Muzaffar Hussain Attar, J.— 1. Appellant instituted civil original suit in the trial court against the respondents praying therein that judgment and decree dated 5th February 1972 (the decree is in fact dated 22nd April 1975) and the compromise deed dated same date be declared as null and void and be set-aside. It was also prayed that decree for declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant declaring her entitled to joint possession and ownership of the land measuring 9 kanal and 5 marlas. The suit was filed inter alia on the ground that mother of appellant-plaintiff Mst. Taja was given 9 kanals & 5 marlas of land under decree dated 5th February 1972 and at that point of time Mst. Taja was minor, the decree and judgment was appealed against before the 1st Appellate Court and on the basis of compromise deed, the Appellate Court passed decree dated 22nd April 1975 giving only 5 kanal to Mst. Taja, though she was minor when the compromise was entered into; the appeal having been filed against Mst. Taja a minor and proceedings have been conducted without appointing next friend for Mst. Taja who was minor, the decree dated 22nd April 1975 is thus nullity and the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to be declared owner of the land subject matter of suit. 2. Respondent filed written statement before the learned trial court in which besides pleading other grounds, it was also pleaded that the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata and estopple. The issues were treated as preliminary issues by the trial court and the suit was dismissed. The appeal filed against the decree and judgment of the trial court was also dismissed. The appellant has filed Civil 2nd Appeal. 3. Since the Civil 2nd Appeal would be admitted to hearing only when substantial questions of law are involved as is mandate of Section 100 of CPC, this court on 20th April 2012 passed the following order:- Maintainability of this suit is under cloud for the following two reasons: a) The suit is filed by the appellant on the ground that the compromise decree passed by the Appellate Court on 24th April, 1975 is void as Mst. Taja, mother of the appellant was minor at that point of time. Neither date of birth not date of death of Mst. Taja is mentioned in plaint. Taja, mother of the appellant was minor at that point of time. Neither date of birth not date of death of Mst. Taja is mentioned in plaint. The above dates assume importance, in as much as, if Taja died in ripe age, and did not challenge the decree in her life time, can appellant her daughter challenge it on the said ground. b) In the suit, challenging compromise decree maintainable under Order 23 Rule 3(A) CPC. Learned counsel for the parties to address arguments on next date of hearing. List in the week following the next for continuation of arguments. Learned counsel for the parties to produce the material/documents relating to birth and death of Mst. Taja, mother of the appellant on next date of hearing. 4. Learned counsel for the parties were given time to assist the court on the issues raised in the aforesaid order. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant sought many adjournments to assist the court. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that when the compromise decree was passed, Mst. Taja was minor and much before her death she had become major. Learned counsel further submitted that since it was pleaded in the plaint that the compromise deed is nullity for the reason that same was passed when Mst. Taja was minor, the learned trial court instead of dismissing the suit in the manner he has done it should have put the issues on trial and allowed the plaintiff-appellant and respondents to lead the evidence. Learned counsel submitted that instead of conducting the full-fledged trial in the suit the learned trial court has scuttled the entire proceedings which has seriously prejudiced the rights of the appellant. 7. No substantial question of law is involved in this Civil 2nd Appeal and it cannot be thus admitted to hearing in view of the mandate contained in Section 100 CPC. The reasons in support of the aforesaid findings are summarized as under:- a. Even if it is assumed that at the time of recording of compromise deed on 2nd April 1975, Mst. Taja was minor, nothing prevented her from challenging the compromise decree by filing appropriate proceedings through next friend. Mst. Taja admittedly had attained majority, but she did not challenge the decree during her life time. The plaintiff-appellant would thus be stopped in law from challenging the compromise decree which Mst. Taja was minor, nothing prevented her from challenging the compromise decree by filing appropriate proceedings through next friend. Mst. Taja admittedly had attained majority, but she did not challenge the decree during her life time. The plaintiff-appellant would thus be stopped in law from challenging the compromise decree which Mst. Taja did not challenge during her life time. b. It is accepted principle in Muslim Law that a Muslim has no heir of his/her property till such time he/she is alive. It is on the death of a muslim, the property devolves upon his/her heirs. Admittedly, Mst. Taja had become major much before her death. She did not challenge the compromise decree on the ground challenged by the appellant her daughter. The appellant would inherit only that property which was in the ownership of Mst. Taja at the time of her death. Mst. Taja was not owner of the land on which claim is laid by the appellant in the suit in view of compromise decree. The plaintiff-appellant in such circumstances cannot stake claim over the suit property. 8. This appeal along-with connected CMP is accordingly dismissed. Record be send back.