Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to challenge an order of the fourth respondent, i.e., the Recovery Officer, ESI Corporation, dated 16.12.2011 addressed to the first respondent Indian Overseas Bank and seeks to set aside the same and further seeks for a direction to the fourth respondent to furnish the breakup details and relevant documents pertaining to the proceedings quantifying the interest to the tune of Rs.37,09,722/- which was noted in the proceedings dated 18.01.2008 and subsequently shown as Rs.90,37,307/- in the show cause notice dated 16.12.2011 and to forbear the fourth respondent from taking any coercive action against the first respondent to recover the amount. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was the Proprietor of M/s.Haritex. The properties of M/s.Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem was taken over under the SARFEASI Act. He became the successful bidder in the public auction conducted by the first respondent Indian Overseas Bank and that the sale was confirmed in his favour. By the impugned order, dated 16.12.2011, which was the show cause notice issued by the ESI Corporation, the Bank was informed that the mill is having several dues to the ESI Corporation. Since they have failed to comply with the earlier order, they were reminded about the provisions of Section 82 of CPC by which coercive proceedings can be initiated. The said show cause notice which was addressed to the Assistant General Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, Salem, was also marked to the Chairman and CEP of the Indian Overseas Bank, the Regional Director of the Reserve Bank of India and also to M/s.Hari Tax, Coimbatore. 3. The Indian Overseas Bank has not come before this court challenging the said recovery notice. But the petitioner, only because a copy has been marked to him, has rushed to this court without disclosing his interest on the same. It must be noted that a distraint notice is preceded by several orders passed by both PF and ESI authorities. In respect of the claim made by the PF Department towards the dues payable by Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem and in attaching the properties towards the dues to the PF and ESI Departments, the first respondent, Indian Overseas Bank came to this court with writ petitions being W.P.Nos.11177 and 23748 of 2008. This Court by a common order dated 7.6.2011 dismissed the same. This Court by a common order dated 7.6.2011 dismissed the same. Thereafter, the Indian Overseas Bank filed writ appeals being W.A.Nos.1110 and 1111 of 2011. A division bench of this court had dismissed both the writ appeals with cost. In paragraphs 46 and 47, it was observed as follows: "46.) In view of the fact that the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 as well as Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are a Social Welfare beneficial legislation and also because of the fact that the Appellant/Bank has a viable, effective and efficacious alternative remedy of approaching the statutory authorities, by way of preferring appropriate Appeals as per Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and also as per Section 7-I of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, we are of the considered view that the Writ Petitions filed by the Appellant/Bank are not maintainable in law. We also hold that the Learned Single Judge has rightly held that the Appellant/Bank cannot thwart the impugned proceedings and the said decision does not suffer from any serious material irregularity or patent illegality. Consequently, the Writ Appeals fail. 47.) In the result, the Writ Appeals are dismissed with a total cost of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees Ten thousand only) to be paid to the MADRAS SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN, NEW No.891, Old No.288, P.H.ROAD, OLD WASHERMANPET, CHENNAI-21 for wasting the valuable public time of the Court, knowing pretty well that the Bank is fighting a losing battle. The common order passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11177 and 23748 of 2008 dated 07.06.2011 is affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in these Appeals. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed." 4. Now it is precisely the reason why the Indian Overseas Bank for whom notice was issued by the ESI Corporation did not come to this court. If the person is aggrieved by any order of distraint, he first of all challenge the substantive order fixing liability on M/s.Jawahar Mills Ltd. Merely because the petitioner is the purchaser of the property of Jawahar Mills Ltd., they cannot escape the liability of payment of dues towards ESI and PF Departments. Under Section 93-A, the transferee establishment is also liable to pay dues. Under Section 94, the contribution to the Corporation will have priority over other debts. Under Section 93-A, the transferee establishment is also liable to pay dues. Under Section 94, the contribution to the Corporation will have priority over other debts. The overriding effect of the provisions of the ESI and PF Acts came to be considered vis-à-vis the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and DRT Act by the Supreme Court in more than one judgment. 5. In Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Limited Vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and others reported in 2009 (10) SCC 123 , the Supreme Court while analysing Section 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, held in paragraphs 31 and 32 as follows: "31.) We shall now consider the question whether the provision contained in Section 11 (2) of the Act operates against other debts like mortgage, pledge, etc. Answer to this question is clearly discernible from the plain language of Section 11. The priority given to the dues of provident fund, etc. in Section 11 is not hedged with any limitation or condition. Rather, a bare reading of the section makes it clear that the amount due is required to be paid in priority to all other debts. Any doubt on the width and scope of Section 11 qua other debts is removed by the use of expression "all other debts" in both the sub-sections. This would mean that the priority clause enshrined in Section 11 will operate against statutory as well as non-statutory and secured as well as unsecured debts including a mortgage or pledge. Sub-section (2) was designedly inserted in the Act for ensuring that the provident fund dues of the workers are not defeated by prior claims of secured or unsecured creditors. This is the reason why the legislature took care to declare that irrespective of time when a debt is created in respect of the assets of the establishment, the dues payable under the Act would always remain first charge and shall be paid first out of the assets of the establishment notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the statutory first charge created on the assets of the establishment by sub-section (2) of Section 11 and priority given to the payment of any amount due from an employer will operate against all types of debts. It is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the statutory first charge created on the assets of the establishment by sub-section (2) of Section 11 and priority given to the payment of any amount due from an employer will operate against all types of debts. 32.) The view we have taken on the interpretation of Section 11 (2) is in tune with a series of decisions of this Court in which the provisions contained in different statutes giving priority to the dues of the State and workers have been interpreted. In the first place, we may refer to some decisions relating to dues of the State."* 6. The Supreme Court in Employees Provident Fund Commissioner v. Official Liquidator reported in (2011) 10 SCC 727 in paragraphs 48 to 51 had observed as follows: "48.) It is also important to bear in mind that even before the insertion of Section 529(1) proviso, Sections 529(3) and 529-A* and amendment of Section 530(1), all sums due to any employee from a provident fund, a pension fund, a gratuity fund or any other fund established for the welfare of the employees were payable in priority to all other debts in a winding-up proceedings [Section 530(1)(f)]. Even the wages, salary and other dues payable to the workers and employees were payable in priority to all other debts. What Parliament has done by these amendments is to define the term “workmen’s dues” and to place them on a par with debts due to secured creditors to the extent such debts rank under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 529(1). However, these amendments, though subsequent in point of time, cannot be interpreted in a manner which would result in diluting the mandate of Section 11 of the EPF Act, sub-section (2) whereof declares that the amount due from an employer shall be the first charge on the assets of the establishment and shall be paid in priority to all other debts. The words “all other debts” used in Section 11(2) would necessarily include the debts due to secured creditors like banks, financial institutions, etc. The words “all other debts” used in Section 11(2) would necessarily include the debts due to secured creditors like banks, financial institutions, etc. The mere ranking of the dues of workers on a par with debts due to secured creditors cannot lead to an inference that Parliament intended to create first charge in favour of the secured creditors and give priority to the debts due to secured creditors over the amount due from the employer under the EPF Act. 49.) At the cost of repetition, we would emphasise that in terms of Section 530(1), all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the company to the Central or State Government or to a local authority, all wages or salary of any employee, in respect of the services rendered to the company and due for a period not exceeding 4 months, all accrued holiday remuneration, etc. and all sums due to any employee from a provident fund, a pension fund, a gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees maintained by the company are payable in priority to all other debts. This provision existed when Section 11(2) was inserted in the EPF Act by Act 40 of 1973 and any amount due from an employer in respect of the employees’ contribution was declared first charge on the assets of the establishment and became payable in priority to all other debts. However, while inserting Section 529-A in the Companies Act by Act 35 of 1985 Parliament, in its wisdom, did not declare the workmen’s dues (this expression includes various dues including provident fund) as first charge. 50.) The effect of the amendment made in the Companies Act in 1985 is only to expand the scope of the dues of workmen and place them on a par with the debts due to secured creditors and there is no reason to interpret this amendment as giving priority to the debts due to secured creditor over the dues of provident fund payable by an employer. Of course, after the amount due from an employer under the EPF Act is paid, the other dues of the workers will be treated on a par with the debts due to secured creditors and payment thereof will be regulated by the provisions contained in Section 529(1) read with Sections 529(3), 529-A and 530 of the Companies Act. Of course, after the amount due from an employer under the EPF Act is paid, the other dues of the workers will be treated on a par with the debts due to secured creditors and payment thereof will be regulated by the provisions contained in Section 529(1) read with Sections 529(3), 529-A and 530 of the Companies Act. 51.) In view of what we have observed above on the interpretation of Section 11 of the EPF Act and Sections 529, 529-A and 530 of the Companies Act, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, which turned on the interpretation of Section 94 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act and Sections 529-A and 530 of the Companies Act and on which reliance has been placed by the learned Company Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court while dismissing the applications filed by the appellant, cannot be treated as laying down the correct law." 7. Therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to impugn the notice. Even if he is aggrieved, Section 75 provides for resolution of the dispute by the ESI Court. The Supreme Court has held that if authorities make determination under Section 45A, unless it is challenged in a proceedings under Section 75, it can be deemed to become final and the authority can proceed to execute the order vide judgment in ESI Corpn. v. C.C. Santhakumar reported in (2007) 1 SCC 584 . The following passages found in paragraphs 17, 25, 28, 30 and 31 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below : "17.) Prior to the incorporation of Section 45-A under Act 44 of 1966, the only resort available to the Corporation was Section 75, for recovery of contribution through the court. Since this procedure was found to be impracticable and delayed process involved, a special provision was contemplated whereunder adjudication is to be made by the Corporation itself. By reason of incorporation of Section 45-A with effect from 17-6-1967, it became possible for the Corporation to have determination of the question, binding on the principal employer, without resorting to the ESI Court. In regard to the order under Section 45-A, the same is enforced, as envisaged under Section 45-B, which was similarly brought into the Act, by which the contribution may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. In regard to the order under Section 45-A, the same is enforced, as envisaged under Section 45-B, which was similarly brought into the Act, by which the contribution may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. With regard to the decision reached by the ESI Court in the application under Section 75, the said decision is enforced, as envisaged in sub-section (4) of Section 75 as if it is a civil court. The mode of recovery under Section 45-B of the Corporation and the mode of recovery as per Section 75(4) by the ESI Court as the civil court are entirely different as both Sections 45 and 75 operate in different spheres.” 25.) Section 45-A of the Act contemplates a summary method to determine contribution in case of deliberate default on the part of the employer. By Amendment Act 29 of 1989, Sections 45-C to 45-I were inserted in the Principal Act, for the purpose of effecting recovery of arrears by attachment and sale of movable and immovable properties or establishment of the principal or immediate employer, without having recourse to law or the ESI Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that a proceeding for recovery as arrears of land revenue by issuing a certificate could be equated to either a suit, appeal or application in the court. Under Section 68(2) and Sections 45-C to 45-I, after determination of contribution, recovery can be made straightaway. If the employer disputes the correctness of the order under Section 45-A, he could challenge the same under Section 75 of the Act before the ESI Court. 28.) What Section 75(2) empowers is not only the recovery of the amounts due to the Corporation from the employer by recourse to the ESI Court, but also the settlement of the dispute of a claim by the corporation against the employer. While this is so, there is no impediment for the Corporation also to apply to the ESI Court to determine a dispute against an employer where it is satisfied that such a dispute exists. If there is no dispute in the determination either under Section 45-A(1) or under Section 68, the Corporation can straightaway go for recovery of the arrears. 30.) The legislature has provided for a special remedy to deal with special cases. The determination of the claim is left to the Corporation, which is based on the information available to it. If there is no dispute in the determination either under Section 45-A(1) or under Section 68, the Corporation can straightaway go for recovery of the arrears. 30.) The legislature has provided for a special remedy to deal with special cases. The determination of the claim is left to the Corporation, which is based on the information available to it. It shows whether information is sufficient or not or the Corporation is able to get information from the employer or not, on the available records, the Corporation could determine the arrears. So, the non-availability of the records after five years, as per the Regulations, would not debar the Corporation to determine the amount of arrears. Therefore, if the provisions of Section 45-A are read with Section 45-B of the Act, then, the determination made by the Corporation is concerned. It may not be final so far as the employer is concerned, if he chooses to challenge it by filing an application under Section 75 of the Act. If the employer fails to challenge the said determination under Section 75 of the Act before the Court, then the determination under Section 45-A becomes final against the employer as well. As such, there is no hurdle for recovery of the amount determined under Section 45-B of the Act, by invoking the mode of recovery, as contemplated in Sections 45-C to 45-I. 31.) In ESI Corpn. v. F. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd.2 it was observed that it is not necessary for the Corporation to seek a resolution of the dispute before the ESI Court, while the order was passed under Section 45-A. Such a claim is recoverable as arrears of land revenue. If the employer disputes the claim, it is for him to move the ESI Court for relief. In other cases, other than cases where determination of the amount of contributions under Section 45-A is made by the Corporation, if the claim is disputed by the employer, then, it may seek an adjudication of the dispute before the ESI Court, before enforcing recovery." 8. In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.