserted the matrimonial house without any sufficient cause she is not entitled to get any maintenance. He further contended that it transpires from the evidence particularly from the deposition of DW.2 that she eloped with another person to Kashmir and thereafter, suddenly surfaced after about 19 years. Apart that he contended that at present the respondent has no earning and he is completely dependent on the income of his sons and as such, he would not be in a position to provide any maintenance to the petitioner. Mr. Deb emphatically pointed out that the plea of the petitioner that she left the matrimonial home as the respondent contracted the second marriage is absolutely unsustainable as the evidence would demonstrate that the respondent contracted second marriage three years after the petitioner left the matrimonial home and as such, the reason assigned for leaving the matrimonial home is without basis, imaginary and fabricated. 8. On careful consideration of the rival contentions this Court is of the view that there is no controversy that the claim of maintenance has been preferred after 19 years from when the petitioner left the matrimonial home. Her contention is very simple that since the respondent contracted the second marriage she left the matrimonial home. That was even supported by her daughter, who was at the relevant point of time aged about 11-12 years. PW.2 only stated that her father contracted the second marriage. The respondent's plea that the petitioner eloped with one person 19 years back cannot be accepted. On the contrary, such aspersion is admittedly based on hearsay. A Court of law cannot determine any issue on the basis of hearsay and as such, the plea of elopement of the petitioner has to be discarded. The respondent's plea that the petitioner eloped with one person 19 years back cannot be accepted. On the contrary, such aspersion is admittedly based on hearsay. A Court of law cannot determine any issue on the basis of hearsay and as such, the plea of elopement of the petitioner has to be discarded. The learned Judge, Family Court committed a serious mistake holding that the petitioner eloped with one person whereas the respondent in his representation to Tripura Commission for Women has categorically stated that from hearsay he learnt that the petitioner eloped with one person to Kashmir. For not claiming maintenance for long 19 years cannot by itself be a ground for disentitlement of maintenance to any legally married wife. It is on record that the respondent has refused to maintain the petitioner even Tripura Commission for Women failed to persuade him to provide some maintenance for her sustenance. It is not denied at present that the respondent is living with a lady who has no legal status, as wife and as such, the petitioner is not expected to live with the respondent. The respondent has admitted that he contracted the marriage with one Sipra Das. Even if this Court supposes that the respondent did not compel, either by torture or by any other means, the petitioner to leave matrimonial home but as he contracted the marriage with said Sipra Das, the petitioner is not expected to live in the matrimonial home. Even though the respondent laboured hard to prove the backdrop of his marriage with said Sipra Das, in the meanwhile, it would make no difference whether the backdrop justified the marriage of the respondent with that Sipra Das or not. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner did not join the matrimonial home without sufficient cause cannot also be accepted. 9. The learned Family Court by implication accepted that petitioner has no means to maintain herself and on that view of the matter the two sons, who are not impleaded, are directed to maintain their mother. Such direction, in absence of the persons, against whom the direction has been made, is grossly irregular and unsustainable and accordingly, the said direction is interfered with and set aside. Such direction, in absence of the persons, against whom the direction has been made, is grossly irregular and unsustainable and accordingly, the said direction is interfered with and set aside. Since it has been proved that the petitioner is a legally married wife of the respondent and she has no means to maintain herself, she is otherwise entitled to get the maintenance from her husband. The respondent herein as per the provisions of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P.C., is to pay the maintenance per month unless it is proved that she is disentitled in view of the provisions as embodied in Section 125(4) of Cr. P.C. It has already been discussed that the petitioner cannot be faulted for not joining the matrimonial home as the respondent contracted marriage with one Sipra Das during the subsistence of the marriage with the petitioner. In this regard this Court cannot entirely brushed aside the testimony of PW.2. The allegation of elopement though tends to colour it with leading life in adultery but there is no evidence and the respondent in his representation admitted that the episode of elopement is based on hearsay and as such, it has to be held that there is no evidence against the petitioner for living in adultery. Therefore, the provisions of Section 125(4) Cr. P.C. cannot disentitle the petitioner from getting the maintenance in the circumstances. Moreover, it is found that the business of the respondent is presently being managed by his sons and as such, it cannot be held that the respondent has no income. Even if the respondent's statement is believed then also he cannot absolve himself from payment of maintenance to his legally married wife. The object of Section 125 of Cr. P.C. is to save the legally married woman and other persons as embraced by Section 125(1) from vagrancy and destitution and for that purpose, the interpretation of provisions of maintenance is bound to be inclusive and this interpretative build-up is reflected in the decisions as relied by Mr. A K Bhowmik, learned senior counsel. In view of this, the respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) per month to the petitioner within the 10th day of every English Calendar month and to remit the said sum as quantified as maintenance to the petitioner by the Money Order. A K Bhowmik, learned senior counsel. In view of this, the respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) per month to the petitioner within the 10th day of every English Calendar month and to remit the said sum as quantified as maintenance to the petitioner by the Money Order. The cost of Money Order has to be borne by the respondent. It is made clear further that as the petition was filed on 01.08.2008 the petitioner is entitled to get arrear of the maintenance. But this Court considering the circumstances as attended to is inclined to direct the respondent to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand) to the petitioner in lieu of the arrear maintenance by 10 (ten) installments and the entire amount of the lump sum arrear maintenance has to be paid by 31.05.2013 positively. It is also made clear that the payment of lump sum amount is in addition to the monthly maintenance as quantified by this Court. 10. With this observations and directions this petition is allowed. LCRs be sent down forthwith. Petition allowed.