Hon'ble MISHRA, C.J.—In these intra-court appeals, validity of land acquisition by the State Government for the purposes of establishing Zonal Office and Staff Quarters of North-Western Railway has been questioned on various grounds. 2. The facts in short are that notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 19.08.1997 by Transport Department, Government of Rajasthan for acquiring land at two villages Bindayaka & Todi Ramjanipura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur. For initiating the acquisition, Shri Ram Vilash Pashwan, the then Minister of Railway, Government of India wrote a letter to the then Chief Minister, Government of Rajasthan on 30.12.1996 informing decisions of the Railway to meet the expectations of public and provide more effective administration, the Railway has decided to create North-Western Railway Zonal Headquarter, at Jaipur for which Office Accommodation, Housing for Staff, and other Ancillary Facilities would be necessary and for that purpose 150-200 acres of land was required, therefore, request was made to the Chief Minister, State of Rajasthan to identify suitable piece of land in area of 150-200 acres at Jaipur and provide the same to the Railway free of cost for setting-up Zonal Office. It was also mentioned that this gesture of the State Government would go a long way in enabling to make zone function early. The O.S.D., North-Western Railway, Jaipur also wrote a letter to the Commissioner, JDA, Jaipur on 15.11.1996 for allotment of land for the aforesaid purpose in front of Getor-Jagatpura Railway Station. Communication was also sent on 12.12.1996 to the Commissioner, JDA to the same effect. The Secretary, JDA, Jaipur also wrote a letter to the Transport Commissioner on 28.2.1997 with respect to acquisition of the land at village Bindayaka & Todi Ramjanipura. Dy. Secretary of the Transport Department wrote a letter dated 29.03.1997 to the Collector, Jaipur, State of Rajasthan informing the decision for initiating the proceedings for acquisition of land of village Bindayaka & Todi Ramjanipura, Tehsil Sanganer. Communication dated 09.05.1997 (Annexure-R/1/7) was written by the North- Western Railway to the Chief Secretary, Government of Rajasthan pointing out the request made by the then Railway Minister. Dy. Chief Engineer, North Western Railway wrote communication dated 11.06.1998 (Annexure-R/1/6) to the Dy. Secretary, Transport Department, State of Rajasthan, Jaipur mentioning that for acquisition of 17.52 hectares of land sanction has already been received from the Ministry of Railway. 3. Dy. Chief Engineer, North Western Railway wrote communication dated 11.06.1998 (Annexure-R/1/6) to the Dy. Secretary, Transport Department, State of Rajasthan, Jaipur mentioning that for acquisition of 17.52 hectares of land sanction has already been received from the Ministry of Railway. 3. Thus, it is apparent from the aforesaid documents that the Railway has made request to the Chief Minister and it is also apparent that the Railway Ministry has ultimately approved 17.52 hectares of land in the aforesaid villages as mentioned in the aforesaid communications. The Transport Department has also directed the Collector to start acquisition proceedings. After issuance of the Notification under Section 4 on 19.08.1997, enquiry under section 5A was conducted and thereafter, declaration under Section 6 was issued on 13.01.1999 in which purpose of acquisition was mentioned in the same terms as mentioned in the notification under Section 4. The award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 21.03.2001 determining the compensation payable to the land-holders. Four writ petitions were filed in the year 1999 (CWP-1364/99, 3477/09, 3722/99 & 4856/99), one writ petition was filed by Yogesh Chand Arora in the year 2001 (CWP-5260/01) and other writ petitions were filed after the award was passed in the year 2002, 2003 & 2007 (CWP-385/02, 384/02, 2133/03 & 9094/07) questioning the land acquisition on the ground that the State Government could not said to be “appropriate Government” as per the Section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also submitted that willfully and malafidely land has been chosen for acquisition. Certain land has been left out which belongs to IAS and IPS Officers. Central Government has not issued any notification neither authorization has been obtained from any Government Officers to do the needful. The respondents No.2 & 3 have illegally been authorized by respondent No.1, therefore, actions taken by them of land acquisition are without jurisdiction and void. 4. Leaving out the land situated at village Todi Ramjanipura is discriminatory. Prayer has been made to quash the notification under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 including the award in some writ petitions which have been filed subsequently. Prayer has also been made to quash the award in the writ petitions which have been filed subsequent to passing of the award. 5. In the return filed by the respondents, it is contended that the State Government has taken action in accordance with law. Prayer has also been made to quash the award in the writ petitions which have been filed subsequent to passing of the award. 5. In the return filed by the respondents, it is contended that the State Government has taken action in accordance with law. The Railway has authorized the State Government to make the acquisition. In the return, aforesaid communications have been relied upon and they have also been filed as Annexures to the return. Acquisition has been duly and validly made for public purpose, no discrimination has been made; land, which has been found suitable, has been acquired; land in dispute is agricultural land and no construction can be made over the land without converting it for residential purposes; if any construction has been made by some of the persons, that is without authority of law. The acquisition has been made pursuant to request made by the railway administration; land of Khatedars has been purchased by certain societies for non-agricultural purposes; most of the petitioners are housing societies; there is no illegality in the acquisition; the land was acquired for construction of Zonal Office and Staff Quarter for Railway which is also for the public purpose; the Railway Secretary, Central Government has sanctioned 17.52 hectares of land equal to 69 bighas of land. It cannot be said that State is lacking jurisdiction to acquire the land. 6. Rejoinder has been filed by the Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Samiti (CWP-384/2002) in which it is mentioned that “appropriate Government” would be the Central Government. In the instant case, no order has been issued by the President for delegating the executive powers to the State Government under Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India. Reference has also been made to Article 77 of the Constitution of India. 7. The Single Bench has dismissed the writ petitions. Consequently, the intra-court appeals have been preferred. 8. It was submitted by Mr. Rajendra Prasad and Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants that acquisition is without jurisdiction as in the instant case “appropriate Government” would be Central Government, considering the purpose for which the acquisition has been made i.e. for establishing the Zonal Office of North Western Railway, they have relied upon Section 3(ee). It was submitted by Mr. Rajendra Prasad and Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants that acquisition is without jurisdiction as in the instant case “appropriate Government” would be Central Government, considering the purpose for which the acquisition has been made i.e. for establishing the Zonal Office of North Western Railway, they have relied upon Section 3(ee). It was also submitted that there is no delegation of powers made under Article 258 by the President by issuance of notification conferring the executive powers of the Central Government upon the State Government as such, it was not open to the State Government to acquire the land for the purpose of Railway. On our query they have referred to Rules called “Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961” (hereinafter referred to as the 'Transaction of Business Rules') and “Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961” (hereinafter referred to as the 'Allocation of Business Rules') framed under Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India. It was submitted by Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants that as per Rule 3 of the Transaction of Business Rules, disposal of Business by Ministries as provided is subject to the provisions of these Rules in regard to consultation with other departments and submission of cases to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and its Committees and the President, all business allotted to a department under the Allocation of Business Rules, shall be disposed of by or under the general or special directions of, the “Minister-in-charge”. He has submitted that under Allocation of Business Rules, which have been framed with respect to Ministry of Railway, Railway Board is authorized in respect of all matters relating to Government Railway including Railway Revenue but excluding the Railway Audit Inspection. He has also submitted that all matters would not include the land acquisition which power is specifically conferred under the Allocation of Business Rules upon Department of Land Resources. The said department has power with respect to administration of the land acquisition and the matters relating to the Union Government. He has relied upon Rule 4 of the Transaction of Business Rules to contend that in case of inter department consultation, concurrence of both the departments is necessary, as such, concurrence of department of Railway and Land Resources was necessary. He has relied upon Rule 4 of the Transaction of Business Rules to contend that in case of inter department consultation, concurrence of both the departments is necessary, as such, concurrence of department of Railway and Land Resources was necessary. In case of failure to concur, matter is required to be travelled to the Cabinet. There is nothing on record to indicate that the Department of Land Resources has concurred acquisition to be made under the Land Acquisition Act by the State Government. They contended that thus, even on considering the Transaction of Business Rules and the Allocation of Business Rules, acquisition cannot be said to be in accordance with law; it was unauthorized. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that the selection of land cannot be said to be proper as large chunk of the land has been left just behind the land which has been selected for construction of quarters for the officials and other staff, land has been left in between the residential quarters to be constructed for the official staff; thus, it is colourable exercise of power. The land situated behind has ultimately been purchased after issuance of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 by certain persons who belongs to the cadre of I.A.S. and I.P.S. Officers. There was no reason for leaving out that chunk of land behind and to acquire the land attached to the corner in the method and manner on which it has been done. It was submitted that the land was held for the public purposes, for need of housing by the societies, as such, there was clash of public purpose; as such the land in dispute belonging to the appellants which has been acquired ought to have been left out of acquisition. It was ultimately to be used for housing purposes for which acquisition has been made. 9. Mr. Suresh Pareek, Sr. Advocate appearing with Mr. It was ultimately to be used for housing purposes for which acquisition has been made. 9. Mr. Suresh Pareek, Sr. Advocate appearing with Mr. Shankar Lal on behalf of respondents has submitted that the acquisition has been made under the authority granted by the Central Government to the State Government; there is no illegality in the acquisition; enquiry under Section 5A has been conducted; some of the incumbents have not filed any objection under Section 5A; most of the writ petitions have been filed belatedly after passing of the award; once award is passed land stands absolutely vests in State and acquisition cannot be questioned. It is also submitted that selection of the land is appropriate; no malice has been made out; some of the IAS and IPS have purchased the plots subsequent to the acquisition of land. Thus, acquisition could not be said to be in order to oblige the IAS and IPS officers nor it could be contended that certain piece of land has been left out due to their influence. It was also submitted that acquisition has been made for the public purpose (establishment of Zonal Office of North-Western Railway and Staff Quarters). No case for interference is made out. Reliance has also been placed by the counsel upon various communications which have been placed on record alongwith return and the decision rendered in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan ( AIR 1955 SC 810 ). 10. First question for consideration is whether the acquisition is for the public purpose (establishment of Zonal Office of North-Western Railway and Staff Quarters) made by the State Government is unauthorized as only the Central Government could have acquired the land. Section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act defines the expression “appropriate Government” means, in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that whenever it appears to the[appropriate Government] the land in any locality[ is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose[ or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette. Section 6 also uses the expression “appropriate Government”. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that whenever it appears to the[appropriate Government] the land in any locality[ is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose[ or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette. Section 6 also uses the expression “appropriate Government”. The “appropriate Government” has to issue declaration under Section 6 after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A of the Act. Section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act is quoted below: “(ee) the expression “appropriate Government” means, in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government.” 11. Reliance has been placed on Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India which provides power of the Union to confer powers on the States in certain cases for which the President may with the consent of the Governor of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to the Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive powers to the Union extends. Article 258(1) is quoted below: “258(1). Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the Governor of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.” 12. In the instant case, it is not the case of the parties that President has issued any notification relating to the Land Acquisition Act authorizing the State Government to make acquisition for the purpose of Union of India. 13. When we come to the Transaction of Business Rules and Allocation of Business Rules which have been framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India, Article 77(3) provides that the President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. The President has made Rules called Transaction of Business Rules as well as the Allocation of Business Rules, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) of Article 77 of the Constitution of India. The President has made Rules called Transaction of Business Rules as well as the Allocation of Business Rules, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) of Article 77 of the Constitution of India. Article 77(3) is quoted Below: “77(3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.” 14. As per Rule 3 of Transaction of Business Rules, on behalf of the Cabinet, its Committee and its President all Business allocated to the departments of the Government of India under the Rules of 1961 shall be disposed of by or under the general or special directions of the Minister-in-charge. The Rule 3 of Transaction of Business Rules is quoted below: “3. Disposal of Business by Ministries.- Subject to the provisions of these Rules in regard to consultation with other departments and submission of cases to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and its Committees and the President, all business allotted to a department under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, shall be disposed of by, or under the general or special directions of, the Minister-in-charge.” 15. In the instant case, the then Railway Minister wrote a letter to the Chief Minister, State of Rajasthan vide communication dated 30.12.1996 placed on record as Annexure-R/11 to the return filed by the State in which Railway Minister has requested the State Government to identify and provide about 150-200 acres of land for setting up North-Western Zone Headquarters, office accommodation, housing for staff and other ancillary facilities. Thus, when request has been made to the State Government by the Railway Minister as per Rule 3 of the Transaction of Business Rules, he was acting on behalf of Union of India as provided under Rule 3 of the Allocation of Business Rules including the President while making such request and exercising executive function, request made to identify and provide the land would include the land acquisition to be made in accordance with law. Apart from that there are certain other communications on record which indicate that the Ministry of Railway has, in fact, approved the proposal for 17.52 hectares of land as mentioned in communication dated 11.06.1998 (Annexure R.1.6). Thus, in our considered opinion, the Railway Minister was acting on behalf of the Govt. of India to request the State Government to make the acquisition. Thus, in our considered opinion, the Railway Minister was acting on behalf of the Govt. of India to request the State Government to make the acquisition. The State Government has acted thereupon for acquisition of the land. Hence, there was no necessity in view of the specific communication issued by the Ministry of Railway under Transaction of Business Rules to issue special order as envisaged under Article 258 of the Constitution of India. It was only in absence of Allocation of Business Rules and authorization issued by the Railway Minister to the State Government to exercise executive powers, there would have been necessity of order being issued by the President and it being notified in the gazette as per Article 258 of the Constitution of India. In view of the Transaction of Business Rules, Article 258 does not come into way. In case, the notification had been issued under Article 258, same would have had effect of amending the provisions provided under Section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of Rule 3 of Transaction of Business Rules, we find no force in the submission raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants that land acquisition made by the State Government was unauthorized or that State Government was not competent to make acquisition. 16. Question arises, what is meaning to be given to expression “any other purpose” as mentioned in Section 3(ee) of the Act. Apart from what we have held, even if it is assumed that land acquisition was for the purpose of the Central Government, for the department of Railways and there was no authorization, though in fact State was authorized, in that event also when acquisition is for “public purpose”; the Apex Court has considered the interpretation of the expression “any other purpose” in the decision rendered in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) in which acquisition was made for housing of a member of the staff of a foreign Consulate, it was held by the High Court that purpose of housing of a member of foreign Consulate was the “Union purpose” without power and scope of the State. The Supreme Court has laid down that categories of “purpose” contemplated are three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose and any other public purpose. The Supreme Court has laid down that categories of “purpose” contemplated are three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose and any other public purpose. Though, every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose, though it will not be strictly be a State or Union purpose. What is a State Purpose or a Union Purpose, duties and obligations cast on the State or the Union to do particular thing for the benefit of the public or a section of the public has to be taken into consideration. The Apex Court has laid down that the interpretation made by the High Court for reaching the result that the words “any other public purpose” are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. If the words “any other public purpose:, in the Statute in question have been used only to mean a State purpose, they would become mere surplusage; Courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible. In State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) the Apex Court has laid down thus: “(7) We are unable to uphold this vie as regards both the standpoints. Item 33 in the Union Legislative List (List I) refers to “acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of Union”. Item 36 in the State List (List II) relates to “acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III”. Item 42 of the Concurrent Legislative List (List III) speaks of “the purposes of the Union or of a State or any other public purpose”. 17. Reading the three items together, it is fairly obvious that the categories of “purpose” contemplated are three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose, and any other public purpose. Though every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. Though every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose, though it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose. 18. When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose, we think of duties and obligations, cast on the State or the Union to do particular thing for the benefit of the public or a section of the public. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into existence of utilitarian institutions, or schemes having public welfare at heart, will fall within the third category abovementioned. (8) With great respect, we are constrained to say that the 'ejusdem generis' rule of construction, which found favour in the Court below for reaching the result that the words “any other public purpose” are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied. If the words “any other public purpose, in the Statute in question have been used only to mean a State purpose, they would become mere surplussage; Courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible. (9) Even if it is conceded that the law contemplates only two purposes, namely, State purpose and Union purpose, it is difficult to see how finding accommodation for the staff of a foreign consulate is a Union purpose and not a State purpose. Item II in the Union list specifies “diplomatic, consular and trade representation” as one of the subjects within the legislative competence of Parliament, and under Art.73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend to all such matters. Item II in the Union list specifies “diplomatic, consular and trade representation” as one of the subjects within the legislative competence of Parliament, and under Art.73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend to all such matters. It can hardly be said that securing a room for a member of the staff of a foreign consulate amounts to providing for consular representation, and that therefore it is a purpose of the Union of which the State cannot legislate. It was conceded by Mr. Rajinder Narain, Counsel for the respondent, that there is no duty cast upon Union to provide accommodation for the consulate staff, and this must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of a Consul in modern times are to protect the interests and promote the commercial affairs of the State which he represents, and that his powers, privileges and immunities are not analogous to those of an ambassador. The trade and commerce of the State which appoints him with the State in which he is located are his primary concern. The State of Bombay is primarily interested in its own trade and commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign consul functioning within the State. We are inclined to regard the purpose for which the requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose than as a Union purpose.” 19. In the same decision, the Apex court has considered the question from another way. An undertaking may have three different facets or aspects, and may serve the purpose of a State, the purpose of the Union and a general public purpose. Even if one may regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member of a Consulate as one appertaining to a Union Purpose, it does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. In this view of the matter also, the Apex Court held that requisition made was valid for the purpose of accommodation for staff Consulate. It was State purpose also despite the purposes of Union of India. Hence, requisition was upheld. The Apex Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) has further laid down thus: “(11) There is another way of looking at the question involved. It was State purpose also despite the purposes of Union of India. Hence, requisition was upheld. The Apex Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) has further laid down thus: “(11) There is another way of looking at the question involved. An undertaking may have three different facets or aspects, and may serve the purpose of a State, the purpose of the Union and a general public purpose. Even if one may regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member of a Consulate as one appertaining to a Union purpose, it does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. In this view also the requisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.” 20. In view of aforesaid dictum, it has not been rightly disputed that the State is going to be benefited by establishing the Zonal Office in question in various ways including with respect to trade and commerce as Railway is vital for the same. Establishment of the Zonal Office and facilities is function of the Railway, however, the State of Rajasthan is also going to be immensely benefited. Thus, on the parity of the reasoning given by the Apex Court in para 11 of the decision rendered in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), we are of the considered opinion that when the public purpose is overlapping, acquisition could have been made by the Union for its purpose, that does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose for which the State is competent being beneficiary. 21. In view of aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) considering from yet another angle, we are of the considered opinion that the acquisition made by the State Government, even if there had been no authorization by Railways Minister, could not have been termed to be illegal; Section 3(ee) has to be interpreted in the aforesaid manner as held by the Apex Court. The Single Bench has also noted the amendment made in the State list also in which acquisition has been assigned to the State Government. The Single Bench has also noted the amendment made in the State list also in which acquisition has been assigned to the State Government. Though, in the instant case, question is not of legislation being enacted by the State Government, we find that there is no encroachment upon the powers of the Union of India; in the instant case, acquisition has been made by the State legislature, however fact remains that the Railway Minister on behalf of Government of India has asked the State Government to provide land and under Business of Allocation Rules, he could have exercised the executive power of the Union of India as envisaged in the Allocation of Business Rules and Transaction of Business Rules. Thus, the State Government was competent to make the acquisition. 22. It was submitted that as per Allocation of Business Rules, Ministry of Railways is competent to deal with all matters including those relating to Railway revenues and audit, that would not include land acquisition as the administration of Land Acquisition Act and matters relating to acquisition of land for purpose of Union is with department of Land Resources. It was also submitted that Railways and Department of Land Resources should have concurred for land acquisition as provided in Rule 4 of Transaction of Business Rules. The provisions of Allocation of Business Rules are quoted below:- “MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS (Rail Mantralaya) RAILWAY BOARD (Rail Board) 1. Government Railways- All matters, including those relating to Railways revenues and expenditure, but excluding Railway Inspectorate and Railway Audit. B. DEPARTMENT OF LAND RESOURCES (BHUMI SANSADHAN VIBHAG) 2. Administration of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) and matters relating to acquisition of land for purposes of the Union.” 23. In our opinion, the submission cannot be accepted in the instant case question is of authorization issued by Minister of Railways as per Rule 3 of the Transaction of Business Rules; the request was made to State Government to provide land to Railways for which there was no necessity of consultation with Land Resources Department. It was not the case of land acquisition being made by the Union Government itself, for that Land Resources Department was to initiate proceedings of the Land Acquisition Act. It was not the case of land acquisition being made by the Union Government itself, for that Land Resources Department was to initiate proceedings of the Land Acquisition Act. All matters relating to Railways would include request to be made to State Government to acquire land for which consultation much less concurrence with Department of Land Resources was not necessary. The submission is hereby rejected. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of the Messrs. Tinsukia Development Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Assam and another (AIR 1961 Assam 133 (V 48 C 43)) in which the Full Bench of the Assam High Court has laid down in the context of acquisition of land by the State for purposes of Union for construction of godowns did not necessarily mean that acquisition was for the Union purpose and that purpose ceased to be State purpose. Referring to the decision of the State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), the Full Bench of High Court of Assam in Messrs. Tinsukia Development Corporation Ltd. (supra) has further laid down thus: “(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'Public purpose' has not been defined anywhere in the Act; nor has the 'purposes of the Union' been defined anywhere in the Act. The words 'for the purposes of' in the definition of the expression 'appropriate Government' in my opinion cannot be equated with the words 'for constructing some building by the Union Government;. It may be that a particular building may be constructed by the Central Government and the food-grains may be stocked by the Central Government, but nonetheless if the food-grains are to be distributed among the inhabitants of the State, it is as much a State purpose as a Union purpose. It is essential for a public benefit in which the State is as much interested as the Central Government.” 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that the delegation made by the Central Government by its notification dated 24th March 1952 is invalid as after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution such a power could not be delegated by the Central Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that the delegation made by the Central Government by its notification dated 24th March 1952 is invalid as after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution such a power could not be delegated by the Central Government. I am also of opinion that the fact that the land was acquired by the State Government for enabling the Central Government to erect a food-grains godown does not necessarily mean that the acquisition was for the Union purpose and that the purpose ceased to be a State purpose.” 25. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants has placed reliance upon the decision passed by the High Court of Bombay (Panaji Bench) in Ramdas Thanu Dessai and Ors. vs. State of Goa and Ors. (2009(2) Bom CR 218) in which it has been laid down that when acquisition was made for setting up of railway line and cargo handling terminal at Shelvona, it was held by the High Court of Bombay that it was for the purposes of Union of India. It has been laid down that the words used in the notification have to be seen. Additional benefits which may arise to the local residents out of construction of such railway line and the terminal and not the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. The resultant benefits which the residents of the affected area in Goa may enjoy is not the purpose for which a particular land is sought to be acquired. It has been laid down that State Government was not competent to make acquisition in absence of the delegation of powers under Article 258 of the Constitution of India by the Central Government. Question of authorization being made by the Railway Minister and the Transaction of Business Rules was not involved in Ramdas Thanu Dessai (supra). In the aforesaid decision, decision of State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) has not been taken into consideration; besides, acquisition for railway line is now governed by the provisions of the Railway Act as provisions have been incorporated in the Railway Act for acquisition for Railway line, which provisions are not attracted in the instant case. In the aforesaid decision, decision of State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) has not been taken into consideration; besides, acquisition for railway line is now governed by the provisions of the Railway Act as provisions have been incorporated in the Railway Act for acquisition for Railway line, which provisions are not attracted in the instant case. In view of the aforesaid, and fact that Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.23068/2009 is also pending against the said decision of Bombay High Court before the Supreme Court as apparent from the order-sheets of the aforesaid SLP which have been submitted by Mr. Suresh Pareek, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of Railway; the judgment has not yet attained finality and decision is distinguishable due to authorization issued by Railways Minister in the instant case, no help can be derived by appellants from aforesaid decision. Similar view had been taken by Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Balak and Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (AIR 1962 Allahabad 208 (V 49 C 59) in which it has been laid down that when acquisition of land is for Union purpose, “appropriate Government”, which is entitle to issue notification, is Central Government. Notification issued by the State Government is invalid in absence of valid delegation of power by the Central Government. Notification issued under Article 258 by the Central Government was held to be invalid. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the question of validity of notification under Article 258; Transaction of Business Rules were not placed for consideration nor authorization issued by Ministry of Railway came up for consideration nor decision of Apex Court rendered in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) was considered. On facts also, aforesaid decision of High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad are distinguishable. 26. Coming to the submission raised that when certain land is held by the Societies for the public purpose for housing whether it was appropriate to acquire same very land for the purpose of construction of the residential quarters and staff quarters for the employees of the Zonal Office. We find that merely because land has been purchased for the housing need by the housing society it could not have come in the way of the acquisition for the public purpose in question. We find that merely because land has been purchased for the housing need by the housing society it could not have come in the way of the acquisition for the public purpose in question. Acquisition was made for the public purpose for establishment of the zonal office, office quarters and staff quarters etc., if we accept the submission, it would not be possible to acquire land which is capable of being used for housing purposes or held by housing society. Question is of catering to larger public interest. The land in question has not been converted into the residential land is not in dispute. The applications were submitted by appellants for conversion of the land from agricultural to residential which have not been allowed so far; the land remained agricultural land. Thus, in our considered opinion acquisition could have been made for the avowed public purpose. Planned development and such need which is to benefit the State may necessitate certain acquisition which can always be made. Establishment of zonal office is in the welfare of the State of Rajasthan in various ways is not rightly disputed at the bar though it was submitted that incidental benefit would be caused to the State. The fact remains that acquisition was for betterment of State and to benefit the residents of the State of Rajasthan. The interest of housing societies cannot prevail over such interest. 27. Coming to the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants as to malice, certain land just adjacent situated behind the residential quarters has been left out and yet another adjacent land on corner of aforesaid land has been chosen for construction of the quarters for staff. It was submitted that it would have been appropriate considering concept of the social equality that quarters for staff should have been constructed just behind the residential quarters adjacent to land in dispute. Argument is entirely devoid of merit. The submission is based upon factual aspect that certain IAS and IPS Officers have purchased the land which was located behind the land acquired for residential quarters. It is not disputed at bar that after land acquisition has been made, some land has been purchased by the certain officials of the IAS or IPS categories behind residential quarters. They were admittedly not in picture when acquisition was initiated and notification under Section 4 & declaration under Section 6 were issued. It is not disputed at bar that after land acquisition has been made, some land has been purchased by the certain officials of the IAS or IPS categories behind residential quarters. They were admittedly not in picture when acquisition was initiated and notification under Section 4 & declaration under Section 6 were issued. It was not the case set up in the petition or argued at bar that they had entered into an agreement to sale in earlier point of time before acquisition. The entire argument as to arbitrarily leaving out land due to influence of IAS & IPS Officers is bereft of merit. The violation of concept of social equality is imaginary. Merely by situation of land acquired it cannot be inferred that principle of social equality has been violated. 28. It was also submitted that poor khatedars had been deprived of their land. It does not lie in mouth of housing societies to espouse cause of poor khatedars; they have, in fact, purchased the land from the poor khatedars at through away price. We do not find any substance in the argument that there was pick and chose of the land while making the acquisition. It was not for the court to substitute the wisdom of the Land Acquisition Officer in selecting the piece of land. It was open to select the land separately for staff quarters and for the bungalows as basically different planning is required for these two different blocks. Thus, the decision cannot be said to be suffering with malice or based on pick and choose method. It was not for Court to substitute its wisdom and to pick and choose which piece of land was to be selected. 29. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Syed Maqbool Ali vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. ( AIR 2011 SC 2542 ) in which the Apex Court has laid down in the factual matrix that several plots of appellant were occupied without proper acquisition and payment of compensation. High Court dismissed the petition holding that petitioner to have recourse to Section 18 of the Act, if he wanted enhancement of compensation. ( AIR 2011 SC 2542 ) in which the Apex Court has laid down in the factual matrix that several plots of appellant were occupied without proper acquisition and payment of compensation. High Court dismissed the petition holding that petitioner to have recourse to Section 18 of the Act, if he wanted enhancement of compensation. The appeals were preferred and question arose whether High Court could have dismissed the writ petition seeking direction to acquire land and pay compensation on the ground that his land has been taken over without acquisition by holding that remedy lies under Section 18 of the Act. It was held that reference under Section 18 of the Act, lies only where land-holder gets aggrieved by award in regard to land acquired, either with reference to quantum of compensation, or measurements of land, or persons shown as being entitled to compensation. Application under Section 18 cannot be filed in regard to land not acquired at all. Land holder whose land has been taken without acquisition, can either file civil suit for recovery of possession and/or for compensation, or approach High Court if action can be shown to be arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, biased, malafide or without authority of law and seek direction that land should be acquired in manner known to law. However, belated writ petitions, without proper explanations for delay are liable to be dismissed. Impugned order was set aside and matter was remitted to High Court for fresh consideration and disposal of petition in accordance with law. In the instant case, admittedly land has been acquired. The Apex court in the said has also laid down that if the writ petition is belated, unless there is good and satisfactory explanation for the delay, the petition will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 30. In the instant case, we are not satisfied with the explanation of delay and laches with respect to petitions filed belatedly after 2001 they are liable to be dismissed on ground of latches only, however, we have dealt with the merits of the case as some petitions were filed in 1999, the same hold good for decision on the merits even in the cases in which petitions have been filed belatedly; they are found to be bereft of merits. 31. Mr. 31. Mr. R.D. Rastogi has further submitted that we should look into the file pertaining to the enquiry conducted under Section 5A. Counsel has tried to address us at length on that issue but without any factual foundation of the same in the petitions in which he is appearing, this question has not been raised and other counsel have not pressed this submission at all. Enquiry under Section 5A has not been questioned in the petition in which Mr. Rastogi is appearing. Thus, we reject the submission made by the learned counsel, Mr. Rastogi in cases in which he is appearing for want of pleading. 32. We place on record that more than 16 crores have been spent in construction by the Railway authorities and in some other areas construction has been completed upto to plinth level. Five out of nine writ petitions have been filed belatedly without reasonable explanation and much after the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. One of writ petition which was filed in the year 1999 was dismissed by the Single Bench and that order has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in SAW No.708/2003 vide order dated 26.04.2004. 33. Resultantly, we find the appeals to be meritless and they are hereby dismissed. Stay applications are also dismissed. Parties to bear their costs.