1. This Civil Miscellaneous 1st Appeal is directed against Additional District Judge, Reasi's order dated 15.07.2006 whereby appellant-plaintiff's Application seeking ad-interim injunction against Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, restraining it from dispossessing him from Shop No.1 situated at Lambi Keri, Katra, without adopting due course of law, during the pendency of his Suit seeking Declaration that he was a tenant in the shop besides a Decree for Permanent Prohibitory Injunction restraining the Board from dispossessing him therefrom without adopting due course of law, was dismissed. 2. The Trial Court declined the appellant's Application finding that the material available on records, which included order passed by this Court in appellant's Writ Petition OWP No. 184/1994, in which he had admitted him to be the Licensee of the shop, would not indicate existence of prima facie case in his favour Of being either an existing Licensee, or a tenant. 3. It is not disputed that the appellant has been in continuous possession of the shop since 1983. According to the appellant, he was a tenant, whereas Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, "the Board", for short, treats him the Licensee of the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust, which was earlier managing the affairs of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine and the properties attached thereto. The appellant would sell Tea, Sweets and Soft drinks etc., in the shop in accordance with the permission granted to him by the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust which had put the shop along with other shops enroute Shrine to auction for use thereof by the successful allottees as Licensee(s) of the Trust. After takeover of the Shrine by the Board in the year 1986, the appellant remained in possession of the shop which, after its reconstruction by the Board was again handed over to him. 4. According to the information supplied by the learned counsel for the Board, the appellant continued paying Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) per year to the Board from 1989 to 1995; but did not thereafter pay any amount because of the litigation between the parties. It is further conveyed by the learned counsel that the yearly License Fee for similar shops in the area was about Rs.5.00 Lac in 1995, Rs.10.00 Lac in 1997 and Rs.15.00 Lac in the year 2003. 5. It is further conveyed by the learned counsel that the yearly License Fee for similar shops in the area was about Rs.5.00 Lac in 1995, Rs.10.00 Lac in 1997 and Rs.15.00 Lac in the year 2003. 5. From the material placed on records, it appears that before the filing of the Suit, the appellant was prosecuting his Second Writ Petition in this Court claiming to be the tenant in the shop. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed finding that the Board was not amenable to Writ jurisdiction of the Court. The appellant was, however, left free to seek adjudication of his plea as projected in the Writ Petition by Civil Suit. The appellant accordingly filed Civil Suit along with an Application seeking interim injunction against his threatened forcible dispossession by the Board. 6. The Trial Court was of the view that bound by admission made in Writ Petition OWP No. 184/1994 that he was a Licensee in the Shop, the appellant was estopped from projecting him a tenant thereof. It was further of the view that period of initial license granted to the appellant having since expired and there being no Agreement between the parties governing their inter se relationship, the appellant's possession over the shop was that of a trespasser and he was disentitled to seek injunctive directions against his dispossession by the Board. 7. The appellant's case, on the other hand, is that the admission appearing in the High Court's Order was only regarding his License to sell eatables in the shop and was not regarding his possession as such therein. To support his plea, he refers to the contents of the Writ Petition to urge that the dispute being only regarding the License issued to him by the State Government to deal in certain eatables, there was no occasion for him to admit him to be the Licensee of the shop. 8. Perused the records and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 9. The undisputed facts arising out of the pleadings of the parties and the material available on records are that the appellant has been dealing in Tea, Sweets and Soft Drinks etc., at his shop since 1983. He paid whatever he was required to pay for user of the shop to the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust during the currency of the allotment made in his favour by the Trust. He paid whatever he was required to pay for user of the shop to the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust during the currency of the allotment made in his favour by the Trust. Even after take over of the Shrine and its properties, the appellant continued paying Rs.15,000/- per year to Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board which was accepted by it without reservation. The two communications of the Board placed by the appellant on records reveal that he was required by the Board to pay rent for the shop. 10. The initial Agreement entered into by the appellant with the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust, being not on records, the exact terms and conditions of the License granted by the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust to the appellant are not known. In the circumstances, the issue regarding the status of the appellant in the shop, whether as a tenant or otherwise, would fall for examination and determination by the Trial Court after the parties were allowed opportunity to lead evidence for and thereagainst. 11. In coming to the conclusion that the appellant did not have any prima facie case to support that he was a tenant in the shop, the Trial Court appears to have been influenced by his admission appearing in the order passed on appellant's First Writ Petition. It, however, appears to have lost sight of the appellant's statement appearing in his subsequent Writ Petition OWP No. 523/1995 where projecting him a tenant of the shop, he is indicated to have stated as follows: "The petitioner was tenant in a shop let out by Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Dharmarth Trust at annual rent of Rs. 15,000/-. After the Jammu and Kashmir Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1986 (Governor's Act, later replaced by the Act of legislature in 1988), the petitioner claimed to have become tenant of the Shrine Board. After the Shrine Board took over, the petitioner was shifted from the original shop allotted to him by the Dharmarth Trust to a new shop constructed by the Shrine Board having smaller area. The officials of the Shrine Board also started interfering in his day-to-day business, threatening to throw him out of the shop and induct a new tenant so that they could extract higher rent. The officials of the Shrine Board also started interfering in his day-to-day business, threatening to throw him out of the shop and induct a new tenant so that they could extract higher rent. The petitioner filed Writ Petition, OWP No. 184/1994, which was disposed of with direction to the Shrine Board to consider his representation. The Shrine Board, thereafter, gave him notice that he had failed to file representation as directed by the High Court and unless he signs an agreement with the Board further action as deemed appropriate would be taken. Protesting the notice, the petitioner filed the instant Writ Petition i.e OWP No. 523/1995." 12. It is settled proposition of law that admissions made, unless withdrawn, are binding on the party making it. The question that, however, arises, is, as to whether or not there was any such admission as is attributed to the appellant, and if it was really so, was there any time limit for its withdrawal and whether or not it stood withdrawn by the appellant in view of his subsequent pleadings in the second Writ Petition where he had projected him a tenant of the Board. 13. The appellant's Suit being still in its infancy and the parties had yet to lead evidence in proof or otherwise of the appellant's plea of being a tenant in the shop, which question may need determination, keeping in view the terms and conditions of the License Deed earlier executed by the appellant and the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust, the nature of appellant's possession therein, and host of other factors necessary to determine the inter se relationship between the parties as to whether or not any right was created in the appellant to use the shop or was it a privilege allowed to him by the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust, the admission attributed to the appellant, which too was yet to be examined as to whether or not it amounted to admission as such in the circumstances, should not have weighed so heavily against the appellant while considering as to whether or not issuance of injunctive directions were warranted against the Board when the appellant was apprehending forcible ouster from the shop where he had been carrying on business continuously for more than 20 years. 14. 14. Be that as it may, finding that there was no proof of appellant's being a tenant in the shop, the Trial Court declined ad interim preventive directions, proceeding on the premise that appellant's possession over the shop was that of a Trespasser. 15. The important question that therefore arises for consideration, is as to whether the appellant who has been doing business in the shop continuously for over a period of 20 years, can be treated as Trespasser and hence disentitled to injunction against his threatened forcible dispossession therefrom in the facts and circumstances of the case when the Board had been accepting money from him up to the year 1995. 16. The Trial Court has declined injunction to the appellant relying on the view taken by this Court in its various decisions that after the expiry of License period or determination thereof, the Licensee becomes a trespasser and thus disentitled to injunction against his dispossession, in that, issuance of injunction against dispossession of a Trespasser would amount to perpetuation of a Trespasser's stay in the premises, which was otherwise, in law, impermissible. 17. The view taken by this Court in Beant Singh v. Cantonment Executive Officer, Jammu, reported as AIR 1960 Jammu and Kashmir, 83 reads thus: "The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that the licensor is bound to bring a Suit either for injunction or for ejectment against the licensee before he can get rid of the right of the licensee to enjoy the license. According to him, this would be the position even if the license had been validly revoked and the licensee's right under the agreement had ceased. I have not been referred to any authority in support of this somewhat extraordinary contention. It militates against the very concept of a license. A license is a right "to do or continue to do in or upon the immovable property of the granter something which would, in the absence of such a right be unlawful." If a license validly determines the right of a licensee to do or continue to do in or upon the immoveable property of the licensor anything in enjoyment of that license would come to an end, the result of which will be to make further exercise of that right unlawful. If an injunction in favour of such a licensee is given, it would only be permitting him to do what is unlawful for him to do. The court would thus be throwing its protection round a wrong-doer and forcing the rightful owner of property to submit to the unlawful action of the wrong-doer. I do not think any court should by any order or decree passed by it bring about such a strange and intolerable situation. The law does not permit a licensee whose license has been validly revoked to exercise his license any longer. If he does so, he does something wrong. He will be only a trespasser after he has lost his right under the license, and the owner of the land is entitled to deal with him as a trespasser. There is neither principle nor authority to support the rather strange proposition that in spite of the valid termination of the right of the licensee, he can continue to exercise his right until the licensor obtains a decree from the court prohibiting him from doing so. After the termination of the license, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes and to treat an intruder as sheer trespasser. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property, he need not secure a decree of court to obtain this right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property. He may exert the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. Whatever be the liability that the true owner may incur under the Criminal Law or even under the Civil Law for use of excessive force, the trespasser will not be entitled to maintain a civil action against him so as to continue the trespass." The above view was later followed by the Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir & anr v. Ghulam Rasool & anr., AIR 1979 J&K 53 and various other decisions. 18. At this stage reference needs to be made to what was held by their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. 18. At this stage reference needs to be made to what was held by their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Sbhobha Ram Venkat Rao, reported as (1989) 4 SCC131, where while dealing with the issue in question, it was held as follows: "It was submitted by him that in view of the license having come to an end, the plaintiff had no right to remain Incharge of the business or the premises where it was conducted and all that the plaintiff could ask for was damages for unlawful dispossession even on the footing of facts as found by the High Court. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. "It is a well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203 . This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Company limited v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy & others, AIR 1924 PC 144 where it has been observed," In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 232 . The Division Bench comprising of three learned judges held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. In the present case, we may point out that there was no question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a trespasser at all, as she had entered into the possession of the restaurant business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee and in due course of law. Thus, defendant No. 3 was not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff unlawfully and behind her back as has been done by him in the present case. It was pointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that some of the observations referred to above were in connection with a Suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or analogous provisions in the earlier Specific Relief Act, 1877. To our mind, this makes no difference in this case as the Suit has been filed only a few weeks of the plaintiff being unlawfully deprived of possession of the said business and the premises and much before the period of six months expired. In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by us, we do not propose to consider the question whether the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 amounted to a license or a sub-lease." 19. The view taken by this Court that after the termination of License, the Licensee becomes a trespasser and thus disentitled to protection against forcible dispossession, may not, therefore, be a correct proposition of law in view of the legal position settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the above case, relying on its earlier view taken by the Division Bench of the Court in Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported as (1977) 2 SCR 232 and the view taken by their Lordships of Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Company limited v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy & others, reported as 1924 Privy Council 144 (at page 147). 20. The Board's learned counsel's plea that the appellant's License having since expired, he was a stark trespasser in the premises and, thus, disentitled to injunction, may not, therefore, be tenable. 20. The Board's learned counsel's plea that the appellant's License having since expired, he was a stark trespasser in the premises and, thus, disentitled to injunction, may not, therefore, be tenable. Learned counsel's reliance on A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam and others, reported as (2012) 6 SCC 430 , may also be not of any help to the Board in view of the binding Division Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to hereinabove. 21. It is true that owner has inbuilt right in him to protect his ownership rights and possession in the immovable property in exercise whereof he may be within his right to use limited force to frustrate threatened trespass over his property; but such right of using force can not be conceded even to a true owner to throw a person who, after having entered the property under an authorized arrangement, becomes an unauthorized occupant, on termination of such arrangement, in view of the distinction noticed in Krishna Ram Mahale's case (supra) regarding the right of the owner against impending threat to his possession by a trespasser and the case of a person who was otherwise in settled possession though unauthorizedly. 22. Therefore, when a person, though having entered upon the immovable property under a lawful arrangement, becomes an unauthorized occupant thereof, either on termination of such arrangement or otherwise or by operation of law, may not as such be entitled to obtain legal protection for his continuance in the premises, but such person would certainly not loose his limited right against threatened dispossession therefrom except under due process of law. This is so because forcible dispossession even of an unauthorized occupant would be against the basic tenets of Rule of law. This is additionally so because forcible ouster even of an unauthorized occupant cannot be comprehended in a civilized society of a democratic setup giving go-by to the laws of the land. In other words, it would mean that his approach to the Court against forcible dispossession, without following due course of law, may not be discouraged merely because he may not have otherwise any right as such to remain in the premises. In other words, it would mean that his approach to the Court against forcible dispossession, without following due course of law, may not be discouraged merely because he may not have otherwise any right as such to remain in the premises. It, however, needs to be emphasized that whereas the approach of such person against his threatened forcible dispossession from the premises in his occupation may not be discouraged, but at the same time interest of the true owner or occupier are required to be protected so that the person in possession may not take advantage of his unauthorized occupation in the premises to the detriment of the true owner or the occupier. 23. Keeping in view the fact that the appellant has been doing business in the shop for over a period of 20 years and even if his status in the shop had to be taken, prima facie, to be that of a person whose License to remain in occupation of the shop, had expired by afflux of time or by operation of law, his forcible dispossession therefrom, needs to be protected until his lawful dispossession particularly when the forcible dispossession was apprehended from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, a Statutory Body, which was, in duty, bound to follow the law of the land and not use force as such to dispossess persons in continuous and settled possession. 24. In the facts and circumstances of the case, refusal of injunction by the Trial Court may not, therefore, be justified. However, before allowing him the protection by issuance of ad-interim injunction, the interests of the Board, which is managing the affairs of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine and the properties attached thereto, are required to be kept in view so that the appellant does not take advantage of his continuance in the shop until his eviction therefrom under due process of law. 25. 25. Therefore, keeping in view the fact that the appellant had been paying Rs.15,000/- per year to the Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust in addition to the premium and even to the Board at the same rate; but had not paid any amount after 1995, when the shop would have generated same amount that the Board had been getting from auction of similar shops, had it been put to auction like other shops in the area, it would be appropriate if the protection made available to the appellant against his forcible dispossession was made subject to appellant's depositing Rs.20.00 Lac with the Trial Court until final disposal of the Suit, so that the interests of the Board until appellant's eviction, if it was so warranted under law, were appropriately protected. The amount, so deposited, shall be kept in a Fixed Deposit, to be disbursed to the party held entitled thereto on final conclusion of the Suit. 26. For all what has been said above, the order passed by the Trial Court cannot, therefore, be sustained. 27. This Appeal accordingly succeeds and is, therefore, allowed setting aside Additional District Judge, Reasi's order dated 15.07.2006. Resultantly, allowing the appellant's Application, the respondents-defendants are restrained from using force for appellant's eviction from Shop No.1 situated at Lambi Keri, Katra except by following due course of law. This shall, however, be subject to appellant's depositing Rs.20.00 Lac with the Trial Court in four installments. First installment of Rs.5.00 Lac to be paid by January 31, 2013, Second by March 31, 2013, Third by May 31, 2013 and last installment by July 31, 2013. The amount when deposited be kept in Fixed Deposit to be appropriated in accordance with the orders that the Trial Court may pass in the case on conclusion of the Suit. 28. As the Appeal in the High Court has taken more than six years to conclude so interests of justice would demand expeditious disposal of the Suit. The Trial Court is, therefore, directed to conclude trial of the Suit within a period of nine months and for that purpose, it may, if its Board so permits, take up the case every week for consideration.