Judgment V.K. Ahuja, J. 1. This is a regular second appeal filed by the appellant under section 100 C.P.C against the judgment and decree, dated 13.5.2010, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, vide which he set aside the judgment and decree, dated 9.4.2008, of the court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.4, District Mandi, H.P., decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for declaration that she is owner in possession of the land in suit. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant, hereinafter also referred to as the plaintiff, filed a suit for declaration and injunction in which her minor son, respondents No.3 and 4 herein, were also impleaded as plaintiffs. The suit was filed against the respondents, hereinafter also referred to as defendants No.1 and 2. The plaintiff alleged that she be declared owner in possession of the land measuring 3-10-0 bigha and a house consisting of five rooms as per compromise dated 28.2.2001 and the defendants be restrained from alienating, selling or creating any charge on the suit property in favour of any person. She alleged that she was the legally wedded wife of defendant No.1 and plaintiffs No.2 and 3 are their sons who are living with plaintiff No.1. She alleged that defendant No.1 had ousted her alongwith her sons from the house and she filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. against defendant No.1. The said petition was compromised on 28.2.2001 and defendant No.1 agreed to give the land and house in question since she was residing in that house and was also cultivating the land. The defendants also agreed that they will not alienate, mortgage or sell the suit property to any person during her life time. Thus, she pleaded that she is absolute owner in possession of the suit land and the house and is entitled to the relief claimed by her. She had also challenged the gift made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 before the filing of the suit and also challenged the exchange attested in favour of defendant No.2. 3. Defendant No.1 pleaded that the compromise in question is not executable since plaintiff No.1 is enjoying all the benefits out of the moveable and immoveable property of the defendant and there is no question of giving maintenance allowance or any landed property to the plaintiff. 4. 3. Defendant No.1 pleaded that the compromise in question is not executable since plaintiff No.1 is enjoying all the benefits out of the moveable and immoveable property of the defendant and there is no question of giving maintenance allowance or any landed property to the plaintiff. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree according to the compromise deed dated 28.2.01 as prayed for? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether during the pendency of the suit, the suit land has been gifted to defendant No.2 and the mutation of exchange has been also attested in the name of defendant No.2 as prayed for? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file the present suit against the defendant No.2, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiff No.1 is estopped to file the present suit by her own act and conduct as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the suit is not property valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD 9. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands and suppressed the material facts and suit is liable to be dismissed, as alleged? OPD 10. Relief.” 5. Parties led their evidence and the learned trial Court vide its impugned judgment, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. On appeal, these findings of the learned trial Court were set aside by the learned Appellate Court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. 6. None has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record of the case. 8. On appeal, these findings of the learned trial Court were set aside by the learned Appellate Court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. 6. None has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record of the case. 8. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant were that respondent No.1 has not denied the compromise in question and it was filed in a petition filed by the plaintiffs for the grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The said compromise in question presented in the Court of Judicial Magistrate has been proved in evidence as Ext.PW-3/A, vide which the defendant had submitted that he had given one house and land to the plaintiff and she could cultivate the land and earn her livelihood and during the life time, the plaintiff will not sell or mortgage the land in question and house in favour of any person. 9. Thus, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that once the compromise has been effected and the possession has been given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance, she becomes absolute owner and not limited owner during her life time. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant upon the decision in Nazar Singh and others versus Jagjit Kaur and others, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 855. The observations made in paras 8, 9 and 10 are relevant and are being reproduced below: “8.Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the most important of which is the decision in V.Tulasamma v. V.Sesha Reddi (1977) 3 SCC 99 : ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ). The principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section(2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. [Also see the recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi, (1995) 6 SCC 88 : (1995 AIR SCW 3885) where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her]. According to sub-section(1), where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the said property was “possessed” by her. Where, however, the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the movement she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows form the words in sub-section(1) which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu……after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.” In other words, though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression “possessed” is concerned, it too has been the subject matter of interpretation by several decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of this case. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied upon a recent decision of this Court in Gumpha v. Jaibai, (1994)(2) SCC 511 in support of his contention that in the facts of this case, it is sub-section(2) of Section 14 and not sub-section(1) that is attracted. But that was a case where certain property was given to a Hindu female under a Will. The Bench held that since Will is referred to only in sub-section(2) and not in sub-section(1), it is sub-section(2) that is attracted in the case of a property bequeathed under a Will. Since, the suit lands were given to Harmel Kaur under a compromise – and not under a Will – the principle of the said decision has no application herein. 10. For the above reasons, we hold that the said lands became the absolute property of Harmel Kaur the moment she was placed in possession thereof. (It is not disputed that the said property was indeed placed in her possession and that she was in possession and enjoyment thereof from the date of the aforesaid compromise.) Once this is so, the suit must fail. The Courts below were in error in holding that because the compromise whereunder the said lands were given to Harmel Kaur towards her maintenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section(1) of Section 14 is not attracted and that it is sub-section(2) that is attracted here.” 10. The Courts below were in error in holding that because the compromise whereunder the said lands were given to Harmel Kaur towards her maintenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section(1) of Section 14 is not attracted and that it is sub-section(2) that is attracted here.” 10. It follows from the above discussion that the above decision applies on all force to the present facts and once possession was given to the plaintiff in pursuance of the compromise, she becomes absolute owner irrespective of several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant or compromise in question. 11. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner in possession of the land and houses mentioned therein. Any alienation made by defendant No.1 shall not be binding on the rights of the plaintiff to own and possess the land and house in dispute. 12. The appeal is allowed with costs and stands disposed of. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.