Judgment Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 15.12.2001, passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 12-G/XIII-2000. 2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiff’ for the sake of convenience) has filed a suit for possession and permanent prohibitory injunction against appellant-defendant (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant’ for the sake of convenience). According to the plaintiff, he alongwith the defendant is the son of one Shri Kanshi Ram, R/o Village Bharwara, who was owing land measuring 0-70-85 hectares, situate in Muhal Barwara, Tehsil Dehra (H.P.). According to the plaintiff, the defendant has prevailed upon Shri Kanshi Ram and by exercising his undue influence and coercion, got the entire suit land gifted in his favour vide gift deed, dated 10.02.1983. According to him, the suit land in the hands of his father, Shri Kanshi Ram was ancestral property and parties were governed by the custom in matters of alienation and succession. Under the custom, Shri Kanshi Ram had no right to gift away his ancestral property without legal necessity and consideration to the exclusion of and without the consent of his lineal descendants. According to him, the gift deed, dated 10.02.1983 was without legal necessity and with consideration. According to him, he being the son of Shri Kanshi Ram, was entitled to succeed to 1/3 share in the suit land and the gift deed being illegal, does not effect his right to succeed to the property of deceased Shri Kanshi Ram. According to him, the mutation No. 33, whereby the suit land has been mutated in favour of the defendant on the basis of impugned gift deed, was wrong, illegal, null and void. He had earlier filed a Civil Suit bearing No. 223/83 for declaration, challenging the validity of the gift. However, the same was withdrawn with liberty to institute fresh suit, which was granted subject to costs of `50/-. 3. The defendant has contested the suit. According to him, he was owner in possession of the suit land on the basis of gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, executed by Shri Kanshi Ram in his favour. According to him, the suit filed by the plaintiff challenging the gift deed was withdrawn by him. 3. The defendant has contested the suit. According to him, he was owner in possession of the suit land on the basis of gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, executed by Shri Kanshi Ram in his favour. According to him, the suit filed by the plaintiff challenging the gift deed was withdrawn by him. According to him, the plaintiff was not son of Shri Kanshi Ram and, thus, he has no locus standi to challenge the gift deed in his favour. He has denied that the gift deed was executed by Shri Kanshi Ram in his favour as a result of undue influence or coercion. He has also denied that the suit land is an ancestral property or that the parties are governed by custom in matters of alienation and succession. 4. The replication was filed by the plaintiff. The Learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. framed the issues on 14.03.1990. The suit was decreed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. on 30.11.1999 by holding that gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, Ex. DW-1/A, executed by Shri Kanshi Ram in favour of the defendant as wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of 1/3 share therein, as claimed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, a decree for joint possession of 1/3 share in the suit land was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant with costs. The defendant preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. He dismissed the same on 15.12.2001. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 5. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 03.01.2003: “1. Whether the Ld. Courts below have not appreciated that the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondents was not within the prescribed limitation inasmuch as plaintiff in the suit for possession had challenged the gift deed being a voidable document as also the consequent mutation order wherein correction of revenue record was necessary before granting him the relief of possession and for such suit, the limitation prescribed under Article 100 of the Limitation Act was 1 year whereas the present suit was filed much beyond prescribed period of limitation. 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs was liable to be dismissed being not maintainable since a duly registered gift deed was executed by late Sh. 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs was liable to be dismissed being not maintainable since a duly registered gift deed was executed by late Sh. Kanshi Ram in favour of the defendant, regular title suit with consequential relief of possession was required to be filed under law? 3. When the plaintiff in the plaint had challenged the legality of gift deed and consequent mutation order, whether suit for declaration of title (under Specific Relief Act) was required to be filed and unless the gift deed was cancelled and the consequent mutation order was set aside, decree of possession could be granted by the court in favour of plaintiff. 4. Whether the land in dispute was ancestral and the parties to lis were governed by Kangra custom? What is the mode and manner of proof of custom? 6. Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not within the period of limitation. According to him, the gift deed, dated 10.02.1983 was duly executed. He also argued that till the gift deed was cancelled and the consequent mutation order was set aside, the decree of possession could not be granted by the Court. He also argued that the suit land was not ancestral and it was also not governed by Kangra custom. 7. Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel for the 8. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence. 9. The plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, his mother has contracted marriage with Shri Kanshi Ram after the death of her previous husband and gave birth to him. He has also proved on record two registered Wills, dated 06.07.1978 (Ex. PW-2/A) and dated 23.07.1981 (Ex. PW-2/B), executed by Shri Kanshi Ram in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant. In both these Wills, Sh. Kanshi Ram has shown the plaintiff as his son. He has also deposed that he was admitted in the school by Shri Kanshi Ram. 10. The defendant has appeared as DW-1. He has placed strong reliance on the written statement, Ex. DW-1/E filed by Shri Kanshi Ram in previous suit No. 223 of 1983, in which he has denied that the plaintiff was his son. He has also deposed that he was admitted in the school by Shri Kanshi Ram. 10. The defendant has appeared as DW-1. He has placed strong reliance on the written statement, Ex. DW-1/E filed by Shri Kanshi Ram in previous suit No. 223 of 1983, in which he has denied that the plaintiff was his son. In his written statement, Kanshi Ram has admitted that mother of the plaintiff lived jointly with him and plaintiff was conceived and born during this period. He has also admitted that he has given his name to the plaintiff in order to save the honour of the family. 11. It has come on the record that Smt. Sartajo has become widow in the year 1934. She lived with Shri Kanshi Ram. There is ample evidence on record to establish that plaintiff’s mother has contracted customary marriage with Shri Kanshi Ram and he was born out of this wedlock. The learned trial Court in paragraph No. 21 of the judgment has held as under: respondent has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. “21. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the defendant has not disputed that the plaintiff has proved that the suit land in the hands of Shri Kanshi Ram was ancestral property. He has, however, contended that the plaintiff has neither pleaded the custom nor proved the same in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 57 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief in this case.” 12. Plaintiff has placed strong reliance on the judgment rendered by this Court in Ratesh Kumar Vs. Basudev Singh Pathania 1994(3) SLJ 1847. The learned Single Judge has held that the Brahmins of Kangra District are governed by Agricultural custom. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “9. It is correct that ordinary rule is that all customs, general or otherwise, have to be proved as envisaged under Section 57 of the Evidence Act. But it a custom has been repeatedly recognized by courts, it become law of the law and court can take judicial notice of it without formal proof. (Please see: Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahipati Gangadara Rama Rao Bahadur Vs. Raja of Pittapur, AIR 1918 Privy Council 81 and Ujagar Singh Vs. Mst Jeo, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1041. But it a custom has been repeatedly recognized by courts, it become law of the law and court can take judicial notice of it without formal proof. (Please see: Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahipati Gangadara Rama Rao Bahadur Vs. Raja of Pittapur, AIR 1918 Privy Council 81 and Ujagar Singh Vs. Mst Jeo, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1041. Applying this principle, the Court can take judicial notice that Brahamins of District Kangra are governed by agricultural custom as held in Mt. Chinto and others Vs. Thebu and others, AIR 1935 Lahore 985 and Tara Mani and others Vs. Mt. Kishen Devi, AIR 1940 Lahore 33.” 13. Learned trial Court has also taken into consideration the customary law of Kangra District compiled by L. Middleton, Vol. XXVIII. In this compilation, the gift has been dealt with under question No. 86. According to this, a man can make a gift of his self acquired property and movable property to anyone he likes, while as to ancestral immovable property, he can only give a small share according to his means to a relation or others in charity or for religious purpose. Thus, according to Kangra custom, the Karta of the family was not completely barred from making gift of his ancestral property. 14. However, in the present case, Shri Kanshi Ram has bequeathed his entire ancestral property in his hands in favour of the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff vide gift deed, dated 10.02.1983 (Ex. DW-1/A). The gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, whereby the entire ancestral property has been bequeathed in favour of the defendant was not valid and was not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of 1/3 share, claimed by him. The plaintiff has proved the Kangra custom. 15. Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the gift deed was executed in favour of the defendant on 10.02.1983 and the present suit was filed on 07.05.1987. However, the fact of the matter is that previously, the plaintiff has instituted a Civil Suit bearing No. 223/84, which was permitted to be withdrawn by the learned trial Court on 24.05.1986. The order dated, 24.05.1986 reads thus: “24.5.1986 Present:-Sh. S.S. Thakur, Adv. Counsel for the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 with counsel Shri H.C. Uppal, Advocate. However, the fact of the matter is that previously, the plaintiff has instituted a Civil Suit bearing No. 223/84, which was permitted to be withdrawn by the learned trial Court on 24.05.1986. The order dated, 24.05.1986 reads thus: “24.5.1986 Present:-Sh. S.S. Thakur, Adv. Counsel for the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 with counsel Shri H.C. Uppal, Advocate. The counsel for the plaintiff have given statement withdrawing the suit and praying for file a fresh suit for possession on the same cause of action. I have gone through the record. Since the defendant No. 2 has expired the suit for declaration as prayed for in the suit cannot proceed as the prayer has been rendered infructuous. Hence the plaintiff is allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty to file fresh suit for possession on the same cause of action subject to cost of Rs.50/-. Be consigned. Announced: sd/-24.5.1986. SJIC, Dehra. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled for exclusion of time for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. The permission granted to the plaintiff to withdraw the previous suit was legal and valid. Thus, the suit filed by the plaintiff was within limitation. The plaintiff has filed the suit for possession by assailing the gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, Ex. DW-1/A. Shri Kanshi Ram could not bequeath his entire ancestral property in favour of the defendant alone. He could, as per the custom prevailing in the area, gift a small portion of the property. The Courts below have rightly held that the gift deed, dated 10.02.1983, Ex. DW-1/A by Shri Kanshi Ram in favour of the defendant was null and void only to the extent of 1/3 share, claimed by the plaintiff. In view of this, there is no illegality in the judgment passed by the Courts below, whereby a decree for joint possession of 1/3 share in the suit land was passed in favour of the plaintiff. 16. The defendant has also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing C.M.P. No. 279 of 2012 for leading additional evidence. The reply to the same has been filed by the plaintiff. These documents were available with the defendant at the time of institution of the suit by the plaintiff. There are no cogent reasons assigned by the defendant why these documents were not placed/proved before the learned trial Court. The reply to the same has been filed by the plaintiff. These documents were available with the defendant at the time of institution of the suit by the plaintiff. There are no cogent reasons assigned by the defendant why these documents were not placed/proved before the learned trial Court. The purpose of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to fill up the lacunae, though it is settled law that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be preferred at any stage of the proceedings. As noticed above, it has come in paragraph No. 21 of the trial Court judgment that the defendant has not disputed that the suit property was ancestral. 17. It is settled law by now that party guilty of remissness in not producing evidence in trial court, cannot be allowed to produce it in appellate court. There must be satisfactory reasons for non-production of the evidence in trial court seeking production thereof in appellate court. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Union of India versus Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 have held as under: “36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra) ]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the nonproduction of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the nonproduction of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice – delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285 ; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 976 SC 2403, while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of his Court held as under: “We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added). A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: “It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence….. The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (Emphasis added) In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration : 38. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ).” The substantial questions of law raised in the Regular Second Appeal are answered accordingly. 18. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in this Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed, so also C.M.P. No. 279 of 2012. No costs.