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2012 DIGILAW 757 (KAR)

Pothedar Siddaiah, Since Deceased By His Lr. H. S. Ramesh v. Mahesh

2012-09-11

K.N.KESHAVANARAYANA

body2012
JUDGMENT K.N. KESHAVANARAYANA, J.—This appeal by the legal representative of the original complainant namely Pothedar Siddaiah in C.C. No. 694 of 2003 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) & JMFC, Mandya, is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.09.2005 passed in the said case acquitting the respondent/accused of the charge levelled against him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Act (for short, ‘N.I. Act’) 2. The original complainant filed private complaint alleging the offence punishable under Section 138 N.I. Act against the respondent inter alia contending that, the accused obtained hand-loan of Rs. 2,75,000/- from him for his contract work in the month of September 1999 agreeing to repay the same within three months; that on 25.01.2000, the accused issued a cheque drawn on Vishweshwaraiah Grameena Bank, Bharathinagar Branch, for Rs. 2,75,000/- in favour of the complainant towards discharge of loan due by him; when the said cheque was presented for encashment, the same was returned unpaid with Banker’s endorsement ‘Insufficient Funds’ and in spite of service of statutory notice, the accused has failed to pay the amount covered under the cheque. 3. The respondent/accused appeared before the learned Magistrate and pleaded not guilty for the accusation made against him. His defence was that he had not borrowed any money from the complainant and that the cheque in question was not issued to the complainant for discharge of any debt or liability due by him. It was his further defence that he had kept his bank cheque book in the motor cycle owned by him and few days prior to the purported date of the cheque, his motor cycle was stolen by some one from near the telephone exchange in Mandya. When the motor cycle was traced after three days, on verification, he noticed one of the cheque leaves found missing from the cheque book and later, he learnt that the son-in-law of the complainant, who had stolen the motor cycle, had removed the cheque leaf from the cheque book and the same has been misused by the complainant, though no amount was due to him by the accused. 4. During the pendency of the case, before the trial Court, the original complainant died and thereafter, his son-H.S. Ramesh came on record and continued the prosecution. 4. During the pendency of the case, before the trial Court, the original complainant died and thereafter, his son-H.S. Ramesh came on record and continued the prosecution. After recording the evidence led by the parties, the learned Magistrate by the judgment under appeal held that the cheque in question was delivered to the complainant in blank state to hold the same as security and not for discharge of any debt or liability, and that since the circumstances brought on record indicate that the complainant had no financial capacity to advance huge amount of Rs. 2,75,000/-, the complainant had no authority to fill-up the blank signed cheque of the accused for a sum of Rs. 2,75,000/-, therefore, the accused has satisfactorily rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. However, the learned Magistrate did not accept the defence theory that the cheque was stolen along with the motor cycle. In view of the finding recorded by the learned Magistrate, the respondent/accused was acquitted of the charge levelled against him. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the legal representative of the original complainant has presented this appeal. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the respondent/accused. Perused the records secured from the trial Court. 6. It is now fairly settled by catena of decisions of the Apex Court that the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act extends even to the existence of the debt and it is for the drawer of the said cheque to rebut the said presumption. Of course, it is also fairly well-settled that the accused is not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of proof regarding the defence plea is one of preponderance of probabilities. As noticed supra, the defence of the accused that he had kept the cheque book in the motor cycle and the said motor cycle along with the cheque book was stolen by some one and later he came to know about the theft of the cheque leaf from the cheque book only after tracing of the stolen motor cycle, has not been accepted by the trial Court. This finding has been recorded in the light of the suggestions put to PW.1 in the cross-examination with regard to the circumstances under which the cheque in question said to have been delivered. This finding has been recorded in the light of the suggestions put to PW.1 in the cross-examination with regard to the circumstances under which the cheque in question said to have been delivered. The learned Magistrate during the course of the judgment under appeal has extracted the suggestions put to PW.1 in the cross-examination and answer given by him. As per the said suggestions, when the complainant went near the house of the accused and demanded repayment of the loan, the accused apprehending that it would affect his reputation in the neighborhood and he will be humiliated in the society, promised the complainant to repay the amount borrowed by him and handed over the cheque to the complainant to keep the same till he repays the amount. The witness also admitted the suggestion that at the time of handing over the cheque, except the signature of the accused, the rest of the portions of the cheque were blank. These suggestions put to PW.1 in the cross-examination completely belies the story of the accused regarding theft of the cheque book along with the motor cycle. Of course, copy of the charge sheet in respect of the theft of his motor cycle was produced and marked as Ex.D1 and copy of the mahazar drawn regarding seizure of the motor cycle was also produced and marked as Ex.D3. The contents of these documents do not show that the accused in his complaint had indicated about his keeping the cheque book in the motor cycle nor the seizure mahazar indicates the presence of the cheque book in the motor cycle at the time of its seizure. Though the accused sought to contend that immediately thereafter he gave instructions to the Banker for stopping payment against the said cheque, the letter said to have submitted to the Bank by him was not produced before the Court. The endorsement made in the account ledger regarding ‘Stop Payment’ did not indicate as to on what date the said endorsement had been made. The cheque in question was returned unpaid not on account of ‘stop payment’ instruction by the drawer, but on account of ‘Insufficiency of Funds’. Therefore, the case of the accused regarding loss of cheque has been rightly rejected by the trial Court. 7. The cheque in question was returned unpaid not on account of ‘stop payment’ instruction by the drawer, but on account of ‘Insufficiency of Funds’. Therefore, the case of the accused regarding loss of cheque has been rightly rejected by the trial Court. 7. The suggestions put to PW.1 in the cross-examination as noticed supra would clearly indicate that there were monetary transactions between the complainant and the accused. If there was no monetary transaction, there was no occasion or reason for the complainant to come near the house of the accused and for the accused to hand-over the cheque. Thus, the aforesaid circumstances would clearly indicate that the accused had borrowed money from the complainant. Admittedly, the cheque in question relates to the account held by the accused with a Banker and it bears admittedly the signature of the accused. The apparent tenor of the cheque indicates the complainant as its drawee. The cheque in question marked as Ex.P.1 bears the date as 25.01.2000. Therefore, as per Clause (b) of Section 118 of the N.I. Act, it has to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn and made on 25.01.2000. The cheque is apparently drawn for a sum of Rs. 2,75,000/-. Therefore, the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that the cheque had been issued for discharge of debt due by the accused to the complainant has to be drawn. No doubt, PW.1 in his evidence has admitted that when the cheque was delivered by the accused, it was blank except the signature of the accused. However, Section 20 of the N.I. Act gives an implied authority to the holder of the cheque to fill-up the blanks. 8. According to Section 20 of the N.I. Act, where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in India and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete Negotiable Instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a Negotiable Instrument, for any amounts specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. Therefore, even if the accused had delivered the cheque in question in a blank state to the complainant, the complainant, as holder of the said instrument had implied authority to make it complete by filling the same to the extent of amount due to him. 9. As noticed supra, the learned Magistrate has recorded a finding that the complainant was not in a financial position to lend such a substantial amount of Rs. 2,75,000/- and therefore, he had no authority to fill-up the cheque for that amount. However, in this regard, the learned Magistrate has failed to consider various suggestions and answers elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1, which had greater bearing with regard to the financial capacity of the complainant. 10. As could be seen from the cross-examination of PW.1 it is clear that his father and his family owned large extent of agricultural land wherein they were growing sugarcane and they had supplied the sugarcane to the sugar factory and they were getting good lot of money every year. Therefore, having regard to the answers elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1, it cannot be said that the complainant had no financial capacity to advance a sum of Rs. 2,75,000/-. On the other hand, the evidence of PW.1 read as a whole indicates that the complainant was financially sound and he was in a financial position to advance loan of Rs. 2,75,000/-.Therefore, the learned Magistrate is not justified in holding that the complainant had no authority to fill-up the cheque to the tune of Rs. 2,75,000/-. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the cheque in question was delivered to the complainant to hold the same as security, it cannot be said that the cheque so issued was not for discharge of the debt to make its dishonour-an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 11. The Apex Court in the case of ICDS Limited vs. Beena Shabeer and another, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 426 has considered the expressions ‘cheque’ and ‘other liability’ occurring under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and has held that these expression leave no manner of doubt for whatever reason it may be, the liability under Section 138 of N.I. Act cannot be avoided in the event the cheque stands returned by the banker unpaid. 12. In the case of Dr. B.V. Sampathkumar vs. Dr. 12. In the case of Dr. B.V. Sampathkumar vs. Dr. K.G.V. Lakshmi, reported in ILR 2000 KAR 1730 this Court has held that, ‘A cheque whether issued for repayment of loan or as security makes little difference under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In the even of dishonour, legal consequences are samewithout distinction’. It is further held in the said decision that, ‘When once issue of cheque is proved, a presumption under Section 138 of the N.I. Act would arise with regard to the consideration’. Therefore, merely because PW.1 has admitted that the cheque was handed-over by the accused to the complainant to hold the same till the amount is repaid, would not make the issuance of cheque as the one issued for security. Even if it was intended to be held as security, as held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, its dishonour when presented for encashment would attract the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the learned Magistrate is not justified in acquitting the accused. 13. From the evidence on record it is clear that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption, on the other hand the tenor of cross-examination of PW.1 clearly indicates that he has admitted the existence of the debt and also issuance of cheque for discharge of the said debt. 14. Admittedly the complainant had complied with all other requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The statutory notice as required by law had been issued, which the accused had received and had sent a reply as per Ex.P.6.Therefore, the judgment of the learned Magistrate acquitting the respondent/accused is highly perverse and illegal and the same cannot be sustained. 15. In view of the fact that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act and on the other hand he has admitted the existence of the debt and also issuance of the cheque, and since the cheque in question had been dishonoured when presented for encashment and since the respondent/accused failed to pay the amount covered under the cheque within 15 days from the date of receipt of demand in writing made by the complainant, the respondent/accused is liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 16. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 16. Having regard to the fact that the loan transaction was of the year 2000, the prosecution was commenced in the year 2003 and the amount advanced was substantial in a sum of Rs. 2,75,000/-, it is just and proper to sentence the respondent/accused to pay fine equivalent to double the cheque amount having regard to the untenable stand taken by him.17) In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 24.09.2005 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) & JMFC, Mandya, in C.C. No. 694/2003 acquitting the respondent/accused is hereby set aside. The respondent/accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 5,50,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Fifty Thousand). 17. Out of fine amount of Rs. 5,50,000/- Rupees Five Lakhs Fifty Thousand), a sum of Rs. 5,25,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) shall be paid to the complainant as compensation.