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Karnataka High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 751 (KAR)

P. N. Rajmohan v. State of Karnataka

2012-09-07

AJIT J.GUNJAL

body2012
21. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, we find that PW.8 stated in detail as to how every event and the incident occurred in the Court, and merely because he had not stated so in the FIR, would not make the testimony of this witness unreliable. On careful perusal of the FIR and the deposition of P.W.8, we are satisfied that he did not make any change in the case/story reflected in the FIR, which was recorded without wasting any time. Apart from the omissions which were tried to be brought on record in the cross-examination of this witness, we did not find anything worth elicited from this witness so as to discard his evidence. 22. We have also gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. The Supreme Court in HALLU (supra) observed that it is generally not easy to find witness on whose testimony implicit reliance can be placed. It is always advisable to test the evidence of witnesses on the anvil of objective circumstances in the case. In BADAM SINGH (supra) the Supreme Court observed that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the conduct of the witnesses is such that it renders the case of the prosecution doubtful or incredible, or that their presence at the place of occurrence as eye witnesses is doubtful, the Court may reject their evidence. That is why it is necessary for the High Court to critically scrutinize the evidence in some detail, it being the final Court of fact. In the present case, we have critically scrutinised the evidence of P.W.8 in detail. In A. SHANKAR (supra) Supreme Court observed that where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. In the present case as observed earlier, none of the omissions in our opinion would amount to contradiction, creating a serious doubt the truthfulness of the witness. Even if it is assumed that the witness made improvements but those improvements cannot be stated to be made in order to make the evidence acceptable. As a matter of fact, P.W.8 has not made any material improvement deviating from the original statement, i.e. the FIR. Even if it is assumed that the witness made improvements but those improvements cannot be stated to be made in order to make the evidence acceptable. As a matter of fact, P.W.8 has not made any material improvement deviating from the original statement, i.e. the FIR. He has not made any change in the story reflected in the FIR. In RAM SWAROOP the complainant’s version before the Court was quite different from what he had stated in the FIR and in this background it was held that his evidence was not consistent with the medical evidence and therefore, not reliable. In our opinion, this Judgment also is of no avail to the defence. In RAGHUNATH (supra) the delay in lodging the complaint was held to be fatal in view of the fact that the complainant party proceeding with injured to hospital but not lodging complaint at either of two police stations on the way. Having regard to the facts of the present case, this Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, also in our opinion is of no avail to the defence. In LUNA RAM (supra) Supreme Court having considered the contradictions, inconsistencies and exaggerations or embellishments were not minor in nature and hence held that the acquittal was justified. Such a view, in the facts of the present case, cannot be taken. 23. We would now like to examine the evidence of other witnesses to find out whether their evidence corroborate the ocular version of PW.8. In this connection, we refer to the evidence of first set of witnesses, namely, PWs.1, 2, 3 and 4. They were examined by the prosecution to prove the motive and/ or the incident of 17th November, 1999. Insofar as PW.1 is concerned, she turned hostile, and hence we do not make any reference to this witness. PWs.2 to 4 were the neighbours of accused No.2. Insofar as PWs.2 and 3 are concerned, they were present and witnessed the incident that took place at about 10.00 -10.30 PM., on 17.11.1999. Undoubtedly, in the evidence of these two witnesses also several omissions were brought on record. All the omissions brought on record are of similar nature as we found in the evidence of PW.8. Insofar as PWs.2 and 3 are concerned, they were present and witnessed the incident that took place at about 10.00 -10.30 PM., on 17.11.1999. Undoubtedly, in the evidence of these two witnesses also several omissions were brought on record. All the omissions brought on record are of similar nature as we found in the evidence of PW.8. From bare perusal of the depositions of these two witnesses, we are satisfied that the 17th incident, as claimed by the prosecution, occurred at 10.30 p.m. near the house of A-2. Houses of PWs.2 and 3 were adjacent to the house of A-2. A-2 was not present at the relevant time and, as deposed by them, his wife alone was there when the deceased visited her in the night. These two witnesses and some other neighbours strongly objected the visit of the deceased to the house of A-2 in his absence when his wife alone was in the house. To this extent their evidence is consistent and, in our opinion undoubtedly supports the prosecution to show that there was a galata (commotion) in the night at 10-10.30 pm., on 17.11.1999. They stood the test of cross-examination, insofar as the visit of Ramachandra in the night to the house of A-2 when his wife (PW.16) alone was there and that he was seen by neighbours and they objected to his visit in the absence of A-2. 24. The next set of witnesses are PWs.5, 6 and 7. In the backdrop of the incident that occurred in the night on 17th, a panchayath was convened in the house of accused No.2 and to prove the meeting/panchayath and the proceedings before it, the prosecution examined PWs.5, 6 and 7. All these witnesses support the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, who speak about the galata in the night on 17th. These witnesses also stated more than what they had stated before the police. However, we did not find any contradiction in the evidence of these witnesses. These witnesses were examined only to prove that the panchayath was called in connection with the incident that occurred on 17th night. PWs.6 and 7 were also members of the panchayath. They deposed the purpose for conducting the panchayath and presence of the accused, in particular A-2. However, we did not find any contradiction in the evidence of these witnesses. These witnesses were examined only to prove that the panchayath was called in connection with the incident that occurred on 17th night. PWs.6 and 7 were also members of the panchayath. They deposed the purpose for conducting the panchayath and presence of the accused, in particular A-2. It is also revealed from the evidence of these two witnesses that after the incident on 17th night, Padmamma (PW.16) was found missing and even deceased was not available in the village. These three witnesses, undoubtedly, improved their version before the Court stating that he would cut the limbs of Ramachandra. They had not stated so before the police. Even if this part of their deposition is overlooked, their presence in the meeting (panchayath) that was held on 18.11.1999 in the evening was natural, being members of the Panchayat, cannot be doubted. Their evidence clearly show that even the other accused were also present when the panchayath was held and that in the meeting the only discussion was regarding the visit of Ramachandra to the house of A-2. Thus the evidence of PWs.2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 does support the prosecution and corroborate the evidence of PW.8 in respect of the incident that occurred on 17th night involving the deceased, the wife of accused No.2, PW.2 and PW.3. About the incident that occurred on 17th, PW.8 heard on 18th morning when people were talking about the same while taking tea, including Nanjegowda (PW.5) and Suresh (PW.6). PW 5 and PW 6 support PW 8 in respect of 18th morning incident also. PW.8 confirms about the 17th night incident, which he heard while taking tea in the morning on 18th. Thus their evidence insofar as the incident of galata on 17th night and the incident in the morning on 18th stand clearly proved. 25. That takes us to consider the evidence of PWs.9 and 11. These two witnesses were informed by PW.8 about the alleged incident when he first returned to the village after he was dropped by the accused on 19th at about 2.30-3.00 pm. Near village. Srinivas (PW.9) knew the accused persons and so also PW.8 and the deceased. He deposed that when he was standing near the house of Venkatesha (PW.11) along with Venkatappa, PW.8 informed him about the incident of assault by accused Nos.1 to 5. Near village. Srinivas (PW.9) knew the accused persons and so also PW.8 and the deceased. He deposed that when he was standing near the house of Venkatesha (PW.11) along with Venkatappa, PW.8 informed him about the incident of assault by accused Nos.1 to 5. They immediately informed to PW.11-Venkatesh, the brother of the deceased and left towards the scene of offence along with PW.8 in a Tata Sumo. He specifically deposed that PW.8 led them to the scene of offence and showed the place where the deceased was lying. When they reached the scene of offence, he stated that the deceased was alive. They immediately removed him to the hospital, where he was declared dead. Similar is the deposition of P.W.11. In their evidence also we find omissions/improvements. But so far as the case of the prosecution is concerned, they corroborated the testimony of P.W.8 to the extent that they were informed by PW.8 about the incident, they immediately rushed to the scene of offence, they brought the deceased to the hospital and from there they rushed to the police station to lodge the complaint after the deceased was declared dead. We did not find anything in the cross-examination worth discarding their evidence. On the contrary, their evidence supports the case of the prosecution and corroborates the deposition of PW.8. 26. PW.10-Kempegowda was examined only to show that he was with the accused persons and PW.8 when they left the D.M. Halli village on 19th morning to search the deceased. His evidence would support the prosecution case to this extent. From his evidence, in our opinion, the prosecution has successfully established that the accused persons left the village in the morning on 19th to search the deceased for Nagamangala along with P.W.8. Thus to that extent he also corroborates the evidence of PW.8. 27. PW.12-Manju, PW.13-Honnamma, PW.14-Sami, PW.15-Krishnamurthy and PW.16-Padmamma turned hostile and their evidence is of no avail to the prosecution. In our opinion, their evidence would not either help or affect the case of the prosecution insofar as the allegation against the accused persons of murdering Ramachandra is concerned. 28. The statement of P.W.27 under section 161 of Cr. P.C. was not recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation, though he was specifically referred/named by PW.8 in the FIR. In our opinion, their evidence would not either help or affect the case of the prosecution insofar as the allegation against the accused persons of murdering Ramachandra is concerned. 28. The statement of P.W.27 under section 161 of Cr. P.C. was not recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation, though he was specifically referred/named by PW.8 in the FIR. The reference to PW.27 in the FIR would show that he was not introduced for the first time in the Court. It is true the prosecution ought to have recorded his statement under Section 161 during investigation. He was, however, examined to establish that in the night on 18.11.1999 the deceased and PW.8 were together and they slept at his place since they did not have any conveyance to go back to their village. Even if the evidence of this witness is completely ignored, still, in our opinion, the evidence of PW.8 is sufficiently corroborated by the other witnesses to establish that Ramachandra and this witness were together right from 18th morning till next day morning. 29. If we see the sequence of events, reflected in the depositions of P.Ws.2 to 11 that support the prosecution case that they (deceased and P.W.8) were together from 18th morning till 19th morning. On 18th morning they left together in the presence of persons at the tea stall including P.W.5 and P.W.6 and that is how the accused came to know that the deceased was with PW.8 and that seems to be the reason why accused approached PW.8 on 19th in the morning to enquire whereabouts of the deceased and they took him to Nagamangala. Thus, even if the evidence of this witness (PW 27) is overlooked, still it stands proved that the deceased and PW.8 were together from 18th morning till 19th morning when he returned to his village. 30. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that though it was possible for the investigating officer to seize the blood stained clothes of the accused and so also of P.Ws.8, 9 & 11 the investigating officer failed to do so and that creates doubt about the testimony of PW.8. In this connection, we would like to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in HARPAL SINGH VS. DEVINDER SINGH [1997 AIR SCW 2926]. In this connection, we would like to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in HARPAL SINGH VS. DEVINDER SINGH [1997 AIR SCW 2926]. In this case a person gave the first information statement to the police in which he claimed that he had seen the occurrence and narrated the incident with all details. He was one of those who helped the injured persons to reach the hospital at the earliest point of time. His clothes got smeared with blood during the rescue operation. The Supreme Court in this background observed that from the omission of the Investigating Agency to attach the blood stained clothes it could not be inferred that he had not seen the occurrence. If the clothes worn by the injured or the victims were not recovered by the investigating team that perhaps would provide a handle to the defence to attack the prosecution case. But no investigating agency would normally take the trouble to seize the clothes worn by witnesses at the time they saw the occurrence and merely because their clothes too had stains of blood during any post-event activities. At any rate Supreme Court observed that said omission on the part of the investigating agency is not a flaw of that type to invite the consequence of rejecting his testimony. It is true that in the present case had the prosecution seized/ attached the clothes of P.W.8 that would have definitely strengthened their case. However, having regard to overall facts and circumstances and the nature of evidence, in our opinion, the said omission on the part of the Investigating Agency is not a flew of that type to invite the consequence of rejecting the complainant’s testimony. Insofar as the clothes of the accused, in the present case, are concerned, there was no question of attaching their clothes since they surrendered after about 16 days and that too before the Court. In other words, the accused were not apprehended immediately after the occurrence. 31. Next we would like to consider the medical evidence placed on record by the prosecution. In other words, the accused were not apprehended immediately after the occurrence. 31. Next we would like to consider the medical evidence placed on record by the prosecution. On the basis of the post mortem report and so also the evidence of Dr.Puttaswamy-PW.20 it was vehemently submitted that the incident did not occur on the date and at the time, as stated by PW.8, and that the death of Ramachandra occurred much before the time of the occurrence reflected in the deposition of PW.8. In short, it was submitted that PW.8 was not a genuine eyewitness and whatever stated by him about the alleged incident is not true or that he is not a truthful/ reliable witness. These submissions were made on the basis of the admission given by PW.20, in reply to the question, during cross-examination, that “deceased might have died 24 hours prior to the time at which the dead body was kept in the cold storage and not 25 to 28 hours as suggested”. Our attention was also invited to some other admissions given by the doctor in support of this contention. It was further submitted that according to the doctor and so also the post mortem report, when the post mortem was conducted the rigor mortis was fully developed, which indicates that the incident did not occur on 19th at 1-1.30 pm., as stated by PW.8. In support of these contentions learned Counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in KUNJU MUHAMMED VS. STATE OF KERALA, 2004 SCC CRIMINAL 1425, BHAGWAN BALIRAM BARI & ANR., VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 2004(2) MAHARASHTRA LAW JOURNAL 645. On the other hand, Mr. Nawaz, learned Additional SPP after inviting our attention to all the relevant facts, namely, the time of occurrence of the incident, the time when the dead body was kept in the cold storage, the time when the dead body was taken out of the cold storage and the time of post mortem submitted that final opinion given by the doctor is consistent with the prosecution case. He also invited our attention to the Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence and so also the Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence to contend merely because the Rigor Mortis was fully developed when the post mortem was conducted, does not mean that the incident did not occur at the time and on the date as narrated by PW.8. 32. He also invited our attention to the Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence and so also the Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence to contend merely because the Rigor Mortis was fully developed when the post mortem was conducted, does not mean that the incident did not occur at the time and on the date as narrated by PW.8. 32. The prosecution examined two doctors namely Dr. M.G. Shivaramu (PW19) and Dr. Puttaswamy (PW20). PW19 simply testified that Dr. ASRK Prasad was working as Professor and Head of Department of the Forensic Medicine, AIMS at the relevant time and he produced the documents in support thereof. This was in order to show that Dr. Prasad was working in the said Hospital at the relevant time, who conducted the post mortem. All the documents produced by him in support of his deposition were taken on record and marked as Exs.P10 to P15. 33. Dr. Puttaswamy (PW20) was working as a Forensic Specialist at the time when his deposition was recorded. It was recorded on 4.2.06. He personally did not conduct post mortem of the dead body of Ramachandra. He deposed that Dr. Prasad was Professor and Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine at the relevant time (i.e., January 1997 to June 1997). He also stated that to the best of his knowledge, Dr. Prasad, on the date of evidence, was not alive. He also produced relevant documents in support of his deposition that Dr. Prasad conducted the post mortem. He also identified handwriting and signature of Dr. Prasad on the post mortem report bearing Ex.P12. Then, he also produced a letter written by Circle Inspector of Nagamangala Circle to the Professor and Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine AIMS Hospital, Belluru. By that letter, the Investigating Officer, sought opinion of Dr. Prasad whether injuries found on the person of the deceased were possible with axe (MO1). Dr. Prasad, made an endorsement on the said letter (Ex.P17) stating “Yes possible”, which appears at Ex.P17(a). 34. It is on the basis of the opinion expressed by Dr. Prasad and the post mortem report, PW20 also deposed that the injuries mentioned in the pose mortem were possible with axe. Dr. Prasad, made an endorsement on the said letter (Ex.P17) stating “Yes possible”, which appears at Ex.P17(a). 34. It is on the basis of the opinion expressed by Dr. Prasad and the post mortem report, PW20 also deposed that the injuries mentioned in the pose mortem were possible with axe. In the cross-examination, PW20 stated that it is true if a person is assaulted with a cutting edge of such weapon the injury that may be caused would be either a “cut lacerated wound” if less force is applied or a “chopped wound” if great force is used. After expressing the opinion and after having seen the injuries mentioned in the post mortem notes, he fairly admitted that in the post mortem report it is not mentioned that the wound was either cut lacerated wound or chop wound. He then opined as per the PM report, all the external injuries were lacerated one. He further admitted that the injuries inflicted on the deceased were possible with a weapon other than the axe (MO1) which was shown to him. It is true that in the PM report, the wounds were not described either as ‘cut lacerated wound’ or ‘chopped wound’. Despite this, Dr. Prasad in reply to the letter (Ex.P17) and this witness, in his examination-in-chief, clearly opined that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were possible with axe (MO1) and that they were described as lacerated wounds. We do not find any reason to hold, as vehemently contended by learned counsel for the appellants, that the injuries mentioned in the PM report were not possible with the weapon like MO1. In our opinion, the prosecution by bringing the evidence in the nature of PM report the letter Ex.P-17, and the deposition of PW20 has proved that the injuries mentioned in the PM report were possible with the axe (M.O.1). 35. That takes us to consider the argument that in view of the opinion expressed by the doctor in respect of rigor mortis it cannot be stated that the incident occurred on the date and time as stated by PW8. According to the prosecution, the actual incident of assault occurred on 19.11.99 at about 1.00 pm. PW8 informed about the incident to the villagers, more particularly to PWs.9 and 11, at about 2.30 p.m. on the same day. According to the prosecution, the actual incident of assault occurred on 19.11.99 at about 1.00 pm. PW8 informed about the incident to the villagers, more particularly to PWs.9 and 11, at about 2.30 p.m. on the same day. PW8, 9 and 11 are not consistent in respect of the exact time, however, they state that they reached the scene of offence in Tata sumo vehicle at about 2.30 p.m. It has also come on record that the distance between the village D.M. Halli and the scene of offence was about 14 Kms. They brought Ramachandra to the Adi Chunchanagiri Medical College Hospital. Though the distance between the scene of offence and the hospital has not come record, they reached the hospital, as stated by PW11, sometime between 3.30 – 4.00 p.m. In the hospital, Ramachandra was declared dead and thereafter, all the three witnesses went to Nagamangala police station for lodging an FIR and the FIR was recorded and the crime was registered between 6.00-7.00 p.m. The exact distance between the hospital and the police station is also not on record. Therefore, it is not possible to state at what time these witnesses left for the police station from the hospital. Then, it has come on record in the evidence of PW20 that the dead body of Ramachandra was kept in the cold storage about 3.10 p.m. at 19.11.99. This timing was subsequently mentioned by Dr. Puttaswamy (PW20). Except the time mentioned in the PM report, there is no other material on record to show at what time the dead body was kept in the cold storage. There is nothing on record to show on what basis Dr. Prasad mentioned the time in PM report. PW20 did not state anything from his personal knowledge and he deposed only on the basis of the PM report prepared by Dr. Prasad. From the evidence of PWs.8, 9 and 11, it may not be correct that the dead body was kept in the cold storage at 3.10 p.m on 19.11.99. From the depositions of all the witnesses and having regard to the sequence of events placed on record by the prosecution, it reveals that the dead body must have been kept in the cold storage some time between 4.00 – 5.00 pm on 19.11.99. PW11 in his deposition, stated that they reached the hospital at 3.30 pm. From the depositions of all the witnesses and having regard to the sequence of events placed on record by the prosecution, it reveals that the dead body must have been kept in the cold storage some time between 4.00 – 5.00 pm on 19.11.99. PW11 in his deposition, stated that they reached the hospital at 3.30 pm. The timings mentioned by all the witnesses seem to be approximate time given by them. 36. Thereafter, on the next day morning inquest panchanama was drawn in the mortuary when the body was taken out from the cold storage. On the basis of the inquest panchanama, it was submitted that the inquest panchanama was drawn keeping the dead body in the cold storage itself. We have perused the inquest panchanama with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that the inquest in the cold storage, in our opinion, must be rejected out right. The body was in the box and it was taken out for conducting inquest and the process of inquest panchanama went on for about two hours. It got over some time around 9.30 a.m and then the body was sent for post mortem as per the requisition issued by Dr.Prasad. He received the dead body at 10.00 a.m. on 20.11.99 for conducting PM examination. On the basis of the PM report, PW20 deposed that the PM examination commenced at 10.00 am on 20.11.99. 37. Thus, from the sequence of events mentioned above, it is clear that the dead body was out of cold storage for about three hours before it was kept in the cold storage and three hours after it was taken out and it was lying in the cold storage for about 16 hours. This will have to be kept in view while appreciating the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and while re-assessing the medical evidence. 38. PW20, in his examination-in-chief, has deposed that rigor mortis was present through out the body and it was kept in the cold storage at 3.10 pm on 19.11.99. Then, in the examination-in-chief, on the basis of the PM report, he opined that the approximate time of death was 24 hours prior to PM examination and that the injuries were fresh. Admittedly, PM examination was concluded at 11.30 am on 20.11.99. He also opined that the death was not instantaneous. Then, in the examination-in-chief, on the basis of the PM report, he opined that the approximate time of death was 24 hours prior to PM examination and that the injuries were fresh. Admittedly, PM examination was concluded at 11.30 am on 20.11.99. He also opined that the death was not instantaneous. This opinion of P.W.20 supports the testimony of P.Ws.8, 9 & 11 who stated that when they reached the scene of offence, the deceased was alive. Even if it is taken that he was not alive, the opinion of the doctor clearly indicates that he died of the assault, as narrated by P.W.8, which, according to him, occurred at 1.00 PM on 19.11.1999 and that the injuries were fresh. This does not support the defence that the death occurred 25 -28 hours before it was kept in cold storage. In the cross-examination, P.W.20 stated that cold storage facility was available in the hospital at the relevant time. He also stated that it was not possible for him to state, on the basis of PM report, as to at what time exactly the dead body was taken out from the cold storage. In any case, it was not possible either for him to state at what time the body was taken out from the cold storage for PM examination. The PM report would not show the timing. He then deposed that when the incident occurred and the PM was conducted it was November / December. Then in the cross he admitted that the deceased had healthy muscles. He then admitted that all ante mortem internal injuries noted in PM report (Ex.P-16) corresponded to 7 external injuries mentioned therein and they caused serious damage to the blood vessels in the body. He also opined that blood must have gushed out from his body within few minutes. He further opined that the deceased might have suffered great shock after receiving the injuries. Such injuries, according to P.W.20, would positively make the injured unconscious and Ramachandra must have died while he was unconscious. Then in the cross-examination, he opined thus: “If the dead body of a person is kept in a cold storage immediately after the death, the on set development, subsistence and disappearance would considerably come down. Such injuries, according to P.W.20, would positively make the injured unconscious and Ramachandra must have died while he was unconscious. Then in the cross-examination, he opined thus: “If the dead body of a person is kept in a cold storage immediately after the death, the on set development, subsistence and disappearance would considerably come down. “Considerable delay means it is ranging from 85 to 90% (had not the dead body been in a cold storage it could have been 100%” On the basis of the PM report he admitted in the cross-examination that the rigor mortis was present throughout the body and further clarified, that means all over the body. Then he stated that the rigor mortis once developed would continue to remain all over the body with same condition for over a period of 12 hours before it starts to disappear in this region. Then he stated that in this region it takes 2 – 3 hours for the rigor mortis to set in. Then having regard to the dead body, on the basis of PM report he stated in the cross that in the cold season if the dead body is not kept in cold storage it normally takes about 18 hours for the rigor mortis to start and develop completely all over the body from the time or setting in of the rigor mortis. Despite this opinion, he further opined that in the present case, it was difficult for him to say as to how long prior to PM examination the rigor mortis had set all over the body. Then on the basis of the PM report he opined that the deceased might have died 24 hours prior to the time at which the dead body was kept in the cold storage and not 25 – 28 hours as suggested. We have perused the PM report very carefully and we did not find any indication in the PM report so as to express such opinion. This opinion of P.W.20 is not consistent with the opinion expressed by Dr. Prasad in the PM report. Dr. Prasad, who actually conducted the PM, in the report noted that the death must have occurred within 24 hours before PM examination. This opinion of P.W.20 is not consistent with the opinion expressed by Dr. Prasad in the PM report. Dr. Prasad, who actually conducted the PM, in the report noted that the death must have occurred within 24 hours before PM examination. He (P.W.20) then opined noting in the PM report “as less than 24 hours ago prior to PM examination with reference to the exact time of death is confusing and not clear”. 39. On the basis of the aforementioned admissions given by the doctor (P.W.20) it was vehemently submitted that under any circumstance, the death cannot be stated to have occurred on the date and at the time reflected in the evidence of P.W.8. Taking the opinion expressed by the doctor in view, it is clear the rigor mortis must have started to set in 1 -2 hours before the dead body was kept in the cold storage. The process of developing rigor mortis after it was kept in the cold storage, as opined by the doctor undoubtedly must have come down considerably. Even if we take the opinion of the doctor as correct, the considerable delay means from 85% to 90% and that if the dead body had not been in the cold storage it could have been 100% as correct, the process of developing rigor mortis continued even in the cold storage. The body was in the cold storage for about 16 hours. Then the question would arise as to what extent the rigor mortis developed while the dead body was in the cold storage. There is no clear opinion of the doctor on record in respect thereof. Then the dead body was taken out of the cold storage and it was out for about 3 hours. Once the dead body is taken out of the cold storage, the rigor mortis spreads with rapid speed. 40. In this connection, we would like to refer to Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 12th Edition. The author in this book has expressed that rigor mortis usually commences within 2 – 4 hours of death (in western countries), though it may not become evident until 5 or 7 hours have passed. 40. In this connection, we would like to refer to Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 12th Edition. The author in this book has expressed that rigor mortis usually commences within 2 – 4 hours of death (in western countries), though it may not become evident until 5 or 7 hours have passed. To this general statement, there are, however, numerous exceptions as stated by the author, some of which were explained by physical facts, for example, freezing at death or “cooking” of muscle by intense heat, some by “covering” phenomena such as cadaveric spasm or electrical spasm, some on bio-chemical grounds. Its ultimate onset is a matter concerning the muscles only, and is independent of the integrity of the nervous system, for a division of nerves leading to particular muscles or even the removal of the brain has not been found to prevent its occurrence; it also occurs in amputated limbs. Then an example has been quoted by the author which reads as under: “In the case of R.V. Alcott (Surrey Assizes, 1952) a young man was found stabbed to death in a railway booking office. When he was first examined, one hour after the crime, rigor mortis was absent; two hours later, however, it was complete. The deceased had fought the attacker vigorously before receiving a fatal wound. On the basis of the aforesaid example he further noted that it is easy to understand that it should come on slowly in healthy, muscular subjects who have died without convulsions, as, for instance, by decapitation, by sudden haemorrhage, by judicial or even other forms of hanging. In such cases the muscles have no more than the average amount of waste metabolites in them, and have their usual circulation at the moment of death, conditions favourable to the continuance of local life, of which rigor marks the end. Then, while considering the effect of freezing, the author expressed that, when a body is frozen so rapidly after death that there has been insufficient time for acid metabolites to appear in the muscles the process of rigor mortis is suspended until thawing takes place. When the body thaws rigor mortis appears with great rapidity and passes off very rapidly. 41. In the present case, the body was out of cold storage for about 6 hours and in the cold storage for about 16 hours. When the body thaws rigor mortis appears with great rapidity and passes off very rapidly. 41. In the present case, the body was out of cold storage for about 6 hours and in the cold storage for about 16 hours. After it was taken out from the cold storage it was out before the post mortem for about 3 hours. On the basis of the opinion expressed by P.W.20 and Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence, in our opinion there was sufficient time for the rigor mortis to spread all over the body. In other words, it cannot be stated that merely because rigor mortis all over the body was noticed by Dr. Prasad at the time of post mortem examination, the death did not occur at the time mentioned by P.W.8. We are drawing this inference not only on the basis of the opinion expressed by the doctor as mentioned above but also on the basis of the opinion expressed by Dr. Prasad which was also endorsed by P.W.20 in his examination-in-chief that the death must have occurred within 24 hours prior to PM examination. 42. The Supreme Court in KUNJU MOHAMMED (supra), on the basis of evidence of the doctor as to the presence of rigor mortis on the body of deceased held that the trial Court was justified in its finding that the death had occurred much earlier than the time mentioned by the prosecution. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court and the facts of the present case are totally different. In that case the dead body was not kept in the cold storage as it happened in the present case. As we have observed that when the dead body is taken out of the cold storage, the process and development of rigor mortis moves with rapid speed. In our case, body was out of cold storage for about 3 hours before the post mortem. 43. Mr. Nawaz, learned Addl. S.P.P. submitted that the evidence of P.W.8 and the other witnesses prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the incident occurred in the manner in which P.W.8 deposed before the Court and in view thereof, even if it is accepted that medical opinion is not consistent with the ocular version, the ocular version cannot be rejected outright. Mr. Nawaz, learned Addl. S.P.P. submitted that the evidence of P.W.8 and the other witnesses prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the incident occurred in the manner in which P.W.8 deposed before the Court and in view thereof, even if it is accepted that medical opinion is not consistent with the ocular version, the ocular version cannot be rejected outright. He submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.8, 9 & 11 and so also the other witnesses clearly establish the guilt of the accused and that the evidence of P.W.8 being wholly reliable and even if the opinion of the doctor is not taken as consistent with his testimony, his evidence cannot be rejected. On the contrary, he submitted, the medical evidence in such a situation can be brushed aside and conviction can be based on the evidence of wholly reliable eye-witness. In support, he placed reliance upon STATE OF U.P. V. HARI CHAND 2009 Cri.L.J page 3039. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in KAPILDEO MANDAL & ORS. VS. STATE OF BIHAR – AIR 2008 SC 533 to contend that if the medical evidence is inconsistent with the ocular version, the medical evidence assumes importance and in view thereof, the ocular version in the present case ought to have been rejected by the trial Court. Then he placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in HALLU & ORS. Vs. STATE OF M.P. – AIR 1974 SC 1936 in support of the said proposition. 44. In KAPIL DEO MANDAL’s case there was a variance between two ocular evidence and in view thereof, Supreme Court observed that if it is not consistent with the medical evidence, the medical evidence assumes importance. The Supreme Court in paragraph 11 thereof observed that when the Court finds consistency in the evidence given by the eye-witnesses which is totally inconsistent to that given by the medical experts, then the evidence is appreciated in different perspective by the Court. After referring to this Judgment in MOHINDER SINGH VS. THE STATE – (1950) SCR 821 and in MANI RAM AND ORS. VS. STATE OF U.P. – 1994 Supp. After referring to this Judgment in MOHINDER SINGH VS. THE STATE – (1950) SCR 821 and in MANI RAM AND ORS. VS. STATE OF U.P. – 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 289 the Supreme Court observed in the light of the facts of the case before it, that in a situation and circumstances, prevailing in that case, the medical evidence will assume importance while appreciating evidence led by the prosecution, by the Court and will have priority over the ocular version and can be used to repel the testimony of the eye-witnesses as it goes to the root of the matter having an effect to repel conclusively the eye witnesses’ version to be true. This observation was made in the light of the fact that the medical evidence in that case was to the effect that there were no fire arm injuries on the body of the deceased, whereas the eye witness version was that the accused-appellants were carrying fire arms and the injuries were caused by fire arms. 45. It is well settled that the medical evidence when specifically rules out the injury claimed to have been inflicted as per the eye-witnesses version, then the Court can draw adverse inference to the effect that the prosecution version as being put forth before the Court is not trustworthy. In the present case, it cannot be stated that the medical evidence rules out the injuries sustained by the deceased. On the contrary, medical evidence supports the ocular version in respect of the injuries suffered by the deceased. In our opinion the Judgment of the Supreme Court in HALLU also is of no avail to the appellants. 46. The Supreme Court in STATE OF U.P. v. HARI CHAND (supra) while dealing with the ocular evidence vis-à-vis medical evidence held that if eye-witnesses account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not acceptable as conclusive. It would be relevant to notice the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14. Paragraph 14 reads thus: “It is trite that where the eye-witnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Paragraph 14 reads thus: “It is trite that where the eye-witnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eye-witnesses’ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be credit-worthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the ‘credit’ of the witnesses; their performance in the witness-box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 47. We have considered the evidence of all the witnesses and more particularly, the solitary eye-witness (P.W.8) and we found it credible and trustworthy. In view thereof, the contention that the medical evidence is inconsistent also deserves to be rejected outright apart from the fact that we do not find it inconsistent with the ocular version. We may also refer to KUNJU @ BALACHANDRAN vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 2008 SCC 151 . In this case, the Supreme Court after referring to its Judgment in VADIVELU THEVAR v. STATE OF MADRAS – AIR 1957 SC 614 observed that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single eye-witness. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the Courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the Court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. In the present case, though we find evidence of P.W.8 reliable, it has also been corroborated by evidence of other witnesses and more particularly P.Ws.2 to 11. 48. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of the offence of murder. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 49. Before we part, we place on record a word of appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. 48. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of the offence of murder. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 49. Before we part, we place on record a word of appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Nawaz, learned Additional SPP for the State. We have heard them at length and they rendered able and useful assistance in the course of hearing of the appeal.