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2012 DIGILAW 741 (JK)

Maulana Syed Abdullah Shah Bukhari v. State of J&K & Ors.

2012-12-03

J.P.SINGH

body2012
1. The petitioner-Maulana Syed Abdullah Shah Bukhari, the Muddrais/Khateeb at Jamia Masjid, Shahdara Sharief, Thanamandi, Rajouri has questioned Administrator Auqaf, Shahdara Sharief's order No. 780-84/SHA-12 dated 29.06.2012 whereby he was ordered to swap his place of posting with Maulana Azhar-ul-Haq Mudrais/Khateeb Jamia Masjid Bethian (Ziarat Sain Wali Dad Sahib) Bethian, on the ground that the Administrator had no jurisdiction to pass such orders, in that, in terms of the provisions of Section 37 of the Jammu and Kashmir Wakafs Act, 2001, it is only the Chairman of the Tehsil Committee, who is empowered to effect transfers of Mudrais/Khateeb's etc. His transfer and posting is otherwise stated unjustified, in that, the petitioner's health condition besides the fact that his School going children would be adversely affected by his transfer, were not taken into consideration by the Administrator while issuing Order dated 29.06.2012. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their submissions. 3. The Tehsil Committee which had jurisdiction over the two Wakaf properties where the petitioner and respondent No. 5 were posted as Muddrais/Khateebs stands dissolved by the Government appointing Administrator for management of the Wakaf properties, is a fact not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was appointed as Muddrais/Khateeb by the Administrator after the dissolution of the Tehsil Committee. 4. Perusal of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Jammu and Kashmir Wakafs Act, 2001 (the 'Act') for short, reveals that every Tehsil Wakaf Committee is a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal with power to acquire and hold property notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in any law for the time being in force, and may sue and be sued by its name. A Wakaf Committee functions through its Chairman or Vice Chairman when the former is not present, and in case of absence of both, by any Member of the Committee chosen from amongst themselves. These functionaries do not have any independent existence as such and they function only during the existence of the Tehsil Committee and not otherwise. With dissolution of the Tehsil Committee, the office of the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman, or any member of the Committee chosen to Act as Chairman, automatically ceases to exist. 5. These functionaries do not have any independent existence as such and they function only during the existence of the Tehsil Committee and not otherwise. With dissolution of the Tehsil Committee, the office of the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman, or any member of the Committee chosen to Act as Chairman, automatically ceases to exist. 5. Although general powers of the Chairman, in terms of Section 37 of the Act, include the powers to appoint, remove or transfer, the Imams, Khatib, etc. of Mosque, Dargah or Khankah; but such power can be exercised by him only if there was a Tehsil Committee in existence and not otherwise. In the event of dissolution of the Tehsil Committee and vesting of the powers thereof in the Administrator, all the powers of the Tehsil Committee including those exercisable by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman under the Act, would vest exclusively and absolutely in the Administrator appointed by the Government, subject, however, to the general control and superintendent of the Wakafs Council. 6. The Scheme of the Act does not contemplate that the power to transfer Muddrais/Khateebs etc. would continue to vest in the Chairman of a Committee, despite its dissolution. 7. There is, therefore, no merit in the petitioner's learned counsel's submission that the Administrator had no jurisdiction to exercise powers of the Tehsil Committee and issue orders for petitioner's transfer. 8. Transfers are not justiciable as such unless shown to be without jurisdiction, arbitrary or malafide. 9. Petitioner's transfer specifically indicated to have been ordered in the interests of Wakaf and Ziarat Sharief, may not, therefore, warrant interference by the Court in exercise of its extraordinary Writ Jurisdiction. 10. Found without merit, this Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.