Judgment : 1. This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 29.07.2005 passed by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases cum IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in C.C.No.32 of 1994 whereby and whereunder the appellant-sole accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. I have heard Sri D.Purnachandra Reddy representing Smt. D.Sangeetha Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, Standing counsel for ACB cases. 3. The appellant, who worked as Excise Superintendent, Karimnagar District during the period from 13.07.1992 to 07.01.1994 was tried for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 11, and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the ground that he demanded bribe of Rs.2,000/-from Mr. M.Hanmanthu Goud and received the same as illegal gratification for the purpose of renewing the wine shop license in the name of the father of PW.1. 4. According to the prosecution, during the year 1993, PW.1 was running a wine shop in Godavarikhani under the name and style, Balaji Wine shop which was in the name of his father M.Linga Goud. On 16.12.1993 PW.1 went to the office of the appellant and requested to renew the license, in respect of which an application was pending. Initially, it is said that the appellant demanded an amount of Rs.4,000/-and finally asked PW.1 to pay an amount of Rs.2,000/-for the purpose of renewing the wine shop license. 5. PW.1, who was not willing to pay the bribe amount, approached the ACB, DSP on 20.12.1993 and gave a complaint, basing on which a case was registered against the appellant and a trap was laid. According to the prosecution, in the course of the said trap laid, the appellant received an amount of Rs.2,000/-from him and kept it in his kurtha pocket. On receiving the pre-arranged signal from PW.2, accompanying witnesses, ACB officials, the trap party rushed to the residence of the appellant and surprised him. Post trap proceedings were conducted and phenolphthalein sodium carbonate reaction test conducted on the right hand fingers of the appellant and the one relating to his Kurtha pocket yielded positive results. 6. The defence theory put-forth by the appellant before the trial Court was that PWs.1 and 2 are friends. Post trap proceedings were conducted and phenolphthalein sodium carbonate reaction test conducted on the right hand fingers of the appellant and the one relating to his Kurtha pocket yielded positive results. 6. The defence theory put-forth by the appellant before the trial Court was that PWs.1 and 2 are friends. PW.1 gave an amount of Rs.2,000/-to the appellant for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2. Admittedly, the explanation was offered spontaneously and the same was incorporated in the post trap proceedings. It is also borne out from the evidence of PW.1 that three or four months earlier to the trap in question the appellant got trapped the Deputy Commissioner of Excise through ACB people. It also came in the evidence that on a particular day the appellant insulted PW.1 by telling him to go out of his office in the presence of several excise contractors. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that PW.1, who developed grouse against the appellant, falsely implicated him in the trap by approaching the ACB officials. The leaned counsel also would contend that by the date of trap, already the renewal of wine shop license was done and no official favour was pending with the appellant and therefore, there was no occasion for him to demand illegal gratification from PW.1. 7. In the instant case, there was no dispute about the fact that the appellant received an amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1. Spontaneously the appellant offered an explanation that he received the said amount through PW.1 for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2. The prosecution is able to establish by positive evidence and also from the defence version of the appellant himself that he received an amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1. In such an event, the presumption would arise under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to the effect that unless rebutted the Court has to presume that the said amount was taken as illegal gratification. 8. The only point, therefore, requires consideration in the present appeal is: whether the appellant could be able to rebut the presumption against him under Section 20 of the Act. 9. PW.1 had categorically stated in his evidence about the appellant demanding and receiving the amount of Rs.2,000/-. 8. The only point, therefore, requires consideration in the present appeal is: whether the appellant could be able to rebut the presumption against him under Section 20 of the Act. 9. PW.1 had categorically stated in his evidence about the appellant demanding and receiving the amount of Rs.2,000/-. PW.2 however, did not support the entire prosecution version and his version is to the effect that he and PW.1 went to the house of the appellant, the appellant, gave some prasadam, as he was feeling cold and cough he came to the balcony to clear his nose with his handkerchief, after that two persons came there and went inside the house of the appellant, and it was about 9 AM. Thereafter, according to him he went away as he had to attend the school, which he was running at Karimnagar. Thus, this witness did not speak about the appellant either demanding or receiving any amount from PW.1. However, as already said there is no dispute about the fact that the appellant received the amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1 and kept the same in his kurtha pocket. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant brought to the notice of this Court about some omissions in the statement-Ex.D.1 of PW.1, which was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In the said statement, PW.1 did not state before the Magistrate that the appellant demanded initially an amount of Rs.4,000/-and reduced the same to Rs.2,000/-subsequently. In my view it is not a material omission. The statement of a witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence. What all the witness states before the Court in the course of trial is the substantive evidence. In the instant case, PW.1 had categorically spoken about the fact of appellant demanding and accepting the bribe. In the cross examination also, he denied the suggestion that the amount was received by the appellant for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2. Therefore, merely because there are some minor omissions in the statement of PW.1 recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate, his evidence before the Court cannot be disbelieved on that score alone. PW.2 who gave evidence before the trial Court clearly admitted that he purposely gave evidence to help the appellant. 11. Therefore, merely because there are some minor omissions in the statement of PW.1 recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate, his evidence before the Court cannot be disbelieved on that score alone. PW.2 who gave evidence before the trial Court clearly admitted that he purposely gave evidence to help the appellant. 11. As regards the contention that no official favour was pending with the appellant on the crucial date, the evidence of PW.4, the Junior Assistant in the office of the Excise Superintendent, Karimnagar requires to be examined. Absolutely, there is no motive for this witness to give false evidence against the appellant. He stated in his evidence that he put up note on 31.10.1993 for renewal of license of PW.1’s father and on the same day the appellant renewed the license. But what PW.4 stated is that since then PW.1 was coming to their office and was meeting the appellant, that PW.1 told him that he will meet appellant and then take the license from him. The crucial aspect of the version of this witness is that on a particular day in the month of November 1993, the appellant called him to his chambers, by that time PW.1 was present. On seeing him, PW.1 went away, then the appellant told him that PW.1 would come to the office within two or three days and instructed him not to hand over the license to PW.1 without the permission of the appellant. This witness stated specifically that as the appellant instructed him to keep the license with him, he did not hand over the same to PW.1. 12. From the evidence of PW.4, it is therefore, clear that though the appellant renewed the license of wine shop of PW1’s father, he instructed PW.4 to keep the license with him without handing over the same to PW.1, till he directs him to do so. Under these circumstances, I absolutely see no force in the contention that since there was no official favour pending with the appellant, there was no occasion for him to demand any illegal gratification from PW.1. The evidence of PW.4 clearly indicates that though the appellant renewed license, withheld the same from handing over to PW.1. From the conduct of the appellant it can therefore be safely presumed that the evidence of PW.1 is truthful, on material particulars having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The evidence of PW.4 clearly indicates that though the appellant renewed license, withheld the same from handing over to PW.1. From the conduct of the appellant it can therefore be safely presumed that the evidence of PW.1 is truthful, on material particulars having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. The appellant, on the other hand examined two witnesses on his behalf as DWs.1 and 2. DW.1 is one K.Ravinder Rao, who is said to be an Excise Contractor in Karnataka State. He gave evidence before the trial court to the effect that in or about 14th or 15th October, 1993 he went to the office of the appellant where he met him in his chambers, four or five minutes later PW.1 Hanumantha Goud came there and PW.1 asked the appellant about the distribution of some trees in a rash manner for which the appellant told PW.1 to go out of his chambers, and then PW.1 left that place. He also further deposed before the trial Court that on 22.12.1993 at about 10 AM, he and one Ashok Goud went to the house of the appellant, the appellant offered them sweets, at that time PWs.1 and 2 also came there, PW.1 requested the appellant to get telephone connection to PW.2 and the appellant assured that he would get the telephone connection to PW.2. At that time according to DW1, PW.1 took out wad of currency notes and handed over to the appellant stating that it was meant for telephone connection. This witness seems to have been examined by the appellant for the purpose of showing that PW.1 had grouse against the appellant and that the amount was in fact paid to the appellant for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to PW.2’s mother-in-law. 14. One P.Ramulu, a resident of Karimnagar was examined as DW.2. His evidence was to the effect that on one occasion the appellant told him that the mother-in-law of PW2 wanted a telephone connection and DW.2 offered to give his disconnected telephone to PW.2’s mother-in-law for Rs.2,000/-. 15. On a proper analysis of the entire evidence on record, I am of the considered view that the spontaneous explanation offered by the appellant that he received the amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1 for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2 is highly unconvincing and seems to be premeditated. 15. On a proper analysis of the entire evidence on record, I am of the considered view that the spontaneous explanation offered by the appellant that he received the amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1 for the purpose of arranging telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2 is highly unconvincing and seems to be premeditated. The appellant is an Excise Superintendent. Merely because PW.2 is known to him he is not expected to arrange telephone connection to the mother-in-law of PW.2 by receiving an amount of Rs.2,000/-from him. Further in the instant case, he did not receive the amount from PW.2, but received the said amount from PW.1. When PW.1 and the appellant were not in good terms, it is not understandable as to why the appellant allowed him and PW.2 to his house, offered sweets, received an amount of Rs.2,000/-from PW.1. It is true that the standard by which the appellant has to prove the defence is not that of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, which rests on the prosecution and it is that of preponderance by probability. Here in this case, the defence plea taken by the appellant itself is quite unconvincing and unbelievable. Therefore, it cannot at all be said that the appellant could be able to rebut the presumption drawn against him under Section 20 of the Act. The learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant does not require any interference in this appeal. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases cum IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in C.C.No.32 of 1994 are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.