Judgment 1. These two Writ Petitions are taken up together for consideration since issue relates to grant of mining lease in respect of 15.30 hectares of Navalatti Village, Sandur Taluk, Bellary District. 2. We have heard Sriyuths D.N. Nanjunda Reddy, M.R. Naik, learned Senior Advocates, K.N. Phanindra, Advocate, R.G. Kolle, learned Additional Government Advocate and Smt. Sinchana, Advocate for Sri. Kalyan Basavaraj, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India. 3. The parties are referred to as per their rank in the respective petitions. 4. Petitioners has sought for quashing of the Final order No.42/08 dated 05.12.2008 passed in Revision Application 13(17)/2008-RC.I Annexure-J by the Director of Mines whereunder the revision application filed by Respondents 4 and 5 came to be allowed and recommendation made by second respondent for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner came to be set aside. Petitioner has also questioned the communication dated 15-01-2009 – Annexure-K from second respondent to third respondent directing it to submit appropriate proposal with regard to renewal application of respondents-4 and 5. 5. Petitioner has sought for not only quashing the orders of the Revisional Authority dated 05.12.2008 and order dated 15.01.2009 (which are also impugned in W.P. 21319/2009) but has also sought for quashing of the endorsement dated 04.10.2008 issued by Second Respondent whereunder Petitioner has been intimated that notification dated 15.03.2003 has been set aside in W.P.No.21608/2005 by order dated 07.08.2008 and further intimating the Petitioner that his application cannot be considered in terms of the order dated 14.03.2008 passed in W.P.No.10463/2006 since the notification dated 15.03.2003 has already been set aside in another writ petition namely W.P.21608/2005 dated 07.08.2008. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 6. One Sri. Krishnamachari filed an application for grant of mining lease in respect of 45 acres of Land in Navalatti Village, Sandur Taluk, Bellary District on 19.10.1968 and same came to be granted for a period of 20 years on 18.02.1970. Before the expiry of the period of lease a renewal application was filed on 09.02.1989 seeking renewal over an area of 38 acres. There was a deemed order of rejection under Rule 24 of the then Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 on 11.05.1989. Before the expiry of the period of lease a renewal application was filed on 09.02.1989 seeking renewal over an area of 38 acres. There was a deemed order of rejection under Rule 24 of the then Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 on 11.05.1989. A revision was filed by the applicant before the Central Mines Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) challenging the deemed order of rejection and said appeal came to be disposed of by order dated 06.12.1989 whereunder the State Government was directed to “Dispose of” the application for renewal of mining lease within a period of 200 days and reserved liberty to the applicant to seek redressal in appropriate court of law in the event of State Government failing to pass an order. Thereafter applicant sought for issuance of working permit Mine for one year which came to be granted and even according to respondents-4 and 5 they could not work on the mines owing to prohibition under Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Thereafter applicant is said to have made several representations and despite an order dated 16.10.1991 to continue under rule 24A(6) of Mineral Concession Rules, effective mining activity could not be commenced on account of prohibition under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 to mine in a forest area. The said applicant approached learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.24740/1995 seeking relief of renewing the Mining Lease and by interim order 27.06.1996 a direction was issued to extend the benefit of Rule 24(6) of the Mineral Concession Rules to the petitioner therein the event of applicant having submitted application for renewal. Subsequently on 30.03.2002 said writ petition came to be dismissed. 7. A Notification came to be issued on 15.03.2003 by the State Government calling for applications for grant of lease in respect of the land in question but restricting it to an extent of 15.38 hectares. Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Venkateshwar Rao) filed an application for grant of mining lease on 15.02.2005 in response to said notification. Likewise several applications were also filed. After hearing all the applicants recommendation dated 26.04.2006 came to be made by State Government which was communicated to the Union of India. Aggrieved by said recommendation appeal was filed by Respondents 4 & 5 before Tribunal in Revision Application 13(17)/2008-RC.I. The Tribunal stayed the order dated 26.04.2006 passed by the State Government recommending the name of the Petitioner Sri. After hearing all the applicants recommendation dated 26.04.2006 came to be made by State Government which was communicated to the Union of India. Aggrieved by said recommendation appeal was filed by Respondents 4 & 5 before Tribunal in Revision Application 13(17)/2008-RC.I. The Tribunal stayed the order dated 26.04.2006 passed by the State Government recommending the name of the Petitioner Sri. Venkateshwar Rao by its order dated 13.05.2008 after condoning the alleged delay of 1 year 7 months 24 days. 8. In the meanwhile Sri. Iqbal Baig (Petitioner in W.P.61038/2009) had filed a Writ Petition in W.P.10463/2006 questioning the recommendation made by the State Government in favour of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) contending that he possessed the requisite qualification and experience and his application ought not to have been rejected and name of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao could not have been recommended. By order dated 14.03.2008 recommendation dated 26.04.2006 made by the State Government in favour of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) came to be quashed with a direction to reconsider and pass fresh orders. The said order dated 18.03.2008 has been questioned by Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) in W.A.1243/2008 and same is pending. 9. In the meanwhile the Central Mines Tribunal allowed the Revision Petition 13 (17)/2008-CR.I by order dated 05.12.2008 filed by the legal heirs of late Krishnamachari i.e., respondents 4 and 5 herein by directing the State Government to consider the renewal application filed by the legal heirs of late Krishnamachari –the original grantee and quashed the recommendation dated 26.04.2006 made by the State Government. CONTENTIONS RAISED: 10. It is the contention of Sri. M.R. Naik that the Revision application file No.13(17)/2008-RC.I filed by the Respondents 4 and 5 was highly belated namely it was filed after 18 years from the date of cause of action accrued and said order from the Tribunal has been obtained by the Revision Petitioners by suppressing the fact of W.P.24740/1995 having been disposed of on 30.03.2000 and by producing only the interim order which had admittedly reached finality and as such order passed by the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. He would further elaborate his submission by contending that entire order of the Tribunal is based on a interim order passed in W.P.24740/95 on 27.06.1996 and not based on the final order which if had been taken into consideration it would have resulted in dismissing the Revision Petition itself. He would further contend that under Rule 54 of the Rules, Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision application at all since notification issued under rule 59 cannot be questioned before the Tribunal. He would contend that an application was filed by Sri. Venkateshwara Raio (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) to recall the interim order dated 09.05.2008 in Revision Petition before the Tribunal and in the said application it was specifically contended that intentionally the Revision Petitioners had furnished incorrect address of the third respondent therein i.e., Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009 viz., Sri. Venkateswara Rao and by virtue of same postal authorities had to redirect the notice issued by Tribunal and as said notice was received by Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) only on 11.05.2008 after the interim order came to be passed and for this precise reason Respondents 4 and 5 did not furnish correct address and as such he seeks for quashing of the order of the Tribunal. 11. Sri. Phanindra, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.No.61038/2009 is in chorus with these arguments and would also submit that Revision filed by Respondents 4 and 5 before the Tribunal was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties namely the Petitioner Sri. Iqbal Baig who was also one of the applicants for grant of Mining Lease and who had also challenged the recommendation of the State Government dated 26.04.2006 and as such he was a necessary party. He would also submit that Revision Petitioners being fully aware of the final orders passed on 30.03.2000 in W.P.24740/1995 did not bring it to the notice of the Tribunal with an intention to snatch an order from Tribunal by depicting the interim order dated 27-06-1996 only. He would also submit that Revision Petitioners being fully aware of the final orders passed on 30.03.2000 in W.P.24740/1995 did not bring it to the notice of the Tribunal with an intention to snatch an order from Tribunal by depicting the interim order dated 27-06-1996 only. He would elaborate his contentions that legal heirs of the grantee will not have a right under Rule 25-A of Mineral Concession Rules to prosecute the application filed by their father in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Saligram Khirwal vs Union of India & Others reported in (2003) 7 SCC 689 since it was a personal right of the applicant. He would contend that Respondents 4 and 5 are seeking renewal of the lease from 1990 and even if it is accepted, the said period if granted would have lapsed in 2010 and as such consideration of their prayer would not arise since said period has expired. He would further contend that under Mineral Concession Rules for filing of revision the prescribed form being Form ‘N’ was admittedly filed by Respondents 4 and 5 and in Column No.3A it has been specifically mentioned that order which was under challenge before the Tribunal was the order dated 26.04.2006 which is the recommendation made by State Government to Central Government in favour of Sri.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) and the notification dated 15.03.2003 was not under direct challenge at all. He would contend even otherwise the notification 15.03.2003 had been gazetted and published which was within the knowledge of legal heirs of Krishnamachari since they had submitted a representation on 08.09.2003 to the State Government seeking for deletion of land in question from notification dated 15.03.2003 and as such Tribunal could not have condoned the delay without noticing these undisputed facts. He would submit Tribunal could not have directed the renewal application to be considered without considering the effect of the order passed in W.P.10463/2006 dated 28.07.2006 whereunder the recommendation dated 26.04.2006 made by the State Government had been set aside with a direction to redo the matter. He would submit Tribunal could not have directed the renewal application to be considered without considering the effect of the order passed in W.P.10463/2006 dated 28.07.2006 whereunder the recommendation dated 26.04.2006 made by the State Government had been set aside with a direction to redo the matter. He would also submit there is no automatic second renewal and in view of the fact that legal heirs of original lessee having not applied for second renewal there was no question of considering their prayer since it does not arise at all and as such he seeks for allowing the writ petition and quashing of the order of Tribunal dated 26.04.2006. 12. Sri. D.N. Nanjunda Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondents 4 and 5 would support the order of the Tribunal dated 05.12.2008 and contends that Sri.Krishnamachari had applied for lease of the land in question in the year 1968 and was granted in the year 1970 and before expiry of the period of lease an application for renewal was made on 15.09.1989 and no order was passed on said application and on account of there being a deemed order of rejection, revision application was filed by Respondents 4 and 5 which came to be allowed by the Central Government on 06.12.1989 by setting aside the deemed of order rejection and directed the State Government to dispose of the application of renewal within a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of the order by reserving liberty to the applicant to approach appropriate forum in the event of non consideration of said application by State Government and contends that immediately thereafter working permit was granted on 16.10.1990 and said Krishnamachari was perforced to file W.P.24740/1995 seeking for a direction to the State Government to renew Petitioners Mining licence for a period of 20 years in which an interim order came to be passed on 27.06.1996 directing the State Government to extend the benefit of Rule 24A (6) and in the meanwhile Krishnamachari died in 1998 which came to be confirmed in the year 2000 and thereafter notification came to be issued on 15.03.2003 by the State Government notifying the area/land in question as being available for being granted without considering the application for renewal filed by Krishnamachari which was pending and as he contends said notification dated 15.03.2003 was bad in law. He would further contend that Director of Mines and Geology had intimated the Secretary, Mines, C & I Department, Bangalore about the mining lease granted to Sri. Krishnamachari having not been cancelled and the issue regarding claim of the legal heirs of late Krishnamachari (Respondents 4 and 5 herein) not having been resolved and same was kept alive and pending, and as such State Government could not have notified the Land in question before adjudication of pending application for renewal. He would submit that in the adjudication proceedings by the State Government while considering all the applications for grant of lease there is no mention in the order dated 26.4.2006 as to why the name of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) should be given preference to others and submits that as such the order passed by the State Government recommending name of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao in the Central Government was rightly quashed by the Tribunal in view of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese and Iron ores Limited Vs State of Karnataka reported in (2010) 13 SCC 1 . 13. He would further contend that Order dated 26.4.2006 recommending the name of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao was challenged before Tribunal in the Revision Petition in question on 17.3.2008 According to Revision Petitioners the delay was 1 year 7 months 24 days if reckoned from 26.4.2006. It is contended Under Rule 54 of Mineral Concession Rules a period of 3 months is fixed for filing revision, which would commence as per Sub-rule (1) from the date of communication of the order and contends that no such communication was given to respondents 4 & 5 and only after obtaining copy under the Right to Information Act, 2005 they came to know in February 2008 of such order having been passed and immediately thereafter Revision Petition in question was filed and as such it is contended delay has to be reckoned from date of knowledge and not from date of recommendation dated 26.04.2006. He would also further submit that Respondents 4 and 5 have been submitting representations repeatedly to the authorities assailing the notification from the year 2003 itself and when it was not considered by the State Government and when recommendation was made by it recommending the name of Sri.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009)/. He would also further submit that Respondents 4 and 5 have been submitting representations repeatedly to the authorities assailing the notification from the year 2003 itself and when it was not considered by the State Government and when recommendation was made by it recommending the name of Sri.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009)/. Respondents 4 and 5 filed Revision Petition in question on 17.03.2008 seeking condonation of delay of 1 year 7 months 24 days which has been rightly condoned by the first respondent, this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He also contends that State Government is admitting that the application filed by Sri.Krishnamachari was and is still pending and therefore notification dated 15.03.2003 could not have been issued under Rule 59 of Mineral Concession Rules and consequently all proceedings there to are bad in law. He would submit that since application for renewal was pending said area could not have been notified under the notification dated 15.03.2003. He would submit that the father of Respondents 4 and 5 had expired before the grant could be made and as such respondents 4 & 5 being legal heirs are entitled to grant of lease and entitled for claiming renewal thereof under Rule 25A(1). Countering the arguments of Sri.Phanindra with reference to the legal heirs were not entitled to maintain the proceedings as legal heirs of deceased Sri.Krishnamachari, he would contend that in Saligram’s case referred to supra there was violation of terms of the lease and after cancellation fresh notification was issued and issue regarding consideration of an application for renewal was not under adjudication in the said judgment. He would also state that said judgment was prior to insertion of Rule 25A which was inserted with effect from 01.04.1991 and said judgment has no application to the facts of the case. 14. He would also counter the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates appearing for the Petitioners to contend that there is no suppression of fact since Respondents 4 and 5 were not a party to the Writ Petition filed by Sri.Iqbal Ahmed Baig namely W.P.10463/2006 and these respondents were not aware of the quashing of the recommendation dated 26.04.2006 made by the State Government recommending the name of Sri. Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) and as such the said order was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal and as such there is no suppression of any fact by Respondents 4 and 5 before the Tribunal. In reply to the contention that the Revision Petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties namely Sri.Iqbal Baig (Petitioner in W.P.61038/2009) not being made a party to Revision Petition, he would submit that said Sri.Iqbal Baig was not a successful applicant in the recommendation made by State Government to Central Government on 26.4.2006 and it was only Sri.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) whose name was recommended and as such he alone was arrayed as a party and as such revision application was not liable to be dismissed for nonjoinder of said person and he cannot be continued as necessary party. On these grounds he seeks for dismissal of the writ petitions. 16. Sri. Kolle, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State would submit that admittedly the application filed by late Sri.Krishnamachari seeking for renewal of lease had not been disposed of by the State Government and it was kept pending and submits that same is required to be considered by the State Government and as such he supports the order passed by the Tribunal dated 05.12.2008 and prays for dismissal of both Writ Petitions. 17. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the pleadings as also the impugned orders we are of the considered view that the following points would emerge for our consideration: 1. Whether the Revision Application File No.13(17)/2008-RC.I was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay by the Tribunal? OR Whether Tribunal was correct in coming to a conclusion that there was delay of 1 year 7 months and 24 days for being condoned or the delay was beyond said period? 2. Whether the Revision Application was liable to be dismissed by Tribunal for nonjoinder of necessary parties? 3. Whether the order passed by the Tribunal dated 5.12.2008 allowing Revision Application File No.13 (17)/2008-RC.I is liable to be quashed or affirmed? 4. Whether respondents-4 and 5 have a vested right as legal representatives which enables them to contend that application filed for renewal of mining lease by their father late Sri S Krishnamachari is to be considered? 5. 3. Whether the order passed by the Tribunal dated 5.12.2008 allowing Revision Application File No.13 (17)/2008-RC.I is liable to be quashed or affirmed? 4. Whether respondents-4 and 5 have a vested right as legal representatives which enables them to contend that application filed for renewal of mining lease by their father late Sri S Krishnamachari is to be considered? 5. Whether the order dated 04.10.2008 Annexure-J to W.P.61038/2009 rejecting the request of the Petitioner, Sri.Iqbal Baig to consider his application in accordance with the direction issued in W.P.10463/2006 dated 14.03.2008 is liable to be quashed or affirmed? 5. What order? 18. In both the writ petitions, order passed by the Mines Tribunal-first respondent in Revision Application File No.13(17)/2008-RC.I in Final Order No.42/2008 dated 05-12-2008 has been challenged on the ground that first respondent ought not to have entertained the revision application since it was highly belated and the delay aspect has been erroneously considered and condoned. Hence, point No.(1) formulated hereinabove is taken up for consideration. 19. In order to answer point No.(1), it would be necessary to narrate facts in brief which would have a bearing for resolving the same and those facts are succinctly narrated as under: SUMMARY OF FACTS On 19-10-1968 the father of respondents-4 and 5 i.e., late Sri. Krishnamachari filed an application for grant of mining lease in respect of 45 acres in Navalatti village Sandur Taluk, Bellary District and same came to be granted pursuant to which mining lease was executed in his favour on 18-02-1970. An application for renewal of the lease came to be filed over an area of 38 acres on 09-02-1989 and as per the Existing Rules namely, Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred as ‘Rules’ for brevity) and in particular, Rule 24 there was a deemed Order of rejection on 11-05-1989. The lessee filed a revision petition before the Mines Tribunal questioning the deemed order of rejection and Tribunal by its order dated 06-12-1989 disposed of the said application for renewal of the mining lease by directing the State Government to dispose of the application for renewal of mining lease within a period of 200 days by reserving liberty to the applicant to seek redressal of his grievance in the event of State Government failing to pass orders on his application for renewal. Thereafter lessee sought for grant of working permit for a period of one year by submitting a representation to third respondent. On account of non consideration of the application for renewal of the lease several representation is said to have been submitted and thereafter Writ Petition was filed by the lessee in W.P.No.24740/1995 seeking direction to the State Government to renew the petitioner’s (therein) mining lease for a period of 20 years. An interim order came to be passed in the said writ petition on 27-06-1996 which reads as under: “that the respondents be and are hereby directed to extend the benefit of Rule 24A (6) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 to petitioner, if he has made an application for renewal in time”. Subsequently, said writ petition came to be dismissed on 30-03-2000 by observing that the petitioner therein was required to seek prior approval from Government of India to carry on mining activity in a Forest Area as required under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. 20. Thereafter on 15-03-2003 a notification came to be issued by the State Government calling for applications for grant of mining lease in respect of different areas including an area measuring to an extent of 15.38 hectares of land in Navalatti Village, Sandur Taluk, Bellary District i.e., portion of the land in question as available for grant. At that point of time, fifth respondent herein along with grandson of late Sri.Krishnamachari (Original Lessee) submitted a representation on 08-09-2003 to the second respondent State Government herein seeking deletion of said land notified at Sl.No.23 in the notification dated 15-03-2003 on the ground of application seeking renewal of the mining lease held by Sri.Krishnamachari was still pending and not disposed of. 21. Pursuant to above said notification dated 15-03-2003, both the petitioners had submitted their applications for grant of mining lease. Notice of hearing was issued as required under Rule 26(1) of the Extant Rules to all the applicants and after hearing the applicants, a recommendation was made by the State Government, by recommending the name of the petitioner Sri.P.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) to the first respondent on 26-04-2006. 22. Being aggrieved by issuance of Notification dated 15.03.2003 and recommendation dated 26.04.2006, Respondents 4 and 5 filed a Revision Petition in Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I before Mines Tribunal. 22. Being aggrieved by issuance of Notification dated 15.03.2003 and recommendation dated 26.04.2006, Respondents 4 and 5 filed a Revision Petition in Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I before Mines Tribunal. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed seeking condonation of delay contending that there was delay of 1 year 7 months 24 days. Tribunal accepted the cause shown and condoned the delay. Thereafter, by order dated 05-12-2008 allowed the revision petition by setting aside the recommendation dated 26-04-2006 and directing the State Government to consider the applications of respondents-4 and 5 for grant of mining lease. This order is impugned in both the Writ Petitions. RE: Point No.(1): In order to answer said point, it would be necessary to examine the nature of prayer sought for by respondents-4 and 5 before Tribunal in their Revision Application No.13/2008 which reads as under: (a) “DECLARE the action of the respondents 1 and 2 in not considering the application of the petitioners for renewal of the Mining lease in respect of the schedule land as highly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed there under; (b) DIRECT the respondents 1 and 2 to cancel the notification issued under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 making the land available for grant by quashing the proceedings taken by the State Government recommending the case of the 3rd respondent for grant of mining lease in respect of the schedule land. (c) DIRECT the respondents 1 and 2 to consider the application of the petitioners for the renewal of the mining lease filed by the father of the petitioners by treating them as the legal representatives of late S. Krishnamachari”. (emphasis supplied by us) A perusal of the above prayer would clearly go to show that notification dated 15-03-2003 has been sought for being quashed/cancelled and they had sought for quashing of proceedings pursuant thereto apart from seeking consideration of their application for renewal of the mining lease. (emphasis supplied by us) A perusal of the above prayer would clearly go to show that notification dated 15-03-2003 has been sought for being quashed/cancelled and they had sought for quashing of proceedings pursuant thereto apart from seeking consideration of their application for renewal of the mining lease. In fact, when the original lessee had approached the Mines Tribunal earlier in revision petition No.2/KR-5589/Mines/5 challenging deemed Order of rejection the Tribunal itself had given liberty to the revision petitioner to approach the appropriate authority Forum for redressal of his grievance in the event of application for renewal is not considered by the State Government within 200 days vide order dated 06-12-1989 which reads as under: “2. The Central Government in exercise of their revisionary powers under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 set aside the deemed rejection of the petitioner’s application for mineral concession, arising out of the State Governments failure too pass orders within 6 months. The State Govt, is directed now to dispose of above application on merits within a period not exceeding two hundred days from the date of this order. Should the State Govt. fail to pass orders on the petitioner’s application he may seek redress in an appropriate court of law, if so advised.” In effect, the father of respondents-4 and 5 was entitled to seek redressal of his grievance in the event of non-consideration of his alleged pending application for renewal of the lease immediately after the expiry of 200 days in the event of its non-consideration by State Government. However, for reasons best known, he did not choose to do so and said liberty granted to him was not made use of. But on the other hand, he sought for issuance of work permit to carry on mining activity over the land leased to him by representation dated 17-01-1990. By such time, Forest Conservation Act, 1980 had come into force by Act No.2/1980 under which, there was absolute bar for carrying on any mining activity in a forest area without prior approval of Central Government. By such time, Forest Conservation Act, 1980 had come into force by Act No.2/1980 under which, there was absolute bar for carrying on any mining activity in a forest area without prior approval of Central Government. In fact, this Court in W.P.24740/1995 disposed of on 30-03-2000 has also made an observation that petitioner – Sri Krishnamachari was not entitled to carry on any mining activity in the forest area without obtaining prior approval and clearance from the Government of India by taking into consideration the law declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T N GODAVARMAN THIRUMULKPAD vs. UNION OF INDIA reported in AIR 1997 SC 1228 . 23. Now coming back to issue to delay it is noticed in that Revision Application 13 (17)/2008-RC.I three reliefs were sought as already extracted hereinabove. The said Revision Petition was filed on 17.03.2008. An application seeking condonation of delay was also filed. It was contended therein that there was delay of 1 year 7 months and 24 days in filing the revision application. In support of the prayer for condonation of delay it was contended that order which has been challenged is dated 24.06.2006 and same was received in February, 2008 and they came to know of such recommendation made in favour of Sri.Venkateshwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) only when they visited the office of Director, Mines and Geology in January 2008 and as such they applied for certified copy of said recommendation under the Right to Information Act in the month of January, 2008, and obtained it during February 2008 and thereafter filed the revision application on 17.03.2008. It was also contended that Respondents 4 and 5 were not aware of the proceedings pending before the Government which ultimately culminated in recommendation being made by the State Government to the Central Government on 26.04.2006 and as such they were not aware of the said proceedings. The affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay has been sworn to by the fifth Respondent before the Tribunal. To avoid any confusion or ambiguity to step in, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to extract the stand taken by fifth Respondent before the Tribunal and same reads as under: “3. I submit that the application filed by out father is kept pending. To avoid any confusion or ambiguity to step in, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to extract the stand taken by fifth Respondent before the Tribunal and same reads as under: “3. I submit that the application filed by out father is kept pending. I further submit that after coming to know the notification issued, I have filed objections to the notification dated 15.03.2003 and requested the State Government to withdraw the said notification. The previous Director has informed that necessary proposal will be sent to the Government for withdrawal of the notification on the ground that Item No.23 in the notification is included by ignorance of the applicant for renewal. In view of the said promise Petitioner did not take any steps for challenging the same. Subsequently without giving notice and opportunity of being heard to any one of the legal representatives, the Chief Minister appears to have accepted the application of third Respondent and the same is kept pending without disclosing the same. Since the orders were not disclosed there was no communication whatsoever. Clandestinely by communication Annexure ‘B’ dated 24.06.2006 the order of the Chief Minister is implemented seeking the prior approval of the State Government. There is xxx decision taken thereon. In view of the same the Petitioners were not aware of the proceedings. In the first week of February, 2008 after making all the enquiries the Petitioners obtained the certified copy and issued a letter on 22.02.2008 requesting to consider the application filed by the father of the Petitioners for renewal of the lease. Very recently xxx approval done. From the date of the knowledge the Revision is within time. However, as a matter of abundant caution the present application for condonation of delay is filed.” (Emphasis supplied by us) Thus, it is clear from the affidavit of Respondent No.5 that Respondents-4 & 5 were aware of the Notification dated 15.03.2003 way back on 08.09.2003 when they submitted representation seeking deletion of the land in question. Respondent No.5 being fully aware of non-consideration of his representations which is said to have been submitted seeking renewal of the lease to the State Government and being fully aware of the notification dated 15-03-2003 having been published in the Gazette did not chose to challenge the said action or the orders/notifications immediately thereafter. Respondent No.5 being fully aware of non-consideration of his representations which is said to have been submitted seeking renewal of the lease to the State Government and being fully aware of the notification dated 15-03-2003 having been published in the Gazette did not chose to challenge the said action or the orders/notifications immediately thereafter. But, went on submitting applications/ representations/ memorials to State Government, obviously to keep the kettle boiling and to revive the cause of action as and when they wish to do so. As to whether such a course of action was left open to them and whether it is permissible either under the Mineral Concession Rules or under the common law is the one which requires to be addressed and answered. They did not choose to take any steps to challenge the same though they had been given liberty to challenge the action or inaction of the Government by the Tribunal way back on 06-12-1989 itself. This clearly establishes that there has been delay and latches on the part of Respondents – 4 and 5. Whether said delay can be construed as sufficient cause for being condoned is the core issue. 24. Under Rule 54 (1) of Mineral Concession Rules, and person aggrieved by any order made by the State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act or the Rules may within three months of the date of the communication of the order can apply to the Central Government in Form ‘N’ and seek revision of the said order. Proviso to Sub-Rule (1) empowers the Revisional Authority to entertain a revision petition if filed beyond the period of three months on sufficient cause being shown. In this statutory background the facts on hand are required to be examined. 25. As noticed herein supra, the prayer made before Tribunal by the Revision Petitioners i.e., Respondents 4 and 5 are three in number. In so far as prayer (b) already extracted would disclose that it relates to cancellation of the notification dated 15.03.2003 issued under Rule 59. In this statutory background the facts on hand are required to be examined. 25. As noticed herein supra, the prayer made before Tribunal by the Revision Petitioners i.e., Respondents 4 and 5 are three in number. In so far as prayer (b) already extracted would disclose that it relates to cancellation of the notification dated 15.03.2003 issued under Rule 59. The recommendation made by the State Government to the Central Government recommending the name of Sri.Venkatehwara Rao (Petitioner in W.P.21319/2009) under proceedings dated 26.04.2006 has been set aside by the Tribunal by its order dated 05.12.2008 and at paragraph 30 Tribunal has observed that notification dated 15.03.2003 has been set aside by the High Court of Karnataka itself in W.P.21608/2005 dated 07.08.2008. There cannot be any cloud over the fact that Respondents 4 and 5 were aggrieved by the notification dated 15.03.2003 in as much as the land in question or the claim laid by them over the land to which they were agitating had been included as Item No.23 in the said notification. Infact Respondents 4 and 5 themselves admit that they had submitted a representation on 08.09.2003 seeking for deletion of the said item from the notification dated 15.03.2003. This clearly goes to show that Respondents 4 and 5 were agitating for cancellation of the said notification from the year 2003 and as such this precise prayer was made by them [prayer (b)] before Tribunal in their Revision application 13(17)/2008-RC.I. In other words it would clearly go to establish that Respondents 4 and 5 were aware of the notification dated 15.03.2003 way back on 08.09.2003 itself. Perusal of said representation 08.09.2003 produced by the Respondents 4 and 5 along with their statement of objections as Annexure-R6 would also establish the fact that it was fully within the knowledge of these Respondents about the notification having been issued on 15.03.2003 by the Government of Karnataka. In their own precise contention raised by them in their representation dated 08.09.2003 Annexure-R6 would fortify the fact and it reads as under: “It is therefore requested that any process in continuation of notification No.CL.16.MMM.2003, Bangalore dated 15.03.2003 becomes violative of law and natural justice. It is therefore humbly requested to not to take any action on invalid notification cited above to the extent of Sl.No.23 i.e., ML.No.957 as per Mining Lease Rules and it is also requested to kindly delete Sl.No.23 i.e., ML.No.957. It is therefore humbly requested to not to take any action on invalid notification cited above to the extent of Sl.No.23 i.e., ML.No.957 as per Mining Lease Rules and it is also requested to kindly delete Sl.No.23 i.e., ML.No.957. 15.3 hectares Maganese and Iron Ore areas at Navalutti Village, Sandur Taluk, Bellard District belonging to Sri. S. Krishnamachari, Mine owner, Bellary from the above notification No.CL.16.MMM.2003, Bangalore dated 15.03.2003 and also to kindly grant renewal of mining lease in our favour in accordance with rules”. 26. This undisputed representation submitted by them on 08.09.2003 to the Second Respondent herein would clearly establish: (i) Respondents 4 and 5 were fully aware of the notification dated 15.03.2003 even as on 08.09.2003. (ii) Respondents 4 and 5 were seeking cancellation of the said notification dated 15.03.2003 even as on 08.09.2003 and as such they cannot plead ignorance of the said notification not being within their knowledge. However, in the Revision application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I they would contend that they were submitting representations to the authorities and had kept their cause of action or grievance alive and it is their further contention that on account of non consideration of their representations and non renewal of the lease they were pursuing with the authorities with a request to grant their prayer made in those representations and same was not being considered by State Government and ultimately when recommendation was made on 26.04.2006 which came to their knowledge in 2008 they preferred revision cannot be eschewed for reasons more than one. 27. Petitioners have been submitting the representations on 15.03.2004, 26.01.2006, 25.07.2007 28.08.2007 at regular intervals to third respondent which is said to have acted as umbilical cord for keeping their claim alive. In fact in the Revision petition they have also categorically contended that such representations were being submitted vide paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Revision Petition. 28. On the one hand, Writ Petitioners have contended that there is delay of 18 years on the part of respondents -4 and 5 in approaching the Mines Tribunal by filing the revision petition. In fact in the Revision petition they have also categorically contended that such representations were being submitted vide paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Revision Petition. 28. On the one hand, Writ Petitioners have contended that there is delay of 18 years on the part of respondents -4 and 5 in approaching the Mines Tribunal by filing the revision petition. It is not in dispute that at earlier point of time, deceased Krishnamachari had approached the Mines Tribunal after deemed order of rejection of his application for renewal of the lease and Tribunal by its order dated 06-12-1989 (extracted herein above) and directed the State Government to dispose of the renewal application within a period of 200 days from the date of order failing which, the revision petitioner had been granted liberty by the Tribunal itself to seek redressal in appropriate Court of law in the event of his application not being considered and as such, respondents -4 and 5 cannot now challenge the act of State Government in not considering their renewal application since liberty granted by Tribunal in its order dated 06-12-1989 has not been made use of and at this length of time they cannot raise said issue particularly when there is unexplained delay of 18 years in approaching the Tribunal. In other words Late Krishnamachari was required to challenge the action of the State is not considering the application of renewal submitted by him after expiry of 200 days from 06-12-1989. 29. Even otherwise, it is the contention of the petitioners that notification came to be issued on 15-03-2003 which was within the knowledge of the respondents-4 and 5 and revision application was filed on 17-03-2008 i.e., after a period of five years and there being no application seeking condonation of said delay of five years, Tribunal could not have held that delay was 1 year 7 months and 24 days. 30. 30. it is further contended that Mines Tribunal erred in not considering the fact that order dated 26-04-2006 was passed by the State Government recommending the grant of mining lease in favour of Sri.P.Venkateshwara Rao and there is no proper explanation coming whatsoever in the application explaining the sufficient cause for condonation of delay from the date of such recommendation till date of filing of revision and as such the delay of one year seven months and 24 days condoned by the Tribunal is without any basis and liable to be quashed. 31. Thus, it would emerge from the contentions raised, facts pleaded, grounds urged and pleas put forward that delay aspect is glaring on three fronts: (1) From the date of expiry of 200 days as ordered by the Mines Tribunal on 06-12-1989 passed in Revision Application No.2/Kar.55/89-Mines-5 to the date of filing of the Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-R.CI on 17-03-2008 it would be around 18 years. (2) From the date of notification dated 15-03-2003 till the date of filing of the Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-R.CI on 17-03-2008, delay would be 5 years. (3) From the date of order/recommendation dated 26-04-2006 made by the State Government recommending the name of Sri.Venkateshwara Rao till the date of filing of the Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I on 17-03-2008 delay would be One year 10 months and 21 days. 32. As already observed hereinabove, the prayer sought for by the respondents-4 and 5 before the Revisional Authority is three fold and by considering those three prayers in juxta position with reference to the three spells of delay noted herein above, contentions of both the parties are delved upon herein below. 33. We are of the view that before proceeding to adjudicate the facts on hand, it would be appropriate to refer to some of the decisions of the Apex Court which would reflect light on this issue. (1) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another vs. Mst.Katiji & Others ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. (1) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another vs. Mst.Katiji & Others ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ‘State’ which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the ‘State’ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression ‘sufficient cause’. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. (2) Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation And Another (2010 AIR SCW 1788) “We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. (2) Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation And Another (2010 AIR SCW 1788) “We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate – Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , n. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay – G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 .” 34. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 .” 34. The perusal of the dicta laid down in above judgments would make it abundantly clear that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ will have to be given liberal construction. While condoning the delay, the Courts will examine as to whether there is negligence or inaction on the part of the litigant in approaching the Court. The absence of such negligence or inaction will have to be kept in mind while considering when there is claim for condonation of delay. It is true that procedural law will have to yield to substantive justice. The Courts would endeavour to resolve the issues or dispute by examining the claims on merits and not nipping the dispute at the bud. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether delay if any in approaching the Courts was not deliberate, unintentional and it was not on account of any malafides. Thus, to achieve the goal of rendering substantial justice the words ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, requires to be interpreted by extending a liberal approach. At the same time, a burden is also cast on the Court to ensure that any dilatory tactics adopted by litigants is required to be curbed with iron hands. Thus, a party approaching the Court after long lapse of time by being privy to certain acts if resulting or culminating in an adverse order being passed cannot be permitted to assail the same at a belated stage on the ground that the cause of action though accrued to him at the first instance to challenge an order or action of the authority was kept alive by infusing oxygen to it by way of submitting memorials or representations or petitions. It is this aspect which cannot be eschewed by Courts of law and as such facts of each case will have to be examined independently and not by a straight-jacket formula. It is in this background, the Hon’ble Apex Court in ORIENTAL AROMA’s case referred to supra has held that expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. 35. It is in this background, the Hon’ble Apex Court in ORIENTAL AROMA’s case referred to supra has held that expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. 35. Keeping in mind the principles enunciated in the above referred to judgment when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, we notice that father of respondents-4 and 5 – late Krishnamachari had approached the Mines Tribunal in Revision Petition 2/Kar.55/89-Mines-5 being aggrieved by deemed rejection order and same came to be disposed of on 06-12-1989 with a direction to the State Government to dispose of the application dated 09-02-1989 submitted by late Sri Krishnamachari seeking renewal within a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of the said order. Tribunal also reserved liberty to the revision petitioner that in the event of State Government failing to pass orders on the said application he can seek redressal of his grievance in an appropriate Court of law. The said 200 days period expired some where during June, 1990 and thereafter the said Sri Krishnamachari did not pursue his grievance at all, except seeking for issuance of working permit and admittedly he did not pursue his application for renewal by approaching Tribunal or Court. However, he woke up from his slumber in the year 1995 by filing a writ petition i.e., in W.P.No.24740/1995 seeking direction to the State Government to renew the mining licence for a period of 20 years. This act on the part of Sri Krishnamachari would clearly go to show that either liberty granted by the Mines Tribunal on 06-12-1989 was given up or he preferred or chose to approach this Court by filing W.P.No.24740/1995 only in 1995. In either of the situation, it would emerge that Sri Krishnamachari did not pursue his claim for consideration of his application for renewal of mining lease as ordered on 06-12-1989 and even if it is construed that he pursued it in the year 1995 it got extinguished on dismissal of said Writ Petition on 30-03-2000. In either of the situation, it would emerge that Sri Krishnamachari did not pursue his claim for consideration of his application for renewal of mining lease as ordered on 06-12-1989 and even if it is construed that he pursued it in the year 1995 it got extinguished on dismissal of said Writ Petition on 30-03-2000. In other words, facts would reveal from June 1990 to the date of filing of the writ petition No.24740/1995, said petitioner had wantonly abandoned his claim which was said to have been available to him as ordered by Tribunal on 06.12.1989. It is contended that representations were being submitted and as such, the cause of action accrued to him was afloat or was alive. It is at this juncture the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court requires to be noticed wherein it has been held that submitting of applications would not revive dead cause of action and they read as under: 1. (2006) 4 SCC 322 – Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd., though its Chairman and Managing Director and another Vs K.Thangappan and another “5. The factual position as noted above clearly shows that for nearly two decades Respondent 1 workman had remained silent. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants even in the representations made in 1997 and 1998 there was no reference to the representations claimed to have been made in 1982 and/or 1989. Even if that would have been made, there was considerable delay even in making the representations. There is no dispute that mere making of representations cannot justify a belated approach. 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty Vs State of Mysore. This was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose Case by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa Vs Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa Vs Arun Kumar Patnaik also). 2. In State of Orissa Vs Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa Vs Arun Kumar Patnaik also). 2. AIR 1967 SC 993 – K.V.Rajalakshmiah Setty and another Vs State of Mysore and another “13. There is also a good deal of force behind the contention that the appellants are guilty of laches. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950, they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they could rest upon their oars if they were really being discriminated against. As we cannot hold that the appellants were entitled to any particular indulgence or concession, the only way of meeting out equality to all surveyors who had been promoted to the cadre of Assistant Engineers would be to say that promotions should in all cases be effective from the date of the notification. This is obviously beyond our powers. (3) AIR 1970 SC 470 – Rabindra Nath Bose And Others V. Union Of India And Others Learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, says that there has been no undue delay. He says that the representations were being received by the Government all the time. But there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations. If the Government has turned down one representation, the making of another representation on similar lines would not enable the petitioners to explain the delay. Learned Counsel for the petitioners says that the petitioners were under the impression that the Departmental Promotion Committee had held a meeting in 1948 and not on April 29, 1949, and the real true facts came to be known in 1961, when the Government mentioned these facts in their letter dated December 28, 1961. We are unable to accept this explanation. This fact has been mentioned in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee which met in Feb. 1952 and we are unable to believe that the petitioners did not come to know all these facts till 1961. But even assuming that the petitioners came to know all these facts only in Dec. We are unable to accept this explanation. This fact has been mentioned in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee which met in Feb. 1952 and we are unable to believe that the petitioners did not come to know all these facts till 1961. But even assuming that the petitioners came to know all these facts only in Dec. 1961, even then there has been inordinate delay in presenting the present petition. The fact that Jaisinghani’s case, 1967-2-SCR 703 =( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ) was pending before the High Court and later in this Court is also, no excuse for the delay in presenting the present petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 36. Thus, it would emerge from the dicta laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court even if representations were given, it would not revive the cause of action if any which had expired long back. Hence, on the ground that the respondents – 4 and 5 and/or their father had abandoned their claim wayback in the year 1990 itself would disentitle them to urge once again in the Revision Application No. 13(17)/2008-RC.I the very same issue viz., renewal of Mining Lease. Hence, the one and the only conclusion that can be arrived is to hold that respondents-4 and 5 had not approached the Tribunal immediately after the expiry of 200 days as ordered in Revision Petition 2/Kar-55/89-Mines-5 and as such after a lapse of almost 18 years respondents -4 and 5 were not justified in seeking such prayer before the Tribunal and it was hopelessly barred by limitation. 37. There cannot be any dispute that notification dated 15-03-2003 was within the knowledge of respondents-4 and 5 as already noticed hereinabove inasmuch, as, these respondents by submitting representation dated 08-09-2003 vide Annexure-R8 to the second respondent herein had sought for deletion of item No.23 from the said notification which relates to the land in question namely, to the land to which respondents-4 and 5 were seeking grant of mining lease or seeking for consideration of their pending application for renewal. Thus, knowledge of said notification is clearly attributable to the respondents 4 & 5 atleast from 08-09-2003. Thus, knowledge of said notification is clearly attributable to the respondents 4 & 5 atleast from 08-09-2003. Being conscious of the issuance of notification particularly, by objecting to the entry found therein by way of submitting their objections on 08-09-2003, Respondents-4 and 5 cannot now contend that they were not aware of such notification having been issued by the State Government and it does not lie in the mouth of respondents-4 and 5 say so in view of their own representation dated 08-09-2003 staring at their face. Thus, the cause of action for respondents-4 and 5 to challenge the said notification when construed to have arisen on 8-9-2003, the Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I on 17-03-2008 will have to be necessarily held to be barred by limitation namely, it was filed after a lapse of nearly five years for which no condonation has been sought for. On that count also, Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I was liable to have been dismissed as barred by limitation and could not have been entertained. 38. Respondents 4 & 5 have also contended that recommendation dated 26-04-2006 made by the State Government recommending the name of Sri. P. Venkateshwara Rao was not within their knowledge requires to be examined with utmost circumspection. Admittedly, these respondents claim to have been knocking at the doors of various authorities, foras and Courts continuously and after not getting the reliefs sought for by them they have ignited fresh litigation in one form or the other. The perusal of the recommendation dated 26-4-2006 would reveal that all the applicants therein were issued notice under Rule 26(1) of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and after hearing the applicants orders of recommendation was made by the State Government as per the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and Minor Mineral Development Regulation Act. In the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay, it has not been stated by respondents-4 and 5 as to what action or as to what steps they took after submitting their objections on 08-09-2003 to the notification dated 15-03-2003 till February, 2008. The affidavit is as vague as vagueness could be and it also lacks of material particulars. A litigant who seeks for condonation of delay as observed herein above has to exhibit diligence and not negligence and his acts should be bonafide and not tainted with malafides or should not give room for any suspicion to doubt the bonafides. The affidavit is as vague as vagueness could be and it also lacks of material particulars. A litigant who seeks for condonation of delay as observed herein above has to exhibit diligence and not negligence and his acts should be bonafide and not tainted with malafides or should not give room for any suspicion to doubt the bonafides. In the instant case, respondents-4 and 5 have not exhibited any diligence whatsoever and have not demonstrated before Tribunal by taking a specific plea as to what steps they took from the year 2003 of 2008 i.e., from the date of notification till date of filing of Revision petition. The particulars furnished in the affidavit is bald, bereft of material particulars and averments made in the affidavit supporting the application for consideration of delay does not inspire any confidence for being accepted and it does not even come within the proximity of truth for being accepted. 39. In these circumstances aforesaid, we are of the considered view that the revision petition filed by respondents-4 and 5 was highly belated, barred by limitation and as such, it was liable to be dismissed at the threshold and was not required to be examined on merits which exercise undertaken by the Tribunal was an exercise in futility and as such order of Tribunal dated 05.12.2008 is liable to be set aside. Hence, we answer point No.1 holding that Tribunal was not justified in condoning the delay and entertaining the Revision on merits. RE: POINT NO.(2): 40. Though it has been contended by the Petitioner in W.P.No.61038/2009 that Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I was not maintainable on account of nonjoinder of parties namely, the petitioner Sri Iqbal Baig having not been impleaded as a party to the proceedings in Revision Application No.13(17)/2008-RC.I we are of the considered view that said plea has to be rejected at the threshold for the simple reason that it is not only necessary party but also proper party which is the basic ingredient required to be examined in the array of parties, so as to ensure that complete justice is done between the parties in respect of a lis to avoid any technical plea being taken and to have a binding effect on all the parties when the ultimate order would be passed affecting the rights of the parties. In this background, when we analyse the facts on hand, it is noticed that petitioner Sri Iqbal Baig was admittedly not made party in the said Revision Application filed by Respondents-4 and 5. The prayer sought for before the Tribunal was for quashing of the notification dated 15-03-2003 and the consequential recommendation made by the State on 26-04-2006 recommending the name of Sri Venkateshwara Rao to the Central Government. Neither a right had crystallised in favour of the said Sri Iqbal Baig in the order of recommendation nor could he be construed as a necessary and proper party in a proceeding assailing said recommendation made in favour of a third party. Hence, point No.(2) is answered in the negative. RE: POINT NO.(3): 41. As already discussed by us hereinabove while answering point No.(1) holding that the order dated 05-12-2008 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No.13 (17)/2008-RC.I is liable to be set aside on the ground of delay for myriad reasons aforesaid, we are also of the considered view that the said order had been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court while hearing and disposing of the Writ Appeal No.1243/2008 c/w Writ Petition Nos.21319/2009, 61038/2009 and Writ Petition No.11447/2009 on 30-07-2009 which was set aside by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal 5495-5496/2011 by order dated 13-07-2011 and a finding had been recorded by this Court as to why the order of the Tribunal dated 5-12-2008 was liable to be set aside. We feel appropriate to extract the same and to avoid repetition, which reads as under: “10.2: It is evident xxxxx stood rejected. Therefore, the non-compliance of the order of the Central Mines Tribunal in No.666/89 dated 6-12-1989 will not confer any right in favour of the legal representatives of Krishnamachari to pursue the remedy on the ground of non-compliance of the order dated 6-12-1989, after lapse of 18 years in the year 2008, in review application No.13(17)2008-RC.I before the Central Mines Tribunal because even though the Central Mines Tribunal, in the instant case, remanded the matter, from the year 1989, till Krishnamachari is alleged to have met with civil death in the year 1998, the legal representatives did not prosecute their claim for renewal of mining lease. Hence, the right of the original lease to seek renewal got abated. Hence, the right of the original lease to seek renewal got abated. 10.3: That apart, even after issuance of statutory notification under Rule 59(1) of MC Rules to the effect that the impugned area is available for grant of mining lease, the legal representatives of the original lessee have not chosen to challenge the same. The legal representatives having not challenged the notification, by way of revision or before this Court or in the manner known to law and also for the lapse in approaching the Tribunal, their claim is liable to be rejected. Hence, the first proviso to 59(1) of MC rules is not attracted. As a result, the impugned area is available for grant of mining lease as notified under Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules and the same is not properly appreciated by the Tribunal. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge placed reliance on the evaluation proceedings, assessing the comparative merits of the applicants viz., Iqbal Baig and P. Venkateshwara Rao and others, pursuant to the notification dated 15-03-2003, which would only mean that the Central Mines Tribunal has also relied upon the notification issued under Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules, in as much as, the Central Mines Tribunal has taken into consideration the orders made in Writ Petition No.10463/2006 dated 14-3-2008 and Writ Petition No.21608/2005 dated 14-8-2008, whereunder, the notification dated 15-3-2003 was challenged in the aforesaid writ petitions. In that view of the matter, the legal representatives of original lessee have no locus standi to claim any right for renewal of mining lease after the issuance of notification under Rule 59(1) of MC Rules. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal dated 5-12-2008 and the consequential order/direction dated 15-1-2009 of the State Government directing the Director of Mines and Geology to consider the renewal application of the legal representatives of the original lessee is totally without jurisdiction.” We do not find any good ground to deviate from the said reasons assigned on the earlier occasion by Division Bench and we are of the considered view that same requires to be re-affirmed which we do. In view of the above and for the reasons assigned by us while answering Point No.(1). Point No.(3) is answered by holding that the order of the Tribunal dated 05-12-2008 is not sustainable. RE: POINT No.4: 42. The lease granted to Sri. Krishnamachari expired on 17.02.1990. In view of the above and for the reasons assigned by us while answering Point No.(1). Point No.(3) is answered by holding that the order of the Tribunal dated 05-12-2008 is not sustainable. RE: POINT No.4: 42. The lease granted to Sri. Krishnamachari expired on 17.02.1990. The original lessee Krishnamachari, however, did not prosecute his claim of renewal either during the period of lease or in his life time. Hence, the right of the original lessee to seek renewal got abated. The legal representatives of Sri Krishnamachari preferred a revision application before the Central Mines Tribunal in Revision Application File No.13 (17)/2008-RC.I in the year 2008, contending that they are the legal heirs of late Krishnamachari, in whose favour, the Central Mines Tribunal, by its final order, in No.666/89, dated 06.12.1989, directed the State Government to consider the renewal application filed on 09.02.1989 within 200 days; but no orders have been passed by the State Government pursuant to the order of the Central Mines Tribunal in the revision petition filed by the original lessee Krishnamachari. The Mines Tribunal, by order dated 05.12.2008 in No.42/2008, taking note of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 14.03.2008 in Writ Petition No.10463/2006, allowed the revision application and directed the State Government to consider the case of the legal representatives of Krishnamachari. The direction of the Mines Tribunal dated 05.12.2008 as well as order of the learned Single Judge dated 14.03.2008 in Writ Petition No.10463/2006 and the order dated 14.08/2008 made in W.P.No.21608/2005, by order dated 15.01.2009, directed the Director of Mines and Geology to immediately process the renewal of mining lease in favour of legal representatives of deceased Krishnamachari. 43. Since the original lessee has not prosecuted his right to seek renewal, his right to seek renewal abates. Admittedly the original lessee, Sri Krishnamachari had in fact filed application for renewal of lease. Further, against the order of deemed rejection the said Sri Krishnamachari had filed Revision Application in No.666/1989. In view of the fact that right to seek renewal by the original lessee itself got abated, the first proviso to Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules is not attracted and therefore, the State Government was well within its jurisdiction to issue notification under Rule 59(1) of MC Rules, notifying the area available for grant of mining lease. In view of the fact that right to seek renewal by the original lessee itself got abated, the first proviso to Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules is not attracted and therefore, the State Government was well within its jurisdiction to issue notification under Rule 59(1) of MC Rules, notifying the area available for grant of mining lease. Consequently, the Central Mines Tribunal has erred in exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 54 in allowing the revision petition and passing the final order dated 05.12.2008 directing the State Government to consider the renewal application filed by the original grantee and in-turn, the State Government has also, by proceedings dated 15.01.2009, erred in directing the Director of Mines and Geology to process the renewal application in favour of legal representatives of Krishnamachari. 44. To examine as to whether the application of the legal representatives of the deceased original lessee was required to be considered, it is relevant to refer the following rules: Rule 24A(6) of the MC Rules which deals with the renewal of mining lease, as substituted by GSR.724(E), dated 27th September 1994, is apt to be referred to, which reads as hereunder: “24A Renewal of mining lease – (1) An application for the renewal of a mining lease shall be made to the State Government in Form J, at least twelve months before the date on which the lease is due to expire, through such officer or authority as the State Government may specify in this behalf. (2) The renewal of renewals of a mining lease granted in respect of a mineral specified in Park ‘A’ and Park ‘B’ of the First Schedule to the Act may be granted by the State Government with the previous approval of the Central Government. (3) The renewal or renewals of the mining lease granted in respect of a mineral not specified in Part ‘A’ and Part ‘B’ of the First Schedule to the Act may be granted by the State Government. Provided that before granting approval for second or subsequent renewal of a mining lease, the State Government shall seek a report from the Controller General Indian Bureau of Mines, as to whether it would be in the interest of mineral development to grant the renewal of the mining lease. Provided that before granting approval for second or subsequent renewal of a mining lease, the State Government shall seek a report from the Controller General Indian Bureau of Mines, as to whether it would be in the interest of mineral development to grant the renewal of the mining lease. Provided further that in case a report is not received from Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines in a period of three months of receipt of the communication from the State Government, it would be deemed that the Indian Bureau of Mines has no adverse comments to offer regarding the grant of the renewal of mining lease. (4) Omitted. (5) Omitted. (6) If an application for the renewal of a mining lease made within the time referred to in sub-rule (1) is not disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period till the State Government passes order thereon. (6) Omitted (7) xxx xxx It is also relevant to refer to Rule 25A of the Rules, which reads thus: “25A. Status of the grant on the death of applicant for mining lease – (1) Where an applicant for grant or renewal of mining lease dies before the order granting him a mining lease or its renewal is passed, the application for the grant or renewal of mining lease shall be deemed to have been made by his legal representative. (2) In the case of an applicant in respect of whom an order granting or renewing a mining lease is passed, but who dies before the deed referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 31 is executed, the order shall be deemed to have been passed in the name of the legal representative of the deceased”. 45. Interpreting Rule 25A of the MC Rules, the Supreme Court in Saligram Khirwal Vs Union of India and others, [ (2003) 7 SCC 689 ], has held thus: 7. Firstly, Rule 25-A, on its plain reading, does not have any applicability to the situation emerging from the facts of the present case. The rule contemplates the death of an applicant for grant or renewal of mining lease expiring before the order granting him a mining lease or its renewal is passed. (emphasis supplied). Firstly, Rule 25-A, on its plain reading, does not have any applicability to the situation emerging from the facts of the present case. The rule contemplates the death of an applicant for grant or renewal of mining lease expiring before the order granting him a mining lease or its renewal is passed. (emphasis supplied). In the present case, the death has been of an applicant in whose favour an order for the grant of lease was never passed. The legal position shall have to be determined dehors Rule 25-A. 8. The position of law came to be examined by this Court in C.Buchivenkata Rao Vs Union of India. It was a case of mining lease. Their Lordships stated the law in the following words: (SCC p.739, para 14) “14. It has to be remembered that, in order to enable a legal representative to continue a legal proceeding, the right to sue or to pursue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor. In the instant case, we have set out provisions showing that the rights which an applicant may have had for the grant of a mining lease, on the strength of an alleged superior claim, cannot be separated from his personal qualifications. No provision has been pointed out to us in the rules for impleading an heir who could continue the application for a mining lease. The scheme under the rules seems to be that, if an applicant dies a fresh application has to be presented by his heirs or legal representatives if they themselves desire to apply for the grant of a lease”. 9. Their Lordships clearly held that once the applicant has died, the legal representatives of the deceased applicant shall have to file a fresh application setting out their own qualifications whereon would be determined their entitlement on the grant. It was submitted before Their Lordships that the legal heirs of the deceased applicant should be assumed to be possessing the same rights which the deceased may have had to obtain the lease which rights would survive to the legal heirs and vest in them. Their Lordships specifically turned down the plea and refused to accept the correctness of the assumption sought to be canvassed. 13. There is an additional fact which cannot be overlooked. Their Lordships specifically turned down the plea and refused to accept the correctness of the assumption sought to be canvassed. 13. There is an additional fact which cannot be overlooked. The grant in favour of the appellant was made in the year 1980 by way of a mining lease for twenty years. That period has expired during the pendency of these proceedings. In terms of the mining lease, the appellant is entitled to one renewal. The learned counsel for the parties are unable to state at the Bar, for want of instructions, whether the appellant has applied for any renewal and, if so, with what result. Be that as it may, the appellant has operated the mine for a period of about 23 years by this time and substantial investment must have been made by the appellate for operating the mine. It will be a travesty of justice to dislodge the appellant from the mine after a period of 23 years solely for the purpose of considering an application by a competitor which application may or may not be allowed at the end. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, it would meet the ends of justice if it is directed that any prayer for renewal of lease made hereinafter shall be treated as an application for a fresh grant and therein the private respondents or any other person shall be entitled to make an application for grant in his favour and to oppose the grant in favour of the appellant herein”. (Emphasis supplied) 46. As per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Saligram Khirwal’s case, referred to above, on the date of the death of the applicant there should be a subsisting lease and for renewal of the same, an application should have been made by the original lessee, which shall be deemed to have been made by the legal representatives on the death of the original lessee. RE: POINT NO.5: 47. Petitioner in Writ Petition No.61038/2009 has contended that second respondent was not justified in rejecting his request namely to consider the application for grant of lease in his favour. The State Government has rejected the request of the petitioner on the ground that an order came to be passed in Writ Petition No.21608/2005 on 07-08-2008 as one of the ground for rejection of his application. The State Government has rejected the request of the petitioner on the ground that an order came to be passed in Writ Petition No.21608/2005 on 07-08-2008 as one of the ground for rejection of his application. This order was under challenge in Writ Appeal No.6087/2009 and it has been held therein that notification dated 15-03-2003 issued by the State Government as valid. In that view of the matter also the prayer of the petitioner cannot be granted by this Court and it is made clear that petitioner’s claim if any is regulated by the said order passed in Writ Appeal No.6087/2009 on 05-06-2009. Hence, we are of the considered view that Point No.(4) has to be answered against the petitioner. In the result, we pass the following: (1) Writ Petition Nos.21319/2009 & 61038/2009 are hereby allowed in part and order dated 05-12-2008 bearing Final Order No.42/08 in Revision Application 13(17)/2008-RC.I is hereby quashed and consequently, said Revision Petition is hereby dismissed. (2) The direction issued by the State Government dated 15-01-2009 (Annexure-K in Writ Petition No.21319/2009) is hereby set aside. (3) The prayer sought for by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.61038/2009 for quashing the order dated 04-10-2008 (Annexure-J) and order dated 18-10-2008 (Annexure-K) are hereby rejected and claim of the petitioner would be regulated by order dated 05-06-2009 passed in Writ Appeal No.6087/2009 and outcome of Writ Appeal No.1243/2008. (4) Parties to bear respective costs.