A.K. Goel, CJ.;— 1. These appeals have been preferred against order of the learned Single Judge dismissing writ petitions of the appellants seeking quashing of Notice dated 31.10.2005 issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, asking the appellants to pay interest in terms of section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 in consequence of judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court dated 19.9.2005, in the case of the appellants, i.e., R.C. Tobacco (P.) Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 725 . 2. By the New Industrial Policy Resolution, dated 24.12.1997, the Central Government granted various incentives to the industrial units established in the North Eastern Region. This was followed by Notification dated 8.7.1999 granting exemption to the industrial units from payment of Central Excise Duty. The exemption was effective from 8.7.1999 to 27.1.2001. The said duty, after payment, was liable to be refunded to the new industrial units. During the period from April to June 2000, the excise duty was refunded to the appellants in terms of the said exemption. The exemption, so granted, was retrospectively withdrawn under section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003. If the amount of excise duty had already been refunded, the same was liable to be recovered. It was further provided that excise duty had not been already refunded to the unit, no further refund would be made. 3. The appellant in WA No. 19/2011 filed WP(C) No.4398/2003 challenging section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003. In that writ petition, interim protection was granted vide order dated 13.6.2003 restraining the respondents from recovering the refund of excise duty in terms of section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003. The said writ petition was transferred to the Apex Court and was dismissed vide order dated 19.9.2005, reported in R.C. Tobacco (P.) Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 725 . As a consequence, the impugned demand notice was issued to the appellants. The appellants having returned the principal amount, dispute survived qua interest only. It is not clear as to when the appellants returned the amount. We are, thus, concerned only with the question whether no interest was payable on principal being returned irrespective of the date when the same was returned. The appellants having returned the principal amount, dispute survived qua interest only. It is not clear as to when the appellants returned the amount. We are, thus, concerned only with the question whether no interest was payable on principal being returned irrespective of the date when the same was returned. Aggrieved by the demand of interest, the appellants again approached this court by way of writ petitions giving rise to these appeals mainly with the contention that the appellants having returned the principal amount of refund granted to them, they were not liable to pay any interest, particularly when the appellants had stay in their favour till the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court. 4. Learned Single Judge did not accept this contention. It was held that the appellants were liable to pay interest as per the provisions of the Finance Act, 2003. In view of judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court upholding the statutory provision relating to the said liability in the case of the appellant itself, the contention raised was not open to be gone into. Mere grant of stay, pending consideration of issue, did not affect the liability. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that even if the retrospective withdrawal of exemption was upheld, the issue of liability to pay interest as per the amending statutory provision was an independent issue. Since the taxing statute was required to be construed strictly and different expressions had been used under section 154(4) of the Finance Act, 2003, such as, 'recoverable' and 'payable', the expression 'payable' being applicable to those who had not paid the amount, the expression recoverable could not include interest. Learned Single Judge wrongly held that stay granted to the appellants did not affect their tax liability. 7. We are unable to accept this submission, we are clearly of the view that under section 154(4) liability of the appellants will be same as it would have been but for the exemption. Once exemption was retrospectively withdrawn, which has been duly upheld, the parties are governed by the principle of restitution. The appellants are liable to place the revenue in the same position in which it would have been but for exemption. Same is position qua the plea of stay. An unsuccessful litigant cannot be allowed to enjoy the fruits of interim order. 8. The appellants are liable to place the revenue in the same position in which it would have been but for exemption. Same is position qua the plea of stay. An unsuccessful litigant cannot be allowed to enjoy the fruits of interim order. 8. Before we advert to the principle of restitution, it would be appropriate to reproduce the statutory provision in question, i.e., section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 : "154. Amendment of Notifications issued under section 5A of the Central Excise Act. - (1) The Notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) Nos. GSR 508(E) dated 8.7.1999 and GSR 509(E), dated 8.7.1999, issued under sub-section (1) of section 5Aof the Central Excise Act read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978), by the Central Government shall stand amended and shall be deemed to have been amended in the manner as specified against each of them in column (3) of the Ninth Schedule, on and from the corresponding date specified in column (4) of that Schedule retrospectively, and accordingly, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, any action taken or anything done or purported to have been taken or done under the said Notifications, shall be deemed to be and always to have been, for all purposes, as validly and effectively taken or done as if the Notifications as amended by this sub-section had been in force at all material times. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Central Government shall have and shall be deemed to have the power to amend the Notifications referred to in the said sub-section with retrospective effect as if the Central Government had the power to amend the said Notifications under sub-section (1) of section 5A of the Central Excise Act read with subsection (3) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978(40 of 1978), retrospectively at all material times. (3) No suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any court, tribunal or other authority for any action taken or anything done or omitted to be done, in respect of any goods under the said Notifications, and no enforcement shall be made by any court, tribunal or other authority of any decree or order relating to such action taken or anything done or omitted to be done as if the amendments made by sub-section (1) had been in force at all material times. (4) Recovery shall be made of all amounts of duty or interest or other charges which have not been collected or, as the case may be, which have been refunded but which would have been collected or, as the case may be, which would have not been refunded if the provisions of this section had been in force at all material times, within a period of thirty days from the day on which the Finance Bill, 2003 receives the assent of the President, and in the event of non-payment of duty or interest or other charges so recoverable, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum shall be payable from the date immediately after the expiry of the said period of thirty days till the date of payment. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if the Notifications referred to in sub-section (1) had not been amended retrospectively by that sub-section.'' (emphasis added) 9. Considering the validity of the above provision, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that withdrawal of exemption from the date of the Notification itself was within the competence of the Parliament and the same not liable to be quashed on the ground of being unreasonable. In para 50, it was observed : "50. Furthermore having upheld the constitutional validity of section 154 it would be a pyrrhic victory for the Union of India if they could not in fact recover the tax. It is not a fit case where the legislation has merely withdrawn the exemptions. The consequences of the withdrawal have been statutorily provided for including the recovery of the excise duties refunded or not paid. The effective period of such imposition is about eight months. It is not a fit case where the legislation has merely withdrawn the exemptions. The consequences of the withdrawal have been statutorily provided for including the recovery of the excise duties refunded or not paid. The effective period of such imposition is about eight months. The State has been deprived of revenue without any corresponding benefit. It may be that the retrospective operation may operate harshly in some cases, but that would not by itself invalidate the demand — See Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa, (1964) 7 SCR 185 : AIR 1964 SC 1581 . It needs to be emphasised that in effect the retrospective operation extended over a very short period and principles of equity must give way to express statutory provision. As was said in Story on Equity (3rd Eng. Edn. 1920) p. 34: "Where a rule, either of the common or the statute law, is direct, and governs the case with all its circumstances, or the particular point, a court of equity is as much bound by it as a court of law, and can as little justify a departure from it." (emphasis added) 10. It was, thus, observed that even if the provision of retrospective operation operated harshly, it was not enough to invalidate the demand as the State had been deprived of the revenue without any corresponding benefit. It was further held that the State was entitled to recover the same as per section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003. 11. The provision of section 154(4) of the Finance Act clearly shows that the amount to be recovered includes the duty, interest and other things which would have been collected but for the exemption. In view of deeming provision, section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 had to be deemed to be operative from the date of exemption itself. Once it is so, the amount wrongly refunded will have to be recovered back as per the statutory provision of Central Excise Act, 1944. "Duty or interest or other charges recoverable" refer to the amount liable to be recovered which was not liable to be refunded as per the statutory provisions applicable. Once it is so, the amount wrongly refunded will have to be recovered back as per the statutory provision of Central Excise Act, 1944. "Duty or interest or other charges recoverable" refer to the amount liable to be recovered which was not liable to be refunded as per the statutory provisions applicable. The second part of section 154(4) providing for interest being "payable" at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum after one month from the date of assent of the President to the Finance Bill, 2003, is restricted to the applicability to the period after thirty days from the date of assent of the President up to payment. We are also unable to hold that liability of the appellants was in any manner wiped out on account of stay. Stay order is in aid of final order and after dismissal of writ petition, order of stay cannot be held to have wiped out liability of the appellants. 12. Coming now to the principle of restitution which fully applies in the present case in respect of stay or retaining of amount in accordance with exemption provision which was retrospectively withdrawn, we may refer to the discussion in South Easten Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 . Therein, it was observed : "26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word "restitution" in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order — see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P., (1984) Supp SCC 505: AIR 1985 SC 39 . In law, the term "restitution" is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another (see Black's Law Dictionary, 7thEdn.,p. 1315). In law, the term "restitution" is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another (see Black's Law Dictionary, 7thEdn.,p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that "restitution" is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done : "Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same.... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed." The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC'). Section 144, CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed.in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed. 27. Section 144, CPC is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from section 144 the court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berharn v. Kedar Nath Marwari, (1922) 49IA 351; AIR 1922 PC 269. Their lordships of the Privy Council said : (AIR p. 271) "It is the duty of the court under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to "place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed". Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act-rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." Cairns, LC, said in Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompic de Paris, (1871) 3 PC 465 : (ER p. 125) "One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression, "the act of the court" is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case." This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1MLJ220. In the exercise of such inherent power the courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of section 144. 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the "act of the court" embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable/reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. 29. Once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. Such interest is not controlled by the provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 or 1978. 30. 29. Once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. Such interest is not controlled by the provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 or 1978. 30. So far as the appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking substitution of rate of interest by 24% per annum in place of 12% per annum as awarded by the High Court is concerned, we are not inclined to grant that relief in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution, especially in view of the opinion formed by the High Court in the impugned decision. The litigation has lasted for a long period of time. Multiple commercial transactions have taken place and much time has been lost in between. The commercial rates of interest (including bank rates) have undergone substantial variations and for quite some time the bank rate of interest has been below 12%, The High Court has, therefore, rightly (and reasonably) opined that upholding entitlement to the payment of interest at the rate of 24% per annum would be excessive and it would meet the ends of justice if the rate of interest is reduced from 24% per annum to 12% per annum on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. We are not inclined to interfere with that view of the High Court but make it clear that this concession is confined to the facts of this case and to the parties herein and shall not be construed as a precedent for overriding rule 64A of the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1960. It is also clarified that the payment of dues should be cleared within six weeks from today (if not already cleared) to get the benefit of reduced rate of interest of 12%; failing the payment in six weeks from today the liability to pay interest @ 24% per annum .shall stand." 13. In view of above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the view taken by learned Single Judge. The appeals are dismissed. _____________