Judgment 1. This appeal is by the owner of the offending vehicle challenging the judgment and award of the Tribunal on the ground of liability as well as quantum. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant-owner of the offending vehicle submits that the owner of the vehicle after receiving notice from MACT/SCCH No.7, Bangalore in MVC 2370/2001 filed by the claimant against him and the insurance company, he contacted the insurer regarding steps to be taken in the matter who obtained his signature to a vakalath stating that they would entrust the matter to their panel Advocate and the will look after the same and he need not have to worry about the case. Accordingly, a panel Advocate of the insurance company had filed vakalath for the owner of the vehicle as well as the insurance company and he was appearing for both the owner and the insurance company. But later, he retired from appearing on behalf of the owner without issuing him any notice. Consequently, nobody represented him in the case and case was proceeded in his absence and the impugned Judgment and award came to be passed by fastening liability against him. He submits that if the owner had come to know about the retirement of learned advocate appearing in the case on his behalf, he would have made an alternative arrangement for defending his interest in the matter and in such an event, the liability would not have been fastened against him. Therefore, he prays for allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal and to remand the matter back to the Tribunal with a direction to reconsider the claim petition afresh by giving him an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the insurer of the offending vehicle submits that the owner of the offending vehicle voluntarily approached the insurer and signed the vakalath requesting to arrange for the service of an advocate to defend his interest in the matter. Accordingly, the insurer had arranged for the service of their panel advocate and the said advocate was appearing for both the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle. Accordingly, the insurer had arranged for the service of their panel advocate and the said advocate was appearing for both the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle. Later, he had to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner by filing a memo on 29.3.2004 along with a letter dated 26.3.2004 addressed by the insurer to the owner informing him to make his own arrangements to defend his interest in the matter, stating that due to conflict of interest, he cannot continue to appear for both the insurer and the owner and he is retiring from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner. He submits that the Tribunal considering the reasons stated in the memo has rightly permitted their panel advocate to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner, as such there is no lapse or letches either on the part of the insurer or on their panel advocate. He submits in the appeal, the insurer has filed an application under Order XLI and Rule 27 r/w section 151 of CPC seeking permission of the Court to produce the letter dated 26.3.2004 and the postal acknowledgement by way of additional evidence to show that the letter dated 26.3.2004 addressed by the insurers to the owner intimating him to make his own arrangements to defend his interest in the matter has been served on him. He further submits that in two other claim petitions arising out of the very same road traffic accident, the liability has been fastened against the owner of the offending vehicle and further, the owner has satisfied the awards and thereby he submits that even if the owner of the vehicle had notice of retirement of their panel advocate from appearing in the case on his behalf and made alternative arrangement for defending his interest in the matter, the result would have been the same and therefore, there is no merit in this appeal. With this he prays for dismissal of the appeal. 4. Although, the claimant was served with the notice of appeal, he remained unrepresented. Hence, I have heard the learned counsel for the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle and perused the judgment and award of the Tribunal including the letter and acknowledgment sought to be produced by way of additional evidence. 5. 4. Although, the claimant was served with the notice of appeal, he remained unrepresented. Hence, I have heard the learned counsel for the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle and perused the judgment and award of the Tribunal including the letter and acknowledgment sought to be produced by way of additional evidence. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle, the points that arise for my consideration in this appeal are:_ a) Whether the Tribunal is justified in permitting the learned counsel, who had filed vakalath for both the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle in the claim petition to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle on the basis of a letter addressed by the insurer to the owner ? b) Whether the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal in fastening liability against the owner of the vehicle is sustainable in law ? c) What order or decree ? 6. Respondent No.1-claimant filed a claim petition in MVC 2370/2001 before MACT, Court of Small Causes (SCCH – 7), Bangalore under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as “MV Act” for short) seeking compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- from M/s. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the insurer of the offending vehicle” for short) and M/s. Peenya Industrial Gases Private Limited. (hereinafter referred to as “the owner of the offending vehicle” for short) for the injuries sustained by him in the road traffic accident occurred on 1.6.2001 due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo bearing No.TN-27-E-8339 while travelling from Srirangapatna to Mandya. The claim petition was resisted by the insurer of the offending vehicle by filing statement of objections. The Tribunal by impugned judgment and award dated 24.5.2004 and by answering issue No.1 in the affirmative holding that the claimant sustained injuries in the road traffic accident occurred on 1.6.2001 at Cauvery Dhaba near Mandya due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver has awarded compensation of Rs.75,000/- with interest and directed the owner of the offending vehicle to pay the said compensation to the claimant by fastening the liability on the owner of the offending vehicle. 7. 7. The grievance of the appellant in this appeal is that the insurer of the offending vehicle had obtained his signature on a vakalath stating that they would entrust the matter to their panel advocate and he will look after the case and he need not worry about the case and accordingly, their panel advocate had filed vakalath for both the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle in the case and he was appearing on behalf of the insurer as well as the owner. But, later he was permitted by the Tribunal to retire from the case from appearing on his behalf and it was without any notice to him, consequently, nobody represented him in the case and as a result, the Tribunal has fastened liability against him. His further grievance is that if he had the notice of retirement of the learned panel advocate of the insurer from the case from appearing in his behalf, he would have made an alternative arrangement and defended his interest in the matter and in such an event, the Tribunal would not have fastened the liability against him. Therefore, he prays for allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal in so far as liability and quantum are concerned. 8. As per the provisions of Order III Rule 1 of CPC, any appearances in any Court may be done by a party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader. Therefore, he prays for allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal in so far as liability and quantum are concerned. 8. As per the provisions of Order III Rule 1 of CPC, any appearances in any Court may be done by a party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader. The very provisions of the said Rule is extracted hereunder: “Any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf: PROVIDED that any such appearance shall, if the court so directs, be made by the party in person.” Order III Rule 4 of CPC (as amended in Karnataka) which deals with appointment of pleader reads as follows: “No pleader shall act for any person in any Court unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document subscribed with his signature in his own hand by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment and the appointment has been accepted in writing by the pleader.” 9. In the instant case, a panel advocate of the insurer of the offending vehicle came to be appointed as the pleader of the owner of the offending vehicle to appear on his behalf in MVC 2370/2001, such an appointment made through the insurer was not proper in law. But, once the learned panel advocate of the insurer was appointed as the pleader of the owner as well to appear on his behalf in the case, such an appointment shall be deemed to be in force until it is determined by following the procedure as contemplated under Order III Rule 4 (2)of the CPC (as amended in Karnataka) which reads as follows: “Every such appointment shall be filed into Court. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, no such appointment shall be deemed to have been terminated until its determination with the leave of the Court by a document subscribed with his signature in his own hand by the client or his recognized or authorized agent or by the pleader, as the case may be, and filed into Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceeding in the suit are ended so far as regards the client.” Admittedly, the learned panel advocate of the insurer, who was appearing for both the insurer and the owner of the vehicle had not informed the owner by addressing a letter through RPAD expressing his desire to retire from the case from appearing on his behalf and by intimating him the case number, the name and address of the court where the said case is pending, the stage of the case and the next date of hearing of the case and asking him to make an alternate arrangement to conduct his case. It is the insurer of the offending vehicle, who had written the alleged letter dated 26.3.2004 to the owner of the offending vehicle. By perusal of the said letter dated 26.3.2004, it is clear that the insurer had obtained the signature of the owner of a vakalath promising him to defend his interest in the claim petition and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer that the owner of the vehicle voluntarily approached the insurer and handed over his vakalath to entrust the matter to an advocate to defend his interest in the matter has no merit. Further, the learned panal advocate of the insurer had filed vakalath on behalf of the insurer in the case on 27.10.2001 and he had filed vakalath for the owner on 27.2.2002 and he was appearing in the case for both the insurer and the owner till 29.3.2004. He filed statement of objections on 12.9.2003 only on behalf of the insurer. On 26.3.2004, the insurer had written a letter to the owner informing him that in view of the changed circumstances of law, they cannot defend his interest in the matter and they have informed their advocate to retire from the case on behalf of the owner and therefore, they are requesting him to make arrangements to defend his interest in the matter. If the Tribunal had examined the letter with reference to the provisions of Order III Rules 1 4 and 4(2) of CPC (amended), it would not have permitted the learned panel advocate of the insurer to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle. When the learned panel advocate of the insurer had filed to separate vakalaths, one on behalf of the insurer and another on behalf of the owner, he could not have retired from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner on the basis of a letter said to have been addressed by the insurer to the owner. If the learned counsel wanted to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner, he could have done so by following the procedure as contemplated under Order III Rule 4(2) of CPC (amended). 10. Admittedly, the intimation letter addressed by the insurer to the owner was dated 26.3.2004 which is just two months prior to the date of pronouncement of the impugned judgment and award dated 24.5.2004 by which time the case had already been posted for trial. The fact remains that the owner had no notice of the fact of retirement of the learned counsel from appearing in the case on his behalf and the order of the Tribunal permitting the learned counsel to retire from the case from appearing on behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle is contrary to Order III Rule 4(2) of CPC and therefore, it is not sustainable in law. Consequently, the judgment and award passed against the owner of the offending vehicle is to be termed as an exparte and which is liable to be set aside. In the process, the victim, who is the claimant who sustained injuries in the road traffic accident occurred as long back as on 1.6.2001 should not be made to suffer for no fault of him and for the lapse and latches on the part of the insurer or their learned panel advocate and his interest is required to be protected by directing the insurer to deposit/pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the claimant. 11. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I deem it just and proper to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal and remand the matter to the Tribunal with a direction to consider the claim petition afresh with regard to liability and quantum after providing an opportunity to the appellant right from the stage of filing statement of objections to the main petition. Hence, the following is allowed. a) The appeal is allowed. b) The judgment and award of the Tribunal dated 24.5.2004 passed in MVC 2370/2001 is set aside in so far as liability and quantum are concerned. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal only with regard to liability and quantum. c) The statutory made in the appeal by the owner is ordered to be transferred to the Tribunal for disbursement of the same in favour of the claimant. The insurer is directed to deposit the balance amount of compensation with upto dated interest before the Tribunal and the insurance company is further directed to intimate the particulars of deposit to the claimant to enable him to withdraw the same, failing to do so, the claimant is at liberty to recover the compensation amount from the insurer with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. d) In the event of Tribunal holding that the insurer of the offending vehicle is liable to pay compensation to the claimant and exonerating the owner of the offending vehicle from liability, the insurance company shall pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- to the owner of the offending vehicle which was deposited by the owner towards statutory deposit while preferring the appeal with interest at 6% p.a. from the date of deposit of the said amount. e) In the event of Tribunal confirming the liability against the owner as has been done under the impugned judgment and award, the owner shall pay the entire amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the insurance company with interest at 6% p.a. from the date of deposit after deducting Rs.25,000/-deposited towards statutory deposit while preferring the appeal, failing which, the insurance company is at liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle by filing an Execution Petition and without initiating any separate proceedings f) No order as to costs.