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2012 DIGILAW 758 (ALL)

DINESH CHANDRA JOSHI v. MEERA DEVI

2012-03-29

SHASHI KANT GUPTA

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—By means of the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the validity and correctness of the common judgment and order dated 12.5.2006 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Court No. 1, Jhansi in SCC Revision Nos. 40 of 2003 (Dinesh Chand Joshi v. Smt. Meera Devi) and SCC Revision No. 47 of 2003 (Smt Meera Devi v. Dinesh Chand Joshi) arising out of judgment & decree dated 5.7.2003 passed by the Judge Small Causes, Jhansi in SCC Suit No. 107 of 1997, whereby the suit filed by the respondent landlady for arrears of rent and ejectment was decreed. 2. The facts of the case, as set out in the writ petition, are recapitulated as follows: 3. Mr. Moti Lal was, admittedly, the owner of house No. 129, inside Laxmi Gate, Jhansi. Chokhey Lal, father of the petitioner was a tenant of the disputed house and after the death of Chokhey Lal, the petitioner became the tenant. Moti Lal, the owner and landlord of the property in dispute died on 8.2.1982 leaving behind his widow Smt. Gomti Bai, daughter in- law Smt. Meera Devi (widow of predeceased son Ram Sewak who died in the year 1944) and two daughters namely Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori alias Kalla. 4. After the death of landlord, Moti Lal, on the basis of alleged will dated 4.2.1982, his widow Smt. Gomti Devi, daughter-in-law respondent/plaintiff Meera Devi and his two daughters Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori alias Kalla came in possession as co-landlords & co-owners of the disputed premises. 5. Smt. Gomati Bai and Smt. Meera Devi filed a declaratory suit No. 278 of 1986 seeking a declaration that the alleged will dated 4.2.1982 executed by late Moti Lal was forged and plaintiffs were the owners and in possession of the properties mentioned in the Schedule alongwith other heirs namely Smt. Deva & Smt. Brij Kishori alias Kalla, daughters of the deceased Moti Lal. It was further pleaded in the said suit that the defendant No. 1 (Pramod Kumar Pandey) has no right to interfere in plaintiff’s possession and other properties in any manner. The said suit was decreed on 27.3.2001 holding the plaintiff’s (Smt. Gomti Devi and Smt. Meera Devi) alongwith Smt. Deva and Brij Kishore, who were also the legal heirs of deceased Moti Lal, to be co owners of the disputed premises. 6. The said suit was decreed on 27.3.2001 holding the plaintiff’s (Smt. Gomti Devi and Smt. Meera Devi) alongwith Smt. Deva and Brij Kishore, who were also the legal heirs of deceased Moti Lal, to be co owners of the disputed premises. 6. The father of the petitioner died in the year 1988 and after his death the petitioner, at the instructions of Smt. Gomati Bai, wife of erstwhile landlord Moti Lal, started paying her rent. Smt. Gomti Bai also died on 14.9.1991 leaving behind the plaintiff Meera Devi and her two daughters namely Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori as her heirs and legal representatives. 7. Smt. Meera Devi (daughter -in- law of late Smt. Gomati Bai), claiming herself to be the sole and exclusive owner and landlady of the house in question, sent a notice dated 11.11.1997 under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act to the petitioner demanding rent since 15.9.1991 and terminating his tenancy. The said notice was served upon the petitioner on 15.11.1997. 8. On 18.11.1997 the petitioner sent a reply to the aforementioned notice of the respondent wherein, while referring to the pending declaratory suit No. 278/86, it sought clarification as to how she became the sole owner and landlady of the disputed house in the presence of Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori (daughters of Moti Lal) and also requested therein to inform Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori, the daughters of Moti Lal, to issue written instructions within a week to him for paying rent to the respondent Smt. Meera Devi alone failing which the rent would be deposited in the Court. Neither any proof of being a sole owner/landlord nor “ no objection” or any instructions to pay rent to Smt. Meera Devi (Plaintiff) were issued by Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori. 9. On not receiving any response/ clarification, as indicated herein above, from the respondent, on 8.12.1997, the petitioner deposited the entire rent due since 15.9.1991 in Court under Section 30(2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (for short the “ Act”) as bona-fide doubt and dispute (It is noteworthy that the declaratory Suit No. 278/86 filed by the plaintiff and Gomti Devi was pending on the relevant date) had arisen as to the person who was entitled to receive any rent in respect of the disputed premises. 10. Subsequently, on 16.12. 10. Subsequently, on 16.12. 1997 the respondent Smt. Meera Devi, claiming herself to be the sole owner and landlady of the property in dispute filed a suit (No. 107/1997) against the petitioner for arrears of rent and ejectment. Prayer for eviction of the petitioner was also sought on the ground of denial of title of the plaintiff. 11. The petitioner contested the said suit by filing its written statement, wherein he denied and disputed the allegations made in the said plaint. It was, inter alia, pleaded that after the death of the erstwhile landlord Moti Lal, on the basis of Will dated 4.2.1982, his wife Smt. Gomti Bai and the respondent alongwith his two daughters namely Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori alias Kalla, came in possession as co-owners and landlords of the disputed premises and at the instructions of Smt. Gomti Bai, the the petitioner was paying rent to her and after her death, there being a bona-fide doubt as to who was entitled to receive the rent, he started depositing the rent under Section 30(2) of the Act. Reference to the pendency of the Declaratory Suit No. 278/86 filed by the plaintiff and Gomti Devi was also made. 12. After considering the material available on record, the trial Court held the deposit under Section 30 (2) of the Act to be valid. However, by its judgment and order dated 5.7.2003 decreed the suit on the ground of denial of title of the plaintiff. 13. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the petitioner as well as the respondent both filed two separate revisions, being SCC Revision No. 40 of 2003 (Dinesh Chand Joshi v. Smt. Meera Devi) and SCC Revision No. 47 of 2003 (Smt Meera Devi v. Dinesh Chand Joshi) before the revisional Court. The revisional Court dismissed the revision of the petitioner and allowed the revision of the respondent landlady modifying the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by holding that the deposit of arrears of rent by the petitioner under Section 30(2) of the Act was invalid and there was denial of title of the plaintiff by the petitioner. Hence the present writ petition. 14. Hence the present writ petition. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below are illegal, arbitrary and are based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter and have not considered the evidence on record in the right perspective. He further submitted that the findings record by the Courts below with regard to deposit of rent under Section 30(2) of the Act and denial of title are illegal and unsustainable. 15. It was further submitted that, in fact, at no point of time, the petitioner denied the title of the respondent. It was further submitted that in the declaratory suit (NO. 278/86) filed by the respondent as well as her mother -in- law Smt. Gomti Bai, it was clearly stated, inter alia, in para 7 of the plaint “that after the death of Moti Lal Dixit, the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 (Smt. Deva and Smt.Brij Kishori alias Kalla) alongwith Gomti Bai and Meera Devi also succeeded to the share of Moti Lal Dixit in the suit properties as mentioned in the Schedule and they are in possession thereof. “ Since the said declaratory suit was pending before the Court below, a clarification was sought by the petitioner as to how the respondent became the sole owner of the property in dispute requesting Meera Devi to provide “no objection” and instructions from Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori, daughters of erstwhile owner/landlord Moti Lal to pay rent to the plaintiff Meera Devi. 16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent landlady has supported the impugned orders passed by the Courts below and submitted that the findings recorded by the Courts below are neither perverse nor based on any extraneous consideration and irrelevant material. The impugned orders have been passed in accordance with law. He further submits that the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the deposit of arrears of rent by the petitioner under Section 30(2) of the Act was not a valid deposit and there was a denial of title by the petitioner. 17. Heard Mr. K. N. Tripathi, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. C. D. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent landlady and perused the record. 18. 17. Heard Mr. K. N. Tripathi, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. C. D. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent landlady and perused the record. 18. In the present case mainly two questions arise for consideration as to whether the petitioner denied the title of the respondent and whether the deposit of rent under Section 30(2) of the Act was a valid deposit. 19. In order to appreciate the relationships of the parties, at this stage, the pedigree of the family of the respondent, is reproduced as under: 20. Admittedly late Moti Lal was the owner of the disputed property. He died on 8.2.1982 leaving behind his wife Smt. Gomti Bai and widow daughter- in- law Smt. Meera Devi (respondent) and two daughters namely Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori alias kalla. After the death of Moti Lal the petitioner started paying rent to his widow Smt. Gomti Bai who had shown the petitioner a Will dated 4.2.1982 left by Moti Lal after his death. According to the alleged will some property of late Moti Lal was also given to his sister’s son namely Pramod Kumar Pandey and, therefore, a declaratory suit (No. 278 of 1986) was filed by Smt. Gomati Bai and the respondent for declaring the alleged will dated 4.2.1982 to be null and void. In the said suit the two daughters of late Moti Lal, namely Smt Deva and Brij Kishori alias Kalla were also impleaded as defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It was further mentioned in the said suit that the plaintiffs were the owners and in possession of the properties alongwith Smt. Deva and Brij Kishore mentioned in the Schedule, and the defendant No. 1 (Pramod Kumar Pandey) had no right to interfere in the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession in any manner whatsoever. 21. Thus, in the plaint filed in the declaratory suit, it was admitted by the plaintiff/respondent and Gomti Bai that Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishore alias Kalla were also the co owners of the property after the death of Moti Lal. Subsequently, by judgment and order dated 27.3.2001 the said declaratory suit (No. 278/1986) was decreed in favour of the plaintiff respondent holding the alleged will to be null and void and further held therein that the plaintiffs including defendant Nos. Subsequently, by judgment and order dated 27.3.2001 the said declaratory suit (No. 278/1986) was decreed in favour of the plaintiff respondent holding the alleged will to be null and void and further held therein that the plaintiffs including defendant Nos. 2 and 3 namely Smt. Brij Kishori alias Kalla and Smt Deva were the owners and in possession of the properties left by late Moti Lal Dixit. 22. Admittedly, after the death of Moti Lal, the rent was being paid to his widow Smt. Gomti Bai and no objection was ever raised on this account by any of the legal heirs. It was only after the death of Smt. Gomti Bai, the question arose as to who was entitled to receive the rent. The respondent claiming herself to be the sole owner and landlady of the disputed property, sent a notice on 11.11.1997 which was replied to by the petitioner. In the said reply while referring to the declaratory suit No. 278/86 filed by the plaintiff and Smt. Gomti Bai it was stated therein that the respondent Meera Devi as well as Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori (daughters of Moti Lal and Gomti Bai) are also the co-owners/co-landlords of the premises in dispute and by means of the said reply, the petitioner also sought clarification and proof as to how the respondent became the sole owner/landlord of the property in dispute and also requested the plaintiff to instruct Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori to give ‘no objection’ and issue instructions within a week to pay rent to the respondent Meera Devi alone, otherwise he would be left with no option but to deposit the rent in the Court. Neither any proof of being the sole owner/landlord nor any “No objection” on behalf of Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori was given by the respondent Meera Devi. Thus, in these circumstances, the petitioner started depositing the rent in the Court under Section 30(2) of the Act as there was no other option left to the petitioner. 23. Neither any proof of being the sole owner/landlord nor any “No objection” on behalf of Smt. Deva and Smt. Brij Kishori was given by the respondent Meera Devi. Thus, in these circumstances, the petitioner started depositing the rent in the Court under Section 30(2) of the Act as there was no other option left to the petitioner. 23. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 30(2) of the Act which runs as under: 30(2) Where any bona-fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent. “ 24. The aforesaid provision clearly stipulates that where any bona-fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent. 25. Thus, in view of the aforesaid provisions, the petitioner had rightly deposited the rent in the Court under Section 30(2) of the Act as bona-fide doubt had arisen as to the person who was entitled to receive rent in respect of the building in dispute. It is also noteworthy that the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment was filed within a month after receiving a reply to the notice issued under Section 106 of the T. P. Act by the respondent. 26. A bare perusal of the notice issued by the respondent and the reply filed by the petitioner clearly indicates that at no point of time the petitioner ever denied to pay the rent to the plaintiff-respondent. 26. A bare perusal of the notice issued by the respondent and the reply filed by the petitioner clearly indicates that at no point of time the petitioner ever denied to pay the rent to the plaintiff-respondent. Simply a clarification was sought from the respondent to show as to how she became sole owner and landlady of the property in dispute during the pendency of a declaratory suit which was filed by the respondent and his mother in law and also requested the plaintiff-respondent to instruct Smt. Deva and Brij kishori to give ‘no objection’ and issue instructions to pay rent to Meera Devi alone and also made reference to the pending suit for seeking declaration. However neither any clarification nor no objection on behalf of Smt. Deva and Brij Kishori was given by the respondent. Therefore, in these circumstances, bona-fide doubt arose as to who was entitled to receive rent as the respondent failed to give any proof as to how she became the sole owner and landlady of the property in dispute. It is also noteworthy that at no point of time the petitioner had ever refused to pay rent or denied the title of the plaintiff respondent after the death of Gomti Bai but since there was a bona-fide doubt and dispute regarding ownership of the property in dispute, a clarification was sought by the petitioner. It is also notable that that there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and therefore, after the death of Gomti Bai, the petitioner was fully justified to seek clarification which does not amount to denial of title and there was no denial of the title of landlady by the petitioner during the continuation of his tenancy. 27. In the case of Ashok Kumar and others v. Ist A.D.J. Bijnor and others, 2006(2) ARC 176, it was held by this Court that questioning the derivative title does not amount to denial of the title. 28. In the case of Smt. Madhu Mittal v. Vth A.D.J. Ghaziabad, 2008 (70) ALR 6771, this Court, in para 5, inter alia, held as follows: “5. Accordingly, it could not be said that through agreement dispute had been settled in between father and daughter or doubt in the mind of the tenant with regard to the right of the person to collect rent had been cleared. Accordingly, it could not be said that through agreement dispute had been settled in between father and daughter or doubt in the mind of the tenant with regard to the right of the person to collect rent had been cleared. Section 30(2) of the Act uses two words ‘doubt’ and ‘dispute’. Even if there is no real dispute still if the situation is such it gives rise to a doubt in the mind of the tenant then he is entitled to deposit the rent under Section 3(2) of the Act. After receipt of notice of demand of rent tenants is not entitled to continue to deposit rent under Section 30(1) of the Act where rent is deposited on the allegation of refusal of the landlord to accept the rent. However, if the deposit is under Section 30(2) of the Act then rent may continued to be deposited until dispute is resolved or doubt is cleared. In case in the two notices Smt. Madhu Mittal had also joined alongwith his father Charan Singh then doubt would have stood cleared. Even according to the order of Munsif passed in proceeding under Section 30(2) of the Act tenant was entitled to deposit the rent until through registered notice mutual consent was intimated. This mutual consent meant consent in between Charan Singh and his daughter Smt. Sumar Kaura.” 29. In the case of Kamleshwar Singh Srivastava v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1987 (1) ARC 1, this Court in paras 6 and 7, inter alia, held as follows: “6. ....It is true that on landlord’s serving notice of demand on a tenant who may be in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and on the tenant’s failure to tender the rent to the landlord within one month from the service of the notice the tenant is liable to eviction, but in the instant case having regard to the special facts and circumstances available on the record we do not find that the appellant failed to tender the rent to the landlords or that he was in arrear for a period of more than four months. He was all along ready to pay and since the landlords did not give any reply to his notice dated 6.9.1982 he was justified in depositing the arrear in the Munsif’s Court. He was all along ready to pay and since the landlords did not give any reply to his notice dated 6.9.1982 he was justified in depositing the arrear in the Munsif’s Court. Since the deposit was made it must be deemed that the appellant had tendered rent to the landlords as contemplated by Section 13(6) of the Act. In this view the High Court as well as the Courts below committed error in holding that the appellant had failed to pay arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and on that ground he was liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute. 7.....Where there is a bona fide dispute regarding the landlord’s right to receive rent on account of there being several claimants or if the landlord refuses to accept the rent without there being any justification for the same, the tenant would be entitled to take proceeding under Section 30 of the Act and deposit the rent in Court thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent to the landlord, consequently he would be relieved of his liability of eviction. It does not however follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him.” 30. In the case of Nanhey Mian v. Sk. Mohd. Yusuf, 1965 ALJ 321, this Court had held that if the landlord transfers the property in the accommodation without informing the tenant, and the transferee demands rent from him, the tenant is entitled to demand clear proof of title from the transferee before he can be asked to stop paying rent to the old landlord. A mere assertion by the transferee that he is the landlord creates no obligation on the tenant to recognise him and repudiate his obligation to the old landlord. The tenant is entitled to ignore a bare assertion without proof as it would expose him to the risk of paying the wrong person and refusing to pay the right person. 31. In the case of Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Sinhga v. Baraboni Goal Concern Ltd., AIR 1987 PC 251, it was held that Section 116 of Evidence Act applies against lessee, assignee of term, sub -lessee or licensee and this principle only applies to title of landlord who let the tenant in as distinct from person claiming to be reversioner. 32. In the case of Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Sinhga v. Baraboni Goal Concern Ltd., AIR 1987 PC 251, it was held that Section 116 of Evidence Act applies against lessee, assignee of term, sub -lessee or licensee and this principle only applies to title of landlord who let the tenant in as distinct from person claiming to be reversioner. 32. The Apex Court in the case of C. Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan, AIR 2000 SC 568 , inter alia, held in para 18 as under: “18. Adverting to the facts of this case, it has been noted above that the appellant derived his title to the premises under release deed executed by his father, late Chockalingam. The respondents became tenants of late Chockalingam long prior to his execution of the release deed Exhibit P-4 in favour of the appellant. It is a common ground that the appellant had not intimated the respondents that he became owner of the premises under the release deed. There is also nothing on record to show that after execution of the release deed, the appellant has got fresh lease deeds executed in his favour. However, after the demise of Chockalingam, the respondents started paying the rent to the appellant. Indeed, the High Court has also referred to the evidence of the appellant in which he admitted that the respondents did not deny that he was the landlord when depositing the rent in the Court and that they were paying the rent to him. When a notice was issued by the appellant to the respondents seeking eviction of the premises for its demolition and reconstruction, the respondents replied that he was not the absolute owner of the property since late Chockalingam had also left behind him three daughters and a widow. In their counters, the respondents reiterated the said plea and added that they were unaware of the execution of release deed in favour of the appellant by late Chockalingam and that they had been paying monthly rent to him and that the denial of absolute title of the property was not wilful and mala fide, as alleged in the petitions. In their counters, the respondents reiterated the said plea and added that they were unaware of the execution of release deed in favour of the appellant by late Chockalingam and that they had been paying monthly rent to him and that the denial of absolute title of the property was not wilful and mala fide, as alleged in the petitions. Now, in this background, when we consider the conduct of the respondents that from the date of the said reply notice (Exhibit P- 18) the respondents neither denied the relationship of landlord and tenant nor did they stop paying rent to the appellant nor did they set up any claim adverse to title or interest of the appellant in themselves or a third party and that after coming to know of the said release deed in favour of the appellant they did not persist in their plea that he was a co-owner, it cannot be said that the respondents denied the title of the appellant, much less can it be said that such a denial was not bona fide.” 33. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, AIR 1965 SC 1923 , held that the disclaimer or the repudiation of the landlord’s title must, however, be clear and unequivocal and made to the knowledge of the landlord. (emphasis supplied) 34. The Apex Court in the case of Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002)3 SC 375, inter alia, held in paras 16 and 17 as under: 16. “After the creation of the tenancy if the title of landlord is transferred or devolves upon a third person the tenant is not estopped from denying such title. However, if the tenant having been apprised of the transfer, assignment or devolution of rights acknowledges the title of transferee either expressly or by paying rent to him, the rule of estoppel once again comes into operation for it is unjust to allow tenant to approbate and reprobate and so long as the tenant enjoys everything which his lease purports to grant how does it concern him what the title of the lessor is [See Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge and others, (1988) 3 SCC 137 ]. A denial of title which falls foul of the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of Evidence Act is considered in law a malicious act on the part of the tenant as it is detrimental to the interest of the landlord and does no good to the lessee himself. However, it has to be borne in mind that since the consequences of applying the rule of determination by forfeiture of tenancy as a result of denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant are very serious, the denial or disclaimer must be in clear and unequivocal terms (See __ Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by Lrs., (1989) 4 SCC 732 , Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, (1989) 1 SCC 552 and Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). We may quote with advantage the law as stated by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Hatimullah and others v. Mahamad Abju Choudhury, AIR 1928 Cal 312. It was held, “the principle of forfeiture by disclaimer is that where the tenant denies the landlord’s title to recover rent from him bona fide on the ground of seeking information of such title or having such title established in a Court of law in order to protect himself, he is not to be charged with disclaiming the landlord’s title. But where the disclaimer is done not with this object but with an express repudiation of the tenancy under the landlord, it would operate as forfeiture”. 17. In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by Rent Control Law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) above said. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability.” 35. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlady, relying upon the principles laid down in the case of Brigunath Sahai v. District Judge, Ballia and others, 1995(1) ARC 304, submitted that denying respondent’s title as a landlady by stating that the respondent is not the sole owner/ landlady of the disputed premises amounts to denial of title of the respondent and the mere fact that the rent was deposited by the tenant under Section 30(2) of the Act would be of no help and as such the Courts below have rightly passed the impugned orders and the findings recorded by the Courts below are perfectly just and legal and are supported by cogent and convincing reasons and the same do not require any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 36. I am afraid, the ratio of the aforementioned decision in the case of Brigunath Sahai (supra) has no bearing to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the said decision is not applicable. 37. 36. I am afraid, the ratio of the aforementioned decision in the case of Brigunath Sahai (supra) has no bearing to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the said decision is not applicable. 37. The aforesaid decision in the case of Brigunath Sahai (supra) emphasizes that if the tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Rent Control Act, he must strictly comply with the requirements and if any condition precedent is required to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, the tenant must strictly comply with that condition failing which he cannot take advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision. In the present case the petitioner, at no point of time, had ever denied the title of the respondent, he had simply sought a clarification to clear his doubts. Moreso, there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and the respondent. If the tenant with the aim of protecting himself or of earning a protection available under rent control law, without disclaiming the character of his own possession of the tenanted premises as a tenant, makes a bona fide demand from the landlord to his ownership and puts forth a question as to how the title came to be vested in the landlord, such demand and question cannot be said to be a denial of landlord’s title or a disclaimer of the tenancy. 38. The Apex Court in Raja Mohammad (supra) has further emphasized that the disclaimer or the repudiation of the landlord’s title must, however, be clear and unequivocal and made to the knowledge of the landlord. Here in the present case no such unequivocal denial was ever made by the tenant either in his written statement or in the reply to the notice of the landlady, wherein he had simply sought a clarification that as to how she became the sole owner/ landlady during the pendency of declaratory suit which was filed by the widow of the original tenant alongwith respondent. 39. The findings recorded by the Courts below are patently illegal and erroneous and are not supported by any cogent and convincing reasons. The revisional Court while upholding the order passed by the trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations. The impugned order is based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter. 40. The revisional Court while upholding the order passed by the trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations. The impugned order is based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter. 40. The reasons assigned by the revisional Court are superficial. It has adopted a very casual approach resulting in a cryptic, abrupt and erroneous conclusion. The impugned orders passed by the Courts below, looking from any angle, cannot stand the scrutiny of law. The order passed by the revisional Court is totally illegal and against the settled provisions of law. 41. In view of what has been discussed, herein above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.5.2006 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Court No. 1, Jhansi in SCC Revision No. 40 of 2003 (Dinesh Chand Joshi v. Smt. Meera Devi), SCC Revision No. 47 of 2003 (Smt Meera Devi v. Dinesh Chand Joshi) and order dated 5.7.2003 passed by Judge Small Causes, Jhansi in SCC Suit No. 107 of 1997, are hereby quashed. ——————