Judgment S.A. BOBDE, J.: 1. rule, returnable forthwith. respondents waive service, heard finally by consent of parties. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 20.10.2011 of the high power committee functioning as an appellate authority in respect of matters under the slum rehabilitation act. The high power committee has confirmed the order of the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority/ respondent no.2 terminating the petitioners’ appointment as a developer of a part of land under a slum rehabilitation scheme at dindoshi, goregaon (east), mumbai. The petitioner had been appointed as a developer for the trimurti sra cooperative housing society i.e. rEspondent no.3 which was formed by the occupants of a piece of land owned by the government of maharashtra and the bombay municipal corporation, in accordance with the resolution of the said cooperative housing society. 3. A letter of intent, (hereinafter referred to as “loi”), was issued in favour of the petitioners on 5 th november, 2007 by the deputy chief engineer, slum rehabilitation authority, approving the petitioners’ proposal for developing a slum as a slum rehabilitation scheme on the said plot (hereinafter referred to as “the said plot”). The loi, vide clause 46, was valid for a period of three months from the date of the issue unless an intimation of approval as a commencement certificate was obtained for any one building. In june, 2008, there was a change in the policy whereby the area of the flats to be constructed was increased from 225 sq.ft. To 269 sq.ft. Apparently, work was not commenced by the petitioners for a period of about four years. Having waited long for the work to commence, the respondent no.3trimurti sra cooperative housing society passed a resolution on 8 th november, 2009 in its general meeting to terminate the appointment of the petitioners as a developer. On 23 rd march, 2010, the slum rehabilitation authority issued a notice to the petitioners referring to condition no.46 and stating that the validity of the loi has already expired on 4 th february, 2008 and since the petitioners have not obtained any intimation of approval and commencement certificate, the petitioners have committed a breach of terms and conditions of the sanctioned sra scheme. The petitioners were called upon to show cause why an order should not be passed in exercise of powers under section 13(2) of the maharashtra slum areas act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the act). The said provision empowers the slum rehabilitation authority, where work of redevelopment has not been commenced by the owners, to pass an order determining the redevelopment of the land at its own costs after giving the owners a reasonable opportunity of showing cause. After considering the petitioners’ reply, the slum rehabilitation authority, having regard to the decision to terminate the petitioners’ appointment as a developer for sra scheme in exercise of the powers under section 13(2) of the act by letter dated 16 th november, 2010, took cognizance of the resolution passed in the special general body meeting of the trimurti sra cooperative housing society. This order of termination was signed by the deputy chief engineer, slum rehabilitation authority, as directed by the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority/respondent no.2, who had heard the petitioners. On the same day, the slum rehabilitation authority, in accordance with the resolution of the general body of the trimurti sra cooperative housing society ltd. Passed on 27 th september, 2010, appointed m/s. Sunshine housing & infrastructure private limited, the respondent no.4 as a developer. 4. On 30 th april, 2011, in appeal, the high power committee agreed with the petitioners that the order of the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, was not a speaking order and, therefore, set aside both the orders dated 16 th november, 2010 passed by the deputy chief engineer, slum rehabilitation authority, terminating the petitioners’ appointment as a developer and appointing respondent no.4m/ s. Sunshine housing & infrastructure private limited as a developer instead and remanded the matter back to the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, one shri s.s. Zende, without, however, reviving the loi in favour of the petitioners. This order was passed by the following high power committee : (a). Mr. S.v.r. Srinivas, addl. Commissioner/mmrda, member, high power committee; (b). Ms. Manisha mhaiskar, addl. Municipal commissioner, western suburb, mcgm, member, high power committee; (c). Mr. S.s. Zende, chief executive officer / sra, member, high power committee; (d). Mr. Satish gavai, vicepresident, mhada, member, high power committee; (e). Mr. Gautam chatterjee, principal secretary, housing department, chairman, high power committee. 5. Mr. S.v.r. Srinivas, addl. Commissioner/mmrda, member, high power committee; (b). Ms. Manisha mhaiskar, addl. Municipal commissioner, western suburb, mcgm, member, high power committee; (c). Mr. S.s. Zende, chief executive officer / sra, member, high power committee; (d). Mr. Satish gavai, vicepresident, mhada, member, high power committee; (e). Mr. Gautam chatterjee, principal secretary, housing department, chairman, high power committee. 5. It may be noted that the respondent no.2 shri s.s. Zende, the chief executive officer, was a member of the high power committee and that the order in appeal terminating the petitioners’ appointment was passed by the deputy chief engineer, slum rehabilitation authority, according to the directions of the same shri s.s. Zende, who was the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority. 6. It is an undisputed fact that the said shri s.s. Zende, who is the chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, is also a member of the high power committee. 7. After remand, the chief executive officer shri s.s. Zende passed a detailed order dated 2 nd august, 2011 considering the merits of the entire matter and confirmed the termination of the petitioners’ appointment as a developer for implementation of the sra scheme on the said plot. The chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, further confirmed the appointment of a new developer m/s. Sunshine housing & infrastructure private limited in accordance with the collective decision of the slum dwellers reflected in the resolution of the society in its special general meeting convened on 27 th september, 2010. The chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, specifically rejected the contention of the petitioners that section 13(2) of the act does not apply to the present case and further observed that the petitioners had even failed to obtain the intimation of approval and a commencement certificate to start the actual work even after a lapse of four years. The chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, observed that the petitioners had lost the support of the slum dwellers and the society and that the petitioners were not willing to submit a performance guarantee for the implementation of the sra scheme. 8. This matter was carried in appeal by the petitioners before the high power committee. The chief executive officer, slum rehabilitation authority, observed that the petitioners had lost the support of the slum dwellers and the society and that the petitioners were not willing to submit a performance guarantee for the implementation of the sra scheme. 8. This matter was carried in appeal by the petitioners before the high power committee. The petitioners moved the matter for interim relief before the high power committee on 6 th september, 2011 and the high power committee, after hearing the petitioners’ advocate, passed an interim order to the effect that the slum rehabilitation authority and the chief executive officer shall not approve the slum scheme of a new developer and shall not grant permission and sanction, which is not already granted. It is not disputed that when the high power committee granted interim relief to the petitioners, the said shri zende was a member of the said committee. The matter was heard finally by the high power committee on 15 th october, 2011. The matter was closed for passing the final order. On 20 th october, 2011, the petitioners’ appeal registered as application no.292 of 2011 was rejected and the order of the respondent no.2 setting aside the petitioners’ termination and appointing the respondent no.4 as a new developer was upheld. It is this order that is challenged before this court. 9. Mr. Samdani, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent no.2 had no authority to invoke section 13(2) of the slum act since no permission was granted under section 12(10) of the slum act. The permission contemplated by section 12(10) is the permission to a owner of the land to redevelop it in accordance with the plans approved by competent authority. There is no merit in this contention since section 13(2) empowers the competent authority to redevelop the land at his own cost where it is satisfied that the owner has been redeveloping the land in contravention of the plans or has not redeveloped it within time. The petitioners have at no prior time disputed the entitlement of the owner to redevelop the land and, in fact, was acting as a developer for that purpose. Moreover, subsection (2) of section 13 does not make the existence of a permission under subsection (10) of section 12 a prerequisite for the exercise of the power under section 13 (2). The petitioners have at no prior time disputed the entitlement of the owner to redevelop the land and, in fact, was acting as a developer for that purpose. Moreover, subsection (2) of section 13 does not make the existence of a permission under subsection (10) of section 12 a prerequisite for the exercise of the power under section 13 (2). In any case, the petitioners entered into a development agreement with the respondent no.3cooperative housing society formed by the occupants of the plot of land partly owned by the respondent no.6 – state of maharashtra and partly by the mumbai municipal corporation of greater mumbai. There was no occasion for grant of the permission under section 12(10) to the owners i.e. The state and the corporation to redevelop the land. Indeed, the petitioners are virtually questioning the source of their own authority to redevelop the land only because now their appointment as a developer is being terminated. 10. The main contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the appellate order passed by the high power committee is vitiated because one of the members of that committee was shri s.s. Zende, the chief executive officer, had passed the order against which the appeal had been filed. According to the learned counsel, the impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice i.e. nEmo debet judex in causa sua since the respondent no.2 was a member of the appellate authority and thus the appellate authority became a judge in its own cause. 11. Mr. Dhakephalkar, the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1, 2 and 5 submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to be even heard on this objection because at no time prior to the passing of the impugned appellate order, they objected to the presence of zende on the appellate forum. According to the respondents, the petitioners, who have throughout represented by the advocates, were all along aware that zende was a member of the high power committee which had appellate powers. In particular, according to mr. Dhakephalkar, zende was also a member of the high power committee on 30.4.2011 by which the order dated 16.11.2010 of the deputy chief engineer, sra, terminating the petitioners’ appointment as a developer was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the chief executive officer. In particular, according to mr. Dhakephalkar, zende was also a member of the high power committee on 30.4.2011 by which the order dated 16.11.2010 of the deputy chief engineer, sra, terminating the petitioners’ appointment as a developer was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the chief executive officer. According to the respondents, the order dated 16.11.2010 of the deputy chief engineer, sra, was, in fact, an order by the chief executive officer – zende who had heard the matter and directed the deputy chief engineer to terminate the petitioners’ appointment. It was submitted that this appellate order of 30.4.2011 of the high power committee was by a committee which consisted of zende, but the petitioners did not raise any objection to the presence of zende on the high power committee because the appellate order was in their favour. Even in the second round, in which the present impugned order was passed, it was submitted that the very same high power committee comprising of zende initially stayed the order of the chief executive officer on 06.09.2011, terminating the petitioners appointment. This stay order was in petitioners’ favour and the petitioners did not raise any objection. The petitioners did not raise any objection either themselves or through their advocates before the matter was heard by the high power committee. Even after the hearing and till the order was passed on 20.10.2011, the petitioners had no objection. In the submission of the respondents, the petitioners have waived their right to object to the presence of zende as a member of the appellate authority and are not entitled to now raise this objection in the writ petition merely because their appeal is rejected. 12. Mr. Samdani, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that the rule of natural justice – nemo debet judex in causa sua is a part of article 14 of the constitution of india which is a fundamental right incorporated in part – iii and cannot be waived. According to the learned counsel this position is well settled vide basheshar nath vs. Commissioner of incometax, delhi and rajasthan and anr. air 1959 sc 149 . , union of india and anr. Vs. Tulsiram patel air 1985 sc 1416 . and olga tellis and ors. Vs. Bombay municipal corporation and ors. air 1986 sc 180 . . According to the learned counsel this position is well settled vide basheshar nath vs. Commissioner of incometax, delhi and rajasthan and anr. air 1959 sc 149 . , union of india and anr. Vs. Tulsiram patel air 1985 sc 1416 . and olga tellis and ors. Vs. Bombay municipal corporation and ors. air 1986 sc 180 . . in other words, according to the petitioners, even though the petitioners may not have objected to the presence of zende as a part of the appellate authority and may have, in fact, participated in the proceeding by arguing their appeal before the appellate authority, they are entitled to object to zende’s presence as a appellate authority for the first time in this court on the ground that said zende has acted as a judge in his own cause and was biased against the petitioners. 13. Thus the issue that arises for determination is, whether a person can be said to have waived his right to object to a breach of natural justice, though natural justice is a part of article 14 of the constitution and, being a fundamental right cannot be waived? 14. now, it is settled law that a judge or a decision maker is disqualified if he becomes a judge in his own cause and that a person having interest in the subject matter of cause is precluded from acting as a judge. In p. D. dinakaran (1) vs. Judges inquiry committee and ors. (2011) 8 scc 380. , the supreme court observed as follows:“ 71. The principles which emerge from the aforesaid decisions are that no man can be a judge in his own cause and justice should not only be done, but manifestly be seen to be done. Scales should not only be held even but they must not be seen to be inclined. A person having interest in the subjectmatter of cause is precluded from acting as a judge. To disqualify a person from adjudicating on the ground of interest in the subjectmatter of lis, the test of real likelihood of the bias is to be applied. In other words, one has to enquire as to whether there is real danger of bias on the part of the person against whom such apprehension is expressed in the sense that he might favour or disfavour a party. In other words, one has to enquire as to whether there is real danger of bias on the part of the person against whom such apprehension is expressed in the sense that he might favour or disfavour a party. In each case, the court has to consider whether a fairminded and informed person, having considered all the facts would reasonably apprehend that the judge would not act impartially. To put it differently, the test would be whether a reasonably intelligent man fully apprised of all the facts would have a serious apprehension of bias......” 15. It is equally well settled that an objection that a decision maker is biased or acting as a judge in his own cause cannot be reserved and a party cannot allow the proceeding to go on and then use it as a trump card to have the decision vitiated if it goes against him. In manak lal vs. Dr. Prem chand singhvi air 1957 sc 425 . the supreme court observed as follows: 17/ “8......the alleged bias in a member of the tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection against the presence of the member in question had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of his right to challenge the presence of the member in the tribunal. It is true that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question. As sir john romilly, m.r., has observed in vyvyan v. Vyvyan:(er p.817). Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question. As sir john romilly, m.r., has observed in vyvyan v. Vyvyan:(er p.817). `......waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either but not both, of which he might claim.’ if, in the present case, it appears that the appellant knew all the facts about the alleged disability of shri chhangani and was also aware that he could effectively request the learned chief justice to nominate some other member instead of shri chhangani and yet did not adopt that course, it may well be that he deliberately took a chance to obtain a report in his favour from the tribunal and when he came to know that the report had gone against him he though better of his rights and raised this point before the high court for the first time. In other words, though the point of law raised by shri daphtary against the competence of the tribunal be sound, it is still necessary for us to consider whether the appellant was precluded from raising this point before the high court by waiver or acquiescence. 9. From the record it is clear that the appellant never raised this point before the tribunal and the manner in which this point was raised by him even before the high court is somewhat significant. The first ground of objection filed by the appellant against the tribunal’s report was that shri chhangani had pecuniary and personal interest in the complainant dr. Prem chand. The learned judges of the high court have found that the allegations about the pecuniary interest of shri chhangani in the present proceedings are wholly unfounded and this finding has not been challenged before us by shri daphtary. The learned judges of the high court have also found that the objection was raised by the appellant before them only to obtain an order for a fresh enquiry and thus gain time. The learned judges of the high court have also found that the objection was raised by the appellant before them only to obtain an order for a fresh enquiry and thus gain time. It may be conceded in favour of shri daphtary that the judgment of the high court does not in terms find against the appellant on the ground of waiver though that no doubt appears to be the substance of their conclusion. We have, however, heard shri daphtary’s case on the question of waiver and we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the appellant waived his objection deliberately and cannot now be allowed to raise it.” the above passage was cited with approval by the supreme court in the case of p. D. dinakaran (1) in case supra, where the petitioner’s knowledgeful silence was held as militating against the bona fides of his objection to the appointment of the member of the committee which was to enquire in his conduct while dismissing the writ petition under article 32 of the constitution of india. 16. According to the petitioners, though it has been held consistently that an objection of bias cannot be taken belatedly and if so taken, must be deemed to be waived, is not valid in view of the settled position of law that the adherence to the rules of natural justice is a guaranteed right under article 14 and which can never be waived. The petitioners rely on the observations of the supreme court in union of india vs. Tulsiram patel (supra), where the two rules i.e. nEmo debet judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem were held by the supreme court as part of article 14 in the following words:“ 95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this court to the concept of equality which is the subject 21/ matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of state action, it is a violation of article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a state action is a violation of article 14. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of state action, it is a violation of article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a state action is a violation of article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or state action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and state action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of “state” in article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.” this decision was subsequently followed by the supreme court in delhi transport corporation vs. D.t.c. Mazdoor congress and ors. air 1991 sc 101 ., where the supreme court observed, “the principle of natural justice and embodied as an integral part of equality clause.” 17. For the proposition that the fundamental right conferred by article 14 cannot be waived or given up by a citizen, the petitioners rely on the case of basheshar nath (supra), where the supreme court observed as follows:“( 14) such being the true intent and effect of art. 14 the question arises, can a breach of the obligation imposed on the state be waived by any person? in the face of such an unequivocal admonition administered by the constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, is it open to the state to disobey the constitutional mandate merely because a person tells the state that it may do so? in the face of such an unequivocal admonition administered by the constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, is it open to the state to disobey the constitutional mandate merely because a person tells the state that it may do so? if the constitution asks the state as to why the state did not carry out its behest, will it be any answer for the state to make that “true, you directed me not to deny any person equality before the law, but this person said that i could do so, for he had no objection to my doing it.” i do not think the state will be in any better position than the position in which adam found himself when god asked him as to why he had eaten the forbidden fruit and the state’s above answer will be as futile as was that of adam who pleaded that the woman had tempted him and so he ate the forbidden fruit. It seems to us absolutely clear, on the language of art. 14 that it is a command issued by the constitution to the state as a matter of public policy with a view to implement its object of ensuring the equality of status and opportunity which every welfare state, such as india, is by her constitution expected to do and no person can, by any act or conduct, relieve the state of the solemn obligation imposed on it by the constitution. Whatever breach of other fundamental right a person or a citizen may or may not waive, he cannot certainly give up or waive a breach of the fundamental right that is indirectly conferred on him by this constitutional mandate directed to the state.” in the said case, the supreme court held that the commissioner, incometax did not have any jurisdiction to continue proceedings against the appellants under act iii of 1947 which had been held to be violative of article 14 of the constitution of india. Therefore, the appellants could not, by waiving their right, confer jurisdiction on the commissioner, vide para 93 at page 184. 18. Therefore, the appellants could not, by waiving their right, confer jurisdiction on the commissioner, vide para 93 at page 184. 18. The petitioners also relied on the decision of the supreme court in olga tellis’s case (supra), where the supreme court clearly rejected the argument that because pavement dwellers had given an undertaking to the high court that they would not claim any fundamental right and obstruct the demolition of huts after certain dates, they are estopped from contending that the huts constructed could not be demolished in view of the fundamental right to life guaranteed by article 21 of the constitution of india. The supreme court observed that the doctrine of estoppel can have no application to representations made regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental right and there can be no waiver of fundamental right. It observed in the following words: “.....for example, the concession made by a person that he does not possess and would not exercise his right to free speech and expression or the right to move freely throughout the territory of india cannot deprive him of those constitutional rights, any more than a concession that a person has no right of personal liberty can justify his detention contrary to the terms of article 22 of the constitution. Fundamental rights are undoubtedly conferred by the constitution upon individuals which have to be asserted and enforced by them, if those rights are violated.......” 19. According to the petitioners what emerges from the above decisions is the proposition that since the rules of natural justice are a part of article 14 which is a fundamental right or right which flows from such rules, cannot be waived. Therefore, a party to the proceeding may not object to the breach of the rule of natural justice, but may, nonetheless, asserts its breach subsequently since a fundamental right cannot be waived. Therefore, though the petitioners may not have objected to the presence of zende in the high power committee in both the rounds, they are entitled to raise this objection before this court in the writ petition. 20. Therefore, though the petitioners may not have objected to the presence of zende in the high power committee in both the rounds, they are entitled to raise this objection before this court in the writ petition. 20. Having considered the submissions, the position that emerges is as follows: the two rules of natural justice i.e. nEmo debet judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem have been in existence and enforced by courts since a very long time, even prior to the framing of the constitution and enactment of article 14. These rules have been held, vide tulsiram patel and delhi transport corporation (supra) by the supreme court as part of article 14 of the constitution of india. The preexisting rules of natural justice have been, in a sense, incorporated in article 14 of the constitution of india. The question is whether due to such incorporation, the limitation on the particular rule of natural justice, such as, that a reasonably intelligent, fully informed man must object at the first instance and not take a chance, has been ejected and only the mandates of the rules have been incorporated mechanically. It is held that the limitations on the rules such as waiver or estoppel have been ejected, it may lead to situations which are clearly prohibited by well settled positions of law. For instance, if it is held that the opportunity of being heard, available to a party due to the rule of audi alteram partem is waived by that party, yet it would have to be held that the party, having foregone the opportunity to be heard voluntarily, would be entitled to have the decision set aside because the rule is treated as part of article 14 of the constitution of india which is a fundamental right that cannot be waived. This was not the result contemplated by the supreme court while deciding tulsiram patel’s case (supra) and holding that rules of natural justice are a part of artilce 14 of the constitution of india. In that very case the supreme court observed that flexibility of the rules of natural justice must be retained and both the rules of natural justice yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. The supreme court observed as follows:“ 97. In that very case the supreme court observed that flexibility of the rules of natural justice must be retained and both the rules of natural justice yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. The supreme court observed as follows:“ 97. Though the two rules of natural justice namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are none the less not statutory rules. Eacyh of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such tribunal is governed. There is no difference in this respect between the law in england and in india. It is necessary to refer to various english decisions which have held so. It will suffice to reproduce what ormond, l.j., said in norwest holst ltd. V. secretary of state for trade (1978).1 ch.201 (at page 227): “the house of lords and this court have repeatedly emphasised that the ordinary principles of natural justice must be kept flexible and must be adapted to the circumstances prevailing in any particular case. One of the most important of these circumstances, as has been said throughout the argument, is, of course, the provisions of the statute in question : in this case sections 164 and 165 of the companies act 1948” 98. One of the most important of these circumstances, as has been said throughout the argument, is, of course, the provisions of the statute in question : in this case sections 164 and 165 of the companies act 1948” 98. In india, in suresh koshy george v. University of kerala ( air 1969 sc 198 ) this court observed (age page 322) (of scr) : (at p. 201 of air): “the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the tribunal and the rules under which it functions.” after referring to this case, in a.k. Kraipak v. Union of india (1970) 1 scr 457 : ( air 1970 sc 150 ) hegde, j., observed (at page 469) (of scr) : (at p. 157 of air): “what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 99. Again in union of india vs. Col. J.n. Sinha (1971) 1 scr 791 : ( air 1971 sc 40 ) it was said (at page 7945) (of scr) : (at p. 42 of air): “as observed by this court in kripak v. Union of india `the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it.’ it is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it.’ it is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.” it is, therefore, not possible to apply the statement of law in basheshar nath and olga tellis (supra) that fundamental rights cannot be waived to the waiver of a rule of nemo debet judex in causa sua. 21. Upholding a right of a party to a litigation to allow a court or tribunal to proceed and render a decision without any objection in spite of knowledge of the bias of the decision maker and then to use the objection as a trump card if the decision goes against the party would be pernicious and undoubtedly illegal. 22. The two main principles of natural justice : “ audi alteram partem” and “ nemo debet judex in causa sua” which may be said to involve conferral of a right to be heard before being condemned and the right to an impartial unbiased tribunal. These rights are given for the advancement of justice and promotion of fairplay in action. They apply to judicial, quasi 33/ judicial and administrative action. It is wellsettled that these rights can be waived, vide manak lal and p. D. dinkaran (supra). After all, if a person does not want to be heard or does not care if a biased tribunal judges him, there is nothing in the law which prevents him from waiving the rights. This position is firmly established in the decided cases. It is wellsettled that these rights can be waived, vide manak lal and p. D. dinkaran (supra). After all, if a person does not want to be heard or does not care if a biased tribunal judges him, there is nothing in the law which prevents him from waiving the rights. This position is firmly established in the decided cases. In a case concerning audi alteram partem a man may well say that he does not want a show cause notice or charges framed against him, or to file a reply to a show cause notice or charges, or that he does not want to be heard or to crossexamine witnesses deposing against him. He may keep silent and simply wait for the decision to come. That is because this rule of natural justice exists so that no man may be condemned unheard and must have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. He may not insist on the right or avail of the right, if opportunity is given, and waive it. Such waiver is embedded in the body of law relating to audi alteram partem. In a case concerning nemo debet judex in causa sua in relation to which a considerable body of law has been judicially developed.if a man, having a reasonable apprehension that the judge is biased, chooses to remain silent and does not object to the presence of the judge and allows the proceedings to come to an end against him, and thus takes his chance, he cannot be heard to say later that the judge was biased. He has waived his right to an impartial and unbiased tribunal. Therefore, when the rules of natural justice are said to be part of article 14 to the extent indicated in tulsiram patel’s case, the principle of waiver is equally an integral part of article 14. 23. We thus find that the petitioners, who were represented by an advocate throughout the proceedings in both the rounds of litigation, had full knowledge of the fact that zende, the chief executive officer of the sra was part of high power committee and decided not to raise any objection. Presumably, the petitioners had no apprehension of bias since the first order of remand was in their favour and in the second round, the high power committee had granted a stay in favour of the petitioners. Presumably, the petitioners had no apprehension of bias since the first order of remand was in their favour and in the second round, the high power committee had granted a stay in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners, thus, consciously took a chance and has raised an objection in this court only because the decision has gone against them. In our view, it would be unjust to permit the petitioners to raise the said objection at this stage. 24. It has been pointed out on behalf of the respondent no.4 that after the decision to terminate the petitioners’ loi was communicated on 8.11.2009, a new loi has been issued to the respondent no.4 who has got 300 tenements vacated. We might mention that it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in the first round, the petitioners were not aware that the decision was taken by zende because the decision was communicated by the deputy chief engineer. It is asserted by the respondents 1 and 2 vide affidavit of b. B. thakare dated 28.01.2012 on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners knew, in fact, that hearing was conducted by zende in his chamber on 01.04.2010 and, therefore, the petitioners understood that the decision, though communicated by the deputy chief engineer, was a decision by zende. Ms. Iyer, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 supported the contentions of the other respondents and submitted that this court should decline to interfere in the present matter because the petitioners have acted negligently in not taking any action for construction of a tenement for a period of four years and ultimately a decision had to be taken in the agm to remove the petitioners and appoint the respondent no.4. 25. In the result, the petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. rule discharged. no order as to costs.