JUDGMENT 1. 1. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. The intra court appeal has been preferred as against the order dated 3.12.2002 passed by Single Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 4285/2001, whereby the Single Bench while allowing the writ application has set aside the award dated 6.1.2000 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jaipur (for short, 'the Tribunal'). The Tribunal has ordered reinstatement of the workman with 50% back wages besides treating him in service without break. The Single Bench has set aside the award passed by the Tribunal on the ground that in case engagement was not as per rules, order of reinstatement could not be passed; burden was upon the workman to prove that he had served continuously for 240 days in the preceding year without interruption, which was not discharged. 3. Facts, in short, are that the workman was engaged as Class IVth employee w.e.f.28.6.1989; his services were terminated on 8.9.1992 without making compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1947'). Conciliation proceedings were undertaken wherein the employer had admitted that the workman had rendered continuous service on part-time basis during the aforesaid period. However, he had served on full time basis only for 78 days. On failure of conciliation proceedings, the matter was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication in the year 1998. The conciliation officer was approached in the year 1996 by the workman as he had travelled to this Court in the year 1993 by way of filing S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 743/1993, which was dismissed vide order dated 1.11.1996 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The workman raised industrial dispute in the year 1996 itself as apparent from the notice issued by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. 4. In the reply filed by the respondents, it was stated that the workman had rendered service for 78 days on full time basis not for 240 days. 5. The Tribunal has considered the evidence adduced by the parties and the admission made before the conciliation officer by the employer that continuous services were rendered on part-time basis for the period from 28.6.1989 to 8.9.1992; during the aforesaid period, 78 days' services were rendered on full time basis. 5. The Tribunal has considered the evidence adduced by the parties and the admission made before the conciliation officer by the employer that continuous services were rendered on part-time basis for the period from 28.6.1989 to 8.9.1992; during the aforesaid period, 78 days' services were rendered on full time basis. Relying upon the aforesaid admission of employer and the evidence adduced by the workman, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that continuous services were rendered by workman for 240 days in preceding year. Thus, direction was issued with respect to grant of back wages. While framing issue No. 6, the Tribunal has found that the workman has not been cross-examined on the statement which he has made with respect to the fact that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere after termination of his services. The dispute was raised by the workman belatedly as he has initially approached the High Court by way of filing the writ petition as referred to above; after dismissal of the same in the year 1996 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, he filed application for conciliation in the year 1996 itself. 6. Award passed by the Tribunal was questioned by the employer before the Single Bench by way of filing the writ application No. 4285/2001; same has been allowed by the impugned order dated 3.12.2002. Aggrieved thereby, the intra court appeal has been preferred by the workman. 7. Mr. B.L. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that the Single Bench has ignored the admission made by the employer during the course of conciliation proceedings and also the fact that the employer has not rebutted the evidence which has been adduced by the workman that he has rendered continuous service for more than 240 days. Even in para 2 of the reply filed by respondents to the statement of claim, it was not disputed that continuous services were rendered by the workman on part-time basis. Thus, the findings recorded by Single Bench cannot be said to be sustainable; the Single Bench has erred in law in holding that Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 was not violated; it was not necessary to be appointed on regular basis to claim violation of Section 25-F. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. Mr. R.K. Kala, learned senior counsel appearing with Mr. 8. Mr. R.K. Kala, learned senior counsel appearing with Mr. Rupin Kala on behalf of respondents No. 2 to 4 has supported the impugned order passed by Single Bench. He has submitted that burden of proof to prove that continuous services were rendered for more than 240 days in the preceding year was upon the workman, which he has failed to discharge. He has placed reliance upon decisions of the Apex Court in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2007) 1 SCC 408 ; Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 533 ; Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 391 ; Incharge Officer & Anr. v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 ; Surendranagar District Panchayat & Anr. v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai, (2005) 8 SCC 450 ; Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani & Ors., (2005) 5 SCC 100 ; Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 ; Director Vocational Education and Training & Anr. v. Nashim Shaikh Chand rendered in C.A.No. 1790/2006 decided on 27.3.2006 and; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Ajay Kumar, C.A.No. 1568/1997 decided 17.2.1997 and; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Man Singh, (2012) 1 SCC 558 . He has further submitted that the evidence adduced by the parties and the admission made before the conciliation officer was on record; burden of proof was required to be discharged by the workman, which was not done. Thus, the workman could not have been ordered to be reinstated. However, it is a case where lumpsum compensation could be ordered considering the fact that the workman has initially approached this Court in the year 1993. Thereafter, he raised the dispute before the conciliation officer in 1996. 9. First question for consideration is whether the Single Bench has erred in reversing the findings recorded by the Tribunal with respect to the services rendered by the workman for more than 240 days in the preceding year. The Tribunal has referred to the evidence adduced by the parties as well as the admission made by the employer that for each and every day service had been rendered by the workman during the period w.e.f.28.6.1989 to 8.9.1992. Thus, admission was made on facts by employer before the conciliation officer, correctness of which was not questioned, there is other evidence adduced before the Tribunal. Thus, admission was made on facts by employer before the conciliation officer, correctness of which was not questioned, there is other evidence adduced before the Tribunal. While reversing the order of the Tribunal, it was incumbent upon the Single Bench to refer to each and every aspect of the reasons employed by the Tribunal, which had not been done. Thus the findings recorded by Single Bench with respect to non-discharge of burden of proof by the workman is against the record and the admission made by the employer has been ignored. Thus, the findings on aforesaid aspect recorded by the Tribunal could not have been set aside in the instant case. As a matter of fact, it appears that the management wanted to show that for 78 days the workman had served on full time basis and for the remaining period, services were rendered on part-time basis. The employer was not considering the services rendered on part-time basis for computation towards the continuous service. Categorical admission was made by the employer with respect to the fact the workman had served for 78 days on full time basis and for the remaining period he served on part-time basis. The decisions relied upon on burden of proof are not of any help in the instant case as burden had been duly discharged. The Apex Court in Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 584 , has considered the question of part-time employment and held that the part-time employment is also covered within the ambit of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. Paras 12 to 14 of the judgment in Devinder Singh's case (supra) are quoted under:- "12. Section 2(s) contains an exhaustive definition of the term "workman". The definition takes within its ambit any person including an apprentice employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward and it is immaterial that the terms of employment are not reduced into writing. The definition also includes a person, who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with industrial dispute or as a consequence of such dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. The last segment of the definition specifies certain exclusions. The definition also includes a person, who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with industrial dispute or as a consequence of such dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. The last segment of the definition specifies certain exclusions. A person to whom the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957, is applicable or who is employed in the police service as an officer or other employee of a prison or who is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity or who is employed in a supervisory capacity and is drawing specified wages per mensem or exercises mainly managerial functions does not fall within the definition of the term "workman". 13. The source of employment, the method of recruitment, the terms and conditions of employment/contract of service, the quantum of wages/pay and the mode of payment are not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. It is apposite to observe that the definition of workman also does not make any distinction between full-time and part-time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be inferred that only a person employed on a regular basis or a person employed for doing whole-time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part-time or contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. 14. Whenever an employer challenges the maintainability of industrial dispute on the ground that the employee is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, what the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is required to consider is whether the person is employed in an industry for hire or reward for doing manual, unskilled, skilled, operational, technical or clerical work in an industry. Once the test of employment for hire or reward for doing the specified type of work is satisfied, the employee would fall within the definition of "workman"." 10. Once the test of employment for hire or reward for doing the specified type of work is satisfied, the employee would fall within the definition of "workman"." 10. In Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited v. A. Sankaralingam, (2008) 10 SCC 698 , the Apex Court has considered the question of part-time employment and held that the person employed on part-time basis under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in terms of Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25-F thereof. The preponderance of judicial opinion is that a workman working even on part-time basis would be entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the Act. 11. Thus, services of the workman could not have been retrenched without making compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same was illegal and void. 12. In Iftikar Ahmad Gauri v. Municipal Council Ambah, 1992 (1) MPJR 104 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh while considering the question whether the employer can escape the liability of avoiding the statutory compliance by taking shelter of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act (as amended by Act No. 49 of 1984) and the fact that the appointments were invalid as the same were made without following the procedure laid down in M.P.Municipalities Act, 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder, held that even in cases of invalid appointments, it has to be examined in the light of Section 25-F of the Act; it cannot be contended that since the appointment of petitioner was not valid being violative of rules, it does not amount to retrenchment. The definition of retrenchment as given in the Act is wide enough and comprehensive to include all types of termination of services unless the termination fall within any of the exceptional categories mentioned therein. An invalid appointment is not one of the exceptions. Therefore, termination not falling under any of the elusory clause of Section 2(oo) would amount to clear retrenchment, and for such termination pre-requisites of Section 25-F are necessary. 13. An invalid appointment is not one of the exceptions. Therefore, termination not falling under any of the elusory clause of Section 2(oo) would amount to clear retrenchment, and for such termination pre-requisites of Section 25-F are necessary. 13. In Prabhudayal Jat v. Alwar, Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. & Ors, 1991 Lab.I.C. 944 this Court while considering the question whether termination of service on the ground that the appointment of the workman was not valid would amount to retrenchment, held that there is no merit in the contention of the employer that since appointment of the workman was not valid, the termination of his services would not amount to retrenchment. The definition of retrenchment as contained in the Act is wide and comprehensive to include all types of terminations of service unless the termination falls within any of the exceptions mentioned therein. Since the case of workman is not covered by any of the exceptions contained in the definition of retrenchment, termination of his services would amount to retrenchment. With respect to the continuous service rendered by a workman this Court held that in order to earn continuous service what is required is that he should work under the same employer. It is not necessary that he should continue to do the work in the same capacity. If he is a workman as defined in the Act and the employer is the same, he earns the continuous service by working for 240 days within the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of retrenchment. 14. Thus, in the instant case, the reasons employed by Single Bench for reversing award of Tribunal are not factually sound and legally correct. 15. Coming to the question of back wages, we find that the workman has initially approached this Court in the year 1993 by way of filing writ application which was dismissed in the year 1996; the workman has not been cross-examined on the aspect that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. 16. We find that as the workman had wrongly approached this Court in 1993 and raised the dispute after decision of writ petition, there was delay in approaching labour court, as such, instead of granting 50% back wages from date of termination, it would be appropriate to award it w.e.f. date of filing of statement of claim before the labour court. We find that as the workman had wrongly approached this Court in 1993 and raised the dispute after decision of writ petition, there was delay in approaching labour court, as such, instead of granting 50% back wages from date of termination, it would be appropriate to award it w.e.f. date of filing of statement of claim before the labour court. We modify the award to the extent that the workman shall be entitled to 50% back wages from the date of filing of statement of claim before the Tribunal and not from the date of retrenchment. We set aside the order of Single Bench.With the aforesaid modification in the award, the appeal is disposed of.Appeal disposed of by modifying award as above. *******