ORDER : K.S. JHEVERI, J. 1. By way of present petition the petitioner has prayed for a direction to direct the respondent corporation to give pensionary benefits to the petitioner in light of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with arrears of pension and interest thereon from the date of commencement of pension scheme i.e. 01.11.1993 and continue to pay the same regularly in future. 2. The petitioner who joined the services with the respondent corporation as an Assistant Administrative Officer (Chartered Accountant) in Rajkot Divisional Office tendered resignation from the post of Deputy General Manager (A/cs) from LIC Mutual Funds, Mumbai after serving due notice as per the Staff Regulations and he worked for all the 23 years and 7 months. Since at the relevant point of time, there was no Pension Rules, the petitioner has resigned. On 28.06.2995, the LIC of Indian (Employees Pension Rules, 1995 were notified in the gazette of the Government of India with effect from 01.11.1993 retrospectively giving coverage from 01.11.1986 and onwards. The petitioner made several representations from 08.08.1999 to 10.02.2011 to the respondent Corporation for getting pensionary benefits but except one dated 05.10.1995, the respondent Corporation has not responded to any of the representations of the petitioner. On 28.08.2011, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 6013 of 2011 arising out of SLP (C) No. 3777 of 2007 directed the respondent to consider the grant of pensionary benefits to the petitioner who had resigned after putting qualifying service for pension. In light of the aforesaid decision, the petitioner served legal notice to the respondent Corporation claiming all pensionary benefits. Since the respondent gave negative reply, the petitioner preferred present petition. 3. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is entitled to pension. In support of his submission he has relied upon the decision in the case of Sheelkumar Jain versus The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And others reported in AIR 2011 SC 2990 . Para 13 thereof reads as under: 13. The aforesaid authorities would show that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of voluntary retirement by way of voluntarily retirement and while construing the statutory provisions. Para 13 thereof reads as under: 13. The aforesaid authorities would show that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of voluntary retirement by way of voluntarily retirement and while construing the statutory provisions. The general purpose of the Pension Scheme, 1995 read as a whole, is to grant pensionary benefits to employees who had rendered service in the Insurance Companies and had retired after putting in the qualifying service in the Insurance Companies and had retired after putting in the qualifying service in the Insurance Companies. Clauses 22 and 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 cannot be so construed as to deprive of an employee of an Insurance Company such as the appellant who had put in the qualifying service for pension and who voluntarily given up his service after serving 90 days notice in accordance with sub-clause. (1) of Clause 5 of the scheme, 1976 and after his notice was accepted by the appointing authority. 4. Affidavit-in-reply is filed by the respondent wherein it is stated that the pensionary benefits to the employees of the Corporation are governed by LIC of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 which are statutory rules notified in the gazette. The said statutory rules do not allow pensionary benefits in case of exits by way resignation before introduction of pension rules. Since the petitioner has resigned from the service and at the relevant point of time, there were no pensionary rules, the petitioner is not entitled for the said benefit. Even otherwise, the petition is not maintainable on the ground of delay. 5. In this regard it would be relevant to peruse a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1330 wherein the Apex Court relying upon the decision reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 has upheld the view that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 5.1 Similar view is taken by the Apex Court in the recent decisions in the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Another reported in 2008(10) SCC 115 , in the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugai Kumar reported in 2008(10) SCALE 449 and in the case of Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh reported in 2008(8) SCC 648 . While considering the issue of delay and laches, the view taken by the Apex Court in these decisions is that the reply given to an individual does not give rise to fresh cause of action or acknowledgement of jural relationship and that the Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief as a result of which the bar or limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 5.2 In the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has held that even in cases of violation or infringement of Fundamental Rights, a writ court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court and if there is gross or unexplained delay, the Court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such a petitioner. 5.3 The Apex Court even recently in the case of Delhi Administration And Others v. Kaushilya Thakur and Another reported in (2012) 5 SCC 412 has held as under: "10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record. 5.3 The Apex Court even recently in the case of Delhi Administration And Others v. Kaushilya Thakur and Another reported in (2012) 5 SCC 412 has held as under: "10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record. In our view, the impugned order as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because while granting relief to the husband of respondent No. 1, the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an application for allotment of 1000 sq. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand. 11. It is trite to say that in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation (State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai)." 6. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to grant the prayers made in the present petition at such a belated stage. No interference is caused in the present petition and the same requires to be dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, petition stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.