JUDGMENT Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Kotiswar Singh 1. Heard Mr. M.Z.Ahmed, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner-company as well as Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3. This petition has been filed by the North Eastern Coal Fields Coal India Ltd. challenging the Award dated 8.9.2003 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati in the matter of an industrial dispute between the Chief General Manager, North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd. Guwahati and Smt. Sharmila Choudhury in Reference Case No. 6(c) of 2001. By the said Award dated 8.9.2003, the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati held that the action of the management of the North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd. in stopping the service of the workman, Smt. Sharmila Choudhury from 20.01.1999 vide their letter dated 19.1.1999 was not justified and accordingly, directed the management of the North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd. to allow the said workman to resume work. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, however, made it clear that the workman would get remuneration from the date of her joining after passing of the award and would not be entitled to back wages for the period she has not worked. 2. The brief facts of the case as narrated by the petitioner-company is that the workman, Smt. Sharmila Choudhury was initially employed as a casual typist in the North Eastern Coal Fields under Coal India Ltd. and was posted at Shillong in the year 1992. Thereafter, after being interviewed, the said workman was selected for regular appointment to the post of Typist-cum Clerk subject to terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment order for a period of six months from the date of her joining vide order issued by the Deputy General Manager (CCS), North Eastern Coal Fields on 28.9.1994. On successful completion of the temporary period of six months, her service was regularized in the said grade. 3. On successful completion of the temporary period of six months, her service was regularized in the said grade. 3. According to the petitioner-company, the workman, impleaded as respondent No. 3 in the present writ petition, at the time of her appointment had submitted her Admit Card and Mark sheet of Assam Higher Secondary School Examination, but on verification with the Assam Higher Secondary Education Council, the Controller of Examination vide their letter dated 21.4.1995 informed that the aforesaid certificate was a counterfeit one as the records showed the name of another candidate and not the name of the respondent No. 3. 4. Accordingly, on the basis of the aforesaid information, the respondent No. 3 was suspended from duty and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her. Formal charges were framed against the respondent No. 3 and the respondent No. 3 submitted her written statement. The departmental enquiry held that the charges were proved and by a letter dated 12.2.1998, the Chief General Manager dismissed the respondent No. 3 from the service of the petitioner-company. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal against the dismissal order under Clause 30 of the Standing Order before the Director-in-Charge, North Eastern Coal Fields, Coal India Ltd., Calcutta. The appellate authority of the petitioner-company took a sympathetic view of the matter and since the respondent No. 3 had the minimum eligible qualification i.e. HSLC certificate for the post of clerical Grade-III, the petitioner-company allowed the respondent No. 3 to join her duties afresh to the post of Clerk Grade-III for a period of six months subject to the condition that her case would be considered for further order on satisfactory performance during the aforesaid period. Accordingly, the respondent No. 3 was posted at the N.E.C. Cell, Calcutta vide letter dated 6.7.98. Subsequently, on the request of the respondent No. 3, she was allowed to join at NEC Guwahati Office at Guwahati. It is the case of the petitioner-company that during the aforesaid six months period after fresh appointment as stated above, it was noticed that the respondent No. 3 was a habitual late comer and in many instances, she signed the Attendance Register after her attendance had been crossed by the concerned officer as absent without the knowledge and permission of the officer. She was also found to be absent without permission from the authorities on various dates such as 22.10.98, 23.10.98, 27.11.98, 21.12.98, 25.12.98 and from 1.1.99 to 8.1.99. It has also been stated by the petitioner-company that the respondent No. 3 further committed malpractice by putting her signatures on 7.1.99 and 8.1.99 when in fact she joined her duty on 9.1.99 without approval by the concerned officer. 5. According to the petitioner-company, because of the aforesaid conduct of the respondent No. 3, the management had no option but not to allow her to continue in service w.e.f. 20.1.99 vide its letter dated No. NEC/GHY/NEE-1/16/99/441 dated 19.1.99. 6. Accordingly, being aggrieved, the workman/respondent No. 3 raised an Industrial Dispute before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and a conciliation proceeding was initiated. Before the said conciliation proceeding, the petitioner-company stated that the management of the petitioner-company took a decision to restrain the respondent No. 3 from working for specific misconduct committed by the respondent No. 3, that she was a habitual late comer, that she used to illegally sign the Attendance Register after her attendance had been crossed by the concerned officer as absent, that she was found absent from duties without permission on various dates. The said conciliation proceeding ended in failure and the matter was referred to the Central Government. The Central Government was of the view that the action of the petitioner-company in stopping the work of the respondent No. 3 for the aforesaid misconduct amounts to an industrial dispute, which requires adjudication by a competent Court. Accordingly, the dispute was referred to Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati to adjudicate as to whether the petitioner-company was justified in stopping the work of the respondent No. 3 with effect from 20.1.99 for the aforesaid misconduct. 7. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal did not accept the contention of the petitioner-company that the conduct of the respondent No. 3 was not satisfactory and held that the management was not justified in stopping the work of the workman. Accordingly, the petitioner-company was directed to allow her to work as stated above. 8. The case of the petitioner-company before the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati was that when it was discovered that the workman/respondent No. 3 had produced a false certificate, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her and based on the findings of the disciplinary proceeding, she was dismissed from service. 8. The case of the petitioner-company before the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati was that when it was discovered that the workman/respondent No. 3 had produced a false certificate, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her and based on the findings of the disciplinary proceeding, she was dismissed from service. However, on sympathetic consideration of the case of the respondent No. 3, the appellate authority appointed her afresh to work with the condition that her case will be considered after six months. Since after fresh appointment, the workman/respondent No. 3 had not been discharging her duties satisfactorily and she was found to be a habitual absentee and also a late comer and also indulged in other misconducts of manipulating the Attendance Register as stated above, her service was discontinued. 9. On behalf of petitioner-company, one S.B. Dasgupta was examined as the sole witness and the workman also examined herself only. In support of the contention of the petitioner-company that the respondent No. 3 had tampered with the Attendance Register, the management produced four Attendance Registers. The petitioner-company also raised the issue of alleged forgery of the educational qualification as mentioned above. 10. The case of the workman/respondent No. 3 before the learned Industrial Tribunal was that she was regularly appointed in the year 1995 and though her service was terminated on the basis of a departmental enquiry, which was falsely hoisted against her, and on appeal, she was reinstated to service by the order passed by the appellate authority on 24.6.98. The respondent No. 3 resumed service w.e.f. 9.8.98 on the condition that she would not claim back wages. However, by the order dated 19.1.1999, the respondent No. 3 was directed by the management that the service of the respondent No. 3 is stopped w.e.f. 20.1.1999 until further orders. According to the respondent No. 3, the aforesaid order is illegal inasmuch as the service of the respondent No. 3 has not been terminated. According to her, no enquiry was conducted against her on the allegation made by the Management and also that no notice was given to her. She also denied the allegations made against her of producing false mark sheet and Admit Card. She also denied that she had signed in the attendance register after it was marked absent against her name. 11. She also denied the allegations made against her of producing false mark sheet and Admit Card. She also denied that she had signed in the attendance register after it was marked absent against her name. 11. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, on consideration of the rival contentions held that the plea of the management that the respondent No. 3 tampered with the Attendance Register has not been proved. It was also observed that no handwriting expert was produced to prove the aforesaid alleged tampering of the Attendance Register. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal also rejected the contention of the management that the education qualification of the workman/respondent No. 3 had been forged and also did not accept the contention of the management that the conduct of the workman is not satisfactory. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal also rejected the contention of the management that the respondent No. 3 is not a workman. Accordingly, the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal passed the Award dated 8.9.2003 rejecting the contentions of the management and directed the management to allow the respondent No. 3 to work as stated above. 12. In the present petition, the management is challenging the findings of the award made by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal on the following grounds:- [i] the workman/respondent No. 3 had presented a totally distorted picture before the learned Industrial Tribunal by stating that she did not submit any false certificate, which is totally false and misleading inasmuch as the Controller of Examination, Assam Higher Secondary Education Council, had already intimated that the mark sheet Sl. No. 113902 as a counterfeit document and the candidate who appeared under the said roll number in the said examination is one Pranita Deka and not Sharmila Choudhury, the respondent No. 3 and asked the authority to report the matter to the police. However, the appellate authority of the management taking a considerate view did not report the matter to the police and reappointed the respondent No. 3 on the condition that further order will be passed after satisfactory performance after six months. [ii] Secondly, it has also been contended that the learned Industrial Tribunal had failed to appreciate the contention that the respondent No. 3 was a habitual late comer and an absentee, which is clearly evident from the Attendance Register produced by them. [ii] Secondly, it has also been contended that the learned Industrial Tribunal had failed to appreciate the contention that the respondent No. 3 was a habitual late comer and an absentee, which is clearly evident from the Attendance Register produced by them. It has been also contended that since there was overwriting and tampering of the Attendance Register, if at all the learned Industrial Tribunal had any doubt, the learned Industrial Tribunal ought to have referred the Attendance Register for examination by any handwriting expert rather than giving the benefit of doubt to the workman. It was contended that the learned Industrial Tribunal ought not to have ignored the documentary evidence produced by the management to show that the performance of the respondent No. 3 was unsatisfactory. [iii] Thirdly, it was also contended that the respondent No. 3 was not a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, inasmuch as she failed to actually continuously work under the petitioner-company for a minimum period of 240 days as required under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act after her fresh appointment. 13. This Court has considered the rival contentions of the parties and gone through the records of the case produced before this Court. We will deal with the last contention of the petitioner-company at the outset. The contention of the petitioner-company that the respondent No. 3 is not a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as she has not worked continuously for at least 240 days is not tenable as there is no such condition attached to the definition of "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act. The contention of the petitioner-company that the respondent No. 3 is not a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as she has not worked continuously for at least 240 days is not tenable as there is no such condition attached to the definition of "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(s) defines workman as under:- (s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as s consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1960 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding (ten thousand rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. The condition mentioned in Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act is only for the purpose of Chapter VA of the Act dealing with lay-off and retrenchment. It was the specific case of the petitioner-company that the case of the respondent workman did not come within the ambit of Section 25F read with Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Further, the status of "workman" is not dependent upon the length of service, as is evident from the definition of "workman" under the Act. As such, the contention of the petitioner-company can not be accepted. 14. We will now deal with the other contentious issues. 15. Further, the status of "workman" is not dependent upon the length of service, as is evident from the definition of "workman" under the Act. As such, the contention of the petitioner-company can not be accepted. 14. We will now deal with the other contentious issues. 15. There is a considerable dispute as to whether the aforesaid rejoining in service of the respondent No. 3 was a fresh appointment as contended by the management of the petitioner-company or mere reinstatement in service as contended by the respondent No. 3. Without going into the aforesaid disputed issue, we may refer to some undisputed facts. The fact remains that the respondent No. 3 was allowed to join as a Clerk-Grade-III vide order dated 6.7.98 whereby it was stated that the competent authority of the petitioner-company was pleased to allow the respondent No. 3 to join as Clerk Grade-III for a period of six months and only on satisfactory performance during this period, the case of the respondent No. 3 will be considered for further orders. The said order also stated that before joining duty, respondent No. 3 is to furnish an undertaking to the effect that she will not claim back wages or any other reliefs. 16. Without going into the controversy whether the aforesaid order was a fresh appointment or a mere reinstatement, this Court is of the opinion that the present issue can be examined on the basis of the orders passed by the petitioner-company pursuant to the said order dated 6.7.1998. The order dated 19.1.99 by which it was stated that the service of the respondent No. 3 is stopped w.e.f. 20.1.99 until further orders is somewhat vague. If, the contention of the petitioner-company that the aforesaid order directing stoppage of the service of the respondent No. 3 was because of the unsatisfactory service rendered by the respondent No. 3 during the six months and her service being no more required, is to be accepted, then, there is no reason to add the words "till further orders" in the impugned order. This stoppage of work, according to the Management, was not meant to be of temporary but of permanent nature. Therefore, this impugned order suffers from the vice of vagueness. This stoppage of work, according to the Management, was not meant to be of temporary but of permanent nature. Therefore, this impugned order suffers from the vice of vagueness. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 also has contended that the aforesaid order dated 19.1.99 stopping the service of the respondent No. 3 w.e.f. 20.1.1999, though seemingly a termination simplicitor, is not really so, inasmuch as the aforesaid order dated 19.1.1999 was passed by way of punishment of the respondent No. 3 for the alleged misconduct of habitual abstention, tampering of Attendance Register and also of submitting forged certificate which have been the reasons for discontinuation of the service of the respondent No. 3, as clearly stated by the petitioner-company before the learned Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, the allegations that the respondent No. 3 was a habitual late comer, she had manipulated the Attendance Register as well as submitted forged certificate were indeed the basis or the foundation for the passing of the aforesaid order dated 19.1.1999. Accordingly, the Respondent No. 3 contends that the aforesaid order dated 19.1.1999 is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel submitted that by lifting the veil of the apparently innocuous order of stopping the service of the respondent No. 3, the real reasons and foundations of the stopping the service of the respondent No. 3 could be clearly found. Accordingly, he submits that since the impugned order was issued without giving any notice, the same is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submits that the service of the Respondent No. 3 was terminated in terms of the appointment letter dated 6.7.1998 in which it was clearly mentioned that her service would be considered on satisfactory performance of her duties during the six months period. Accordingly, the learned counsel submits that there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order and has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Vidyavardhaka Sangha and Anr. vs. Y.D. Deshpande and others", (2006) 12 SCC 482 to buttress his argument, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that; 4. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. In the instant case as noticed above, the respective respondents have accepted the appointment including the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment orders and joined the posts in question and continued on the said posts for some years. The respondents having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment order and allowed the period for which they were appointed to have been elapsed by efflux of time, they are not now permitted to turn their back and say that their appointments could not be terminated on the basis of their appointment letters nor they could be treated as temporary employees or on contract basis. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the said effect has no merit and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is also well-settled law by several other decisions of this Court that appointment on ad hoc basis/temporary basis comes to an end by efflux of time and persons holding such post have no right to continue on the post and ask for regularization, etc. Accordingly, the learned counsel submits that the Respondent No. 3 was not entitled to any notice as the termination was in terms of the appointment order. Likening the status of the Respondent No. 3 to that of a casual/badli worker, the learned counsel relying on "Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. vs. S.G. Kotturappa & anr.", (2005) 3 SCC 409 , submits that the service of the Respondent No. 3 can be dispensed with, if for any reasons she was not found suitable for the job for which her service was utilized. Further, a dispute as regards purported wrongful termination of service can be raised only if such termination takes place in violation of mandatory provisions of the statute governing the services. In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no such mandatory provision of the statute has been violated and the service of the Respondent No. 3 was discontinued as she was not found suitable for the job. 17. In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no such mandatory provision of the statute has been violated and the service of the Respondent No. 3 was discontinued as she was not found suitable for the job. 17. It was also contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 that the onus was on the petitioner-company to prove that the Attendance Register was tampered with by the respondent No. 3 and therefore, on the failure on the part of the management of the North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd. to produce the necessary evidence and witnesses to prove the aforesaid allegation of tampering of Attendance Register, the finding of the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted with. In fact, the person in whose custody the Attendance Register was supposed to be, was not even examined. Only one officer, namely, S. Dasgupta, who was Deputy Personnel Manager and who was not the custodian of the aforesaid Attendance Register was examined and as such, the aforesaid allegations that the respondent No. 3 had tampered with the Attendance Register is not proved. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, submitted that the Industrial Tribunal was not entitled to go into the merits about the various allegations and proof thereof. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 however submitted that the Award dated 8.9.2003 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal does not suffer from any irregularity or illegality The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 has relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the case of General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Silchar vs. Oil and Natural Gas Commission Contractual Workers Union, (2008) 12 SCC 275 stating that in absence of any perversity and patent illegality in the award made by the learned Industrial Tribunal, High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of the award made by the learned Industrial Tribunal. Referring to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & ors.; (1999) 3 SCC 60 as well as V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab & ors.; (2000) 3 SCC 239 , the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 has also contended that even if assuming that the appointment of the respondent No. 3 was a fresh one and she was placed under probation, her service could not have been terminated in the manner it had been done without complying with the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the aforesaid order dated 19.1.1999 stopping the service of the respondent No. 3 was by way of punishment. 18. As can be seen from the records, it is the specific case of the petitioner-company that it was noticed that during the period of six months after the respondent No. 3 had joined her duties afresh, (1) she was a habitual late comer, (2) she had tampered with the Attendance Register and (3) she had submitted a forged certificate. Because of the aforesaid acts of the respondent No. 3, the Management had no other option but to disallow her to continue in service, more so, as her case did not come within the ambit of Section 25F read with Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. 19. This Court also has noted that one of the reasons as stated above for discontinuation of the service of the respondent No. 3 was the alleged act of the respondent No. 3 in submitting forged certificate. The petitioner-company had already taken a punitive action against the respondent No. 3 by dismissing her service on the basis of a departmental proceeding regarding the aforesaid alleged act of submission of the forged certificate. Therefore, after the respondent No. 3 was reinstated in service by the order of the appellate authority, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid alleged misconduct of the respondent No. 3 could not be used again for taking action against the respondent No. 3 as has been sought to be done by order dated 19.1.1999. Further, the aforesaid alleged misconduct was committed prior to the issue of the appointment order dated 6.7.1998. The period of the aforesaid alleged misconduct does not fall within the six months period after the said appointment order dated 6.7.1998. Further, the aforesaid alleged misconduct was committed prior to the issue of the appointment order dated 6.7.1998. The period of the aforesaid alleged misconduct does not fall within the six months period after the said appointment order dated 6.7.1998. Therefore, the Management could not have referred to the aforesaid alleged misconduct to assess her work during the said six months period. Therefore, invoking the alleged past misconduct to judge the suitability of the Respondent No. 3 after she was re-appointed can not be said to be appropriate. This Court has also observed that as regards the allegation of tampering of Attendance Register, the respondent No. 3 had clearly denied in her written statement before the learned Industrial Tribunal. In view of the aforesaid specific denial by the respondent No. 3, onus was on the management of the North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd. to prove that the Attendance Register had indeed been tampered with and manipulated by the respondent No. 3. The Management did not produce any witness who had direct knowledge of the alleged tampering of Attendance Register by the Respondent No. 3. This Court also perused the Attendance Register. It can not be ascertained without the relevant witnesses whether the Attendance Register was manipulated by the Respondent No. 3 or not. It can not be said with certainty whether the cross mark was placed after the Respondent No. 3 had already put her signature or vice-versa. The failure by the Management to produce the witness who had custody of the Attendance Register or knowledge about the alleged manipulation weakens their case. It is to be also noted that the Management had not also stated how they had come to a conclusion that the Attendance Register was manipulated by the Respondent No. 3 so as to make an assessment of the suitability of the Respondent No. 3 on the basis of such an act. Assessment of suitability must be based on certain verifiable facts and not merely on suspicious, otherwise, it can lead to serious abuse of power. Therefore, the finding of the learned Industrial Tribunal that the allegation of the petitioner-company that the Attendance Register was tampered with by the respondent No. 3 is not proved, cannot be faulted with. The said finding also can not be said to be perverse. 20. There is yet another disturbing aspect of the matter. Therefore, the finding of the learned Industrial Tribunal that the allegation of the petitioner-company that the Attendance Register was tampered with by the respondent No. 3 is not proved, cannot be faulted with. The said finding also can not be said to be perverse. 20. There is yet another disturbing aspect of the matter. On perusal of the records produced, it is seen that the Management had apparently stopped the work of the Respondent No. 3 on the basis of the letter dated 19.01.1999. However, the Management also produced a document which was exhibited as Exhibit "N" before the learned Industrial Tribunal, bearing No. NEC/GHY/16/99/380 dated 21.1.1999, which is reproduced herein below:- NEC/GHY/16/99/380 Date: 21-01-99 Smt. Sharmila Choudhury, Clerk Grade-III was appointed vide Office Order No. NEC/GHY/DGM/1250 dt. 29-09-94 as Typist/Clerk Grade-III. As per terms of appointment she was appointed for a period of Six months and on successful completion she was to be regularized in grade-III. On verification of Certificates from Assam Board; it is found that the Higher Secondary School Certificate submitted by Smt. Sharmila Choudhury were false. Accordingly, she was Chargesheeted and an enquiry was conducted where it was proved that the Higher Secondary Certificate submitted by Smt. Sharmila Choudhury were false. Accordingly she was dismissed from service w.e.f. 12.2.98. Smt. Sharmila Choudhury submitted a petition for reconsideration of her case. The Competent Authority considered the matter and allowed her join afresh for a period of Six months and ordered to keep watch on her performance and there after, case may be put up for further orders. Vide letter No. NEC/NEE-1/16/98/236 dt. 6.7.98 Smt. Sharmila Choudhury was allowed to join as Clerk Grade-III for a period of Six months. Smt. Choudhury joined on 10.07.98. During this period from 10.07.98 till date it has been observed that Smt. Sharmila Choudhury is a habitual late comer which is proved from the attendance register. Further it has been also be found that she in the habit of signing the attendance register after her attendance has been crossed by the Officer concerned without any knowledge or permission from the Officer concerned. She has also found to be absent on the following dates. Further it has been also be found that she in the habit of signing the attendance register after her attendance has been crossed by the Officer concerned without any knowledge or permission from the Officer concerned. She has also found to be absent on the following dates. From 22.10.98 to 23.10.98 19.11.98 & 27.11.98 21.12.98 & 25.12.98 From 01.01.99 to 08.01.99 It is also found that although she was absenting from 1.1.99 to 8.1.99, she has put signature on 7th and 8th Jan' after coming to office on 9th without the concerned Officer's approval. The above indicates very clearly that she is not serious about her job and her habitual late coming and signing the attendance register on the dates of absence is submersive to discipline and sets a bad example to other employees. In view of the above Competent Authority may like to decide please. Sd/- 21.01.99 Dy. PM (P & A) CGM DIC From the aforesaid document, what transpires is that there was proposal from the Dy.PM(P&A) to the higher authority, i.e. CGM on 21.1.1999 for taking necessary decision with regard to the Respondent No. 3 on the basis of the alleged irregularities as mentioned above. The production of this document dated 21.1.1999 has laid bare the intentions of the Management. While this document purports to contain the reason for issuing the order of stoppage of work dated 19.1.1999, the order for stoppage of work precedes the document. In normal course, the order of stoppage of work should have followed the consideration of the performance of the work of the Respondent No. 3 by the authorities. However, this document which reflects the assessment of the performance of the Respondent No. 3 is subsequent to the order of stoppage of work issued on 19.1.1999. This clearly reveals that the order of stoppage of work of the Respondent No. 3 was issued without proper assessment of the work of the Respondent No. 3. What the document dated 21.1.1999 reflects is that the assessment of the work of the Respondent No. 3 was done after the order of stoppage of work of the Respondent No. 3 was issued which is not permissible in law. If this document is to be believed to be genuine, it ought to have preceded the order of stoppage of work. If this document is to be believed to be genuine, it ought to have preceded the order of stoppage of work. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the action of the Management in issuing the order dated 19.1.1999 was arbitrary and without proper application of mind and the said document dated 21.1.1999 was an afterthought. 21. Coming to the not so simple issue whether the stoppage order was a "termination simplicitor" or "punitive", the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3 has urged that the impugned order dated 19.1.1999 was issued by way of punishment and has relied upon several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as mentioned above. It is now more or less well settled that to ascertain whether any action of termination amounts to punitive or simplicitor would depend as to whether the allegations against the employee were the "foundation" or "motive" for the termination. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) after a review and discussion of related law held that, 21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. However, as we proceed further, it may be apposite to refer to a very important aspect highlighted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash Sahi vs. State of U.P. and ors. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 152 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision in Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd., 1987 Supp SCC 739, observed that, 24...................................................................................................... reported in (2000) 5 SCC 152 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision in Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd., 1987 Supp SCC 739, observed that, 24...................................................................................................... in the relationship of master and servant there is a moral obligation to act fairly. Therefore should be an assessment of the work of the employee and if any defect is noted in his working, the employee should be made aware of the defect in his work and deficiency in his performance. Defects or deficiency, indifference or indiscretion may be with the employee by inadvertence and not by incapacity to work. Timely communication of the assessment of work in such cases may put the employee on the right track. Without any such communication, it was observed, it would be arbitrary to give a movement order to the employee on the ground of unsuitability. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was thus of the view that if there be any deficiency in the service of the employees, the employee ought to have been notified of such deficiency and the employee ought not to be given marching order abruptly. In the present case, it is revealed from the records that the Respondent No. 3 was not given any warning about the alleged absence from work. Shri S. Dasgupta, who was examined on behalf of the Management had stated before the Industrial Tribunal that he did not warn the Respondent No. 3 for her frequent absence by letter. 22. In the instant case, the records do not reveal that any enquiry had been conducted against the respondent No. 3 before the impugned order was issued, thus it may seem that the allegation would be a motive and not the foundation. Yet, there is a very important aspect which has engaged the mind of the Court. Though the Management contends that the service of the respondent No. 3 was stopped as her service was found to be unsatisfactory, yet, the Management makes a very categorical statement that the aforesaid stoppage of work was resorted to because of specific misconduct committed by the respondent No. 3. 23. In this regard, it may be appropriate to refer to paragraphs No. 8, 9 and 10 of the petition, which are reproduced herein below:- 8. 23. In this regard, it may be appropriate to refer to paragraphs No. 8, 9 and 10 of the petition, which are reproduced herein below:- 8. That during the relevant period of six months after the respondent No. 3 had again joined her duties afresh under condition of satisfactory performance during the aforesaid period, then only, her case to be considered for further orders, it was noticed that the Respondent was a habitual late comer, as it would be evident from the Attendance Register. Moreover, in many instances, the Respondent had the audacity to sign the Attendance Register after her attendance had been crossed by the concerned Officer as absent, without his knowledge or permission. Inspite of that the Respondent No. 3 was found to be absent from her duties without any permission from the competent Authority on various dates such as 22.10.98, 23.10.98, 27.11.98, 21.12.98, 25.12.98 and from 1.1.99 to 8.1.99. The Respondent No. 3 further committed malpractice by putting her signatures on 7th and 8th January, 1999, when in fact she had joined her duties only on 9th January, 1999, without the approval of the concerned Officer. 9. That the Order allowing the Respondent to join as Clerk Grade-III, clearly stipulated that in the even the Workman's performance and conduct was found unsatisfactory during the aforesaid period of six months, the Workman's case would be considered for further orders. The Respondent had repeatedly absented from duties without prior permission and as she had become a habitual late comer, the Management had no other option but to disallow her to continue in service with effect from 20.1.99 by its letter No. NEC/GHY/NEE-1/16/99/441 dated 19.1.99, more so, as her case did not come within the ambit of Section 25F read with Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Respondent cannot be deemed to be a workman for any purpose, more particularly in the instant case. 10. That, an Industrial Dispute was raised by the Respondent No. 3 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and a conciliation proceeding was initiated. The Respondent cannot be deemed to be a workman for any purpose, more particularly in the instant case. 10. That, an Industrial Dispute was raised by the Respondent No. 3 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and a conciliation proceeding was initiated. In the conciliation proceeding both the sides had filed their written representations wherein the petitioners stand regarding their action restraining the Respondent No. 3 from working, was for a specific misconduct committed by the Respondent No. 3, and that she was a habitual late comer, and she used to illegally sign the Attendance Register after her attendance had been crossed by the concerned Officer as absent, she was found absent from duties without permission on various dates and as such the conciliation proceeding ended in failure and the matter was referred to the Central Government ..................................................................................................................... (emphasis added) 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case of Chandra Prakash Sahi (supra) has also observed that, whether the order by which the service is terminated was innocuous or punitive had to be decided on the facts of each case after considering the relevant facts in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 25. It is the plea of the petitioner-company at every stage/level of proceedings, before the conciliation proceeding, the Industrial Tribunal as well as before this Court that the stoppage of the work of the Respondent No. 3 was because of her misconducts. It is, therefore, very obvious that even though nothing is mentioned about the reasons for the stoppage of work in the order dated 19.1.1999, the Management has made it very clear and obvious that the service of the Respondent No. 3 was stopped because of the aforesaid alleged misconducts. The intention of the Management to discontinue the service of the Respondent No. 3 because of the alleged misconduct is also amply demonstrated by the fact that they also referred to the past deed of alleged act of forgery by the Respondent No. 3. Therefore, considering all these aspects, this Court is of the view that the aforesaid alleged misconducts of the Respondent No. 3 were indeed the foundation for passing the order dated 19.1.1999 and not mere "motives" and accordingly, the said order could not have been passed without giving show cause notice to the respondent No. 3. Therefore, considering all these aspects, this Court is of the view that the aforesaid alleged misconducts of the Respondent No. 3 were indeed the foundation for passing the order dated 19.1.1999 and not mere "motives" and accordingly, the said order could not have been passed without giving show cause notice to the respondent No. 3. This Court, after having considered the facts and attending circumstances as discussed above, is of the view that the order dated 19.1.1999 stopping the work of the Respondent No. 3 suffers from the vice of vagueness and arbitrariness. Further, the Management has not acted fairly while issuing the said order stopping the work. This Court is also of the view that the alleged misconducts of the Respondent No. 3 were the foundation of the said order dated 19.1.1999. For the reasons and discussions as stated above, this Court concurs with conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal and no case has been made out to interfere with the finding and conclusion of the learned Industrial Tribunal and accordingly, the present petition is dismissed as devoid of merit. Petition dismissed.