Judgment Surinder Singh, J. 1. The plaintiff/appellant felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Shimla whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court was upheld while dismissing the appeal on 04.06.2011, thus, the present appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by him. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the findings of the learned First Appellate Court and the learned Trial Court are a result of complete misreading of pleadings, evidence and the law as applicable to the facts of the case and as such, palpably erroneous and illegal and if so to what effect and particularly documents Ext. P4, P5, P7, P18, P21, P22, P27, P31, P33, P36, P44 and P46? 2. Whether the First Appellate Court failed to formulate proper points for determination and whether failure of it has affected its judgment and resulted into miscarriage of justice to appellants? 3. Whether the learned Trial Court below has erred gravely and acted with material illegality and irregularity by not framing proper issues arising from the pleadings and particularly to the effect as to who was in legal possession of the property on the crucial date of 19th April, 2002 and whether non framing of such issues has resulted into miscarriage of justice and mistrial of the case and if so what effect?” 2. In short, the facts giving rise to the present appeal can be stated thus. The appellant, hereinafter referred as ‘the plaintiff’ is admittedly the owner of the double storeyed building known as Sharma Niwas, Tank Road, Solan, i.e. ‘the suit property’. It was initially leased out to the respondent, to be referred as ‘defendant-Corporation’, on 26th December, 1994 for a period of three years, on a monthly rent of ` 18,102/- and a lease deed to this effect was executed on 27.11.1995. It was further renewed for two years with the increase of 10% amount and in this way, the lease of the defendant-Corporation was extended from time to time upto 25.12.2000. But before its expiry, the plaintiff insisted upon the defendant-Corporation for formal renewal of the lease as per the past precedent, to avoid financial implications to either side. It was further renewed for two years with the increase of 10% amount and in this way, the lease of the defendant-Corporation was extended from time to time upto 25.12.2000. But before its expiry, the plaintiff insisted upon the defendant-Corporation for formal renewal of the lease as per the past precedent, to avoid financial implications to either side. (ii) The defendant-Corporation vide their letter dated 3.1.2001 informed the plaintiff that they were no more interested to retain the suit property and it stood already vacated on 22.12.2000 and he could take its possession. (iii) The plaintiff insisted upon the defendant-Corporation to hand over the vacant possession by opening their locks on the spot. It is alleged that the defendant-Corporation did not put any heed to it. Then the plaintiff vide his letter dated 09.05.2001 informed the defendant-Corporation that the possession was not handed over to him as per the terms and conditions of the lease agreement whereas he was ready and willing to accept the possession and asked them to hand over the possession of the premises on 21.6.2001 and to prepare a list of damage, if any, to the property/fixtures and fittings etc. A legal notice dated 23.07.2001 was also served upon the defendants requiring them to hand over the vacant possession followed by reply dated 27.8.2001 refuting the allegations of the defendants. (iv) It is alleged that the defendant-Corporation turned deaf ears to his requests thus he was forced to file eviction petition under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 before the learned Rent Controller, Solan, wherein the dispute arose as to whether the defendant-Corporation had not vacated the premises and handed over the possession to the plaintiff. (v) On 05.04.2002, Shri S.K. Biswas, Senior Manager (Personnel) of the defendant-Corporation had made a statement (Ext.P1) before the Rent Controller that the premises stood already vacated on 22.12.2000 and the plaintiff did not take its possession and the plaintiff was at liberty to break open the locks of the demised premises. (vi) The plaintiff alleged in the suit that prior to that the defendants have failed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in terms of the agreement. (vi) The plaintiff alleged in the suit that prior to that the defendants have failed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in terms of the agreement. Even after the said statement before the Rent Controller, he had informed the defendants to depute some representative to open the locks to avoid breaking of the locks, but again they did not depute their representative. Thus, he broke- open the locks on 19.04.2001 in the presence of the witnesses. The intimation thereof was sent to the defendants. Consequently the eviction petition was withdrawn. (vii) Now, the case of the plaintiff has been that the defendant-Corporation was in occupation of the demised premises for 15 months and 28 days, therefore they are liable to pay rent and damages for their use and occupation for the period w.e.f. 23.12.2000 to 19.04.2002 at the rate of ` 21,903/- per month alongwith 9% interest thereon. Hence, filed a suit for the recovery of the amount of ` 3,48,583/-. 3. The defendant-Corporation offered strong resistance to the suit and alleged that the plaintiff had concealed the material facts from the Court. In their written statement, they also questioned the maintainability of the suit and jurisdiction of the Court by taking of preliminary objections and on merits, denied the allegations made in the plaint. It is specifically averred that the defendant-Corporation through its Senior Manager had informed the plaintiff well before expiry of lease period that they were not interested to continue with the tenancy of the suit property and would vacate the premises on or before expiry of the lease i.e. 25.12.2000. The intimation-letter was also delivered to the plaintiff at his residence which was received by Shri Rajiv Sharma, his son and the plaintiff was repeatedly requested to depute some person to take over the vacant possession, but when he did not pay any heed to their request, they finally vacated the premises on 22.12.2000 in the presence of their officials and deputed Shri R.S. Rana, Assistant Engineer to hand over the keys to the plaintiff, but he refused to receive it. The plaintiff was informed in writing to this effect vide letter dated 27.12.2000 with a request to take the keys of the premises from its Chambaghat Office. The plaintiff was informed in writing to this effect vide letter dated 27.12.2000 with a request to take the keys of the premises from its Chambaghat Office. Again, this position made clear and fact was intimated to him vide letter dated 03.01.2001, whereas, the allegations with respect to the damage to the property and fittings have been totally denied and also denied the liability of the aforesaid amount, thus prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The replication to the written statement was filed by the plaintiff. He denied any communication having been sent to him with respect to the eviction of the premises or to his son and also deputing Mr. R.S. Rana for handing over the keys. Further, he re-affirmed even paras of the plaint on merits while denying the preliminary objections. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the possession of the lease property was not handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant till 19.4.2002 and if so, to what amount the plaintiff is entitled to use and occupation charges? .….OPP 2. Whether the suit as framed is not competent and maintainable, as alleged? …OPD 3. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? …OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and had suppressed the material facts, as alleged? . …OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit from his act and conduct, as alleged? …OPD. 6. Relief. 6. In support of their rival contentions, both the parties led their evidence. At the conclusion of trial, in reply to Issue No. 1, the learned trial Court held that the plaintiff was only entitled to the use and occupation charges w.e.f. 23.12.2000 to 3.1.2001 for 12 days to the tune of ` 8,400/- as the plaintiff could only establish that the defendant Corporation had in fact vacated the premises on 03.01.2001. Issues No. 4 & 5 were partly decided in favour of the defendant-Corporation, whereas issues No. 2 & 3 were decided against them. Consequent upon these findings, the learned trial Court partly decreed the suit. 7. Issues No. 4 & 5 were partly decided in favour of the defendant-Corporation, whereas issues No. 2 & 3 were decided against them. Consequent upon these findings, the learned trial Court partly decreed the suit. 7. Feeling dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the plaintiff filed the appeal before the learned District Judge, which came to be decided by the learned Additional District, Judge, who on the appraisal of the evidence on record, did not find force therein and while concurring with the factual findings on all the issues, the appeal was dismissed. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. 8. Shri Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff duly assisted by Shri Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate vehemently argued that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the documents placed on record in the right perspective which resulted into miscarriage of justice. Further, according to him, as per the terms and conditions of the lease deed, a proper procedure was covenanted inter-se the parties for handing over and taking the possession of the suit property, which was not followed. Further that the defendant-Corporation coined a false story to wriggle out from the liability. He also referred to the documents qua the proceedings which had taken place before the learned Rent Controller for possession. The learned Counsel also relied upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court rendered in Mec India Pvt. Ltd. Versus Lt. Col. Inder Maira & others, 80 (1999) Delhi Law Times 679, wherein it has been held that when a tenant who upon determination of the tenancy does not deliver up possession to the landlord as required by Section 108(q), cannot be heard to say that he is not a tenant, be he one at sufferance or be he one from month-to-month. Therefore, unless the landlord is actually put into possession, the premises remain under a tenancy, which unless assented to by the landlord, has the character of one at sufferance. According to the learned counsel, since the defendant-Corporation wrongfully continued in possession of the suit property after the extinction of the lawful title, the defendant-Corporation is liable to pay the damages for the use and occupation. Further, it is also ventilated that the findings of the Courts below are based upon conjectures and surmises, thus perverse and could be interfered with in the Regular Second Appeal. 9. Further, it is also ventilated that the findings of the Courts below are based upon conjectures and surmises, thus perverse and could be interfered with in the Regular Second Appeal. 9. To counter the above arguments Shri G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant-Corporation duly assisted by Shri Pawan Sharma, Advocate forcefully argued that the learned trial Court had rightly given issue-wise findings based upon the evidence adduced on record which was examined threadbare. Thereafter, in appeal, the learned District Judge sifted the evidence and reassessed, but came to the same conclusion. Further that the First Appellate Court exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error, either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal and further that the learned first Appellate Court could have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference in the second appeal. To impress upon this point, he placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court rendered in State of Rajasthan versus Harphool Singh (dead) through his LRs (2000) 5 SCC 652 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam versus Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . It is also ventilated that there are concurrent findings of facts by the Courts below which cannot be re-appreciated at this stage when there is no mis-appreciation and mis-interpretation of the evidence. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari versus Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs, (2001) 3 SCC 179 . In nutshell, while taking the points raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, the learned Counsel vehemently argued that the points so raised are not at all the questions of law much less the substantial questions of law, thus, the regular second appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and have carefully examined the points taken by each of them. I find force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the defendant-Corporation, as such, the appeal deserves dismissal for the reasons mentioned hereinafter. 11. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been substituted by an amendment in the year 1976. I find force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the defendant-Corporation, as such, the appeal deserves dismissal for the reasons mentioned hereinafter. 11. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been substituted by an amendment in the year 1976. It restricts the scope of second appeals so that litigation may not drag on for a long period, by confining the right of second appeals only to the cases where a question of law is involved and the question of law so involved is substantial. The object behind this amendment appears to be that all questions of facts involved in a case must rest where they lie after they have been decided by the court of first appeal without any further appeal, and there will be no longer any scope whatsoever for admission of second appeal by the High Court on such questions of facts merely on the fact that the findings recorded are supposed to be manifestly unjust or merely because of such procedural defects of the nature mentioned in old Clause (c ) unless they raise “substantial questions of law”, as the wide language of old Section 100 used to give such scope. It is also well settled that where the parties had led evidence on the matter of dispute, non framing of an issue on the point would not be ground for setting aside judgment of lower Court in appeal. 12. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in Section 100 of the Code must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and the Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam’s case supra has held that no court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Further it is also held that the concurrent findings of facts however erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. The Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Further it is also held that the concurrent findings of facts however erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. The Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] held that: “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 13. The apex Court further held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. Even, when it is a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is held to be not permissible, unless it is found that the conclusion drawn by the lower appellate Court is erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or is based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence {State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 652 ] } and the respondent in appeal is within his rights to show that the question formulated by the High Court is not involved in the case. { Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] } . { Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] } . The first appellate Court is duty bound to meticulously analyse the matter before it and it cannot mechanically affirm the findings of the trial Court without due and proper application of mind. Thus, the present appeal has to be approached on the above well settled parameters and I proceed to examine it. 14. There is no denying of the fact that if after the determination of the tenancy the tenant does not deliver up the possession to the Landlord, he is definitely entitled for the damages for its use and occupation, but in the instant case, both the Courts below have meticulously examined the facts and documents proved and relied upon. Even the appellate Court had reappraised Clause (7) of the lease agreement Ext.D4, which states that each party shall be entitled to terminate the lease at any time during the initial stage or renewal terms of the lease upon serving one month’s previous notice to quit in writing upon them, which means that an advance notice in writing was required to be served when the tenancy was intended to be terminated during the lease period. But however, it is the positive case of the parties that the lease deed was to terminate on 25.12.2000, thus one month’s notice was not required to be served in advance to quit, upon the plaintiff. The learned first Appellate Court also took notice of clause-8 of the lease deed and rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in know of the fact that no tenancy was going to be extended beyond 25.12.2000 by the defendant-Corporation. Even the plaintiff’s letter Ext.P23 can be construed as an offer by him to renew the tenancy after its expiry to which the defendant-Corporation declined and the plaintiff also knew that the defendant would vacate his premises by due date. 15. Further Ext.P4 is the legal notice sent to the defendant on 23.7.2001 through counsel of the plaintiff. Ext.P5 is his another response. Ext.P7 is the reply of the letters/ notices sent by the plaintiff whereby the Senior Manager of the Corporation informed the plaintiff about the Account Payee Cheque amounting to `.11,799/- as the balance amount of rent till 22.12.2000 and had clearly made the request to him to collect the keys from Chambaghat office. Ext.P5 is his another response. Ext.P7 is the reply of the letters/ notices sent by the plaintiff whereby the Senior Manager of the Corporation informed the plaintiff about the Account Payee Cheque amounting to `.11,799/- as the balance amount of rent till 22.12.2000 and had clearly made the request to him to collect the keys from Chambaghat office. The same stand was taken before the learned Rent Controller by the defendant-Corporation when said Shri Biswas made a statement in the eviction petition copy whereof is Ext.P18, on the basis of which the petition was withdrawn. But plaintiff knowing fully well that the defendant-Corporation had vacated the premises insisted upon by writing various letters to hand over the possession as is stated in letter Ext.P21. Similar is the stand taken in reply to the notice by the plaintiff in Exts. P22, P27, P31, P33 and all other related documents, thus on perusal I do not find that the Courts below have mis-interpreted or mis-appreciated the evidence on record in any manner. 16. Further learned counsel for the appellant failed to point out as to which issue or point was not framed for its determination. This plea is being taken for the first time in this appeal, which cannot be now entertained. Even otherwise, the parties knew their case fully well and had led their evidence, therefore, in my opinion, the plaintiff was not misled to lead his evidence and no miscarriage of justice has caused. 17. In nut-shell, the learned trial Court rightly held that the premises in question were proved to have been vacated by the defendant on 3.1.2001 and partly decreed the suit as aforesaid. These findings were upheld in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, which has rightly exercised its judicial discretion, which requires no interference. Since no substantial questions of law in view of the judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court do arise for its determination, the appeal merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 16. No other point is urged or pressed. 17. The matter stands disposed of.