JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. All these Land Acquisition Appeals are tied together inasmuch as these cases arose out of the same Notification No. F.9(8)-Rev/Acq/XIV/97.p-1, dated 19.11.1997, as proclaimed by the Land Acquisition Collector, for construction of N.F. Railway line from Kumarghat to Agartala and are related to Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5. Moreover, the Land Acquisition Appeals, hereinafter referred to as L.A. Appeals (as shown in the table below) are also preferred by the N.F. Railway, the requisitioning authority against the impugned judgment and award dated 20.02.2003 in Misc.(L.A.) No.115/1999, judgment and award dated 17.05.2003 in Misc. (L.A.) No. 115 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 45 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 58 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 75 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 77 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 80 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 88 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 23 of 1999, judgment and award dated 20.05.2003 in Misc. (L.A.) No. 36 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 41 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 42 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 50 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 64 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 67 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 70 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 79 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No.85 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 86 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 90 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 100 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 117 of 1999, Misc. (L.A.) No. 25 of 1999 and judgment and award dated 12.02.2004 in Misc. (L.A.) No. 103 of 1999 & Misc. (L.A.) No. 104 of 1999, as passed by the Land Acquisition Judge, hereinafter referred to as the L.A. Judge:- 1. L.A. App. No. 14 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 115 of 1999) 2. L.A. App. No. 28 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 45 of 1999) 3. L.A. App. No. 29 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 58 of 1999) 4. L.A. App. No. 30 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 75 of 1999) 5. L.A. App. No. 31 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 77 of 1999) 6. L.A. App. No. 32 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 80 of 1999) 7. L.A. App. No. 33 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 88 of 1999) 8. L.A. App. No. 34 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 23 of 1999) 9. L.A. App. No. 50 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 77 of 1999) 6. L.A. App. No. 32 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 80 of 1999) 7. L.A. App. No. 33 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 88 of 1999) 8. L.A. App. No. 34 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 23 of 1999) 9. L.A. App. No. 50 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 36 of 1999) 10. L.A. App. No. 51 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 41 of 1999) 11. L.A. App. No. 52 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 42 of 1999) 12. L.A. App. No. 53 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 50 of 1999) 13. L.A. App. No. 54 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 64 of 1999) 14. L.A. App. No. 55 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 67 of 1999) 15. L.A. App. No. 56 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 70 of 1999) 16. L.A. App. No. 57 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 79 of 1999) 17. L.A. App. No. 58 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 85 of 1999) 18. L.A. App. No. 59 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 86 of 1999) 19. L.A. App. No. 60 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 90 of 1999) 20. L.A. App. No. 61 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 100 of 1999) 21. L.A. App. No. 62 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 117 of 1999) 22. L.A. App. No. 63 of 2003 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 25 of 1999) 23. L.A. App. No. 12 of 2004 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 103 of 1999) 24. L.A. App. No. 13 of 2004 (Related to Misc. (L.A.) No. 104 of 1999) For purpose of appreciation of these appeals, it would be beneficial if the quantum of land with the class is also demonstrated in relation to the L.A. Appeals. The quantum of land with the class is shown in a tabular form hereunder:- Sl. Misc. (L.A.) Nos. Misc. (L.A.) Appeal Nos. Quantum of Class of No. land acquired land 1. Misc. (L.A.) No. 115/1999 L.A. App. No. 14/2003 0.02 acres Bastu 2 Misc. (L.A.) No. 45/1999 L.A. App. No. 28/2003 0.20 acres Viti 3 Misc. (L.A.) No. 58/1999 L.A. App. No. 29/2003 0.08 acres Viti 4 Misc. (L.A.) No. 75/1999 L.A. App. No. 30/2003 0.05 acres Viti 5 Misc. Quantum of Class of No. land acquired land 1. Misc. (L.A.) No. 115/1999 L.A. App. No. 14/2003 0.02 acres Bastu 2 Misc. (L.A.) No. 45/1999 L.A. App. No. 28/2003 0.20 acres Viti 3 Misc. (L.A.) No. 58/1999 L.A. App. No. 29/2003 0.08 acres Viti 4 Misc. (L.A.) No. 75/1999 L.A. App. No. 30/2003 0.05 acres Viti 5 Misc. (L.A.) No. 77/1999 L.A. App. No. 31/2003 0.15 acres Bastu/Viti 6 Misc. (L.A.) No. 80/1999 L.A. App. No. 32/2003 0.72 acres 0.12 acres Nal and 0.60 acres Viti 7 Misc. (L.A.) No. 88/1999 L.A. App. No. 33/2003 0.20 acres Bastu 8 Misc. (L.A.) No. 23/1999 L.A. App. No. 34/2003 0.30 acres Viti 9 Misc. (L.A.) No. 36/1999 L.A. App. No. 50/2003 0.12 acres Bastu 10 Misc. (L.A.) No. 41/1999 L.A. App. No. 51/2003 0.44 acres Viti 11 Misc. (L.A.) No. 42/1999 L.A. App. No. 52/2003 0.16 acres Viti 12 Misc. (L.A.) No. 50/1999 L.A. App. No. 53/2003 0.07 acres Bastu 13 Misc. (L.A.) No. 64/1999 L.A. App. No. 54/2003 0.27 acres Bastu 14 Misc. (L.A.) No. 67/1999 L.A. App. No. 55/2003 0.20 acres Viti 15 Misc. (L.A.) No. 70/1999 L.A. App. No. 56/2003 0.44 acres 0.31 acres Viti and 0.13 acres Nal-path 16 Misc. (L.A.) No. 79/1999 L.A. App. No. 57/2003 0.14 acres Viti/Bastu 17 Misc. (L.A.) No. 85/1999 L.A. App. No. 58/2003 0.20 acres Viti 18 Misc. (L.A.) No. 86/1999 L.A. App. No. 59/2003 0.68 acres 0.59 acres Viti and 0.09 acres Lunga 19 Misc. (L.A.) No. 90/1999 L.A. App. No. 60/2003 0.82 acres Bastu/Viti 20 Misc. (L.A.) No. 100/1999 L.A. App. No. 61/2003 0.25 acres Bastu 21 Misc. (L.A.) No. 117/1999 L.A. App. No. 62/2003 0.10 acres Viti 22 Misc. (L.A.) No. 25/1999 L.A. App. No. 63/2003 0.32 acres Viti/Tilla 23 Misc. (L.A.) No. 103/1999 L.A. App. No. 12/2004 0.15 acres Bastu/Viti 24 Misc. (L.A.) No. 104/1999 L.A. App. No. 13/2004 0.09 acres Path class 2. By the Notification No. F.9(8)-Rev/Acq./XIV/97.p-1, dated 19.11.1997 made under Section 4 of the L.A. Act, which was published in the Tripura Gazette Extraordinary Issue dated 08.12.1997, the necessary declaration was made for acquisition of land measuring 55.89 acres (Jote land 37.58 acres and khas land 18.31 acres) in total of different classes namely, Bastu, Viti, Chara, Tilla, Lunga etc. situated at Mouja Badharghat under Sub-Division Bishalgarh, Sheet No.5 for purpose of construction of N.F. Railway, Agartala. situated at Mouja Badharghat under Sub-Division Bishalgarh, Sheet No.5 for purpose of construction of N.F. Railway, Agartala. This notification was followed by a declaration as made under Section 6 of the L.A. Act under No. F.9(8)-Rev/Acq./XIV/97.p-1, dated 09.12.1997, which was published in the Tripura Gazette Extraordinary Issue dated 24.12.1997. Thereafter, the L.A. Collector issued all necessary notices for hearing under Section 9 of the L.A. Act, affording opportunity to the 'interested persons' for purpose of determining the compensation for such land of different categories. On completion of the said exercise, the L.A. Collector, fixed the compensation towards the land of each category as follows:- 1 Bastu, Viti and Chara : Rs. 1,06,000/- per kani i.e. Rs. 2,65,000/- per acre. 12 Tilla : Rs. 80,000/- per kani i.e. Rs. 2,00,000/- per acre. 3 Others : Rs. 70,000/- per kani i.e. Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre. 3. Accordingly, the award was made against the referring claimants and they received the award of compensation on denoting their protest. The receipts of the referring claimants (the claimant respondents herein) are summarised to reflect the nature of transaction at the stage as provided by Section 31 of the L.A. Act. (a) In L.A. No.14/2003 land measuring 0.02 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Uttam Sutradhar, recorded in Khatian No. 16621, Plot No.8259/23273/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.13,233/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (b) In L.A. No.28/2003 land measuring 0.20 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Smt. Mina Rani Deb recorded in Khatian No.9995, Plot No.8514 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.2,26,497/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (c) In L.A. No.29/2003 land measuring 0.08 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Dilip Das recorded in Khatian No. 12757, Plot No.8524/19626 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.28,224/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (d) In L.A. No.30/2003 land measuring 0.05 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimants, Smt. Kusum Bala Bhattacharjee and Smt. Rama Bhattacharjee, recorded in Khatian No.15193, Plot Nos. (d) In L.A. No.30/2003 land measuring 0.05 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimants, Smt. Kusum Bala Bhattacharjee and Smt. Rama Bhattacharjee, recorded in Khatian No.15193, Plot Nos. 8483/22158 and 8483/22157 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.17,640/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (e) In L.A. No.31/2003 land measuring 0.15 acres classified as bastu/viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Jiban Bhattacharjee, recorded in Khatian No.15192, Plot No.8483/13519 and 8483/22157 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.99,065/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (f) In L.A. No.32/2003 land measuring 0.72 acres of Nal and viti class (0.12 acres nal land and 0.60 acres viti land) belonged to the referring-claimant, Smt. Maya Rani Bhattacharjee recorded in Khatian No.6451, Plot No.8307, 8308 and 8309 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani of the viti class of land and Rs.70,000/- per kani of Nal class land and assessed compensation of Rs.2,39,634/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (g) In L.A. No.33/2003 land measuring 0.20 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Sankar Datta, recorded in Khatian No.13540, Plot No.8307/20213 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.1,14,948/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (h) In L.A. No.34/2003 land measuring 0.30 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Chinu Debnath, recorded in Khatian No.13901, Plot No.8196 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs. 1,05,838.35 and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (i) In L.A. No.50/2003 land measuring 0.12 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Harendra Chandra Sil, recorded in Khatian No.12661, Plot No.8469/19533 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.86,275/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (i) In L.A. No.50/2003 land measuring 0.12 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Harendra Chandra Sil, recorded in Khatian No.12661, Plot No.8469/19533 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.86,275/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (j) In L.A. No.51/2003 land measuring 0.44 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Dayal Chand Bhowmik, recorded in Khatian No.2379, Plot No.8469 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.2,26,776/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (k) In L.A. No.52/2003 land measuring 0.16 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Swapan Kumar Deb, recorded in Khatian No.10863, Plot No.8544/17730 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.56,447/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (l) In L.A. No.53/2003 land measuring 0.07 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Smt. Ashima Rakshit (Chakraborty), recorded in Khatian No.13982, Plot No.8515/21216 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.24,596/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (m) In L.A. No.54/2003 land measuring 0.27 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimants, Smt. Sefali Debnath, Smt. Bhakti Debnath and Smt. Rekha Debnath, recorded in Khatian No.6459, Plot No.8198/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.1,28,512/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (n) In L.A. No.55/2003 land measuring 0.20 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Sujit Nama, recorded in Khatian No.13075, Plot Nos.8196/19924 and 8311/199925 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.70,559/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (o) In L.A. No.56/2003 land measuring 0.44 acres viti/Nal-path class (0.31 acres of viti class and 0.13 acres of Nal-path class) belonged to the referring-claimants, Sri Chandan Kumar Das, Sri Shankar Das and Smt. Khela Rani Das, recorded in Khatian No.6468, Plot Nos. (o) In L.A. No.56/2003 land measuring 0.44 acres viti/Nal-path class (0.31 acres of viti class and 0.13 acres of Nal-path class) belonged to the referring-claimants, Sri Chandan Kumar Das, Sri Shankar Das and Smt. Khela Rani Das, recorded in Khatian No.6468, Plot Nos. 8310, 8311, 8312 and 8313 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.1,39,653.37/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (p) In L.A. No.57/2003 land measuring 0.14 acres classified as viti/bastu belonged to the referring-claimants, Sri Sukumar Dasgupta and Smt. Malati Dasgupta, recorded in Khatian No.6451, Plot Nos. 8329 and 8334 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.1,11,296/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (q) In L.A. No.58/2003 land measuring 0.20 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Smt. Laxmi Rani Ghosh, recorded in Khatian No.6440, Plot No.8302/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.70,558.90 and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (r) In L.A. No.59/2003 land measuring 0.68 acres of viti and Lunga class (0.59 acres viti and 0.09 acres lunga) belonged to the referring-claimants, Smt. Kalpana Das and Smt. Chinu Barman, recorded in Khatian No.6463, Plot Nos.8304/P, 8305 and 8306/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.2,32,502/- and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (s) In L.A. No.60/2003 land measuring 0.82 acres classified as bastu/viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Bimal Chandra Dey, recorded in Khatian No.15191, Plot Nos. 8483/22139/P and 8483/23244 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.3,00,511/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (t) In L.A. No.61/2003 land measuring 0.25 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Amar Chand Shil, recorded in Khatian No.5323, Plot Nos.8529/P, 8530 and 8531 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.88,199.63 and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (t) In L.A. No.61/2003 land measuring 0.25 acres classified as bastu belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Amar Chand Shil, recorded in Khatian No.5323, Plot Nos.8529/P, 8530 and 8531 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.88,199.63 and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (u) In L.A. No.62/2003 land measuring 0.10 acres classified as viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Smt. Sandhya Rani Das, recorded in Khatian No.11830, Plot No.8274/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.35,279/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (v) In L.A. No.63/2003 land measuring 0.32 acres classified as viti and tilla belonged to the referring-claimants, Sri Sashi Bhusan Roy, Sri Promode Bandhu Deb, Sri Gopesh Lal Roy and Sri Subir Roy, recorded in Khatian No.16030, Plot Nos. 8482/P (tilla-0.16 acres) and 8482/P (bastu-0.16 acres) were acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani for bastu class of 0.16 acres and @Rs.80,000/- per kani for tilla class of 0.16 acres and assessed compensation of Rs.99,048.72 and the referring-claimants received the amount under protest. (w) In L.A. No.12/2004 land measuring 0.15 acres classified as bastu/viti belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Matilal Acharjee, recorded in Khatian No.13832, Plot Nos. 8281 and 8282 of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.1,06,000/- per kani and assessed compensation of Rs.77,051/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. (x) In L.A. No.13/2004 land measuring 0.09 acres classified as path belonged to the referring-claimant, Sri Maran Krishna Das, recorded in Khatian No.5646, Plot Nos. 8256/P and 8258/P of Mouja Badharghat, Sheet No.5 was acquired and the L.A. Collector fixed compensation @ Rs.70,000/- per kani and computed total compensation of Rs.20,968/- and the referring-claimant received the amount under protest. 4. The persons from whom the land was acquired are hereinafter referred as the 'referring claimant' or 'referring claimants'. All the referring claimants, on raising protest received the awarded amount under Section 31(1) of the L.A. Act and staked for referring their cases under Section 18 of the L.A. Act for determination of just and adequate compensation on the basis of the prevailing market price of the land in that area. All the referring claimants, on raising protest received the awarded amount under Section 31(1) of the L.A. Act and staked for referring their cases under Section 18 of the L.A. Act for determination of just and adequate compensation on the basis of the prevailing market price of the land in that area. Accordingly, the references were made under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and when the above referred Misc. (L.A.) Cases were registered. The referring claimants, the L.A. Collector and the requisitioning agency namely, N.F. Railway were asked to submit their statement in the court of the L.A. Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. Accordingly, the referring claimants filed their claim by way of a statement, whereas the appellant and the L.A. Collector, by filing the statement sought to defend the assessment as made by the L.A. Collector and furnished a copy of the assessment order dated 11.03.1998 etc. in the court of the learned L.A. Judge. After referring the evidence, the learned L.A. Judge held by the impugned judgment and award that the acquired land is situated in the close vicinity of Agartala Municipal area having some sorts of urban facilities such as water supply, electricity etc. and barring a few cases, all the acquired land are mostly Bastu/Viti class of land and most of them were having the residential huts/buildings, structures thereon and also there were valuable trees. However, the learned L.A. Judge held that it did not surface that the acquired lands were having the high commercial potential, but it has been established by the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record that the acquired lands were having with major urban facilities. While awarding compensation all those factors should have been taken into consideration. The learned L.A. Judge, as it appears from the impugned judgment did not attach much importance to the oral testimony, rather he was persuaded by the documentary evidence as relied on by the rival parties such as the instrument relating to the sale instances. The learned L.A. Judge, having regard to the claim of the referring claimants that they should get at least Rs.10,00,000/- per kani, had surveyed the evidence as led by the parties in the proceedings. 5. It is already evident that the notification for acquisition was made on 19.11.1997. The learned L.A. Judge, having regard to the claim of the referring claimants that they should get at least Rs.10,00,000/- per kani, had surveyed the evidence as led by the parties in the proceedings. 5. It is already evident that the notification for acquisition was made on 19.11.1997. Taking this as the relevant date the sale instances as admitted in the evidence were considered by the learned L.A. Judge and it was observed:- So we may exclude from consideration the sale instances held long prior to the date of acquisition. Therefore, we should take into consideration the sale instances within a radious of three years for determination of the market price at the date of acquisition. 6. The sale instances as relied by the referring claimants are available at Exbt.-1 series, which consists of four sale deeds and out of those, the Sale Deed No.1- 700, dated 24.01.1992 was a sale transaction long before the date of notification and as such the learned L.A. Judge did not take into consideration of that sale deed but he considered Sale Deed No.1-4748, dated 04.08.1997 where the price of the land as available was Rs.6,00,000/- per kani. Another Sale Deed No.1-4675, dated 30.07.1997 represents sale transaction where the price of land was Rs.6,00,000/- per kani. Similarly, another sale instance as reflected in the Sale Deed No.1-4572, dated 25.07.1997 represents sale transaction where the price of land was Rs.6,00,000/- per kani. 7. On the other hand, Exbt.-A series consists of four sale deeds as furnished by the L.A. Collector. Sale instances as evident by represented by the Sale Deed No.1-1745, dated 20.03.1996 reflects the market price at Rs.80,000/- per kani whereas another Sale Deed No.1-386, dated 20.01.1997 represents the market price at Rs.1,00,000/- per kani. Sale Deed No.1-1752, dated 21.03.1996 reflects the market price at Rs.80,000/- per kani and the learned L.A. Judge only considered these three sale deeds for purpose of determining the market price of 'tilla' class of land and he considered Sale Deed No.1-6701, dated 20.12.1996 representing the sale instances having the market price at Rs.80,000/- per kani and the said sale deed was taken into consideration for determining the price of the 'viti' class of land. 8. Exbt.-B series as admitted at the instance of the requisitioning agency, the N.F. Railway consists of five sale deeds. 8. Exbt.-B series as admitted at the instance of the requisitioning agency, the N.F. Railway consists of five sale deeds. Sale Deed No.1-4548, dated 24.07.1997 reflects sale transaction having market price of Rs.73,350/- per kani whereas Sale Deed No.1-4121, dated 03.07.1997 reflects market price at Rs.66,700/- per kani. The Sale Deed No.1-5213, dated 20.06.2001 represents the sale transaction having market price of Rs.44,500/- per kani and the learned L.A. Judge considered all these three sale deeds for determining market price of 'tilla' class of land, whereas he considered Sale Deed No.1-6701, dated 20.12.1996 representing the sale instances having the market price of Rs.80,000/- per kani. He however did not consider the Sale Deed No.1-5310, dated 23.11.1994 as the sale instances took place for more than three years before the date of acquisition. 9. It is pertinent to note that the learned L.A. Judge excluded the sale instances as referred by the referring claimants showing abnormally high price. While considering Exbt.-1 series, Exbt.-A series and Exbt.-B series documents, the learned L.A. Judge observed:- Admittedly the acquired land is situated within the vicinity of Agartala town, i.e., the capital of the State. It is common knowledge that there is serious scarcity of residential land and price of such land is going up arithmetically. Such potentiality factors were not taken to consideration by the L.A. Collector and as I find L.A. Collector considered sale transactions of comparatively lower side and that approach cannot be accepted as a correct approach for determination of market price of acquired land. It is a settled law that where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on, the transaction representing highest value should be preferred to the rest. It is also a settled law that where large tracts are acquired the transaction in respect of small properties does not offer a proper guideline. Therefore, the valuation in transaction in regard to the smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the compensation of larger tracts of property and there is bound to be some amount of reduction. So I think in the present cases taking into consideration all the relevant sale instances and making an average of the same we may get a reasonable picture and after deduction of a reasonable amount from the same we may get a reasonable price of the acquired land. 10. So I think in the present cases taking into consideration all the relevant sale instances and making an average of the same we may get a reasonable picture and after deduction of a reasonable amount from the same we may get a reasonable price of the acquired land. 10. On the basis of such formulation, the learned L.A. Judge, by the impugned judgment and award, calculated the market value for determining the compensation for the acquired land in the mode as is available in para-18, which is profitably reproduced hereunder:- 18. On the basis of the above consideration of the exhibited sale deeds for determination of market price of bastu and viti class of land we may take into consideration Sale Deed No.1-4675 dated 30.7.97 and Sale Deed No.1-4572 dated 25.7.97 of Exhibit-1 series and both the sale deeds represent a price of Rs.6,00,000/- per kani of bastu, viti class of land. Out of Exhibit-A series an Exhibit-8 series the same Sale Deed No.1-6701 dated 20.12.96 represent sale transaction of viti class of land @ Rs.80,000/- per kani. So let us make an average of above sale transaction and the amount stands at Rs.6,00,000/- Rs.80,000/- = Rs.6,80,000/-/2 = Rs.3,40,000/- per kani. Now, for determination of tilla class of land let us take into consideration Sale Deed No.1-4748 dated 4.8.97 of Exhibit-1 series and Sale Deed No.1745 dated 20.3.96, Sale Deed No.1-386 dated 20.1.97 and Sale Deed No.1-1752 dated 21.3.96 of Exhibit-A series and Sale Deed No.1-4538 dated 24.7.97, Sale Deed No.4121 dated 3.7.97 and Sale Deed No.1-5213 dated 27.8.97. If we make an average of the price of above 7 Nos. of sale instances the amount stands at Rs.6,00,000/- Rs.80,000/- Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.80,000/- Rs.73,350/- Rs.66,700/- Rs.44,500/- = Rs.10,44,550/-/7 Rs.1,49,221/- say Rs.1,50,000/- per kani. Since all the above sale transactions are of small tracts of land and the acquisition were made for large tracts of land let us make a deduction of 25% of the above average amount and the amount stands at Rs.3,40,000/- (-) Rs.85,000/- = Rs.2,55,000/- per kani for bastu/viti class of land and Rs.1,50,000/- (-) Rs.37,500/- = Rs.1,12,500/- per kani for tilla class of land. As already stated earlier the land of Misc.(L.A.) 42 of 1999 is situated just by the side of main road and that will definitely bear a higher price than that of ordinary bastu/viti class of land and after consideration of Sale Deed No.1-4572 dated 25.7.97 of Exhibit-1 series I fix the price of acquired land of Misc.(L.A.) 42 of 1999 @ Rs.3,00,000/- per kani. However, the learned L.A. Judge awarded the value of the viti class of land in Mis. (L.A.) No.42/1999 (corresponding to L.A. App. No.52/2003) at Rs.3,00,000/- per kani as the said land was situated in the close proximity of the big road whereas for the other referring claimants, the bastu/viti class of land was determined at Rs.2,55,000/- per kani. Similarly, some exception was made in the case of Misc. (L.A.) No.25/1999 (corresponding to L.A. App. No. 63/2003), where the till class of land was determined at Rs.1,12,500/- per kani. Needles to refer that the compensation also would include apart from market value of the acquired rate, solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act and 12% under Section 23(1)(A) of the L.A. Act from the date of notification i.e. 19.11.1997 till the date of possession or award whichever is earlier. The interest on the amount of compensation and solatium shall be @ 9% per annum from the date of possession till one year and @ 15% per annum from the date of expiry of one year till the date of payment of the enhanced amount of compensation. Added to this, a sum of Rs.300/- towards cost of reference was awarded in favour of the referring claimants. 11. The impact of redetermination of the compensation by the learned L.A. Judge can be outlined from the table below. As the appellant was dissatisfied by the said redetermination, the appeals are preferred to question the method and means of the said redetermination. 12. For appreciating the challenge as carried forward by the appellant, the law so far developed by the Apex Court may briefly be encountered. 13. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha & other vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust & other, as reported in (1982)1 SCC 419 , the Apex Court held:- 3. As to point No. (2), a few facts must be stated. An area of 269 kanals and 9 marlas out of a total area of 118.5 acres had been acquired. 13. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha & other vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust & other, as reported in (1982)1 SCC 419 , the Apex Court held:- 3. As to point No. (2), a few facts must be stated. An area of 269 kanals and 9 marlas out of a total area of 118.5 acres had been acquired. The Collector based the award on the 'belting' principle and classified the acquired area into two belts, namely, 'A' and B'. An area measuring 48 kanals and 18 marlas abutting the roads on three sides to a depth of karams was classified as belt 'A' and the remaining 200 kanals 11 marlas as belt 'B'. The land acquired is situate undoubtedly in the vicinity of a developed locality, but is itself undeveloped, although it is bounded by 4 roads. The 45 bungalows and 5 factories which the claimants speak, are, as the High Court observes, situate outside the acquired area. Extensive as it is, it has to be plotted out into small house sites with amenities. These amenities will consist of roads, drainage, lighting and so on, and roads will require space and laying of roads will mean expenditure. The High Court, while upholding a cut of 33 per cent, of the market value in one case and 20 per cent in the other towards the cost of development, as made by the Tribunal, observes: For the purpose of converting the big plot into small plots, it would be necessary to provide roads, parks etc. The benefit of such roads and parks etc. would accrue to the plot holders without payment of any extra price. In other words, the price of the land under roads and parks etc. would be included in the price of the smaller plots made out of the big one. It is in this background that while assessing the market price of the acquired area measuring 269 kanals 9 marlas, the Tribunal applied the 20 per cent, cut on the price otherwise assessed. It is a well settled principle of valuation that where there is a large 45 area of undeveloped land under acquisition, provision has to be made for providing the minimum amenities of town life such as water connections, well laid-out roads, drainage facility, electric connections etc. It is a well settled principle of valuation that where there is a large 45 area of undeveloped land under acquisition, provision has to be made for providing the minimum amenities of town life such as water connections, well laid-out roads, drainage facility, electric connections etc. The process necessarily involves deduction of the cost of factors required to bring the undeveloped lands on a par with the developed lands. An extent of 20 per cent of the total land acquired is normally taken as a reasonable deduction for the space required for roads. This is apart from the cost of laying roads themselves and the cost of providing other amenities like electricity, water, underground drainage etc. In Tribeni Devi vs. Collector of Ranchi (1972)3 SCR 208 , the Court allowed a deduction of 33-1/3 per cent, towards the cost of development. The cost of development may range from 20 to 33 percent depending on the nature of the land, its situation and the stage of development etc. The Tribunal had before it material on which it directed a cut of 33 per cent, of the market value in one and 20 per cent in the other. It cannot be said that the aforesaid deductions were arbitrary or unreasonable having regard to the fact that the land acquired is an undeveloped area and the award of the Tribunal is based on the 'belting' principle. 14. In Administrator General of West Bengal vs. Collector, Varanasi, as reported in (1988)2 SCC 150 , the Apex Court held:- 12. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots can not form safe-bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties. (See Collector of Lakhimpur v. B.C. Dutta AIR 1971 SC 2015 ; Mirza Nausherwan Khan v. Collector (Land Acquisition), Hyderabad (1975) 2 SCR 184 ; Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCR 329 ; Smt. Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer Aurangabad, (1984) 2 SCR 900 . The principle that evidence of market-value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots can not directly be adopted in valuing large extents. The principle that evidence of market-value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots can not directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued does admit of and is ripe for use for building purposes; that building-lots that could be laid-out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of a hypothetical lay-out could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small, laid-out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civic amenities; expenses of development of the sites by laying-out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of the realisation of the price; the profits on the venture etc. are to be made. In Sahib Singh Kalha and other v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, (1982) 1 SCC 940, this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come-up to as much as 53%. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas, for the reason that the former reflects the 'retail' price of land and the latter the 'wholesale' price. 13. The sale transaction at Ext. 24 was an year later. Such subsequent transactions which are not proximate in point of time to the acquisition can be taken into account for purposes of determining whether as on the date of acquisition there was an upward trend in the prices of land in the area. Further under certain circumstances where it is shown that the market was stable and there were no fluctuations in the prices between the date of the preliminary notification and the date of such subsequent transaction, the transaction could also be relied upon to ascertain the market-value. This court in State of U.P. vs. Jitendra Kumar AIR 1982 SC 876 observed: (SCC p.383, para 3) It is true that the sale deed Ext. This court in State of U.P. vs. Jitendra Kumar AIR 1982 SC 876 observed: (SCC p.383, para 3) It is true that the sale deed Ext. 21 upon which the High Court has relied is of a date three years later than the Notification under Section 4 but no material was produced before the Court to suggest that there was any fluctuation in the market rate at Meerut from 1948 onwards till 1951 and if so to what extent. In the absence of any material showing any fluctuation in the market rate the High Court thought it fit to rely upon Ex.21 under which the Housing Society itself had purchased land in the neighbourhood of the land dispute. On the whole we are not satisfied that any error was committed by the High court in relying upon the sale deed Ex.21. But this principle could be appealed to only where there is evidence to the effect that there was no upward surge in the prices in the interregnum. The burden of establishing this would be squarely on the party relying on such subsequent transaction. In the present case appellant did not endeavour to show that between the date of preliminary notification i.e. 4.7.1959 and the date of Ext. 24 i.e. 18.8.1960 there was no appreciation in the value of land in the area. Therefore, Ext. 24 cannot be relied upon as affording evidence of the market-value as on 4.7.1959. We cannot accept the argument that the price indicated in Ext. 24 should be accepted after allowing an appropriate deduction for the possible appreciation of the land-values during the period of one year. Apart from other difficulties in this exercise, there is no evidence as to the rate and degree of appreciation in the values of land so that the figure could be jobbed backwards from July 14, 1960 to July 4, 1959. 14. It appears to us that even if the value at Rs.1250 as on 27.8.1958 indicated by Ext. 2 is adopted and something is added thereto for the possible appreciation for the period till the preliminary notification, also taking into account the trend of appreciation in the prices in the area as indicated by Ext. 24 and the value of small developed sites is estimated somewhere between Rs. 1400 and Rs. 1600 per biswa or Rs. 450/- to Rs. 24 and the value of small developed sites is estimated somewhere between Rs. 1400 and Rs. 1600 per biswa or Rs. 450/- to Rs. 500/- per decimal, yet, the valuation made in the present case does not call for or justify any upward revision at all. There is a simple way of cross checking these results. The value of small plots --Rs. 500 per decimal as now estimated - represents what may be called the "retail" price of the land. What is to be estimated therefrom is the "wholesale" price of land. In Bombay Improvement Trust vs. Mervanji Manekji Mistry AIR 1926 Bom 420, Macleod CJ suggested a simple rule: Valuation cases must be dealt with just as much from the point of view of the hypothetical purchase as of the claimant. The valuation itself must often be more or less a matter of guesswork. But it is obviously wrong to fix upon a valuation which, judged by everyday principles, no purchaser would be likely to give. I have always been adverse to elaborate hypothetical calculations which are no more likely to lead to a fair conclusion than far simpler methods. But, in any event, no harm can be done by testing a conclusion arrived at in one way by a conclusion arrived at in another. A very simple method of valuing land wholesale from retail prices is to take anything between one and half' one-third, according to circumstances of the expected gross valuation, as the wholesale price. (Emphasis supplied) 15. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona & another, as reported in (1988)3 SCC 751 , the Apex Court held:- 4. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen: (1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to suit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act(dates of Notifications under Sections. 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. (7) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land). (9) Even post notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) Proximity from time angle. (ii) Proximity from situation angle. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) Proximity from time angle. (ii) Proximity from situation angle. (11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. (14) The exercise indicated in Clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors:- Positive factors Negative Factors (i) Smallness of size (i) Largeness of size (ii) Proximity to road (ii) Situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) Frontage on road (iii) Narrow strip of the land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) Nearness to developed (iv) Lower level requiring the depressed portion to area be filled up (v) Regular shape (v) Remoteness from the developed locality (vi) Level vis-a-vis land (vi) some special disadvantageous factors which would under deter a purchaser (vii) Special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage 16. In Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittor vs. L. Kamalamma & other, as reported in (1998)2 SCC 385 , the Apex Court held:- 6. The general trend in the prices of land is on the rise and the judicial notice of the same had been taken by the High Court correctly and therefore, cannot be challenged. Puttur is an urban area and the lands in question are abutting the main road leading from Tirupathi to Arkonam via Puttur and the acquired land was in the heart of Puttur town. Puttur is an urban area and the lands in question are abutting the main road leading from Tirupathi to Arkonam via Puttur and the acquired land was in the heart of Puttur town. To the north of the land in question there is a famous Venkateswaraswamy Temple and to the immediate south, the famous Tiruthani, one of the abodes of Lord Subrahamanyaswamy. Therefore taking into consideration, the topography of the land we may safely proceed on the basis that the High Court had correctly noted the situation of the land in question which has the potentiality of being developed as urban land. Exb.-B-30 is a sale deed dated 9th August, 1976, the transaction having taken place prior to eight months from the issue of preliminary Notification for acquisition of land in the present case. Having found that that piece of land referred in Ex. B-30 is situated very close to the lands that are acquired under the Notification in question the Reference Court and the High Court relied upon the said document and, in our view, rightly. Further when no sales of comparable land was available where large chunks of land had been sold, even land transactions in respect of smaller extent of land could be taken note of as indicating the price that it may fetch in respect of large tracts of land by making appropriate deductions such as for development of the land by providing enough space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a lay out, lump sum payment as also the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed. 7. The argument advanced by Shri Nageswara Rao that the classification by Land Acquisition Officer was in order and ought not to have been interfered with by the Reference Court or the High Court does not appeal to us. When a land is acquired which has the potentiality of being developed into an urban land, merely because some portion of it abuts the main road, higher rate of compensation should be paid while in respect of the lands on the interior side should be at lower rate may not stand to reason because when sites are formed those abutting the main road may have its advantages as well as disadvantages. Many a discerning customer may prefer to stay in the interior and far away from the main road and may be willing to pay reasonably higher price for that site. One cannot rely on the mere possibility so as to indulge in a meticulous exercise of classification of the land as was done by the Land Acquisition Officer when the entire land was acquired in one block and therefore classification of the same into different categories does not stand to reason. 17. In Kasturi & other vs. State of Haryana, as reported in (2003)1 SCC 354 , the Apex Court held:- 8. This Court in Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector, Varanasi (1988) 2 SCC 150 , referring to earlier decisions has held that prices fetched for small plots cannot form basis for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties. Para 12 of the said judgment reads: (SCC pp.157-58, para 12) 12. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties. (See Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta (1972) 4 SCC 236 ; Mirza Nausherwan Khan v. Collector (Land Acquisition), Hyderabad (1975) 1 SCC 238 ; Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab (1977)1 SCC 330 ; Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad (1984) 2 SCC 324 ). The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its property perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued does not admit of and is ripe for use for building purposes; that building lots that could be laid out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of hypothetical lay out could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small laid out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civil amenities; expenses or development of the sites by laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest of the cut lays for the period of deferment of the realization of the price; the profits on the venture etc. are to be made. In Sahib Singh Kalha v, Amritsar Improvement Trust (1982) 1 SCC 419 , this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come up to as much as 53 per cent. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas, for the reason that the former reflects the 'retail' price of the land the latter the 'wholesale' price. 9. In Gulzar Singh v, State of Punjab and Ors, (1993) 4 SCC 245 , referring to the case of Administrator of West Bengal (supra) and other cases, this Court upheld the deduction of 1/3rd of the undeveloped land towards developmental charges. In that case, 90 acres of undeveloped land was acquired which required development by laying road, parks, drainages, lighting and other civic amenities. It may also be noted that in the said judgment, this Court distinguished the case of Bhagwathula Samanna (supra) on which the appellants strongly relied. 10. Yet again in K. Vasundara Devi vs. Revenue Divisional Officer (LAO) (1995)5 SCC 426 , this Court reiterated that when genuine and reliable sale deeds of small extents were considered to determine market value, the same will not form sole basis to determine market value of large tracts of land. Sufficient deduction should be made to arrive at a just and fair market value of large tracts of land. Again, in this case also Bhagwathula Samanna (supra) was distinguished while upholding the deduction as to developmental charges. 11. This Court again in Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. V.T. Velu (1996) 2 SCC 538 in a similar situation as in the case on hand has held that at least 1/3rd of the land acquired is to be set apart for road purpose, developmental purpose and other civic amenities. 11. This Court again in Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. V.T. Velu (1996) 2 SCC 538 in a similar situation as in the case on hand has held that at least 1/3rd of the land acquired is to be set apart for road purpose, developmental purpose and other civic amenities. It is also observed: (SCC p.540, para 6) the mere fact that there is a connection road to the land, by itself is not a correct principle of law in refusing to deduct towards development charges. (Emphasis supplied) 12. In U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996)3 SCC 124 , this Court has stated thus:- Therefore, it should be determined only on the basis of yardage. If the principle of determination of compensation on yardage basis is adopted, it is equally settled law that at least 1/3rd of the land required should be deducted towards developmental purposes, namely, providing roads, electricity, drainage facilities and other betterment development. 13. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, in similar circumstances in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam (1998) 2 SCC 467 , upheld the deduction of 1/3 of the price towards cost of development for the housing scheme involving construction of roads and other amenities after agreeing with the earlier decisions of this Court even after referring to the case of Bhagwathula Samanna aforementioned. In the said judgment, it is observed that: (SCC p.490, para 33) The High Court has also held that the exemplar submitted by the Parishad could not be accepted for the reason that therein it was categorically provided that the purchaser would take the risk of statutory prohibitions, if any, on the transfer and that the vendor would not be responsible and that for covering the risk, the purchaser will normally demand reduction in the rate. Referring to the exemplars produced by the landowners the High Court observed that in respect of land covered in most of the exemplars no evidence of any deficiency had been brought to its notice. The High Court has pointed out that admittedly, the acquired land was not developed and it may only have the potentiality of development to be used as building sites and while facilities for drainage, electricity supply, water supply and pucca road are available in those developed areas, the land which is acquired measuring more than 200 acres does not have such advantages. The High Court was however, of the view that as the acquired land is within the municipal limits and is surrounded by developed area with buildings and pucca roads and other facilities and has the advantage of road passing by the side, it has potentiality of developing though it cannot be treated to have similar advantages as the land in the developed areas. The High court has also taken note of the fact that the entire acquired area was used for the purpose of agriculture even in 1983 when the surrounding areas had already developed. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court held that the rates available for land in developed area could not be adopted for determination of market value of the acquired land though they can be used for guidance to determine the market value by taking note of other circumstances as available on record. 14. On facts and in the light of the legal position emerging from the various decisions referred to above, it is not possible for us to say that cut of 20% adopted by the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment is wrong or unsustainable. It appears to us having regard to facts and circumstances of the case that the High Court has applied cut of 20% as against the normal 1/3 deduction. We find that the High Court was right and justified in doing so. 15. The decision of Bhagwathula Samanna (supra) does not help the appellants as the said decision was rendered on the facts of that case. As already noticed above, the said decision was referred to in earlier decisions of this Court and distinguished. That was a case of a fully developed land having all amenities and situated in an advantageous position. In the context of the facts of that case, in para 11, it is stated thus: (SCC pp. 510-11, para 11) 11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive at the market value of the acquired land. In applying the principle it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. It is not the extent of the area covered under the acquisition which is the only relevant factor. The principle of deduction in the land value covered by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive at the market value of the acquired land. In applying the principle it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. It is not the extent of the area covered under the acquisition which is the only relevant factor. Even in the vast area there may be land which is fully developed having all amenities and situated in an advantageous position. If smaller area within the large tract is already developed and suitable for building purposes and have in its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity, communications etc. then the principle of deduction simply for the reason that it is part of the large tract acquired, may not be justified." (Emphasis supplied) 16. In that case deduction was not given on the ground that even in the vast area may be land, which is fully developed having all amenities and situated in an advantageous position; if smaller area within the large tract is already developed and suitable for building purposes and have in its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity, communication, etc., then the principle of deduction simply for the reason that it is part of the large tract acquired, may not be justified. 17. In the present case the situation is entirely different. The area acquired is not a small area; it was not developed; may be it had some advantages; a small portion of the large tract was abutting the main road; it was also not the case that any smaller area within the large tract of land acquired was fully developed having all facilities as in the case of Bhagwathula Samanna (supra). The appellants herein did not establish that the entire area of 84 acres of land acquired was fully developed having all the facilities such as roads, drains, sewers, water, electricity lines and civic amenities. In order to convert the land into plots for the purpose of construction of residential and commercial buildings certain area was to be earmarked for the abovementioned purposes in accordance with the law governing in the matter of creating layouts in addition to incurring of expenditure for the development area. Hence the claim of the appellants that there should have been no deduction out of the compensation amount determined for the entire area acquired is unsustainable. Hence the claim of the appellants that there should have been no deduction out of the compensation amount determined for the entire area acquired is unsustainable. May be the acquired land with potentiality for construction of residential and commercial buildings had some advantages, which aspect is taken note of by the High Court in giving cut of only 20% as against 1/3rd normal deduction. 18. In Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village, Nizamabad District, A.P. vs. Nookala Rajamallu & other, as reported in (2003)12 SCC 334 , the Apex Court held:- 6. Where large area is the subject matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criteria. Reference in this context may be made to few decisions of this Court in The Collector of Lakhimour vs. (1972) 4 SCC 236 ; Prithvi Raj Taneja vs. State of M.P. (1977)1 SCC 684 and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer (1984)2 SCC 324 . 7. It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material it may in appropriate cases be open to the adjudicating Court to make comparison of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices. 8. In the case of Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust (1989) 2 SCC 329 , in a case under the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960 this Court held that the rates paid for small parcels of land do not provide a useful guide for determining the market value of the land acquired. While determining the market value of the land acquired it has to be correctly determined and paid so that there is neither unjust enrichment on the part of the acquirer nor undue deprivation on the part of the owner. It is an accepted principle as laid down in the case of Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs. Revenue Divisional Officer AIR 1939 PC 98 that the compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from the willing purchaser. It is an accepted principle as laid down in the case of Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs. Revenue Divisional Officer AIR 1939 PC 98 that the compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from the willing purchaser. While considering the market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy it must alike be disregarded. Neither must be considered as acting under any compulsion. The value of the land is not to be estimated as its value to the purchaser. But similarly this does not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land more than others is to be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser, though not his compulsion may always be taken into consideration for what it is worth. Section 23 of the Act enumerates the matters to be considered in determining compensation. The first criteria to be taken into consideration is the market value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Similarly, Section 24 of the Act enumerates the matters which the Court shall not take into consideration in determining the compensation. A safeguard is provided in Section 25 of the Act that the amount of compensation to be awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Value of the potentiality is to be determined on such materials as are available and without indulgence in any fits of imagination. Impracticability of determining the potential value is writ large in almost all cases. There is bound to be some amount of guess work involved while determining the potentiality. 9. It can be broadly stated that the element of speculation is reduced to minimum if the underlying principles of fixation of market value with reference to comparable sales are made:- (i) When sale is within a reasonable, time of the date of notification under Section 4(1). (ii) It should be a bona fide transaction. (iii) It should be of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired. (iv) It should possess similar advantages. 19. In V. Hanumantha Reddy vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer, as reported in (2003) 12 SCC 642, the Apex Court held:- 7. (ii) It should be a bona fide transaction. (iii) It should be of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired. (iv) It should possess similar advantages. 19. In V. Hanumantha Reddy vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer, as reported in (2003) 12 SCC 642, the Apex Court held:- 7. This Court in Kasturi v. State of Haryana (2003)1 SCC 354 , held that it is well settled that in respect of agricultural land or undeveloped land which has potential value for housing or commercial purposes, normally 1/1d amount of compensation has to be deducted out of the amount of compensation payable on the acquired land subject to certain variations depending on its nature, location, extent of expenditure involved for development and the area required for roads and other civic amenities to develop the land so as to make the plots for residential or commercial purposes. This Court also pointed out that there is difference between a developed area and an area having potential value, which is yet to be developed. It was further pointed out that the land is developed or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso facto make every land situated in the area also developed to be valued as a building site or plot. The facts of the present case are exactly the same as the situation in which this Court has made the above observation. In the present case, the undisputed facts on record would show that the acquired land with National Highway No. 7 is intervened by a petrol bunk and the premises of the State Bank of India. There are also houses, shops and hotels on the north, south and west of the acquired land. The acquired land is also about 100 yards away from the National Highway No. 7. No doubt, the acquired land may be having high potential value but that itself per se cannot be claimed to be a developed land. Lots of developmental activities are to be undertaken like laying of roads, sewerage facility, water supply etc. so that the land would be made fit for construction of houses for the needy people, which would require enormous amount of expenditure. 20. In Viluben Malejar Contractor vs. State of Gujarat, as reported in (2005)4 SCC 789 , the Apex Court held:- 20. The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. so that the land would be made fit for construction of houses for the needy people, which would require enormous amount of expenditure. 20. In Viluben Malejar Contractor vs. State of Gujarat, as reported in (2005)4 SCC 789 , the Apex Court held:- 20. The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. A comparable instance has to be identified having regard to the proximity from time angle as well as proximity from situation angle. For determining the market value of the land under acquisition, suitable adjustment has to be made having regard to various positive and negative factors vis-a-vis the land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. The positive and negative factors are as under:- Positive factors Negative Factors (i) Smallness of size (i) Largeness of size (ii) Proximity to road (ii) Situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) Frontage on road (iii) narrow strip of the land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) Nearness to developed (iv) Lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up (v) Regular shape (v) Remoteness from the developed locality (vi) Level vis-a-vis land under (vi) some special disadvantageous factors which would deter a purchaser (vii) Special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage 21. Whereas a smaller plot may be within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed preparing a layout plan, carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers and the hazards of an entrepreneur. Such development charges may range between 20% and 50% of the total price. 22. Certain peculiar features of this case may, at this juncture, be noticed. Due to construction of Kadana Dam and due to water logging causing submergence, the development of Pratappura even according to the Claimants had practically stopped. Development shifted to the area known as Godhra Bhagal. The finding of the Reference Court to the effect that the acquired lands had potentiality for more development is, thus, not correct. 23. A river known as Suki intervened between the Santrampur town and Godhra Bhagal. In a case of this nature, it is difficult to evolve a principle which would apply to all situations. Some amount of rational guess work, in our opinion, is inevitable. 24. 23. A river known as Suki intervened between the Santrampur town and Godhra Bhagal. In a case of this nature, it is difficult to evolve a principle which would apply to all situations. Some amount of rational guess work, in our opinion, is inevitable. 24. The purpose for which acquisition is made is also a relevant factor for determining the market value. In Basavva v. SpL Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 9 SCC 640 , deduction to the extent of 65% was made towards development charges. 25. In Bhagwathula Samanna (supra), it has been held: (SCC pp.510-11, para 11) 11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive at the market value of the acquired land. In applying the principle it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. It is not the extent of the area covered under the acquisition which is the only relevant factor. Even in the vast area there may be land which is fully developed having all amenities and situated in an advantageous position. If smaller area within the large tract is already developed and suitable for building purposes and have in its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity, communications etc. then the principle of deduction simply for the reason that it is part of the large tract acquired, may not be justified. 26. In L. Kamalamma (supra), this Court held: (SCC p.387, para 6) Ext. B-30 is a sale deed dated 9-8-1976, the transaction having taken place prior to eight months from the issue of the preliminary notification for acquisition of land in the present case. Having found that the piece of land referred in Ext. B-30 is situated very close to the lands that are acquired under the notification in question the reference court and the High Court relied upon the said document and, in our view, rightly. Having found that the piece of land referred in Ext. B-30 is situated very close to the lands that are acquired under the notification in question the reference court and the High Court relied upon the said document and, in our view, rightly. Further when no sales of comparable land were available where large chunks of land had been sold, even land transactions in respect of smaller extent of land could be taken note of as indicating the price that it may fetch in respect of large tracts of land by making appropriate deductions such as for development of the land by providing enough space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a layout, lump sum payment as also the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed. 21. In Atma Singh & other vs. State of Haryana & another, as reported in (2008)2 SCC 568 , the Apex Court held:- 4. In order to determine the compensation which the tenure-holders are entitled to get for their land which has been acquired, the main question to be considered is what is the market value of the land. Section 23(1) of the Act lays down what the Court has to take into consideration while Section 24 lays down what the Court shall not take into consideration and have to be neglected. The main object of the enquiry before the Court is to determine the market value of the land acquired. The expression 'market value' has been subject-matter of consideration by this Court in several cases. The market value is the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when led out in most advantageous manner excluding any advantage due to carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. In considering market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. The guiding star would be the conduct of hypothetical willing vendor who would offer the land and a purchaser in normal human conduct would be willing to buy as a prudent man in normal market conditions but not an anxious dealing at arms length nor facade of sale nor fictitious sale brought about in quick succession or otherwise to inflate the market value. The determination of market value is the prediction of an economic event viz., a price outcome of hypothetical sale expressed in terms of probabilities. (See Kanta Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (1976)3 SCC 772 ; Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P. (1977)1 SCC 684 ; Administrator General of WB v. Collector, Varanasi (1988)2 SCC 150 and Periyar Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1991)4 SCC 195 ). 5. For ascertaining the market value of the land, the potentiality of the acquired land should also be taken into consideration. Potentiality means capacity or possibility for changing or developing into state of actuality. It is well settled that market value of a property has to be determined having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibility when led out in its most advantageous manner. The question whether a land has potential value or not, is primarily one of fact depending upon its condition, situation, user to which it is put or is reasonably capable of being put and proximity to residential, commercial or industrial areas or institutions. The existing amenities like, water, electricity, possibility of their further extension, whether near about Town is developing or has prospect of development have to be taken into consideration. (See Collector v. Dr. Harisingh Thakur (1979)1 SCC 236 , Raghubans Narain Singh v. U.P. Government AIR 1967 SC 465 and Administrator General, W.B. v. Collector Varanasi(supra). It has been held in Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer (1984) 2 SCC 324 and Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust (1989) 2 SCC 329 that failing to consider potential value of the acquired land is an error of principle. 22. In General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel & another, as reported in (2008)14 SCC 745 , the Apex Court held:- 15. 22. In General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel & another, as reported in (2008)14 SCC 745 , the Apex Court held:- 15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisition), where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on-sale transactions/acquisitions precedes the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is upto four to five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is only a few years, may become unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of a land acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is because, over the course of years, the 'rate' of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard of increase. 16. Much more unsafe is the recent trend to determine the market value of acquired lands with reference to future sale transactions or acquisitions. To illustrate, if the market value of a land acquired in 1992 has to be determined and if there are no sale transactions/acquisitions of 1991 or 1992 (prior to the date of preliminary notification), the statistics relating to sales/acquisitions in future, say of the years 1994-1995 or 1995-1996 are taken as the base price and the market value in 1992 is worked back by making deductions at the rate of 10% to 15% per annum. How far is this safe? One of the fundamental principles of valuation is that the transactions subsequent to the acquisition should be ignored for determining the market value of acquired lands, as the very acquisition and the consequential development would accelerate the overall development of the surrounding areas resulting in a sudden or steep spurt in the prices. Let us illustrate. Let us assume there was no development activity in a particular area. Let us illustrate. Let us assume there was no development activity in a particular area. The appreciation in market price in such area would be slow and minimal. But if some lands in that area are acquired for a residential/commercial/industrial layout, there will be all round development and improvement in the infrastructure/amenities/facilities in the next one or two years, as a result of which the surrounding lands will become more valuable. Even if there is no actual improvement in infrastructure, the potential and possibility of improvement on account of the proposed residential/commercial/industrial layout will result in a higher rate of escalation in prices. As a result, if the annual increase in market value was around 10% per annum before the acquisition, the annual increase of market value of lands in the areas neighbouring the acquired land, will become much more, say 20% to 30%, or even more on account of the development/proposed development. Therefore, if the percentage to be added with reference to previous acquisitions/sale transactions is 10% per annum, the percentage to be deducted to arrive at a market value with reference to future acquisitions/sale transactions should not be 10% per annum, but much more. The percentage of standard increase becomes unreliable. Courts should therefore avoid determination of market value with reference to subsequent/future transactions. Even if it becomes inevitable, there should be greater caution in applying the prices fetched for transactions in future. Be that as it may. 23. In Subh Ram & other vs. State of Haryana & another as reported in (2010)1 SCC 444, the Apex Court held:- 27. Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector; Varanasi (1988) 2 SCC 150 contains a precise statement as to the concept of deducting development cost. This Court stated: (SCC p.157, para 12) 12. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties.... The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued...is ripe for use for building purposes; that building lots that could be laid out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of hypothetical lay out could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small, laid out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civil amenities; expenses of development of the sites by laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of the realisation of the price; the profits on the venture etc. are to be made. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust (1982) 1 SCC 419 , this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come up to as much as 53 per cent. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas, for the reasons that the former reflects the 'retail' price of land and the latter the 'wholesale' price. (Emphasis supplied) This Court referred to and relied upon several earlier decisions including three Judge Bench decisions in Mirza Nausherwan Khan v. Collector (LA) and Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 330 . 28. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer: (1988) 3 SCC 751 , this Court held: (SCC pp.755-56, para 4) 4. (15)... a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. (15)... a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx, between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. It should be noted that deduction of 20% to 50% referred to therein is only in regard to the land to be earmarked for roads, community areas etc. and does not refer to the further deduction towards the expenses of development. 29. In K.S. Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commr. & Land Acquisition Officer (1996)2 SCC 62 this Court held: (SCC p.65, para 10) 10. It is then contended that 54% is not automatic but depends upon the nature of the development and the stage of development. We are inclined to agree with the learned Counsel that the extent of deduction depends upon development need in each case. Under the Building Rules 53% of land is required to be left out. This Court has laid as a general rule that for laying the roads and other amenities 33-1/3% is required to be deducted. Where the development has already taken place, appropriate deduction needs to be made. In this case, we do not find any development had taken place as on that date. When we are determining compensation under Section 23(1), as on the date of notification under Section 4(1), we have to consider the situation of the land development, if already made, and other relevant facts as on that date. No doubt, the land possessed potential value, but no development had taken place as on the date. When we are determining compensation under Section 23(1), as on the date of notification under Section 4(1), we have to consider the situation of the land development, if already made, and other relevant facts as on that date. No doubt, the land possessed potential value, but no development had taken place as on the date. In view of the obligation on the part of the owner to hand over the land to the City Improvement Trust for roads and for other amenities and his requirement to expend money for laying the roads, water supply mains, electricity etc., the deduction of 53% and further deduction towards development charges @ 33-1/3%, as ordered by the High Court, was not illegal. 30. In Atma Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568 , this Court reiterated the settled principles regarding deductions thus: (SCC p.576, para 14) 14. The reasons given for the principle that price fetched for small plots cannot form safe basis for valuation of large tracks of land, according to cases referred to above, are that substantial area is used for development of sites like laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines and other civic amenities. Expenses are so incurred in providing these basic amenities. That apart it takes considerable period in carving out the roads making sewers and drains and waiting for the purchasers. Meanwhile the invested money is blocked up and the return on the investment flows after a considerable period of time. In order to make up for the area of land which is used in providing civic amenities and the waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur gets locked up a deduction from 20% onward, depending upon the facts of each case, is made. 31. The legal position is therefore clear and well settled. But in Atma Singh, after reiterating the said principle regarding deduction of development cost, this Court made an observation that no deduction need be made having regard to the purpose of acquisition, which requires to be clarified. We extract the relevant portion below: (SCC pp.576-77, para 15) 15. The question to be considered is whether in the present case those factors exist which warrant a deduction by way of allowance from the price exhibited by the exemplars of small plots which have been filed by the parties. We extract the relevant portion below: (SCC pp.576-77, para 15) 15. The question to be considered is whether in the present case those factors exist which warrant a deduction by way of allowance from the price exhibited by the exemplars of small plots which have been filed by the parties. The land has not been acquired for a Housing Colony or Government Office or an Institution. The land has been acquired for setting up a sugar factory. The factory would produce goods worth many crores in a year. A sugar factory apart from producing sugar also produces many by-product in the same process. One of the by-products is molasses, which is produced in huge quantity. Earlier, it had no utility and its disposal used to be a big problem. But now molasses is used for production of alcohol and ethanol which yield lot of revenue. Another by product degases is now used for generation of power and press mud is utilized in manure. Therefore, the profit from a sugar factory is substantial. Moreover, it is not confined to one year but will accrue every year so long as the factory runs. A housing board does not run on business lines. Once plots are carved out after acquisition of land and are sold to public, there is no scope for earning any money in future. An industry established on acquired land, if run efficiently, earns money or makes profit every year. The return from the land acquired for the purpose of Housing Colony, or Offices, or Institution cannot even remotely be compared with the land which has been acquired for the purpose of setting up a factory or industry. After all the factory cannot be set up without land and if such land is giving substantial return, there is no justification for making any deduction from the price exhibited by the exemplars even if they are of small plots. It is possible that a part of the acquired land might be used for construction of residential colony for the staff working in the factory. It is possible that a part of the acquired land might be used for construction of residential colony for the staff working in the factory. Nevertheless where the remaining part of the acquired land is contributing to production of goods yielding good profit, it would not be proper to make a deduction in the price of land shown by the exemplars of small plots as the reasons for doing so assigned in various decisions of this Court are not applicable in the case under consideration. 32. The above observations in Atma Singh no doubt seem to suggest that where the acquisition is for a residential lay out, deduction towards development cost is a must, but if the acquisition is for an industry which does not require forming a layout of sites, the market value of small residential plots may be adopted without any cuts towards development cost. The said observations are made with reference to the special facts of that case. If they are read out of context to support a contention that the purpose of acquisition is a relevant factor to avoid the deduction of development cost in valuation, it may then be necessary to consider the said observations as having been made per incuriam, as they overlook a mandatory statutory provision -- Section 24 (clause Fifthly) of the Act and the series of decisions of larger benches of this Court which hold that when value of large tracts of undeveloped lands is sought to be determined with reference to small residential plots in developed area, it is mandatory to deduct an appropriate percentage towards development cost. But it may be unnecessary to consider whether the observations are per incuriam as para 15 of the decision makes it clear that what is stated therein, is with reference to the special facts of that case, with a view not to disturb the smaller deduction of 10% by the High Court, and not intended to be statement of law. 24. In Andhra Pradesh Housing Board vs. K. Manohar Reddy & other, as reported in (2010) 12 SCC 707 , the Apex Court held:- 14. 24. In Andhra Pradesh Housing Board vs. K. Manohar Reddy & other, as reported in (2010) 12 SCC 707 , the Apex Court held:- 14. This Court in a catena of decisions has laid down that when a large tract of land is acquired and sale instances produced for small plots as exemplar, the best course for the court to arrive at a reasonable and fare valuation is to deduct a reasonable percentage from the valuation shown in the exemplar land and on the basis thereof to arrive at a just and fair valuation. 15. In Rishi Pal Singh v. Meerut Development Authority (2004)8 SCC 270 , while dealing with the issue relating to a large tract of land held as follows: (SCC p.207, para 5) 5....With respect to the first reason, that is, exemplars of small plots have been taken into consideration by the Reference Court, in the first instance our attention was invited, to some judgments of this Court to urge that there is no absolute bar to exemplars of small plots being considered provided adequate discount is given in this behalf Thus there is no bar in law to exemplars of small plots being considered. In an appropriate case, especially when other relevant or material evidence is not available, such exemplars can be considered after making adequate discount. This is a case in which appropriate exemplars are not available. The Reference Court has made adequate discount for taking the exemplars of small plots into consideration. 16. In Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector (1988) 2 SCC 150 , this Court held (SCC para 12) that where large tracts of land are required to be valued, valuation in transactions with regard to small plots cannot directly be adopted for valuing the compensation of large tracts of land. (SCC pp. 157-58) 12. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties.... The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued does not admit of and is ripe for use for building purposes; that building lots that could be laid out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of hypothetical lay out could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small, laid out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civil amenities; expenses of development of the sites by laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of the realisation of the price; the profits on the venture etc. are to be made. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust (1982) 1 SCC 419 , this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come up to as much as 53 per cent. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas, for the reason that the former reflects the "retail" price of land and the latter the "wholesale" price. 17. On the admissibility and relevance of sale deeds, this Court in Ranvir Singh v. Union of India (2005) 12 SCC 59 held as follows: (SCC PP.70-71, paras 31 & 36) 31. Furthermore, it is well settled that the sale deeds pertaining to the portion of lands which are subject to acquisition would be the most relevant piece of evidence for assessing the market value of the acquired lands. 36. Furthermore, a judgment or award determining the amount of compensation is not conclusive. The same would merely be a piece of evidence. There cannot be any fixed criteria for determining the increase in the value of land at a fixed rate. (Emphasis supplied) 18. 36. Furthermore, a judgment or award determining the amount of compensation is not conclusive. The same would merely be a piece of evidence. There cannot be any fixed criteria for determining the increase in the value of land at a fixed rate. (Emphasis supplied) 18. It was held in Union of India and another v. Ram Phool (2003)10 SCC 166 that: (SCC p.168, para 6) 6. The sale price in respect of a small bit of transaction would not be the determinative factor for deciding the market value of a vast stretch of land. 19. In Kasturi v. State of Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 354 , this Court held as follows: 7....It is well settled that in respect of agricultural land or undeveloped land which has potential value for housing or commercial purposes, normally 1/3rd amount of compensation has to he deducted out of the amount of compensation payable on the acquired land subject to certain variations depending on its nature, location, extent of expenditure involved for development and the area required for roads and other civic amenities to develop the land so as to make the plots for residential or commercial purposes. A land may be plain or uneven, the soil of the land may be soft or hard bearing on the foundation for the purpose of making construction; maybe the land is situated in the midst of a developed area all around but that land may have a hillock or may be low-lying or may be having deep ditches. So the amount of expenses that may be incurred in developing the area also varies. A claimant who claims that his land is fully developed and nothing more is required to be done for developmental purposes, must show on the basis of evidence that it is such a land and it is so located. In the absence of such evidence, merely saying that the area adjoining his land is a developed area, is not enough particularly when the extent of the acquired land is large and even if a small portion of the land is abutting the main road in the developed area, does not give the land the character of a developed area. In the absence of such evidence, merely saying that the area adjoining his land is a developed area, is not enough particularly when the extent of the acquired land is large and even if a small portion of the land is abutting the main road in the developed area, does not give the land the character of a developed area. In 84 acres of land acquired even if one portion on one side abuts the main road, the remaining large area where planned development is required, needs laying of internal roads, drainage, sewer, water, electricity lines, providing civic amenities etc. However, in cases of some land where there are certain advantages by virtue of the developed area around, it may help in reducing the percentage of cut to be applied, as the developmental charges required may be less on that account. There may be various factual factors which may have to be taken into consideration while applying the cut in payment of compensation towards developmental charges, maybe in some cases it is more than 1/3rd and in some cases less than 1/3rd. It must be remembered that there is difference between a developed area and an area having potential value, which is yet to be developed. The fact that an area is developed or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso facto make every land situated in the area also developed to be valued as a building site or plot, particularly when vast tracts are acquired, as in this case, for development purpose. 20. Further, in the case of Shaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2001)7 SCC 650 , this Court held that: (SCC pp.652-53, para 3) 3. It is no doubt true that courts adopt comparable sales method of valuation of land while fixing the market value of the acquired land. While fixing the market value of the acquired land, comparable sales method of valuation is preferred than other methods of valuation of land such as capitalisation of net income method or expert opinion method. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquired land if it had been sold in the open market at the time of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquired land if it had been sold in the open market at the time of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, comparable sales method of valuation of land for fixing the market value of the acquired land is not always conclusive. There are certain factors which are required to be fulfilled and on fulfilment of those factors the compensation can be awarded, according to the value of the land reflected in the sales. The factors laid down inter alia are: (1) the sale must be a genuine transaction, (2) that the sale deed must have been executed at the time proximate to the date of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act, (3) that the land covered by the sale must be in the vicinity of the acquired land, (4) that the land covered by the sales must be similar to the acquired land, and (5) that the size of plot of the land covered by the sales be comparable to the land acquired. If all these factors are satisfied, then there is no reason why the sale value of the land covered by the sales be not given for the acquired land. However, if there is a dissimilarity in regard to locality, shape, site or nature of land between land covered by sales and land acquired, it is open to the court to proportionately reduce the compensation for acquired land than what is reflected in the sales depending upon the disadvantages attached with the acquired land. 21. In Lal Chand v. Union of India (2009)15 SCC 769 , this Court while determining the rate at which development charges may be deducted, held: (SCC pp.779-80, paras 13-14 & 20-22) 13. The percentage of 'deduction for development' to be made to arrive at the market value of large tracts of undeveloped agricultural land (with potential for development), with reference to the sale price of small developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the price of such developed plots, the percentage depending upon the nature of development of the lay out in which the exemplar plots are situated. 14. The 'deduction for development' consists of two components. 14. The 'deduction for development' consists of two components. The first is with reference to the area required to be utilised for developmental works and the second is the cost of the development works. 20. Therefore the deduction for the 'development factor' to be made with reference to the price of a small plot in a developed lay out, to arrive at the cost of undeveloped land, will be for more than the deduction with reference to the price of a small plot in an unauthorized private lay out or an industrial layout. It is also well known that the development cost incurred by statutory agencies is much higher than the cost incurred by private developers, having regard to higher overheads and expenditure. 21. Even among the layouts formed by DDA, the percentage of land utilized for roads, civic amenities, parks and play grounds may vary with reference to the nature of layout - whether it is residential, residential- cum-commercial or industrial; and even among residential layouts, the percentage will differ having regard to the size of the plots, width of the roads, extent of community facilities, parks and play grounds provided. 22. Some of the layouts formed by statutory Development Authorities may have large areas earmarked for water/sewage treatment plants, water tanks, electrical sub-stations etc. in addition to the usual areas earmarked for roads, drains, parks, playgrounds and community/civic amenities. The purpose of the aforesaid examples is only to show that the 'deduction for development' factor is a variable percentage and the range of percentage itself being very wide from 20% to 75%." (Emphasis supplied) 22. It is, therefore, implicit from the aforesaid discussion of case law and precedent that whatever could be deducted towards development charges for developing a particular plot of land could range between 20 per cent to, 75 per cent. This is a very wide bracket, no doubt, but an appropriate deduction befitting the situation, location and the nature of the land justifying the deduction made could be arrived at upon estimation of all the aforesaid factors. If the land is already developed and could be used as a commercial/residential plot, what should be deducted would be in the lower side whereas if development is to be made, like filling up of the land, providing of roads, sewage and other civic amenities, etc., the range of the deduction could be higher. 25. If the land is already developed and could be used as a commercial/residential plot, what should be deducted would be in the lower side whereas if development is to be made, like filling up of the land, providing of roads, sewage and other civic amenities, etc., the range of the deduction could be higher. 25. In Special Land Acquisition Officer & another vs. M.K. Rafiq Saheb, as reported in (2010)1 SCC 444, the Apex Court held:- 20. It has been held in the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. Nookala Rajamallu (2003) 12 SCC 334 that: (SCC p.337, paras 6- 7) 6. Where large area is the subject-matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criterion. Reference in this context may be made to few decisions of this Court in Collector v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta (1972)4 SCC 236 , Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P. (1977)1 SCC 684 and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer (1984) 2 SCC 324 . 7. It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material, it may in appropriate cases be open to the adjudicating Court to make comparison of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices. 21. In the case of Bhagwathula Samanna v. Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer (1991)4 SCC 506 , it was held F 9SCC p.511, para 13) 13. The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted. 22. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted. 22. In Land Acquisition Officer v. L. Kamalamma (1998)2 SCC 385 , this Court held as under: (SCC p.387, para 6) 6....when no sales of comparable land was available where large chunks of land had been sold, even land transactions in respect of smaller extent of land could be taken note of as indicating the price that it may fetch in respect of large tracts of land by making appropriate deductions such as for development of the land by providing enough space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a lay out, lump sum payment as also the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed. 23. Further, it has also been held in Basavva and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 9 SCC 640 that the court has to consider whether sales relating to smaller pieces of land are genuine and reliable and whether they are in respect of comparable lands. In case the said requirements are met, sufficient deduction should be made to arrive at a just and fair market value of large tracks of land. Further, the court stated that the time lag for real development and the waiting period for development were also relevant factors to be considered in determining compensation. The court added that each case depended upon its own facts. In the said case, based on the particular facts and circumstances, this Court made a total deduction of 65% in determination of compensation. 24. It may also be noticed that in the normal course of events, it is hardly possible for a claimant to produce sale instances of large tracks of land. The sale of land containing large tracks are generally very far and few. Normally, the sale instances would relate to small pieces of land. This limitation of sale transaction cannot operate to the disadvantage of the claimants. Thus, the Court should look into sale instances of smaller pieces of land while applying reasonable element of deduction. 26. The sale of land containing large tracks are generally very far and few. Normally, the sale instances would relate to small pieces of land. This limitation of sale transaction cannot operate to the disadvantage of the claimants. Thus, the Court should look into sale instances of smaller pieces of land while applying reasonable element of deduction. 26. In Hasanali Walimchand vs. State of Maharashtra, as reported in (1998)2 SCC 388 , the Apex Court held:- 7. We are unable to find any justification for such observation and finding. The above finding of the High Court is contradictory to the earlier finding based on the location of the land. It is no doubt correct that the reference court was influenced by sale transactions in respect of developed land and it failed to make any deduction for development of land while enhancing the compensation, but the High Court fell in error in ignoring the future potential of the land in question and instead resting its finding as realized potential only. The evidence on the record clearly establishes that the acquired land did have future potential on account of its location. It is not denied that the area around the city of Ahmednagar is fast developing and the land in question was located only at a short distance of about one and a half miles from Ahmednagar town. The finding recorded by the High Court to the effect that there was no demand of any urban character in respect of the land in question is belied by the evidence on record. Indeed the land unlike the Housing Society Land was not developed and, therefore, proper course for the High Court would have been that it should have taken note of development charges and made some suitable deduction for the same. The reference court had made the Award based on the material on the record but had failed to notice that the acquired land was still undeveloped. It, therefore, appears appropriate to us to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and restore the award made by the reference court with the modification that out of the amount fixed by the reference court @ Rs. It, therefore, appears appropriate to us to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and restore the award made by the reference court with the modification that out of the amount fixed by the reference court @ Rs. 1 per square foot, deduction to the extent of 50 paisa per square foot, towards development charges, shall be made and compensation calculated on that basis and shall paid to the claimants in accordance with their holdings, along with the statutory benefits of solatium and interest. 27. In Lal Chand vs. Union of India & another, as reported in (2009)15 SCC 769 , the Apex Court held:- 40. In R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha (2004)2 SCC 9 , while examining the issue in the context of a case relating to disproportionate assets, this Court held: (SCC pp. 40-41, paras 22 & 24) 22. The guideline value is a rate fixed by authorities under the Stamp Act for purposes of determining the true market value of the property disclosed in an instrument requiring payment of stamp duty. Thus the guideline value fixed is not final but only a prima facie rate prevailing in an area. It is open to the registering authority as well as the person seeking registration to prove the actual market value of property. The authorities cannot regard the guideline valuation as the last word on the subject of market value. 24. This scheme of the enactment and the Rules contemplate that guideline value will only afford a prima facie basis to ascertain the true or correct market value. Undue emphasis on the guideline value without reference to the setting in which it is to be viewed will obscure the issue for consideration. It is clear, therefore, that guideline value is not sacrosant as urged on behalf of the appellants, but only a factor to be taken note of if at all available in respect of an area in which the property transferred lies. 28. In Valliyammal & another vs. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) & another, as reported in (2011)8 SCC 91 , the Apex Court held:- 22. In Ranjit Singh v. U.T. of Chandigarh (1992)4 SCC 659 , Land Acquisition Officer v. Ramanjulu, (2005)9 SCC 594 , Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Bipin Kumar (2004)2 SCC 283 , Sardar Jogendra Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)17 SCC 133, Revenue Divl. Officer-cum-LAO. v. Sk. In Ranjit Singh v. U.T. of Chandigarh (1992)4 SCC 659 , Land Acquisition Officer v. Ramanjulu, (2005)9 SCC 594 , Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Bipin Kumar (2004)2 SCC 283 , Sardar Jogendra Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)17 SCC 133, Revenue Divl. Officer-cum-LAO. v. Sk. Azam Saheb (2009)4 SCC 395 and ONGC Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (2008)14 SCC 745 , this Court has repeatedly held that the exercise undertaken for fixing market value and determination of the compensation payable to the landowner should necessarily involve consideration of escalation in land prices. In the last mentioned judgment, the Court noticed the earlier precedents and observed as under (ONGC Ltd. case, SCC pp.750-51, paras 12-15) 12. We have examined the facts of the three decisions relied on by the Respondents. They all related to acquisition of lands in urban or semi-urban areas. Ranjit Singh related to acquisition for development of Sector 41 of Chandigarh. Ramanjulu related to acquisition of the third phase of an existing and established industrial estate in an urban area. Bipin Kumar related to an acquisition of lands adjoining Badaun-Delhi Highway in a semi-urban area where building construction activity was going on all around the acquired lands. 13. Primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four factors: situation of the land, nature of development in surrounding area, availability of land for development in the area, and the demand for land in the area. In rural areas, unless there is any prospect of development in the vicinity, increase in prices would be slow, steady and gradual, without any sudden spurts or jumps. On the other hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where the development is faster, where the demand for land is high and where there is construction activity all around, the escalation in market price is at a much higher rate, as compared to rural areas. In some pockets in big cities, due to rapid development and high demand for land, the escalations in prices have touched even 30% to 50% or more per year, during the nineties. 14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there was no chance of any development and hardly any buyers, the prices stagnated for years or rose marginally at a nominal rate of 1; or 2% per annum. 14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there was no chance of any development and hardly any buyers, the prices stagnated for years or rose marginally at a nominal rate of 1; or 2% per annum. There is thus a significant difference in increases in market value of lands in urban/semi-urban areas and increases in market value of lands in the rural areas. Therefore, if the increase in market value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10% to 15% per annum, the corresponding increases in rural areas would at best be only around half of it, that is, about 5% to 7.5% per annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or any specific evidence relating to the actual increase in prices, then the increase to be applied would depend upon the same. 15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisitions), where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on sale transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is of only a few years, may become unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of a land acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is because, over the course of years, the "rate" of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard of increase. 23. Though it may appear repetitive, we deem it necessary to mention that the acquired land is situated in the close vicinity of various residential colonies, educational institutions, hospitals etc. 23. Though it may appear repetitive, we deem it necessary to mention that the acquired land is situated in the close vicinity of various residential colonies, educational institutions, hospitals etc. and is on the junction of two important roads. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the land is semi-urban and has huge potential for being developed as housing sites and the High Court should have added 10% per annum escalation in the price specified in the sale deeds relied upon for fixing market value of the acquired land. 29. In Chandrashekar (D) & other vs. Land Acquisition Officer & another, as reported in 2012 AIR SCW 73, the Apex Court held:- 18. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the analysis of the legal position referred to in the foregoing two paragraphs, we are of the view that there is no discrepancy on the issue, in the recent judgments of this Court. In our view, for the "first component" under the head of "development", deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the "second component" under the head of "development" a further deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The facts and circumstances of each case would determine the actual component of deduction, for each of the two components. Yet under the head of "development", the applied deduction should not exceed 67 percent. That should be treated as the upper benchmark. This would mean, that even if deduction under one or the other of the two components exceeds 33-1/3 percent, the two components under the head of "development" put together, should not exceed the upper benchmark. 19. In Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra), this Court expressed the upper limit of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions upto 67 percent can be made under the head of "development". Under what head then, would the remaining component of deductions fall further deductions would obviously pertain to considerations other than the head of "development". Illustratively a deduction could be made keeping in mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the waiting period for sale of developed plots and or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "de-escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of the precedents on the issue, that all deductions should not cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75 percent would give the impression of being lopsided, or contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25 percent of his land. This impression is unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions. Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. Market value based on an exemplar sale, from which a deduction in excess of 75 percent has to be made, would not be a relevant sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question of applying the market value of one (exemplar sale) to determine the compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however needs to be clarified, that even though on account of developmental activities (under the head "development"), we have specified the upper benchmark of 67 percent, it would seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible range would be upto 8 percent. That however is not the correct position. The range of deductions, other than under the head "development", would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental activities (under the head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper benchmark of 75 percent. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental activities (under the head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper benchmark of 75 percent. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. 20. Before applying deductions for ascertaining the market value of the undeveloped acquired land, it would be necessary to classify the nature of the exemplar land, as also, the acquired land. This would constitute the second step in the process of determination of the correct quantum of deductions. The lands under reference may be totally undeveloped, partially developed, substantially developed or fully developed. In arriving at an appropriate classification of the nature of the lands which are to be compared, reference may be made to the developmental activities referred to by us in connection with the "first component", as also, the "second component" (in paragraph 17 above). The presence (or absence) of one or more of the components of development, would lead to an appropriate classification of the exemplar land, and the acquired land. Comparison of the classifications thus arrived, would depict the difference in terms of development, between the exemplar land and the acquired land. This exercise would lead to the final step. In the final step, the absence and presence of developmental components, based on such comparison, would constitute the basis for arriving at an appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to balance the differential factors between the exemplar land and the acquired land. 30. In Chindha Fakira Patil (D) vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Jalgaon, as reported in 2012 AIR SCW 270, the Apex Court held:- 12. In view of the law laid down in the above noted three judgments, it must be held that the High Court committed an error by refusing to rely upon Exhibit 28 on the ground that the average sale price of the transactions relied upon by the Respondent was far less than the price for which land was sold vide Exhibit 28. 13. 13. The High Court was also not right in upsetting the finding of the Reference Court on the issue of nature of land. In his deposition, Arjun Sukdeo Patil categorically stated that there were wells in the lands of the Appellants and there were Jujubee, Tambrine, Mango, Pomegranate trees. This was supported by the entries contained in 7/12 extracts. The High Court discarded the evidence of the Appellants by observing that they had not cultivated sugarcane and wheat. When it was not in dispute that there were wells in the acquired land, the mere fact that the Appellants had not cultivated sugarcane or wheat cannot lead to an inference that the land was not irrigated and, in our view, there was no valid reason for the High Court to interfere with the finding recorded by the Reference Court that parts of the lands were Bagayat and for such land they were entitled to compensation @ Rs. 6 lacs per hectare. 14. The High Court also committed error by rejecting the reports submitted by Shri Ravindra Ghanshyam Choudhari, who was examined by the Appellants. This witness is a consultant in Agriculture and Horticulture. He personally visited the acquired land and gave the details of the trees standing on different parts of the land, their present and future age, condition, height, width, spread and annual fruit production capacity. The valuation made by him was amply supported by the market rates of fruits fixed by Agriculture and Horticulture Department of Government of Maharashtra. In the cross-examination, the witness stood by reports Exhibits 36 to 41 given by him. This being the position, the High Court had no reason to overturn the finding recorded by the Reference Court on the issue of existence of trees on the acquired land and their valuation. 31. In Sanath Kumar vs. Special Tahsildar & another, as reported in 2012 AIR SCW 819, the Apex Court held:- 9. This being the position, the High Court had no reason to overturn the finding recorded by the Reference Court on the issue of existence of trees on the acquired land and their valuation. 31. In Sanath Kumar vs. Special Tahsildar & another, as reported in 2012 AIR SCW 819, the Apex Court held:- 9. The rule of 1/3rd deduction was reiterated in Tejumal Bhojwani v. State of U.P. (2003) 10 SCC 525 : AIR 2003 SC 3791 : 2003 AIR SCW 4335); V. Hanumantha Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer: (2003) 12 SCC 642: ( AIR 2004 SC 1185 : 2004 AIR SCW 75); H.P. Housing Board v. Bharat S. Negi, (2004) 2 SCC 184 : AIR 2004 SC 1800 : 2004 AIR SCW 797 and Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad Development Authority (2004)10 SCC 745 : AIR 2004 SC 2006 ; 2004 AIR SCW 2089. In Subh Ram v. State of Haryana (2010)1 SCC 444: (AIR 2010 SC 241: 2010 AIR SCW 173), this Court held as under:- Deduction of "development cost" is the concept used to derive the "wholesale price" of a large undeveloped land with reference to the "retail price" of a small developed plot. The difference between the value of a small developed plot and the value of a large undeveloped land is the "development cost". Two factors have a bearing on the quantum (or percentage) of deduction in the "retail price" as development cost. Firstly, the percentage of deduction is decided with reference to the extent and nature of development of the area/layout in which the small developed plot is situated. Secondly, the condition of the acquired land as on the date of preliminary notification, whether it was undeveloped, or partly developed, is considered and appropriate adjustment is made in the percentage of deduction to take note of the developed status of the acquired land. The percentage of deduction (development cost factor) will be applied fully where the acquired land has no development. But where the acquired land can be considered to be partly developed (say for example, having good road access or having the amenity of electricity, water, etc.) then the development cost (that is, percentage of deduction) will be modulated with reference to the extent of development of the acquired land as on the date of acquisition. But where the acquired land can be considered to be partly developed (say for example, having good road access or having the amenity of electricity, water, etc.) then the development cost (that is, percentage of deduction) will be modulated with reference to the extent of development of the acquired land as on the date of acquisition. But under no circumstances, will the future use or purpose of acquisition play a role in determining the percentage of deduction towards development cost. 10. A reading of the impugned judgment shows that the High Court ordained deduction of 53% of market value towards development charges only on the ground that substantial amount was spent for providing the facilities like road, power supply, water supply, drainage etc. for multinationals, NRI's and other who would like to set up industries in the complex. 11. In our view, the reasons assigned by the High Court for increasing the percentage of deduction from 40 to 53 are legally untenable. While determining market value of the acquired land, the court must always bear in mind that in majority of cases the acquisition of land deprives the land owner of his only source of livelihood and sustenance. The acquiring authority and the beneficiaries of acquisition can always recover the cost of land from the allottees of plots. If the allotment is made to industrial entrepreneurs, they will invariably pass on the cost of land to the consumers of their products. Therefore, while increasing the percentage of deduction from the market value determined by the Reference Court, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect and should have, keeping in view the law laid down by this Court, refrained from increasing the percentage of cut from 40 to 53, which resulted in depriving the landowners of their right to receive just and reasonable compensation. 32. 32. If the law relating to determination of the market value for arriving at a just compensation for the land acquired is assessed in retrospect, a consensus of parameters can be availed therefrom (i) To obviate inequitous determination of the market value of different categories of land as acquired for a particular purpose under the same Notification, the belting principle is a safe process for classification of the land in terms of the developed and the underdeveloped and in some cases in terms of their utility for purpose of that particular project vis-a-vis the development of the acquired land; (ii) To consider the contemporaneous sale instances the purpose of determining the market value of the acquired land, the court has to correlate the market value reflected in most comparable instance which provides the index of the market value; (iii) To identify the most comparable instances out of the genuine sale instances, the following two factors are required to be considered:- (a) Proximity from the time-angle, and (b) Proximity from the situation-angle. (iv) To determine the market price/value, some factors which may be illustrated even though those are not exhaustive are catalogued hereunder:- Positive factors Negative Factors (i) Smallness of size (i) Largeness of size (ii) Proximity to road (ii) Situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) Frontage on road (iii) Narrow strip of the land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) Nearness to developed (iv) Lower level requiring the depressed portion to area be filled up (v) Regular shape (v) Remoteness from the developed locality (vi) Level vis-a-vis land (vi) some special disadvantageous factors which would under deter a purchaser (vii) Special value for special advantage attached to the land (v) To consider the general trend in the prices of the land which is on the rise. The judicial notice of the same has to be taken. If the escalation is not considered while considering the price, it would definitely prejudicial to the land loser. (vi) To determine the market value, the genuine and reliable sale deeds of small extents can be considered as the exemplar. The same however will not form the sole basis to determine the market value of the large tracts of land. Sufficient deduction is made to arrive at a just and fair market value of the large tract of land. (vi) To determine the market value, the genuine and reliable sale deeds of small extents can be considered as the exemplar. The same however will not form the sole basis to determine the market value of the large tracts of land. Sufficient deduction is made to arrive at a just and fair market value of the large tract of land. But if it is found that the vast land is as developed as the smaller land in the exemplar, the principle of deduction shall not apply; (vii) To discard or ignore the transaction subsequent to the acquisition for determining the market value of the acquired land the fundamental principles of valuation is that the contemporary sale instances occurred prior to the acquisition notification only be relied to obviate any possibility of fraud; (viii) To determine the percentage of deduction for development from the market value of the large tracts of the underdeveloped land (with potential for development), it is required that the reference as made to the sale price of small developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the price. The percentage however, depends upon the nature of the development lay-out in which the exemplar plots are situated and to the level of development, the vast tracts of land had acquired till the acquisition; (ix) To arrive at the upper benchmark, the deduction should not be made cumulatively exceeding the upper benchmark of 75%. A deduction beyond 75% would give the impression of being lopsided or contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for 25% of his land. In Chandrasekhar (supra), the mode has been illustrated elaborately. 33. To wipe out misconstructs which plague sometimes the process of determination of the market value of the acquired land, it is to be restated that even if the referring claimants could not bring out any comparable sale instances, but that by itself would not render the reference to futility. The reference court shall reassess the market value on the oral or other evidence relating to the advantageous situation, amenities attached to the proximate or the acquired land, the rate of the annual escalation coupled with the developmental potential etc. The reference court should not be oblivious the market value is re-determine for doing substantial justice to the land-losers. 34. The reference court shall reassess the market value on the oral or other evidence relating to the advantageous situation, amenities attached to the proximate or the acquired land, the rate of the annual escalation coupled with the developmental potential etc. The reference court should not be oblivious the market value is re-determine for doing substantial justice to the land-losers. 34. In the case in hand, the learned L.A. Judge for determining the market value of the acquired land had accepted the sale instances for the exemplar from the Exbt.-1 series where the price of the land is found at Rs.6,00,000/- per kani. On adopting a very strange method, the learned L.A. Judge chose another exemplar from the Exbt.-A Series of land whose market rate is found to be Rs.80,000/- per kani. Thereafter, the average of both the prices (Rs.6,00,000 + Rs.80,000/-)/2 was determined at Rs.3,40,000/- per kani, which the learned L.A. Judge accepted as the derived value of the vast tract of the acquired land in the belt of bastu/viti class of the acquired land. Considering the development index of the vast acquired land, the learned L.A. Judge deducted 25% from the said average derived price. Thus the market value of the bastu/viti class of land was determined at Rs.2,55,000/- per kani for purpose of assessing the compensation to be awarded to the land losers and in accordance with the said market value, the compensation was calculated as per Section 23 of the L.A. Act. 35. On the principle as developed by the Apex Court, the price of the exemplar land would be considered as the base price and thereafter the appropriate deduction as required be made in the context of the development index of a particular acquisition instance for determination of the market value of the land. But the deduction be ranged from 20% to 75% considering the factors and the development instance with the comparable and the compared land. The deduction that has been made by the learned L.A. Judge comes to 59% if the base price is taken from the exemplar of the Exbt.-1 series. Though it is apparent on the record that only 25% has been deducted on consideration of the development of the vast acquired land following the strange formula of averaging of two sale instances or exemplars, the actual deduction was made to the extent of 59%. Though it is apparent on the record that only 25% has been deducted on consideration of the development of the vast acquired land following the strange formula of averaging of two sale instances or exemplars, the actual deduction was made to the extent of 59%. In view of the learned L.A. Judge as reproduced hereunder, the deduction of 59% is not only unreasonable and prejudicial to the land-losers but also unsustainable in view of the law as laid down by the Apex Court so far. The deduction should have been within the range of 25-30% in the different belting on considering that the said land is situated in an urban area having the annual escalation rate more than 30%. From the above findings of the L.A. Collector which the opposite party relied, it is clear that the acquired land was having with some facilities of water supply, electricity etc. and the records speaks that the present acquired lands are of Sheet No.5 of Mouja Badharghat and it is more developed than that of Sheet No.6. The acquired land of referring-claimant of Misc.(L.A.) 42 of 1999 is situated near the big road but the other lands are not situated near the big road but those are situated within close proximity of each other of Mouja Badharghat Sheet No.5 which is within the close vicinity of Agartala Municipal area having some sorts of urban facilities and except 50% of the land of Misc.(L.A.) 25 of 1999 the acquired land of all other referring-claimants are mostly bastu/viti class of land and most of it were having with residential huts/buildings, structures thereon and also there were different valuable trees. It does not appear that the acquired land was having with high commercial potential value. But it is established on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record that the acquired lands of the present cases are mostly bastu/viti class of land and were having with urban facilities and while awarding compensation all those factors should be taken to consideration. 36. The market value as determined by the learned L.A. Judge, if reassessed as per the time tested principles, it would be evident that the market value is in the lower side than what it should have been. 36. The market value as determined by the learned L.A. Judge, if reassessed as per the time tested principles, it would be evident that the market value is in the lower side than what it should have been. As the referring claimants did not project any grievance by filing appeals or cross objections, this court should not venture for interfering with the impugned assessment as made by the learned L.A. Judge. However, it would be apposite to restate that while determining the value of the acquired land, the Court must always bear in mind that in majority of cases the acquisition of land deprives the land owner of his/her only source of livelihood, sustenance and shelter. The acquiring authority and the beneficiaries of acquisition can always recover the cost of land from the allottees of the plots. If the allotment is made to the industrial entrepreneurs, they will invariably pass on the cost of land to the consumers of their products. Therefore, while increasing the percentage of deduction from the market value determined by the Reference Court or the Land Acquisition Collector, it should be extremely careful and circumspect and should have, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, refrained from increasing the percentage cut on the higher side, which resulted in depriving the land owners of their right to receive just and reasonable compensation. For the reasons as stated above, this Court finds no merit in this batch of appeals and accordingly those fail. As consequence thereof, the appeals are dismissed. Appeal dismissed.