JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Ms. Pratima Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Shishir Jain, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that the petitioner, Sri Mukesh worked on the post of Beldar as a daily wager for the period from 1989 to 1991. Thereafter his services were retrenched. Subsequently, the petitioner and some other similarly situated persons working on the post of Beldar /Helper in Uttar Pradesh Rajya Setu Nigam, whose services were retrenched, have approached the respondents to consider their case for giving appointment by making representation dated 18.10.1993 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). 3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that thereafter nothing has been done in the matter in question inspite of the repeated requests and reminders in this regard to the authorities concerned, as such the father of the petitioner submitted a representation dated 25.9.1994 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) to the concerned Minister, raising the grievance to consider his case for reappointment in the department as he belongs to the reserved category and his services were retrenched from the department. In pursuance to the same, a letter dated 11,11,1994 on behalf of the Minister concerned has been written to opposite party No. 4/Deputy Project Manager, Nirman Ekai Unit, U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam, Etawah. In response to the same, the official respondents/opposite party No. 4 of the Nigam informed the Minister concerned that as per documents on record, the petitioner Sri Mukesh by his own act, has left the job. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even thereafter the petitioner represented before the opposite parties for consideration of his case for reappointment but no heed has been paid in the matter in question, hence the present writ petition has been filed raising his grievance. 5.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even thereafter the petitioner represented before the opposite parties for consideration of his case for reappointment but no heed has been paid in the matter in question, hence the present writ petition has been filed raising his grievance. 5. Sri Shishir Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, in rebuttal, submits that it is totally incorrect on the part of the petitioner to state that he is retrenched employee but as per the matter of facts on record, he himself has left his service and the said fact has been duly informed to him in the matter in question as such he does not fall in the category of retrenched employees, working in the Nigam whose cases were later on considered by the directions given by this Court in the judgment dated 15.7.1993 passed in Writ Petition No. 5319 (SS) of 1991 (Vineet Kumar Srivastava v. U.P. Bridge Corporation and others) and other connected writ petitions, the same were disposed of with certain directions, so the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the said judgment as his case stands on different footing. 6. Sri Shishir Jain, learned counsel for the respondents further submits that in the matter in question as per admitted fact, petitioner has been duly informed in the year 1995 that he himself left the job in the matter in question but thereafter no steps were taken by him for redressal of his grievance, but only repeated requests and reminders have been made by the petitioner, so the present writ petition filed by the petitioner, liable to be dismissed in view of the law as laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of C Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining, AIR 2009 SC 264 and Union of India and others v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. So far as the facts admitted by the learned counsel for the parties are that the petitioner worked on the post of Beldar as daily wager for the period from 1989 to 1991. Thereafter he was not in job as per version of the respondents and has left the job.
So far as the facts admitted by the learned counsel for the parties are that the petitioner worked on the post of Beldar as daily wager for the period from 1989 to 1991. Thereafter he was not in job as per version of the respondents and has left the job. The said plea, if according to the petitioner, is not correct then he has to challenge the same but the said act has not been done by him. 8. Further in the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was out of job since 1991 and the similarly situated persons to the petitioner if assumed who are retrenched employees working in the Nigam, for redressal of their grievance, approached this Court by filing writ petitions in the year 1991 to 1993 before this Court, disposed of by order dated 15.7.1993 with the direction that the respondents are commanded to comply with the directions as given therein. In view of the said facts, if the petitioner wants to claim parity on the said ground, then in that circumstances he should have approached this Court at that moment, but he remain silent upto 2009 and only thereafter he filed the present writ petition. 9. So far as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is making repeated representations in this regard, has also got not force because repeated representations made by the petitioner does not extend the benefit of limitation or give a right to approach this Court for redressal of his grievance at a belated stage. 10. In the case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 after relying on the earlier judgment in the case of Shivdas v. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraph 6 has held as under : “The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustice, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 11. In the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining, (supra), the Apex Court held as under : “We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasize the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for consideration. If the representation is on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim Courts should desist from directing consideration of such claims.” 12. In the case of Union of India and others v. M.K. Sarkar (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “ When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead”issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a Court’s direction. Neither a Court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.” 13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kanaiyalal Lal Chand Sachdev and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2011) 2 SCC 782 , in para Nos. 23 and 24 held as under : “Para - 23 - In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the Appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well-settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See: Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co.
It is well-settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See: Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, (2003) 3 SCC 524 ; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 ; State Bank of India v. Allied Chemical Laboratories and another, (2006) 9 SCC 252 ). Para - 24- In City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others, (2009) 1 SCC 168 , this Court had observed that: The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the Petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.” Thus, in view of the above said fact, the relief as claimed by the petitioner by meas of present writ petition, cannot be granted on the ground of delay and laches. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed accordingly. ——————