JUDGMENT : ABHILASHA KUMARI, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred with a prayer to quash and set aside the Award dated 10.4.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot ("the Tribunal" for short) in Reference (I.T.) No. 121 of 2004. The petitioner is the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that the respondent workman was working as a Writer in the Bhachau Depot. When the inspection of the Booking department took place from 2.9.1998 upto 6.10.1998, the respondent did not co-operate with the Inquiry Officer and for the alleged insubordination, a charge-sheet was issued to her. The respondent gave a reply to the charge-sheet. However, the petitioner was not satisfied with the same and an inquiry was conducted against her, which resulted in the imposition of a penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect. The respondent preferred a First Appeal, which came to be rejected. The Second Appellate Authority reduced the punishment to stoppage of one increment with future effect. The respondent raised an Industrial Dispute, wherein the legality and validity of the departmental proceedings was not challenged but only the findings of the Inquiry Officer were assailed. By the impugned Award dated 10.4.2012, the Tribunal has set aside the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect as well as the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court, by filing the present petition. Mr. Hardik C. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that the terms of Reference u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act" for short) were whether the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect imposed upon the respondent is liable to be quashed and set aside, or not. It is further submitted that the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect was reduced by the Second Appellate Authority, to stoppage of one increment with future effect. In fact, the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect no longer existed as it had already been modified by the Second Appellate Authority. Further, the terms of Reference were only regarding the legality and validity of the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect and not regarding the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. Further, the terms of Reference were only regarding the legality and validity of the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect and not regarding the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. The Tribunal could not have gone beyond the terms of Reference by quashing the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect, imposed by the Second Appellate Authority, without there being any terms of Reference regarding the same. It is contended that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside not only the penalty of stoppage of two increments that was within the terms of Reference, but also the penalty of stoppage of one increment, which was not part of the terms of Reference. It is, therefore, submitted that as the Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of reference while passing the impugned Award, the same be quashed and set aside. 2. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed upon the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Premsingh L. Rathod, (2000) 3 LLJ 492. 3. Mr. Yogi K. Gadhia, learned advocate for the respondent, has submitted that even the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect imposed by the Appellate Authority is too harsh, as the respondent is on the verge of retirement and would have to face financial consequences. It is further submitted that the charges against the respondent were regarding non-cooperation with the Inquiry Officer, and as the same have not been substantiated by the petitioner, the Tribunal has rightly quashed and set aside both the penalties. It is prayed that the petition may be dismissed. 4. Having heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and upon perusal of the impugned Award, it becomes clear that the terms of Reference regarding the dispute that was referred to the Tribunal was in respect of the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect only. The terms of Reference do not state anything regarding the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. It, therefore, transpires that the dispute regarding penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect was never referred to the Tribunal by the Appropriate Government. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon G.S.R.T.C. Ahmedabad vs. Premsingh L. Rathod (supra), wherein this Court has held as below: 3. It, therefore, transpires that the dispute regarding penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect was never referred to the Tribunal by the Appropriate Government. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon G.S.R.T.C. Ahmedabad vs. Premsingh L. Rathod (supra), wherein this Court has held as below: 3. After careful consideration of the submissions made before this Court, as per my view, the facts which are required to be examined by the Labour Court were in relation to the dismissal order in reference No. 1628 of 1984 and the mater was referred to the Labour Court by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Adipur under his communication dated 1.4.1984 wherein the dispute was relating to the relief of reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and with full back wages. It is the settled law that the Labour Court has power and authority to adjudicate the dispute which has been referred to it by the appropriate authority u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Labour Court cannot go beyond the terms of the reference. Therefore, apparently, the order passed by the second appellate authority cannot be said to be the subject-matter of the pending reference because it is an independent proceedings wherein a separate order was passed by the second appellate authority on 24.7.1984 and the said order dated 24.7.1984 cannot be said to be incidental to the main dispute which was referred by the Assistant Labour Commissioner Adipur to the Labour Court under order dated 11.4.1984. Therefore, the Labour Court ought not to have gone beyond the scope of terms of reference while exercising the powers u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the directions issued by the Labour Court is without jurisdiction and, therefore, the award impugned herein is required to be quashed and set aside by this Court. In view of the above observation, the view taken by the Labour Court is erroneous and contrary to the law settled by the Apex Court. Hence, the directions issued by the Labour Court in award dated 9.11.1989 is beyond the scope of terms of the reference and, therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside. The order passed by the second appellate authority has already been implemented. 6. Hence, the directions issued by the Labour Court in award dated 9.11.1989 is beyond the scope of terms of the reference and, therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside. The order passed by the second appellate authority has already been implemented. 6. Further, in the case of Bhogpur Co-op Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Harmesh Kumar, AIR 2007 SC 288 the Supreme Court has held as below: 7. The Labour Court derived its jurisdiction from the terms in reference. It ought to have exercised its jurisdiction within the four corners thereof. 8. The principal question which was referred by the State Government was as to whether the termination of services of the respondent was justified. The Labour Court was, therefore, not required to go into the question as to whether the appellant was bound to take the services of the respondent in all subsequent seasons or not. 7. It is a settled position of law that the Labour Court/Tribunal has power and authority to adjudicate a dispute that has been referred to it by the appropriate Government u/s 10(1) of the Act. However, the Labour Court/Tribunal cannot go beyond the terms of Reference but has to decide within the four corners thereof. In the present case, the terms of Reference were only regarding the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect. That penalty had already been modified by the Second Appellate Authority by imposing the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. It is not disputed by learned Counsel for the respondent that the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect did not fall within the terms of Reference before the Tribunal. However, this penalty has also been quashed and set aside by the Tribunal even though it was never referred to it for adjudication at all. 8. In view of the above legal position, this Court does not consider it necessary to deal with the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties, on merits. It is clear from the impugned Award that the Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of Reference and on this ground alone, the Award has become vulnerable and calls for interference by this Court. 9. As a result of the above discussion, the petition is partly allowed. It is clear from the impugned Award that the Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of Reference and on this ground alone, the Award has become vulnerable and calls for interference by this Court. 9. As a result of the above discussion, the petition is partly allowed. The direction of the Tribunal in the impugned Award regarding quashing of the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect is set aside. In other words, the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect imposed by the Second Appellate Authority upon the respondent shall remain as it is. It is open to the respondent to take appropriate legal recourse regarding this penalty, if so desired. 10. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs.