Judgment (N.M. Jamdar, J.) This appeal challenges the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber summons No.471 of 2008 in execution application No.192 of 2004 in Summary Suit (Panvel Court) No.3 of 2003. By the impugned order, the learned Judge rejected the chamber summons which was moved by the appellants for a direction that a sum of Rs.14,36,000/-deposited in this Court be released in their favour on the basis of a mortgage deed dated 8 October 2003 executed in their favour. The learned Judge by the impugned order found that the mortgage deed executed in favour of the appellant was not reliable and the chamber summons was accordingly dismissed. 2. We have heard the learned advocate for both sides. The advocate for the appellant has urged that the judgment debtor had executed a mortgage deed coupled with deposit of title deeds in favour of the appellants' father on 8 October 2003. He submitted that as long as the mortgage deed was not set aside, it was binding on all parties and the learned Judge erred in not taking this factor into consideration. He also submitted that the judgment debtor had executed the deed in view of the loan advanced by the father of the appellants in favour of the judgment debtor and since their case was squarely covered by section 73(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code, the appellants were entitled to the said amount. The advocate for the decree holder opposed this appeal on the ground that the mortgage deed on the face of it shows that it was executed with a sole intention to defeat the claim of the decree holder and the learned Judge was right in coming to the conclusion accordingly. 3. We have gone through the judgment and order and we find that the learned Judge has taken note of the fact that the stamp paper used for the mortgage deed was purchased on 2 May 2003 when the summary suit was pending. On 24 July 2003, the Court at Panvel granted leave to the judgment debtor subject to furnishing solvent surety to the extent for the suit claim. On 25 November 2003, the Court at Panvel considered the conduct of the judgment debtor and struck off his defence. The mortgage deed was registered on 30 January 2004 and the decree in summary suit was passed in February 2004. On 25 November 2003, the Court at Panvel considered the conduct of the judgment debtor and struck off his defence. The mortgage deed was registered on 30 January 2004 and the decree in summary suit was passed in February 2004. The narration of the events above will show that when the judgment debtor was almost certain that the decree would be passed against him and the property will be attached in pursuance of the decree, the mortgage deed has come into existence. 4. The advocate for the decree holder has taken us through the mortgage deed which shows interpolation in respect of the date of the execution of the mortgage deed. He has also shown us the receipt clause in the said deed. The receipt clause mentions that the entire sum of Rs.8 lakhs was received at one time in cash. However, in the cross-examination, the wife of the judgment debtor has stated that the above amount was received in instalments. The advocate for the decree holder has also pointed out that the deed mentions that the Society had noted the charge vide its letter dated 12 April 2003 which is even prior to the purchase of stamp paper. This fact also, according to him, destroys the case of the appellant. It has also come on record that the judgment debtor and the father of the appellants were close friends and they had business transactions. 5. The learned Single Judge has also noted that the decree was passed in the year 2004, the execution application was also filed in the year 2004 and now, on the basis of a claim which does not inspire any confidence at all if the decree holder was to be deprived of the benefit of the decree, it would be a travesty of justice. In view of this position, we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the entire exercise undertaken by the appellants was to deprive the decree holder fruits of the decree. Hence the appeal is dismissed.