Judgment Kanchan Chakraborty, J. 1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 24.2.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Siliguri in Sessions Trial no. 16 of 1008 thereby convicting the appellant for committing offence punishable under Section 326 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer R.I. for 3 years and 7 years, respectively with fine. 2. On 20.6.2007, at 7.45, hours Bhabesh Chandra Ray lodged one F.I.R with Kharibari Police Station alleging therein that on 19.6.2007, at about 10.30 P.M., Indranath Barman (Appellant) attacked his daughter Lata Ray with deadly weapon when she was proceeding towards latrine and, as a result, she sustained serious bleeding injureis on her head and other parts of her body and that soon after the incident, on the protest of Bhabesh Chandra Ray, Indranath Barman (Appellant) fled away from the spot. Lata Ray was taken to Naxalbari Rural Hospital for her treatment. Initially a G.D. entry was recorded but afterwards on the basis of the F.I.R., Kharibari Police station case no. 15 of 2007 dated 20.6.2007 was started against the appellant under Section 326 and 307 of IPC. 3. The appellant was arrayed to face charges under Section 326 and 307 of Indian Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty to the charges and as a result, the trial commenced. 14 witnesses, in all, were examined on behalf of the prosecution. Some documents, such as, injury report formal, FIR, discharge certificate, sketch map of the place of occurrence etc. were admitted into evidence and marked Exhibit on behalf of the prosecution. No witness was examined nor any document was placed by the appellant in course of trial. The learned Trial Court upon consideration of the evidence on record, oral and documentary, found that the prosecution brought home the charges against the appellant and accordingly, recorded the impugned order of conviction and sentence. 4. No witness was examined nor any document was placed by the appellant in course of trial. The learned Trial Court upon consideration of the evidence on record, oral and documentary, found that the prosecution brought home the charges against the appellant and accordingly, recorded the impugned order of conviction and sentence. 4. The judgment impugned has been assailed in this appeal on the following grounds : a) that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective; b) that the presence of witnesses in place of occurrence was entirely doubtful which the learned Court failed to appreciate; c) that the learned Court failed to consider the discrepancies in the statement of the witnesses on material points; d) that the prosecution case was entirely doubtful so far as it relates to causing hurt to Lata Rau by the appellant; e) that the learned Court failed to appreciate that necessary and important materials like the offending weapon, blood strained wearing apparels and blood strained earth were not seized by the I.O.; f) that on all probabilities, the statement of the victim to the Doctor indicated that she did not identify the person who assaulted her; g) that the learned Court failed to appreciate also that none of the witnesses watched the incident and it was not possible for anybody to identify the assailant at that particular time in such particular place; h) that the judgment being otherwise bad in law, is not sustainable and liable to be set aside; 4. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that there was inordinate in lodging the F.I.R. Although a reason has been given in the F.I.R., which, according to him, is not acceptable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is contended further that before lodging of the F.I.R. as well as G.D. entry no. 835 dated 20.6.2007, the injured Lata Ray was examined by the Medical Officer, Kharibari Rural Hospital (P.W. 1)on 19.6.2007 and a statement was made by the injured to him which he recorded in the injury report which has been marked as Exhibit 1. At that time, Lata Ray, the injured did not disclose the name of the appellant as the assailant. The persons took her to hospital also did not disclose the name of the assailant at that time. Mr. At that time, Lata Ray, the injured did not disclose the name of the appellant as the assailant. The persons took her to hospital also did not disclose the name of the assailant at that time. Mr. Mukherjee contended that it was the first recording of the alleged incident to any third person/independent person which, astonishingly anough, did not disclose the name of the assailant for reason not analyzed. Mr. Mukherjee contended further that according to the Exhibit 1 as well as statement of the P.W. 1, the patient Lata Ray was conscious when she was brought in the Hospital. But the victim Lata Ray as P.W. 3 stated categorically in her examination in chief that the she became senseless and thereafter regained her sense in the next morning when she found herself in the Nakshalbari Hospital. This discrepancy together with the fact that the name of the assailant was not disclosed at the first opportunity coupled with delay in lodging the F.I.R. altogether had cast shadow of doubt on the prosecution case. 5. Mr. Mukherjee contended that according to the F.I.R., the lodger of the F.I.,R. had seen the incident first of all and on his protest only the appellant left the place of occurrence. The F.I.R. does not say that Sunil, son of the lodger of the F.I.R. rushed to the place of occurrence first of all and had seen the appellant to assault Lata Ray. Sunil was examined as P.W. 11. He stated that hearing shouting of Lata Ray, he came out of the room and saw the appellant was assaulting his elder sister with a “da” and he shouted, rushed towards the spot and the appellant fled away. Lata fell down with bleeding injuries and became senseless. He further stated that thereafter, his parent came there and the injured Lata was taken to Nakshalbari Hospital by a car of Shyam Chatri. The fact stated in the F.I.R. that the lodger of the F.I.R. Bhabesh Chandra Ray had seen the incident first of all and on his protest, the appellant left the spot appears to be false in view of statement of the P.W. 11. 6. It has been contended further that according to the F.I.R. the alleged incident had taken place at 10.30 P.M. while Lata was proceeding towards the latrine. 6. It has been contended further that according to the F.I.R. the alleged incident had taken place at 10.30 P.M. while Lata was proceeding towards the latrine. According to the statement made by Lata to the Doctor (P.W. 1) she was assaulted at 11.20 P.M. inside the toilet. According to the statement of the victim Lata Ray (P.W. 3) she was assaulted when she was returning to the room from the latrine. There is serious discrepancies on the material point as to time and place of the occurrence which the learned Court has ignored completely. The above mentioned factors, according to Mr. Mukherjee, if are taken together, obviously go against the prosecution case. Besides the above factors, the investigating officer of the case did not seize any blood stained, wearing apparels of the victim. The offending weapon i.e. “da” was not also seized. No local witness having houses nearby not also came forward and supported the prosecution case. The impugned order of conviction was recorded only on the uncorroborated testimony of victim and her brother P.W. 11. Again, had the appellant intention to kill her, he could have hit the injured on more vital parts than on hand, shoulder and back of the neck. The Exhibit 1 does not say that the injuries sustained by the P.W. 3 Lata Ray were grievous in nature. The P.W. 1 Doctor has not also stated that the injuries so caused were grievous in nature. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in order to categoriese an injury as grievous injury, it should come within the parameter of Section 320 of IPC. The injuries received by Lata Ray were not found grievous and she was not in the hospital for treatment more than 10 days in all. Accordingly, the appellant cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 326 of IPC. Since the intention of the assailant to kill Lata Ray was not atall established by sufficient and satisfactory evidence, the appellant cannot be said to have committed the under Section 307 of IPC also. 7. Mr. Mukherjee also raised one important point and put much stress on it. He contended that identification of the assailant is doubtful in the instant case in view of the discrepancies already pointed out. He contended that there is no evidence to the effect that the place of occurrence was having sufficient light to identify a person. 7. Mr. Mukherjee also raised one important point and put much stress on it. He contended that identification of the assailant is doubtful in the instant case in view of the discrepancies already pointed out. He contended that there is no evidence to the effect that the place of occurrence was having sufficient light to identify a person. Again, who did actually identify the appellant as the assailant-Lata Ray or her brother or her father? If she has made a statement to the Doctor (P.W. 1) on the very night she was assaulted, she could have easily disclosed the name of the assailant. The name of the assailant was suppressed by her. The F.I.R. was not lodged promptly. There were discrepancies in respect of time of incident and place of occurrence. These facts together creates doubt as to the identity of the actual assailant. 8. Mr. Panda, Learned Counsel contended that the Victim Lata Ray herself identified the appellant as the assailant. She could do so because appellant was a known person to her. Besides the victim, the brother of the victim also identified the assailant. Therefore, there is no doubt as to identification of the assailant in this case. He further contended that the discrepancies pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee are trivial in nature and they have no impact on the prosecution case. The fact that Lata Ray sustained injury and that was caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon has been established by Ex. 1 as well as the evidence of P.W. 1, the victim and other witnesses. The appellant wanted to marry the victim. Since she did not marry him and married another person, the appellant being furious caused grievous hurt and attempted to kill the victim Lata Ray. Mr. Panda contended that evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is sufficient enough to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant and the learned Trial Court made no mistake in recording of conviction of the appellant. 9. In reply, Mr. Mukherjee contended elaborately that there is no room of doubt that Lata Ray, the P.W. 3 sustained serious injuries which were caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon on 19.6.2007 and that she was medically treated initially at Nakshalbari Rural Hospital. 9. In reply, Mr. Mukherjee contended elaborately that there is no room of doubt that Lata Ray, the P.W. 3 sustained serious injuries which were caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon on 19.6.2007 and that she was medically treated initially at Nakshalbari Rural Hospital. He contended that this fact alone does not necessarily establish that the appellant who wanted to marry the P.W. 3 but unsuccessful to do so, caused hurt in order to kill her. The onus of proving everything essential for establishment of the charge against the accused lies on the prosecution. There must be clear and unequivocal proof of the “Corpus Delict”. The evidence against the accused should be such as to exclude to a moral certainty, every reasonable doubt of guilt of the accused. In matters of doubt, it is safe to acquit than to condemn, for it is better that several guilty persons should escape than that one innocent suffers. He contended that the F.I.R. was lodged on 20.6.2007 at 5.45 P.M. There was inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. the G.D. entry no. 835 was recorded also on 20.6.2007. The ground mentioned in the F.I.R. showing that delay was caused in filing the F.I.R. as the lodger of the F.I.R. was busy with his injured daughter and her treatment which, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the case. He contended that it is Surprising that the victim did not state the name of the assailant Indranath Barman @ Rabin Barman, i.e., the appellant to the P.W. 1. The P.W. 1 in his deposition as well as in his report (Ex. 1) has made it clear that the victim was conscious and stated that she was assaulted by a known person. The persons who brought the victim to hospital did not also disclose the name of the appellant as the assailant. This fact appears to be important because statement made by the victim to the Doctor was her first statement to a third person who had no connection either with the victim or the appellant. The P.W. 1 had no reason also not to wright the name of the appellant as assailant if not stated to him. This fact, according to Mr. Mukherjee, creates a strong doubt as to whether the assailant was actually identified by the victim or not. Mr. The P.W. 1 had no reason also not to wright the name of the appellant as assailant if not stated to him. This fact, according to Mr. Mukherjee, creates a strong doubt as to whether the assailant was actually identified by the victim or not. Mr. Mukherjee further explained that according to the lodger of the F.I.R. i.e. Bibash Chandra Ray (P.W. 2) the appellant left the place and fled away from the place only on his protest. In the four corners of the F.I.R. it has not been stated that his son i.e. P.W. 11 appeared in the scene then and there and identified the appellant and that the appellant fled away seeing the P.W. 10. The P.W. 1 stated that he did not witness the incident of assault but his son Sunil Ray witnessed the same. The P.W. 4 is the aunt of Lata, the victim. She said that she heard shouting of Sunil Ray at 10/10.30 P.M. on 19.6.2007 and rushed to the place of occurrence and found Lata was lying on the goround unconscious with bleeding injuries on her head, neck and on her hand. She was taken to hospital by car. Sunil Ray told her that appellant assaulted Lata with a “da”. In her cross-examination she stated that she did not witness incident but heard about it from Lata and Sunil. She stated further that when she came to the spot she found Push nath, Kailash and others on the spot. Kailash and Push Nath were not examined as witnesses in the case. The P.W. 4 did not state that on reaching the spot she found P.W. 2 Bhavesh and P.W. 11 Sunil there. P.W. 5 is mother of Lata. She has stated that on 19.6.2007 at 10.30 P.M. she was sleeping in her room with her husband. She heard shouting of her son Sunil and woke up. She came out and found her daughter lying on the ground. Her son Sunil was there. She did not find anybody else on the spot. Her husband also came thereafter. She heard from the his son Sunil that Indranath Barman fled away from their house seeing Sunil. In her cross-examination she stated categorically that she saw none but her son on the spot. Mr. Her son Sunil was there. She did not find anybody else on the spot. Her husband also came thereafter. She heard from the his son Sunil that Indranath Barman fled away from their house seeing Sunil. In her cross-examination she stated categorically that she saw none but her son on the spot. Mr. Mukherjee contended that this statement of the P.W. 5 rules out presence of P.W. 2 immediately after the incident on spot and also rules out that on his protest, the assailant/appellant fled away from the spot as stated in the F.I.R. which was prepared long after the incident and long after recording of statement given by the victim to the P.W. 1, Doctor. The P.W. 6 is brother of Babesh Ray. He also rushed to the P.O. hearing shouting at 10.30 P.M. and found Lata lying on the ground with bleeding injuries on her neck, shoulder, hand and fingers. Brother of Lata told him that the appellant assaulted Lata by a “da”. The P.W. 8 is the husband of Lata Ray. He stated that on 19.6.2007 at 10.45 p.m., he received a telephone call from Sunil who told him that Lata was assaulted with da by Indra Barman. Sunil Ray son of Bhabesh Chandra Ray and brother of victim Lata stated that at 10.30 P.M. his sister Lata went out to attend natures call. Thereafter he heard shouting of Lata. He came out of the room and found the appellant was assaulting Lata with a da. Then he shouted and rushed towards Lata while appellant fled away. Lata failed down and lost his sense. Thereafter her parents appeared in the scene. The P.W. 11 has not stated any where that he made a phone call to P.W. 8 at 10.45 P.M. and informed about the incident. He stated that he informed his father that he saw appellant on the spot. He has not stated anywhere that he narrated the incident to his mother P.W. 5, Aunt, P.W. 4 and Uncle P.W. 6. Mr. He stated that he informed his father that he saw appellant on the spot. He has not stated anywhere that he narrated the incident to his mother P.W. 5, Aunt, P.W. 4 and Uncle P.W. 6. Mr. Mukherjee further explained that according to the prosecution story the alleged incident had taken place at 10.00 P.M. to 10.30 P.M. The Exhibit 1 i.e. the injury report and the evidence of P.W. 1, who attended the injured victim for the first time, together makes it clear that the alleged incident had taken place at 11.20 hours by a known person while the victim was in toilet. Who was that known person? The victim was conscious according to the P.W. 1 when she reported the incident to the P.W. I. She had categorically stated to the P.W. 1 that she was assaulted at 11.20 hours in the toilet by a known person. This fact was changed subsequently. The appellant was projected as the known person at the time the F.I.R. was lodged. Mr. Mukherjee explained further that according to the F.I.R., the incident had taken place when Lata was proceeding towards the latrine. According to the Lata, the victim (P.W. 3) she was assaulted when she was returning from the toilet through the courtyard to his room. According to the P.W. 1 and Exhibit 1, the incident took place in the toilet. The P.W. 11 has not stated the exact location of the incident. There is also discrepancy in respect to time of incident and place of incident besides improbality of presence of some witnesses at the P.O. immediately after the incident. The offending weapon i.e. the “da” was not recovered or seized. No blood stained wearing apparels of the victim was seized. No local witness came forward to support the version of the prosecution case. All these factors cast shadow of doubt on the prosecution case and the appellant should have been acquitted on benefit of doubt. 11. This Court appreciates the way Mr. Mukherjee pointed out the defects in the prosecution case. Now, it is for this Court to see how all these points were considered by the trial Court. 12. On careful appraisal of the judgment impugned it appears to me that the learned Court discussed all the points raised by Mr. Mukherjee elaborately. 11. This Court appreciates the way Mr. Mukherjee pointed out the defects in the prosecution case. Now, it is for this Court to see how all these points were considered by the trial Court. 12. On careful appraisal of the judgment impugned it appears to me that the learned Court discussed all the points raised by Mr. Mukherjee elaborately. Not only the learned Court discussed all the points exhaustively but had given sufficient reasons as to why those points were not found acceptable to him. 13. It is the admitted position in this case the victim Lata Ray sustained the following injuries on 19.6.2007 and was treated in the Nakshalbari Rural Hospital by the P.W. 1- a) Multipal Small cut injury over right middle and ring figure. b) Cut injury over right forearm; c)multiple injuries over back of the right hand; d) one cut injury over right forearm 6” 2’ into muscle layer esposing bone; e) one cut injury over right shoulder, posterior aspect over 6” 3” muscle deep esposing bone; f) one cut injury over the back of the neck 7” 3” muscle deep; g) one cut injury on light parital region measuring 5” 2” into skin deep. 14. It is also admitted position that those injuries were caused by the assailant with a sharp cutting heavy weapon. A ‘da’ can well said to be a sharp cutting heavy weapon which no one can deny. 15. It is basic principle of appreciation of evidence in Criminal case is that the Court is required to bear in mind the set up and environment in which the crime is committed. The level of understanding of the witnesses is also to be borne in mind and everyone’s different way of narration for same facts. Bearing in mind these broad principles, the evidence is to be appreciated to find out what part out of the evidence represents the true and correct state of affairs. It is for the Courts to separate the grain from the chaff. 16. Under the evidence act a fact is said to be proved when the Court considers its existence so probable on the available evidence that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that the fact exists. 17. The exhibit 1 and the evidence of P.W. 1 together, no doubt, makes it clear that the victim did not disclose the name of assailant. 17. The exhibit 1 and the evidence of P.W. 1 together, no doubt, makes it clear that the victim did not disclose the name of assailant. She simply stated that assailant was a ‘known’ person. It is pertinent to take note of the fact that she did not say to the P.W. 1 that the assailant was an unknown person. The fact that the appellant was a known person is found in the evidence of almost all the witnesses. So, the question comes in is why she did not state the name of that “known” person to the Doctor but to others? Does this fact carry much importance? She a married lady admittedly. The Doctor was a third person with whom she was having no acquaintance. It might be that and in all probabilities she did not want that a third person comes to know about her old boy friend. Besides that, she was physically not in a position to give details of the incident correctly and narrate the fact accurately to the Doctor. It was an unintentional omission on her part. The entire matter could have been different had she stated that the assailant was unknown to her. The learned Trial Court explained the situation properly by taking the help of the view of the Hon’ble Apex Court that, “ It is settled proposition to law that omission to mention the name of the assailants in the requisition memo perforce does not render the prosecution version brittle and omission to mention the name of the assailant to the requisition memo of the injury would not render the prosecution case doubtful”. It is not a case where the victim only identified the assailant. The P.W. 11 perhaps had given the description of the incident in a much better way by stating that “hearing the shouting of my didi I came out of the room and saw the accused Rabin @ Indranath Barman was assaulting by didi with a da and then I shouted and rushed to my didi Shyamali, the accused fled away from that place”. He informed the incident to the P.W., 8 i.e., husband of the victim short after the incident and at that time he named the appellant as the assailant. He also informed the name of the appellant as assailant to the P.W.2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 6 immediately after the incident. He informed the incident to the P.W., 8 i.e., husband of the victim short after the incident and at that time he named the appellant as the assailant. He also informed the name of the appellant as assailant to the P.W.2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 6 immediately after the incident. The P.W. 2,4,5 and 6 came to the P.O. hearing shouting of the P.W. 11. Why their testimonies are to be disbelieved? Simply because there was an omission on the part of the victim to state the name of the “known” person to the Doctor ? This analogy cannot be accepted by any prudent person. It is not that type of omission which strikes at the root of the prosecution case. Therefore, in my estimate, the learned Trial Court approached the issue from correct angle and that view cannot be said to be unsustainable. An innocuous omission is inconsequential. 18. Now comes the discrepancies as to time and place of occurrence. It should not be forgotten that in this case the contents of the F.I.R. were not admitted into evidence and marked Exhibit. Therefore, the Court was not bound to give any evidentiary/probative value of the part of the F.I.R. which was not admitted into evidence. True it is that time of occurrence stated in the F.I.R. as 10.30 P.M. All the witness including the victim (P.W. 3) stated that the time of occurrence at 10.30 P.M. excepting the P.W. 1 who did not witness the incident nor rushed to the place immediately thereafter. It is true also that he in his report (Exhibit 1) mentioned the time of occurrence as at 11.20 P.M. as stated by the victim. So, what he stated was reported to him and he had no personal knowledge about the incident. Therefore, his evidence must not overshadow the direct evidence of the injured and the eye witness (P.W. 11). The victim was not obviously in a proper state of mind and not sure what she stated to the P.W. 1 at the time she was examined medically. In all probabilities, she was not supposed to narrate everything in minute details. Such discrepancies cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. Even if it is accepted that she was assaulted at 11.20 P.M., does it make any difference? Discrepancies do not necessarily demolish testimony. In all probabilities, she was not supposed to narrate everything in minute details. Such discrepancies cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. Even if it is accepted that she was assaulted at 11.20 P.M., does it make any difference? Discrepancies do not necessarily demolish testimony. Minor contradiction of the prosecution are bound to occur which are spontaneous and natural. This, however, does weaken or debilitate the prosecution case. Where the entire incident took place hardly in 4 to 5 munites and it is possible that injured person may not have seen everything and may have made mistake relating to sequence to event, it would not be proper to discard the evidence of eye witnesses on its entirety. Discrepancies of in the testimony of various witnesses on material or broad points have to be carefully weighed in arriving at the truth. But trifling discrepancies should be ignored and they are often a test of truth. Several persons giving their version on a transaction witnessed by them are naturally liable to disagree on immaterial points. Their powers of observation, expression or memory are not the same and honest differences are easily possible. It must be remembered that there are discrepancies of truth as well as false hood. It is the broad fact of the case and not the little detail that are to be considered in weighing evidence. 19. As regards the discrepancies in respect of the place of occurrence as pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee, is concerned, suffice it to state that such discrepancies have neither made the prosecution case dis-believable nor discarded the oral testimonies of the witnesses. There was no controversy to the fact that the incident took place inside the house of the P.W. 2. The P.W. 2 did not follow his daughter when she went to the latrine. Nor the P.W. 11 also. Therefore, they were not in a position to state whether the victim was assaulted on her way to latrine or in the latrine or on her way back to latrine. It was the victim only and the eye witness i.e. P.W. 11 only who could say where the victim was assaulted. Both of them categorically stated that the incident of assault took place on the courtyard. There was no doubt in it and the learned Trial Court rightly put no importance on this discrepancies. 20. It was the victim only and the eye witness i.e. P.W. 11 only who could say where the victim was assaulted. Both of them categorically stated that the incident of assault took place on the courtyard. There was no doubt in it and the learned Trial Court rightly put no importance on this discrepancies. 20. Again, non-examination of the people of the area who appeared in the scence did not affect the prosecution case at all. It is trite law that quality is to be counted no quantity. The quality of evidence aduced on behalf of the prosecution was not only sufficient but, more or less, consistent, cogent and trustworthy. So, non-examination of some local people has not discredited the evidence of eye witness, injured and the other witnesses who came to the P.O. immediately after the occurrence. The explanation for delay in lodging the F.I.R. has been given clearly in the F.I.R. itself. The defense did not put any question to the P.W. 2 on this issue while he was cross-examined. It is needless to state that being a father, the P.W. 2 was supposed to take his daughter to hospital for her treatment first of all instead of going to the police station. That was normal and natural action for him. Therefore, the explanation given was correctly accepted by the learned Court. All these points, in my opinion, are not tenable because no human being especially a lady would cause self-inflicted injuries of like nature on important parts of her body simply because the appellant wanted to marry her previously. On the contrary, it would be a major reason for the appellant to cause hurt to the victim as she refused to marry him and married to P.W. 8. In all probabilities, the case of the prosecution can well be said to have been established and, as such, the finding of the Court cannot be said to be perversed. This court is of opinion that the view of the learned Court that none but the appellant caused hurt to Lata Roy on the fateful night is well reasoned and is not required to be upset. 21. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in order to categorized any hurt as “grievous hurt”, the parameter laid down in Section 320 of IPC is to be followed. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “ grievous” First – Emasculation. 21. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in order to categorized any hurt as “grievous hurt”, the parameter laid down in Section 320 of IPC is to be followed. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “ grievous” First – Emasculation. Secondly.-Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Thirdly.-Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly.-Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly. – Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly-Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.-Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily paid, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. Learned Court was of view that the injuries caused to the victim came within the clause “eighthly” of Section 320 of the IPC and, as such, it was grievous hurt attracting Section 326 of IPC. 22. The injuries sustained by the victim have already been noted down. No injury was caused on any vital part of the body of the victim. The injuries no. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) , and (f) are not at all grievous so as to attract Section 320 IPC. The injury no. (g) was caused on vital part, no doubt, but only a skin deep injury. It did not even reach the muscle layer. Therefore, that injury cannot also be designated as grievous injury. In the instant case, the Doctor who has examined as P.W. 1 and injury report (Ex. 1) did not describe the injuries as grievous in nature. The victim was not in medical treatment for a time span of 20 days. It was also not the prosecution case that she was unable to follow her ordinary pursuits. Therefore, in my estimate, the injuries caused by the appellant cannot be categorized as grievous injury as defined Section 320 of IPC. This Court differs with the view of the learned Trial Court on this issue. 23. No doubt the appellant used a ‘da’ which is a heavy sharp cutting weapon, and , in fact, the appellant caused cut injuries on the body of the victim and that was done voluntarily. Therefore, the offence committed by him comes within the purview of Section 324 of IPC. This Court is of opinion that the appellant committed an offence under Section 324 of IPC and is liable to be convicted to that offence. 24. Therefore, the offence committed by him comes within the purview of Section 324 of IPC. This Court is of opinion that the appellant committed an offence under Section 324 of IPC and is liable to be convicted to that offence. 24. As regard order of conviction under Section 307 of IPC, learned Court came to a findings that the appellant intended to kill the victim and that is why he caused hurt to the victim at that odd hour with a weapon like ‘da’. This analogy of the learned Trial Court cannot be accepted. It is sine quo non to constitute an offence under Section 307 of IPC that the offender had the intention to murder the victim. The question obviously comes in is as to how such an intention of an accused can be established. Intention which is a state of mind can never be preciously proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts. Some relevant consideration are (i) the nature of weapon, (ii) the place where injuries were inflicted, (iii) the nature of injuries caused, iv) the opportunity available which the accused gets. When an accused despite having a dangerous weapon in hand inflicted not grievous injuries, there was no intention to murder-the offence goes off Section 307 of IPC. Evidence when does not show intention to murder and injuries inflicted when are not dangerous to life, conviction under Section 307 IPC is improper. In the instant case, the appellant had a da in his hand. It appears from the evidence of witnesses that he brandished the ‘da’ aimlessly. The hand injuries were caused, perhaps when the victim tried to resist the attack. The head injury was only skin deep. The appellant would have used the weapon with full force on the head of victim or could chop her frontal region of the neck. He could have also hit on her abdomen covering the naval region. He did not cause any such injury. Although he got the victim alone at that odd hour in the lonely courtyard, he could inflict grievous hurt on the important parts of the victim which would have been endangarous to her life. All these facts together goes to suggest that the appellant did not want to kill or eliminate the victim. He had the scope to do so but did not avail the opportunity. All these facts together goes to suggest that the appellant did not want to kill or eliminate the victim. He had the scope to do so but did not avail the opportunity. He could resist the P.W. 11 also had he any such intention because P.W. 11 was having no arm with him when he appeared in the scene. Taking everything into consideration that this Court is of view that the prosecution failed to established the intention to kill on the part of the appellant. The view of the learned Court on this issue is not accepted. 25. In view of the discussion above, the appeal is allowed in part. Instead of convicting the accused under Section 326 and 307 of IPC this Court convicts the appellant for committing offence under Section 324 of IPC. The order of Sentence is also modified accordingly. The appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/-. 26. The appeals stands disposed of.