Judgment :- 1. The Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, after calling for the concerned records relating to the impugned proceedings of the first respondent issued in Na.Ka.12060/04/B1, dated 28.7.2007 and order in Na.Ka.121306/2007, dated 25.6.2008 passed by the third respondent and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 2. Facts of the case as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, are as follows: (a) The petitioner was appointed as Sales Man on 21.4.1983 in Ussoor Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank, Ussoor Village, Vellore Taluk. Subsequently, he was promoted as Clerk in 1990. On 6.6.1996, the petitioner was given-in-charge of the post of the Secretary. In the month of June 1997, the petitioner was given the regular post of Secretary and continuing in the same post. (b) A criminal case was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Vellore in C.C.No.94 of 2005 against the petitioner. The lower Court imposed a fine of Rs.1,500/-and one year rigorous imprisonment, against which, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No.146 of 2004 before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore. By judgment dated 22.11.2005, the learned District Judge acquitted the petitioner of the charges. (c) The petitioner was placed under suspension on 8.8.2005. The petitioner made a representation on 26.2.2005 requesting the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service. The petitioner filed W.P.No.8615 of 2006 before this Court, challenging the order of suspension, dated 8.8.2005. This Court, by order dated 29.3.2006, directed the Special Officer of the Society to consider the representations of the petitioner, dated 26.12.2005 and 3.3.2006 and pass orders in the light of the judgment rendered in Crl.A.No.146 of 2004, dated 22.11.2005, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. By order dated 7.6.2006, the petitioner was reinstated into service. (d) While so, the first respondent issued a charge memo containing 23 charges against the petitioner on 25.4.2006. The petitioner submitted explanation on 9.5.2006 and 15.5.2006 denying the charges. Inspite of the explanation, the first respondent appointed an enquiry officer, who submitted a report on 4.12.2006 holding that 15 charges were proved and eight charges were not proved. (d) While so, the first respondent issued a charge memo containing 23 charges against the petitioner on 25.4.2006. The petitioner submitted explanation on 9.5.2006 and 15.5.2006 denying the charges. Inspite of the explanation, the first respondent appointed an enquiry officer, who submitted a report on 4.12.2006 holding that 15 charges were proved and eight charges were not proved. The charges include the charges levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case. The first respondent issued a show cause notice, dated 4.12.2006 directing the petitioner to submit his representation on the findings of the enquiry officer. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation on 4.4.2007. The first respondent, without considering the explanation, dated 4.4.2007, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on 28.7.2007. (e) Challenging the said order of dismissal, dated 28.7.2007, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.27846 of 2007 before this Court, which was dismissed on 22.8.2007 with liberty to exhaust the remedy of appeal against the order dated 28.7.2007. Thereafter, a revision petition was filed on 22.1.2008 before the third respondent, which was dismissed on 25.6.2008. Having no other alternative remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition. 3. The petitioner challenges the impugned orders on the following grounds: (i) The third respondent ought to have seen that the first respondent failed to conduct a detailed enquiry into the charges giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. The first respondent mechanically accepted the findings of the enquiry officer. (ii) The findings of the enquiry officer are not based on any evidence. The findings of the enquiry officer are therefore perverse and liable to be set aside. The enquiry officer failed to conduct enquiry in a fair manner. (iii) The first respondent failed to see that once the Criminal Court exonerated the petitioner of the charges, it is not open to the respondents to initiate the disciplinary proceedings in respect of the same charges. Therefore, the petitioner submits that the charge memo and the order of dismissal are liable to be set aside. (iv) Since the Sessions Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges, the charge memo dated 25.4.2006 is illegal and liable to be set aside. Therefore, the petitioner submits that the charge memo and the order of dismissal are liable to be set aside. (iv) Since the Sessions Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges, the charge memo dated 25.4.2006 is illegal and liable to be set aside. (v) The first respondent failed to see that the opportunity given to the petitioner by the show cause notice, dated 4.12.2006 is only an empty formality and the first respondent simply recorded the petitioner's explanation to the charges and the findings of the enquiry officer and imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. The first respondent failed to apply the mind independently. (vi) The third respondent mechanically rejected the revision petition without considering the fact that the enquiry contemplated is detailed enquiry by producing witnesses on the side of the Department to prove the charges. The enquiry officer cannot give the enquiry report against the petitioner without conducting a detailed enquiry and without giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the Management. In this case, the third respondent failed to see that during the enquiry against the petitioner, no witnesses were produced. Therefore, the enquiry conducted against the petitioner is no enquiry at all. (vii) The third respondent even though called for reply from the first respondent, failed to see the illegality committed by the first and second respondents in the matter of conducting enquiry and imposing punishment. 4. Respondents have filed separate counter affidavits, inter-alia stating in common, as follows: (a) The petitioner was working as Secretary of the Ussoor Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank Limited, Vellore Taluk in Vellore District and 23 charges were framed against him for having committed certain serious irregularities including misappropriation of funds of the Bank and causing revenue loss to the Bank. Consequently, he was dismissed from service by the first respondent, following the procedure of law, based on the findings of the enquiry report. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner appealed to the third respondent by way of Revision Petition under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, which was dismissed by the impugned order of the third respondent. Without exhausting the further remedy available under the statute, the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service and the dismissal of the revision petition. Without exhausting the further remedy available under the statute, the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service and the dismissal of the revision petition. (b) The petitioner, while working as Secretary of the second respondent-Bank, misappropriated the funds of the Bank, by refunding three Fixed Deposits amounting to Rs.3 lakhs deposited by Thiru.Senthil Kumar and Thiru.Sathyamurthy to the President of the Bank by forging the signatures of the depositors. A criminal case in C.C.No.94 of 2002 was filed against the petitioner, which ended in imposing a fine of Rs.1,500/-and one year rigorous imprisonment by the learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Vellore. But on appeal against the said sentence before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges, by judgment dated 22.11.2005. In the meantime, based on the conviction, the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 8.8.2005. (c) The petitioner filed Writ Petition No.8615 of 2006 before this Court challenging the order of suspension dated 8.8.2005 and in compliance with the order of this Court, dated 29.3.2006, the petitioner was reinstated in service. (d) A charge memo dated 25.4.2006 containing 23 charges was issued to the petitioner for the irregularities committed by him, which are grave in nature and he has submitted his explanation on 9.5.2006 and 15.5.2006. Since the explanation was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer who conducted the enquiry, held that 13 out of 23 charges were proved. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 4.12.2006 was issued to the petitioner calling for further explanation, by communicating a copy of the enquiry report. Since the further explanation dated 4.4.2007 was not satisfactory and convincing, he was dismissed from the services of the Bank on 28.7.2007 by the first respondent. The petitioner earlier approached this Court in W.P.No.27846 of 2007 and the said Writ Petition was dismissed by an order dated 22.8.2007, observing that the petitioner can agitate the order of the first respondent dated 28.7.2007 by filing an appeal before the appropriate authority. Hence, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the third respondent. The third respondent, after taking into consideration the grounds raised by him in the revision petition and the counter filed therein, dismissed the said revision petition by the impugned order dated 25.6.2008. Hence, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the third respondent. The third respondent, after taking into consideration the grounds raised by him in the revision petition and the counter filed therein, dismissed the said revision petition by the impugned order dated 25.6.2008. (e) The petitioner was given reasonable opportunity by the enquiry officer and that the impugned order of dismissal was passed by the first respondent after following due procedure of law. The criminal case filed against the petitioner was in respect of the refund of the Fixed Deposit of Senthil Kumar and Sathyamurthy only. The scope of the criminal case is only to punish the offender for the commission of offence committed and even if a person is acquitted in a criminal case, it cannot be a ground for any leniency in the departmental proceedings. The departmental proceedings are distinct in nature and independent in respect of the delinquencies committed or omitted by an employee. Out of 23 charges framed against the petitioner, 13 charges were held as proved by the enquiry officer and those findings are based on records and evidence and the dismissal of the petitioner from service, is based on the 13 proved charges and the findings were accepted by the disciplinary authority. The charge regarding criminal prosecution was held as not proved based on the acquittal of the petitioner. The charges which were held by the enquiry officer as not proved, is based on the acquittal of the petitioner. The order of dismissal is based on 13 other charges which were held as proved and not based on the charge relating to his acquittal by the Sessions Court. (f) The grounds raised in the affidavit by the petitioner, are the same which were raised before the third respondent. A thorough and detailed enquiry was conducted by the appointed enquiry officer and there is no infirmity or irregularity in the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer. The order of dismissal of the petitioner was based on the proved 13 charges, which is based on materials (g) The third respondent dismissed the revision petition after going through the entire records and also taking into consideration the grounds raised by the petitioner and no ground was made out by the petitioner to review the order of dismissal. Therefore, it is not correct to state that the third respondent mechanically rejected the revision petition. Therefore, it is not correct to state that the third respondent mechanically rejected the revision petition. (h) There is no illegality in imposing the punishment by the first respondent and the second respondent has nothing to do with the orders passed by the first respondent who is the disciplinary authority. (i) The petitioner has not exhausted the remedy of review before the Government, as provided under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act and hence, it is not correct to state that he has no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court. The respondents pray for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 5. Mr.A.Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in his first limb of submissions, strenuously contended that the impugned order passed by the first respondent and the other connected orders passed by the respondents 2 and 3, are non-speaking in nature and there is no reasoning given by the respondents. Secondly, he submitted that there are no independent findings in those orders. Thirdly, he stated that the respondents-authorities, namely the original authority/disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, have failed to consider the explanation given by the petitioner, and therefore, the orders passed by the respondents, are passed with total non-application of mind. In his last submission, he contended that the punishment imposed on the petitioner-delinquent is excessive and disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. In support of his stand, he has relied on the following decisions : (a) 1995 (6) SCC 749 (B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India): "18) A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." "25) No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of the High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the lawmakers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert Section 11-A in it to confer this power even on a labour court/industrial tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under Section 11-A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to government employees or employees of public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate." (b) 2000 (3) SCC 450 = AISLJ II 2001 (1) 266 : U.P.SRTC. Vs. Mahesh Kumar Mishra: 7) A three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ) laid down as under: (SCC p.762, para 18): "18) A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 8) This will show that not only this Court but also the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee if, that penalty, shocks the conscience of the Court. The law, therefore, is not, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the High Court can, in no circumstance, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee after disciplinary proceedings. 9) Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar and others ( 1998 (3) SCC 192 = 1998 (2) SLJ 87 (SC) has also laid down the same proposition and held that if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges held proved against the employee, it will be open to the court to interfere. 9) Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar and others ( 1998 (3) SCC 192 = 1998 (2) SLJ 87 (SC) has also laid down the same proposition and held that if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges held proved against the employee, it will be open to the court to interfere. 10) As pointed out earlier, the order of the High Court though extremely brief, must have been based on overall consideration of the facts of the case and it must have exercised its jurisdiction only when it was shocked to notice that though all the passengers had been issued tickets, the only dispute was with regard to the point at which they had boarded the bus for which the punishment of dismissal from service was highly disproportionate. 11) We have already noticed above that instead of charging a fare of Rs.1.80, the respondent had charged a fare of Rs.1.50 from the passengers. While the appellants maintained that the passengers had boarded the bus at the "High Court" and were to alight at "Manauri", the respondent contended that the passengers had boarded the bus at "Zero Road" and were to get down at "Manauri" and, therefore, he had rightly charged Rs 1.50 from those passengers. This fact could have been established beyond doubt if any of those passengers was examined at the domestic inquiry, or the Transport Inspector, who checked the bus, could have recorded their statements at the spot. This was not done and reliance was placed only upon the report of the Transport Inspector which was signed by the respondent also. It was not a case where the passengers were allowed to travel without tickets so that the amount of fare charged from the passengers could be pocketed by him. 12) Under these circumstances, we do not agree with the contention of the counsel for the appellants, that the High Court should not have interfered with the quantum of punishment inflicted upon the respondent. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs." (c) 2006 (3) SCC 173 (Commr. Of Police Vs. 12) Under these circumstances, we do not agree with the contention of the counsel for the appellants, that the High Court should not have interfered with the quantum of punishment inflicted upon the respondent. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs." (c) 2006 (3) SCC 173 (Commr. Of Police Vs. Syed Hussain): "9) Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that as the respondent did not commit any misconduct in discharge of his official duty, a case has been made out where doctrine of proportionality should be invoked. The disciplinary authority, learned Counsel would submit, while exercising its statutory power of imposing punishment must act reasonably while exercising its jurisdiction. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Om Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India ( 2001 (2) SCC 386 = 2001 SCC (L & S) 1039 = MANU/SC/0704/2000: 2000(7)SCALE 524). It was further more pointed out that in England in stead and place of doctrine of "Irrationality", the doctrine of Proportionality is being invoked generally and in support of said contention reliance has been placed on R. Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Daly [(2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL)]. 10) It is one thing to say that order passed by the statutory authority is wholly arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus liable to be set aside, but it is another thing to say that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by such authority should not ordinarily be interfered with by a superior Court while exercising its power of judicial review unless one or the other ground upon which and on the basis whereof the power of judicial review can be exercised, exist. 11) It is not the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the impugned order of punishment smacks of arbitrariness so as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority to impose such punishment is also not in question. 12) Thus, even assuming that a time has come where this Court can develop "administrative law" by following the recent decisions of the House of Lords, we are of the opinion that it is not one of such cases where the doctrine of proportionality should be invoked. 12) Thus, even assuming that a time has come where this Court can develop "administrative law" by following the recent decisions of the House of Lords, we are of the opinion that it is not one of such cases where the doctrine of proportionality should be invoked. In ex p Daly (2001 (3) All ER 433 (HL) it was held that the depth of judicial review and the deference due to the administrative discretion vary with the subject-matter. It was further stated: (All ER p.447, para 32): "It may well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd." As for example in Huang Vs. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. (2005 (3) All ER 435) referring to R. Vs. Secy. of State of the Home Deptt., ex p Daly (2001 (3) All ER 433 (HL) ), it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vs. Wednesbury Corpn. (1947) 2 All ER 680 = (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA), but involves a full-blown merits judgment, which is yet more than [what] ex p Daly (2001 (3) All ER 433 (HL) ) requires on a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue. 13) It is, therefore, beyond any doubt or dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate case as the depth of judicial review will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case." (d) 2007 (6) Supreme 172 = 2007 (10) SCC 88 (M.P.State Agro Indu. Dev. Corp. Ltd. & another Vs. Jahan Khan): "11) Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that in the light of our interpretation of the aforenoted Regulations, the imposition of penalty vide composite order dated 19-12-1989, directing recovery of loss of Rs 16,903.41 and stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect, is a major penalty, clearly envisaging a regular enquiry before punishing the respondent. Since admittedly this procedure was not followed, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that imposition of the impugned penalty without holding enquiry was illegal and without jurisdiction. Since admittedly this procedure was not followed, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that imposition of the impugned penalty without holding enquiry was illegal and without jurisdiction. 12) Before parting with the case, we may also deal with the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that a remedy by way of an appeal being available to the respondent, the High Court ought not to have entertained his petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. There is no gainsaying that in a given case, the High Court may not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said to be of universal application. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ court may still exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances, an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. (See Whirlpool Corpn. Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks ( 1998 (8) SCC 1 ), Harbanslal Sahnia Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. ( 2003 (2) SCC 107 ), State of H.P. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. ( 2005 (6) SCC 499 ) and Sanjana M.Wig Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. ( 2005 (8) SCC 242 )." (e) 2009 (7) SCC 248 (Ramanuj Pandey Vs. State of M.P): "8) In Commr. of Police Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. ( 2003 (2) SCC 107 ), State of H.P. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. ( 2005 (6) SCC 499 ) and Sanjana M.Wig Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. ( 2005 (8) SCC 242 )." (e) 2009 (7) SCC 248 (Ramanuj Pandey Vs. State of M.P): "8) In Commr. of Police Vs. Syed Hussain ( 2006 (3) SCC 173 = 2006 SCC (L & S) 503), this Court observed that: (SCC pp.176-77, paras 10 & 13): "10) It is one thing to say that order passed by the statutory authority is wholly arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and thus liable to be set aside, but it is another thing to say that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by such authority should not ordinarily be interfered with by a superior court while exercising its power of judicial review unless one or the other ground upon which and on the basis whereof the power of judicial review can be exercised, exists. 13) It is, therefore, beyond any doubt or dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate case as the depth of judicial review will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case." 9) Admittedly, it is for the disciplinary authority or the administrative authority to decide the quantum of punishment in a case of misconduct and the role of the court is only secondary. But in view of the gravity of the misconduct, namely, the appellant having apprehended Laxmi Narain and registering him under Section 13 of the Lunacy Act, where the disciplinary authority held the appellant guilty for detaining a public servant in police post without any reason and removed him from government service, the interference with the imposition of punishment is necessary." "11) While considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, this Court in Rangaswami Vs. State of T.N. (1989 Supp (1) SCC 686 = 1989 SCC (Cri) 617 = AIR 1989 SC 1137 ), held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty. Accordingly, the punishment of the appellant of dismissal from services as imposed by the disciplinary authority is substituted to one of compulsory retirement from the date of his dismissal from service i.e. 7-5-1992." (f) 2011 (4) SCC 584 (State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Accordingly, the punishment of the appellant of dismissal from services as imposed by the disciplinary authority is substituted to one of compulsory retirement from the date of his dismissal from service i.e. 7-5-1992." (f) 2011 (4) SCC 584 (State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya) : "7) It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 = 1996 SCC (L & S) 80 = 1996 (32) ATC 44), Union of India Vs. G.Ganayutham ( 1997 (7) SCC 463 = 1997 SCC (L & S) 1806), Bank of India Vs. Degala Suryanarayana ( 1999 (5) SCC 762 = 1999 SCC (L & S) 1036) and High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S.Patil ( 2000 (1) SCC 416 = 2000 SCC (L & S) 144)." "10) The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the Respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him." 6. Per contra, Mr.M.Dig Vijaya Pandian, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first and third respondents, submitted that when the enquiry report is not assailed by the petitioner, it is not permissible at this stage to raise a plea of non-application of mind on the part of the respondents-authorities while passing the impugned order. He further contended that when the charges levelled against the petitioner are grave in nature, and when there are 23 charges framed against the petitioner, 13 of which have been proved, the orders passed by the respondents-authorities are legally valid and there is no infirmity on the same. To substantiate his contentions, learned Addl.G.P. relied on a decision of the Madurai Bench of this Court in W.P.(MD).No.3575 of 2005, dated 12.8.2008 (Mr.K.Paul Raj Vs. The Joint Registrar of Go-operative Societies and 2 others), wherein, this Court observed as under: "10) It is also an admitted fact that an enquiry was conducted for the said allegations. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken a stand that adequate opportunity was not given to the petitioner, but the same was not substantiated. As such, I am not able to agree with this stand of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Apart from this, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, the charges levelled as against the petitioner are not of misappropriation, but connivance with the Secretary and also it was the base for causing heavy loss to the Bank. As far as these charges are concerned, the Enquiry Officer has given a finding that the same were proved. As far as these charges are concerned, the Enquiry Officer has given a finding that the same were proved. It is not the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the Enquiry Officer is perverse in this regard. That apart, no procedural irregularity either in the conduct of the enquiry or in passing the final orders has brought to the notice of this Court. 11). Under such circumstances, in the judgment reported in 2006 (4) SCC 598 (Y.P.Sarabhai Vs. Union Bank of India and another), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "The factual finding of the Disciplinary Authority after holding a detailed enquiry and after going through elaborate evidence are not assailable in Courts unless breach of principle of natural justice or violation of any rules or any material irregularity on face of record is alleged or shown." 7. Mr.A.Arumugham, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-Society (Bank) submitted that the scope of either the revision filed before the first respondent, or this Writ Petition, is very limited, when the charges have been proved, coupled with the fact that the loss incurred to the Society on account of the misconduct alleged against the petitioner, is huge, and thus, the charge of misappropriation of the amount, cannot be viewed leniently. The learned counsel has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (State Bank of India Vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and another) (Civil Appeal No.2930 of 2009, dated 13.10.2011), wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: "4) Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there were charges of grave misconduct against the respondent no.1 and four of the six charges had been proved in the enquiry. He submitted that the findings of the enquiry officer on the four charges proved against the respondent no.1 were based on relevant material and these findings had also been confirmed by the appellate and reviewing authorities. He submitted that contrary to the settled position of law that the High Court, while exercising its powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not interfere with the finding in the departmental enquiry so long as it is based on some evidence in the impugned order, the High Court has interfered with findings in the enquiry and has held that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of the charges. By the impugned order, the High Court has also quashed the order of dismissal and has directed release of the arrears of salary and post retirement benefits of the respondent no.1." "7) Coming now to the contention of the appellant, we find that the enquiry officer has found that charges no.1, 2, 4 and 6 had been proved against the respondent no.1. While arriving at these findings on the four charges proved against the respondent no.1, the enquiry officer has considered a number of documents marked as exhibits and has also considered the documents produced on behalf of the respondent no.1 and marked as exhibits. The findings of the enquiry officer were based on evidence and the appointing authority had agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer. This Court has held in State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ): "The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence" 8) Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations levelled against the respondent no.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of any misconduct." 8. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel on either side and perused the records and the decisions relied on by them. 9. An indepth analysis of the facts of the case, reveals that the petitioner was appointed as Salesman on 21.4.1983 in Ussoor Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank, Ussoor Village, Vellore Taluk. Subsequently, he was promoted as Clerk in 1990. On 6.6.1996, the petitioner was given-in-charge of the post of the Secretary. In the month of June 1997, the petitioner was given the regular post of Secretary and continuing in the same post. While so, a criminal case was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Vellore in C.C.No.94 of 2005 against the petitioner. The lower Court imposed a fine of Rs.1,500/- and one year rigorous imprisonment, against which, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No.146 of 2004 before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore. By judgment dated 22.11.2005, the learned District Judge acquitted the petitioner of the charges. 10. In the meantime, he was placed under suspension on 8.8.2005. The petitioner made a representation on 26.2.2005 requesting the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service. The petitioner filed W.P.No.8615 of 2006 before this Court, challenging the order of suspension, dated 8.8.2005. This Court, by an order dated 29.3.2006, directed the Special Officer of the Society to consider the representations of the petitioner, dated 26.12.2005 and 3.3.2006 and pass orders in the light of the judgment rendered in Crl.A.No.146 of 2004, dated 22.11.2005, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. By an order dated 7.6.2006, the petitioner was reinstated into service. By then, the first respondent issued a charge memo containing 23 charges against the petitioner on 25.4.2006. The petitioner submitted explanations on 9.5.2006 and 15.5.2006 denying the charges. By an order dated 7.6.2006, the petitioner was reinstated into service. By then, the first respondent issued a charge memo containing 23 charges against the petitioner on 25.4.2006. The petitioner submitted explanations on 9.5.2006 and 15.5.2006 denying the charges. Inspite of the said explanations, the first respondent appointed an enquiry officer, who submitted a report on 4.12.2006 holding that 13 charges as proved and eight charges as not proved. The charges include the charges levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case. 11. The first respondent issued a show cause notice, dated 4.12.2006 directing the petitioner to submit his representation on the findings of the enquiry officer. On receipt of the same, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation on 4.4.2007. Without considering the said explanation, the first respondent imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on 28.7.2007. Challenging the said order of dismissal dated 28.7.2007, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.27846 of 2007 before this Court, which was dismissed on 22.8.2007 with liberty to exhaust the remedy of appeal against the order dated 28.7.2007. 12. Thereafter, a revision petition was filed on 22.1.2008 before the third respondent, raising the grounds that the first respondent ought to have conducted a detailed enquiry into the charges, giving an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses and there was a mechanical acceptance of the findings of the enquiry officer and the first respondent failed to take note of the criminal Court judgment, and it is not open to the respondents 1 and 2 to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of the same set of charges as were framed in the Criminal case. It is further alleged by the petitioner that the show cause notice was only an empty formality, as the first respondent has not considered the explanation of the petitioner, which was based on the criminal Court's findings. He has put in 22 years of unblemished service in the second respondent-Bank and he has no bad remarks and the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges and therefore, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The said revision petition preferred before the third respondent, was however dismissed on 25.6.2008, whereby, the order of the first respondent was confirmed. 13. The said revision petition preferred before the third respondent, was however dismissed on 25.6.2008, whereby, the order of the first respondent was confirmed. 13. Assailing the above orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the original authority (first respondent) as well as the revisional authority/third respondent on the ground of non-speaking nature of the same; that there is no independent findings by the authorities, that there is no application of mind in considering the petitioner's explanation based on the criminal Court's judgment and that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is excessive and disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition. 14. The above grounds raised by the petitioner in the revision petition and the averments and grounds set out in the present Writ Petition are resisted by the respondents on the ground that the charges alleged against the petitioner are grave in nature and the loss caused to the respondent-Society (Bank) is huge and that the scope of the revision is very limited and therefore, the impugned orders cannot be found fault with. 15. To examine the veracity and legality of the above orders passed by the respondents, it is to be seen that a clear circumspection of the case would reveal that the impugned orders passed by the first and third respondent are a mere extraction of the enquiry officer's report and the same are also without any discussion on the part of the respondents and had been passed mechanically, without giving an independent findings. Though the enquiry officer's report had been placed before the disciplinary authority, yet each and every charge levelled against the petitioner-delinquent have not been discussed in detail by them. The charges have not been dealt with by the disciplinary authority 'in toto' and the findings of the enquiry officer, have not been analysed, and ultimately, the first respondent has come to the conclusion that 13 out of 23 charges having been proved, is a major factor to be taken into account before passing the order of punishment and without giving their own reasonings by passing a speaking order, orders have been passed by the respondents in a casual way. In 'stricto-sensu', it is the hallmark and ordained principle in the service law jurisprudence that the disciplinary authority, while dealing with the punishment, ought to have assigned appropriate reasonings, which is the heart-beat of the decision as may be rendered while arriving at a final conclusion in the disciplinary proceedings. Such reasonings should be supported by material documents, and the authorities have to apply their mind in respect of each and every charge, so as to arrive at a conclusion either to accept the report of the enquiry officer or to reject the same by giving valid reasons, and only then appropriate punishment should have been imposed. Similarly, the appellate/revisional authority should also deal with the matter in the manner as prescribed under the statutes/Rules, etc. 16. A bare perusal of the entire orders passed by the first and third respondents, clearly gives an impression to this Court that they have not applied their mind in giving an independent findings of each and every charges and therefore, to that extent, the said orders suffer from legal infirmity. 17. It is true that the power of this Court in examining the orders passed against a delinquent-employee with regard to the punishment of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, based on the findings on the enquiry report, is a matter for the appellate authority to consider it in proper perspective and arrive at an independent conclusion of either accepting the dismissal or modifying the dismissal or any other modifications of punishment and it is purely in the domain of the appellate authority to deal with the issue of conduct and moral of employees when they are put to disciplinary proceedings on account of their misconduct like misappropriation of money, disobedience, insubordination etc. It is for the appropriate authority to apply their mind and take a consistent view keeping in mind the principles enunciated in law in dealing with the departmental/disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a legitimate conclusion before imposing the capital punishment of dismissal from service, irrespective of the fact that the charges alleged against the delinquent-employee is grave or not, based on material facts supported by relevant records. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the above aspects of the matter have not been scrupulously followed by the respondents-authorities while passing the impugned order. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the above aspects of the matter have not been scrupulously followed by the respondents-authorities while passing the impugned order. The impugned order are only mere extraction of enquiry officer's report, to arrive at a conclusion without assigning any proper and valid reasons. 18. As regards the revisional authority's order, this Court's scope of interference on the revision petition is very limited as emanated from various decisions of the Supreme Court, that too, with regard to the consideration of punishment of dismissal, and the authorities concerned are bound to look into the order passed by the disciplinary authority when there is a direction by this Court, by an order dated 22.08.2007 in W.P.No.27846 of 2007 filed by the very same petitioner before this Court, directing the petitioner to exhaust the appeal remedy (i.e. revision petition) and when such revision petition is preferred before the third respondent-appellate authority, the third respondent has to apply his mind with regard to each and every aspect of the case and to go in-depth by analysing each and every charges levelled against the petitioner and also shall browse the reasonings given by the disciplinary authority. Only thereafter, the third respondent has to come to a conclusion that the order of punishment imposed by the first respondent is in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court and also in accordance with the relevant Rules and the procedures prescribed thereunder, and if only the said process of analysis is adopted, the third respondent could come to an irresistible conclusion as to whether the original authority's order is infirmed or not, and whether the same is liable to be interfered with or not. 19. A clear reading of each and every observations made by the first and third respondents in the impugned orders, shows that the third respondent has mechanically confirmed the order of the first respondent without assigning valid reasons therefor. 20. 19. A clear reading of each and every observations made by the first and third respondents in the impugned orders, shows that the third respondent has mechanically confirmed the order of the first respondent without assigning valid reasons therefor. 20. No doubt, the power of judicial review in matters of examining the revisional authority's order is very limited to this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, except to the extent that the revisional authority has considered each and every aspect of the matter or not and come to a conclusion as to whether the disciplinary authority has analysed the various aspects of the case and whether the same is in accordance with rules and procedures prescribed in law and also as to whether the original authority has taken into consideration the various factors while imposing the punishment of dismissal. Such an exhaustive course having been always available to the revisional authority/appellate authority while examining the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and exercising the power of revision/appeal filed under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. 21. In this case, it is pertinent to note that due to the above procedural irregularity, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside and the same is liable to be interfered with for bereft of reasons and non-speaking nature of order passed by them. 22. Lastly, with regard to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the punishment of dismissal imposed against the petitioner by the original authority is excessive in nature and disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner, the same is a matter to be determined by the revisional/appellate authority before deciding the appeal/revision one way or the other. It is seen that the petitioner has rendered approximately 22 years of unblemished service in the second respondent-Bank (Society). This aspect is not supported by any material documents being placed before this Court to indicate as to whether the petitioner has come to the adverse notice of his superiors during his period of service. It is seen that the petitioner has rendered approximately 22 years of unblemished service in the second respondent-Bank (Society). This aspect is not supported by any material documents being placed before this Court to indicate as to whether the petitioner has come to the adverse notice of his superiors during his period of service. But he was tried and convicted by the Criminal Court, against which he preferred appeal before the Sessions Court, which acquitted the petitioner-accused of the charges, and despite his acquittal, the petitioner was charge-sheeted by the department with 23 charges, out of which, 13 having been proved, the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner or not, and as to whether it is shocking the conscience of the authority, as the same is excessive, are all matters for consideration and examination by the revisional/appellate authority (third respondent herein). 23. It is the cardinal principle as settled by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2009 (7) SCC 248 (Ramanuj Pandey Vs. State of M.P) that it is for the disciplinary authority or the administrative authority to decide the quantum of punishment in a case of misconduct and the role of the Court is only secondary. The Supreme Court in 2009 (7) SCC 248 (cited supra) relied on its earlier decision reported in 2006 (3) SCC 173 = 2006 SCC (L & S) 503 (Commr. Of Police Vs. Syed Hussain), in which it is laid down that it is one thing to say that the order passed by the statutory authority is wholly arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus liable to be set aside, but is another thing to say that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by such authority should not ordinarily be interfered with by a superior Court while exercising the power of judicial review unless one or the other ground upon which and on the basis whereof the power of judicial review can be exercised, exists. 24. It is therefore beyond any dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate cases as the scope of judicial review will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. It is therefore beyond any dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate cases as the scope of judicial review will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. While exercising the power of judicial review by this Court, this Court will not normally substitute its own conclusion in deciding the penalty/punishment and if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of this Court, this Court will mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to re-consider the whole issue of imposition of penalty/punishment on an analysis of records in detail and give cogent reasons before arriving at an authoritative conclusion in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction prescribed in the statutes/Act/Rules etc. 25. On a perusal of the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, as also this Court, and on a consideration of each and every factors in this case and the charges levelled against the petitioner both in the Criminal Court and in the departmental disciplinary proceedings, coupled with the reading of the impugned orders, it is seen that the impugned orders are not speaking, as they have been passed with total non-application of mind, without assigning any reasons therefor. Hence, on all these grounds, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned orders are to be set aside. Accordingly, the same are set aside. 26. In view of the foregoing reasonings, this Court comes to the conclusion that the respondents-authorities have not passed the impugned orders in consonance with the law and have not applied their mind in proper perspective in imposing/confirming the punishment of dismissal and have not given cogent and valid reasons in deciding the issue against the petitioner and hence, the matter requires re-consideration by them, including the consideration of proportionality of punishment to be borne out by records. This Court cannot sit in appeal in the Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as an appellate Court and analyse the evidence and records afresh and that course could be adopted only based on adducing oral and documentary evidence before the authority concerned. 27. This Court cannot sit in appeal in the Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as an appellate Court and analyse the evidence and records afresh and that course could be adopted only based on adducing oral and documentary evidence before the authority concerned. 27. For the reasons stated above, the matter requires re-consideration by the respondents by following the principles of natural justice and the relevant Rules, and for passing a reasoned order, the matter is remanded to the respondents for de-novo consideration taking into account the materials placed before them and also the rulings of the Supreme Court and give an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned and in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order or on production of a copy of this order by the petitioner. The Writ Petition is allowed with the above observations and directions. No costs.