Judgment :- (P. Jyothimani.) 1. The present writ petition is filed against the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal confirming the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in refusing to grant permission to the borrower to cross-examine the officer of the Life Insurance Corporation, who has filed proof affidavit in respect of the claim made in O.A.No.618 of 1997. 2. Admittedly, the third respondent/Life Insurance Corporation has filed the original application for recovery of amount stated to have been borrowed by the petitioner. The dispute is relating to the quantum of interest payable in respect of the borrowed amount. The officer of the Life Insurance Corporation has filed a proof affidavit claiming the amount of interest at 17= %. It was in those circumstances, the petitioner has filed an interlocutory application in I.A.No.128 of 2008 seeking permission to cross-examine the said officer on the ground that there has been some discrepancies in respect of the interest, as it is seen in the proposal given by the Bank while granting loan, which also includes the deposit of title deeds. It is no doubt true that at the time of obtaining the loan, which is stated to be an extent of Rs.8.00 lakhs, certain promissory notes have been executed by the petitioner and according to the learned counsel appearing for the Life Insurance Corporation, the amount has been advanced periodically as and when the progress in construction is shown. 3. While it is admitted that in the proposal form, one of the clauses dealing with interest payable by the petitioner says that interest is 14% / 15% / 16% per annum payable half-yearly and compounding with half-yearly rests, the said clause also contains an additional interest of 2= % per annum. The said clause is as follows:- "The rate of interest on the loan will be 14%/15%/16% p.a., payable half-yearly and compounding with half-yearly rests. However, you will pay interest at such increased rates as shall from time to time be fixed by the Corporation and intimated to you but such rates shall not at any point of time exceed the rate at which loans are advanced by commercial banks. However, you will pay interest at such increased rates as shall from time to time be fixed by the Corporation and intimated to you but such rates shall not at any point of time exceed the rate at which loans are advanced by commercial banks. PROVIDED HOWEVER that in case of default in the payment of instalments of interest and/or payment of premia on life insurance policies within the days of grace provided thereunder assigned to the Corporation as collateral security for the loan, an additional interest at the rate of 2= % p.a. Will become payable on the outstanding loan in addition to the date of interest, as aforesaid. If any default is made in payment of any half-yearly instalment of principal and/or interest or any part there-of on the date appointed for payment thereof, you will over and above the additional interest payable as herein before, mentioned also pay interest on the outstanding amount of interest by way of compound interest at the rate of 14%/15%/16% p.a. by half-yearly payments on the days aforesaid so long as any half-yearly instalment of principal or any interest or any part hereof remain unpaid." 4. It is also not in dispute that as per the promissory note, the interest rate is stated as 17= %. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, there is an ambiguity in respect of the quantum of interest payable by the petitioner and it was in those circumstances, the petitioner has made an application for the purpose of cross-examining the officer concerned, so as to enable the Court to come to a proper conclusion as to the correct rate of interest. That application came to be dismissed by the Tribunal as confirmed by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the documents themselves speak and therefore, there is no necessity for the oral evidence to be adduced. 5. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the rejection of the plea made by the petitioner for cross-examination is not on any sound reasoning. On the other hand, the application itself has been filed for cross-examination on the admitted situation that there has been ambiguity in respect of the quantum of interest and that aspect has not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority. On the other hand, the application itself has been filed for cross-examination on the admitted situation that there has been ambiguity in respect of the quantum of interest and that aspect has not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority. In this regard, it is relevant to extract Rule 12(6) of Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, which is as follows:- "(12.) Filing of reply and other documents by the defendant.” (6) The Tribunal may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts shall be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness shall be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Tribunal thinks reasonable: Provided that after filing of the affidavits by the respective parties where it appears to the Tribunal that either the applicant or the defendant desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced and it is necessary to do so, the Tribunal shall for sufficient reasons to be recorded, order the witness to be present for cross-examination, and in the event of the witness to be present for cross-examination, then, the affidavit shall not be taken into evidence and further that no oral evidence other than that given in this proviso will be permitted." 6. A reading of the said Rule makes it abundantly clear that even though, as opined by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the wordings are not satisfactorily made, there is a discretion on the part of the Tribunal to allow the party for cross-examination assigning sufficient reason and if the same desire it necessary. 7. In fact, as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of the inappropriate wording of the said rules is clear that the tribunal has got a duty to find out the bona fide need for oral examination of the witness even though the same arises rarely, since admittedly, the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal are summary in nature and the very idea of the constitution of the Tribunal is for an expedient settlement and recovery of amount due to the bank advanced by way of loan without resorting to the very same procedure of civil law. 8. 8. In Union of India and another -vs-Delhi High Court Bar Association and others reported in [(2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 275), in paragraph Nos.22 and 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "(22.) At the outset, we find that Rule 12 is not happily worded. The reason for establishing Banking Tribunals being to expedite the disposal of the claims by the banks, Parliament thought it proper only to require the principles of natural justice to be the guiding factor for the Tribunals in deciding the applications, as is evident from Section 22 of the Act. While the Tribunal has, no doubt, been given the power of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath, but the Act does not contain any provision which makes it mandatory for the witness to be examined, if such a witness could be produced. Rule 12(6) has to be read harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act and the Rules. As we have already noticed, Rule 12(7) gives the Tribunal the power to act upon the affidavit of the applicant where the defendant denies his liability to pay the claims. Rule 12(6), if paraphrased, would read as follows: 1. the Tribunal may, at any time for sufficient reason, order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit - on such conditions as the Tribunal thinks reasonable; 2. the Tribunal may, at any time for sufficient reason, order -that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Tribunal thinks reasonable. (23.) In other words, the Tribunal has the power to require any particular fact to be proved by affidavit, or it may order that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing. While passing such an order, it must record sufficient reasons for the same. The proviso to Rule 12(6) would certainly apply only where the Tribunal chooses to issue a direction on its own, for any particular fact to be proved by affidavit or the affidavit of a witness being read at the hearing. The said proviso refers to the desire of an applicant or a defendant for the production of a witness for cross-examination. The said proviso refers to the desire of an applicant or a defendant for the production of a witness for cross-examination. In the setting in which the said proviso occurs, it would appear to us that once the parties have filed affidavits in support of their respective cases, it is only thereafter that the desire for a witness to be cross-examined can legitimately arise. It is at that time, if it appears to the Tribunal, that such a witness can be produced and it is necessary to do so and there is no desire to prolong the case that it shall require the witness to be present for cross-examination and in the event of his not appearing, then the affidavit shall not be taken into evidence. When the High Courts and the Supreme Court in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 32 can decide questions of fact as well as law merely on the basis of documents and affidavits filed before them ordinarily, there should be no reason as to why a Tribunal, likewise, should not be able to decide the case merely on the basis of documents and affidavits before it. It is common knowledge that hardly any transaction with the bank would be oral and without proper documentation, whether in the form of letters or formal agreements. In such an event the bona fide need for the oral examination of a witness should rarely arise. There has to be a very good reason to hold that affidavits, in such a case, would not be sufficient. 9. In such view of the matter, when there is a discretion available on the file of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, in our view, the rejection of the plea of the petitioner on the ground that the records would speak and the borrower happens to be an Advocate and he would not have signed without knowing the correct contents is not sustainable in law. On the reading of the wording of the proposal there is an ambiguity apparently on record and in all fairness, in our view, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the cross-examination of the officer of the Life Insurance Corporation, who has filed the proof affidavit, in order to arrive at a correct conclusion regarding the quantum of loan. In any event, such examination is not detrimental to the interest of the Insurance Company at all. 10. In any event, such examination is not detrimental to the interest of the Insurance Company at all. 10. For the reasons stated above, the impugned orders of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal as well as the Debt Recovery Tribunal in refusing permission to cross-examine the officer of the Insurance Company, who has filed the proof affidavit, stand set aside. The Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai, is directed to take up O.A.No.618 of 1997 and allow the petitioner to cross-examine the officer, who has filed the proof affidavit and thereafter, complete the trial and pass appropriate final order in the said original application expeditiously, in any event, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition stands allowed. Connected M.P. is closed. However, there will be no order as to costs.