Judgment Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. The contesting defendants are the appellants against this judgment of reversal. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as plaintiffs filed a title suit being Title Suit No.210 of 1981 in the Court of learned Munsif, 3rd Court at Howrah, against the present appellants as defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and also against proforma respondents as defendant Nos. 7 to 9 for recovery of possession of the suit premises by evicting the defendants’ licensees on revocation of the licence and also for damages. The plaintiffs’ case, in short, is that their father Md. Hanif took settlement of the suit land in thika tenancy from the then landlord and constructed a house thereupon having holding No.30/4, Munshi Noor Mohammad Lane, P. S. Howrah. In 1952, the then landlord filed a case bearing No.117 of 1952 under Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act praying for eviction of Md. Hanif form the suit land. During pendency of the suit, Md. Hanif died in 1954 leaving behind his illiterate widow Ketaban Bibi, two minor sons and two daughters. Ketaban Bibi, being helpless approached Hanif’s brother Md. Jahur for assistance and inducted Md. Jahur as licensee in respect of three rooms in the suit holding in 1954. Md. Jahur started a hotel in one of the rooms and also a pan shop in another room. Jahur agreed to pay damages to Ketaban Bibi for use and occupation of the rooms. In 1960, the case initiated by the landlord of Md. Hanif terminated. Then Ketaban Bibi claimed damages from Jahur for use and occupation of those rooms but he declined to make payment. Jahur, on the other hand, inducted his another brother Md. Ibrahim in another room of the suit holding. In 1965, Ibrahim brought a partition suit being Title Suit No.48 of 1965 asking for partition of the suit holding alleging that he and other brothers were co-sharers of the suit holding. It was dismissed by the trial court. Both Ibrahim and Jahur preferred separate appeals against said judgment and decree of dismissal of the partition suit. Both the appeals were heard analogously and were dismissed. Jahur preferred a second appeal which also ended in dismissal. In the meantime, Ibrahim died on 3rd August,9 1977 laving behind the defendant Nos. 7 to 9 as his heirs. Subsequently, Jahur also died leaving behind defendant Nos. 1 to 6 as his heirs. Both the appeals were heard analogously and were dismissed. Jahur preferred a second appeal which also ended in dismissal. In the meantime, Ibrahim died on 3rd August,9 1977 laving behind the defendant Nos. 7 to 9 as his heirs. Subsequently, Jahur also died leaving behind defendant Nos. 1 to 6 as his heirs. On 8th June, 1981 the plaintiffs revoked the licence but in spite of such revocation, defendants did not vacate the suit premises. Hence was the suit. Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 contested the suit by filing a joint written statement denying material allegations of the plaint. They contended inter alia that they are possessing the suit property adversely from the time of their predecessor Jahur since 1927 and that all alone Jahur resided there and carried on business. After contested hearing learned trial court dismissed the suit without cost against defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and ex parte without cost against the rest by the judgment dated 30th October, 1990. The plaintiffs appellants preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No.276 of 1990 which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Howrah by the judgment dated 21st September, 1996. By the impugned judgment learned Lower Appellate Court reversed the judgement and decree of the learned Trial Court and passed a decree for recovery of possession of the suit property by evicting the defendants therefrom. The contesting defendants being aggrieved have filed this second appeal. Learned counsel of the parties argued on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court substantially erred in law by holding the defendants as trespassers in the suit premises overlooking the admissions of the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest in various Court documents wherein they recognized the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant as tenants.” From the submissions of learned counsels of the parties as well as from the materials on record the following facts are found to be admitted:- (1) The settlement of the suit land in Thika Tenancy from the then landlord was in the name of Md. Hanif, plaintiff’s predecessor. (2) A structure was constructed thereupon being holding No.30/4, Munsi Noor Md. Lane P. S. Howrah. (3) The then landlord instituted a case for eviction under Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act being Case No.117 of 1952. (4) Md. Hanif, plaintiff’s predecessor. (2) A structure was constructed thereupon being holding No.30/4, Munsi Noor Md. Lane P. S. Howrah. (3) The then landlord instituted a case for eviction under Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act being Case No.117 of 1952. (4) Md. Hanif died during pendency of said case in 1954 leaving behind his widow Ketaban Bibi, two minor sons and two daughters. (5) It was specific plaint’s case that after said death of Md. Hanif Ketaban Bibi inducted Hanif’s brother Md. Jahur as licensee in respect of three rooms in the suit property on condition of payment of reasonable sum by way of damages for use and occupation of the suit property. (6) It was further plaint’s case that Md. Jahur inducted his another brother Md. Ibrahim in one of the rooms of suit holding. (7) The case instituted by the then landlord was dismissed in 1960. (8) Md. Ibrahim filed a suit being Title Suit No.48 of 1965 praying for partition of the suit holding alleging that the settlement was taken as well the structure was constructed thereupon from the joint income of all the brothers though the settlement stood in the name of Md. Hanif alone. (9) In said Title Suit No.48 of 1965 Md. Jahur filed a written statement as a defendant (No.1) supporting the claim of plaintiff Md. Ibrahim and asserting his right also as one of the co-sharer brothers of the suit holding. (10) Ketaban Bibi, the mother of the present plaintiffs, as defendant No.2 filed a written statement denying said allegation of co-ownership of any of the brothers of Md. Hanif in the suit property and at the same time alleging that Md. Jahur was inducted therein as a tenant. (11) After contested hearing Title Suit No.48 of 1965 was dismissed by judgement dated 15.02.1970 (Ext.8) holding that neither Md. Ibrahim nor any other brother of Md. Jahur had any share in the suit holding. (12) Said judgment of dismissal was challenged not only by Md. Ibrahim being plaintiff of said case but also by defendant No.1 Md. Jahur by filing two separate appeals being Title Appeal Nos.122 of 1970 and 132 of 1970. (13) Both those Title Appeals were heard analogously and were dismissed after contested hearing vide a common judgment dated 16.05.1972 (Ext.9). (14) Md. Ibrahim being plaintiff of said case but also by defendant No.1 Md. Jahur by filing two separate appeals being Title Appeal Nos.122 of 1970 and 132 of 1970. (13) Both those Title Appeals were heard analogously and were dismissed after contested hearing vide a common judgment dated 16.05.1972 (Ext.9). (14) Md. Jahur preferred a second appeal being S. A. No.13 of 1973 against saidjudgment of dismissal dated 16.05.1972 passed in Title Appeals but said Second Appeal stood abated vide order dated 3rd of July, 1980 (Ext.7). (15) The contesting defendants being heirs of Md. Jahur filed a written statement asserting their rights over the suit property through their predecessor-in-interest by way of adverse possession and thereby acquiring a title thereupon. (16) Initially the suit filed by the present respondent plaintiffs was decreed against which the contesting defendants filed an appeal being Title Appeal No.235 of 1986. (17) Said Title Appeal was allowed by setting aside the earlier judgment and decree and by remanding back the case to the learned Trial Court with liberty to the parties to file amended plaint as well as additional written statement, if any. (18) In terms of said order of remand plaintiffs amended the plaint alleging that the licence was granted to Md. Jahur by their predecessor Md. Hanif. (19) The contesting defendants filed an additional written statement denying the plaintiff’s story of granting of alleged licence to Md. Jahur either by Ketaban Bibi or by Md. Hanif at any point of time. (20) It was asserted by the contesting defendants in the written statement as well as in their additional written statement that the story of granting licence to Md. Jahur either by Ketaban Bibi or by Md. Hanif was belied not only by occupation of the suit property by Md. Jahur long before the death of Md. Hanif in 1954 but also in view of admission made by Ketaban Bibi as well as by the plaintiffs’ indifferent Court proceedings wherein they described Md. Jahur as a tenant in the suit premises. (21) In para 13 of the additional written statement it was averred by the contesting defendants that if their possessory title in the suit property is denied by the learned Court then plaintiffs should file proper suit in proper forum for eviction of the defendants as the defendants were not licensees in the suit premises at any point of time. (21) In para 13 of the additional written statement it was averred by the contesting defendants that if their possessory title in the suit property is denied by the learned Court then plaintiffs should file proper suit in proper forum for eviction of the defendants as the defendants were not licensees in the suit premises at any point of time. (22) In view of overwhelming documentary evidence on record supported by oral evidence both the Courts came to concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants were licensees in the suit premises at any point of time. (23) Learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence on record came to a finding of fact that the contesting defendants failed to establish their title to the suit property by way of adverse possession though admittedly they through their predecessor-in-interest were in possession in the suit property for long. (24) Learned Trial Court, however, dismissed the suit for eviction by holding that the contesting defendants were tenants under the plaintiffs from the time of their predecessor-in-interest in view of admission of Ketaban Bibi in the written statement filed in Title Suit No.48 of 1965, as well as the admission of the plaintiffs in the petition filed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ext.F), and that the suit for ejectment was filed without giving statutory notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. (25) Learned Lower Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal by setting aside said judgment and decree of learned Trial Court on the following grounds: (i) The defendants did not plead in the written statement specifically that they were tenants in the suit premises. (ii) The defendants all along claimed title to the suit property by way of adverse possession which they failed to establish. (iii) The defendants cannot reap the benefit of alleged admission of tenancy either by Ketaban Bibi or by the plaintiffs since they have not come before the Court with the specific case of tenancy even by necessary implications. (iv) Though neither party claimed tenancy of the contesting defendants in the suit premises learned Trial Court made out a third case of tenancy which was not permissible in law. (iv) Though neither party claimed tenancy of the contesting defendants in the suit premises learned Trial Court made out a third case of tenancy which was not permissible in law. (v) As plaintiffs’ title to the suit property through their predecessor-in-interest was established and defendants failed to establish their possession having any legal character, the plaintiffs were entitled to get a decree of eviction treating the defendants as trespassers. Mr. Banerjee, learned senior counsel for the appellants, submits that the plaintiffs’ plea of granting licence with the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting defendants (Md. Jahur) either by his mother Ketaban Bibi or his father Md. Hanif was found to be a myth as there were overwhelming documentary evidence to show the possession of Md. Jahur and his other brothers in the suit property since long. According to Mr. Banerjee even if the contesting defendants’ specific plea of title to the suit property by way of adverse possession was not proved still the plaintiffs were not entitled to get any decree of eviction as they failed to make out their specific case of licence. In this connection, he further submits that plaintiffs’ case must stand on its own legs and that it cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendants’ case. His next leg of submission is that in the earlier partition suit being Title Suit No.48 of 1965 brought by Md. Ibrahim, another brother of Md. Hanif and Md. Jahur and whose heirs are also defendants in the present suit, Jahura Bibi filed a written statement asserting that the possession of Md. Jahur in the suit premises was that of a tenant. He further submits that the plaintiff also filed one case under Section 144 of Code of Criminal Procedure against Md. Jahur and others wherein he also admitted the nature of possession of the suit premises by Md. Jahur and his heirs as that of a tenant. He next submits that Ketaban Bibi also filed one Money Suit No. 41 of 1965 against Md. Jahur for recovery of arrear rents wherein she also described Md. Jahur as a tenant. According to Mr. Banerjee said clear admissions of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest namely Jahura Bibi were clear enough to show that Md. He next submits that Ketaban Bibi also filed one Money Suit No. 41 of 1965 against Md. Jahur for recovery of arrear rents wherein she also described Md. Jahur as a tenant. According to Mr. Banerjee said clear admissions of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest namely Jahura Bibi were clear enough to show that Md. Jahur and later on his death the present defendants as his heirs were in possession of the suit premises at least as a tenant if not in any other better capacity. According to him, learned Lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate said admissions from the side of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest in those Court proceedings and set aside the well reasoned judgment of learned Trial Court, by passing a decree of eviction treating the defendants as rank trespassers. He further submits that in view of said admission on the side of the plaintiff it was not required for the defendants to prove their tenancy right in the suit premises. In this connection he refers a case law reported in 2012 (2) CLJ (SC) page 14 (Joshna Gouda versus Brundaban Gouda and another) wherein it was held that an admission must be clear and unambiguous in order that such an admission should relieve the opponent of the burden of proof of the fact said to have been admitted. In this connection he further submits that it was not correct to say that the defendants did not take the plea of tenancy in the suit premises as admitted by the plaintiff and his mother in the Court proceedings, as in the additional written statement it was specifically stated in para 13 that the plaintiff should file proper suit in proper forum for eviction of the defendants as the defendants were not licensees in the suit premises at any point of time. Mr. Bhaskar Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that at no point of time the appellant defendants asserted that either they or their predecessor-in-interest Jahur were in possession of the suit premises as tenants either under the plaintiffs or under their predecessor-in-interest Jahura Bibi. He further submits that in view of the pleadings of the parties, it was nobody’s case that the present defendants or their predecessor-in-interest Md. Jahur were in possession of the suit premises as a tenant. He further submits that in view of the pleadings of the parties, it was nobody’s case that the present defendants or their predecessor-in-interest Md. Jahur were in possession of the suit premises as a tenant. According to him, the defendants cannot be allowed to succeed in a case not set up by them either in the pleadings or in their evidence and that learned Trial Court was absolutely wrong to make out a third case of tenancy beyond pleadings and that learned Lower Appellate Court was justified to set aside said judgment of learned Trial Court. In support of his contention he has referred a case law reported in AIR 1954 SC 758 (Sheodhari Rai and others vs. Suraj Prasad Singh and others) wherein it was held as follows: “Where the defendant in his written statement sets up title to the disputed lands as the nearest reversioner, the Court cannot, on failure of the defendant to prove his case, make out a new case for him which is not only not made in the written statement but which is wholly inconsistent with the title set up by the defendant, namely, that the defendant was holding under a Shikmi settlement from the nearest reversioner.” He also refers a case law reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1291 (Gappulal vs. Thakurji Shriii Dwarkadheeshji and another) wherein it was again held that in the absence of any pleadings and any issue on the point a Court of law should not make out a new case. He also refers a case law reported in AIR 2003 SC page 1905 (Bondar Singh and others vs. Nihal Singh and others) wherein it was held that when there was no clear pleading in support of a specific right no evidence led on that plea should be taken into consideration and said plea cannot be permitted to be built up in that case. His next leg of submission is that when plaintiffs’ title to the suit property was proved and the only defence of adverse possession taken by the contesting defendants failed and there was no case of tenancy of the defendants’ suit premises advanced by the parties in the pleadings then the plaintiffs were entitled to get a decree of eviction treating the possession of the defendants as that of trespassers. In support of his contention he refers case laws reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court page 735 (Bhagwati Prasad vs. Chandramaul) and AIR 1975 Calcutta page 200 (Amulya Ratan Mukherjee and others vs. Kali Pada Tah and others) wherein it was held that if the plaintiffs’ title to the suit property was established and the defendants’ alleged right of possession of the suit property was demolished then the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree of eviction even if it fails to establish the nature of the possession of the defendant in the suit premises as canvassed in the plaint. There is no denial that plaintiffs’ title to suit property was well established and the defendants’ claim of title over the suit property by way of adverse possession was not at all proved. The plaintiffs described the possession of the defendants in the suit premises as that of a licensee. The plaintiffs failed to prove said alleged licence granted to the defendants. It is true that during evidence it came out that the plaintiffs’ mother described the possession of Md. Jahur, the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting defendants, as that of a tenant in the partition suit brought by Md. Ibrahim wherein Md. Jahur was a party. But said partition suit was dismissed by holding that neither Md. Ibrahim nor Md. Jahur or any other brother of Md. Hanif had any share in the suit property. However, the status of the present defendants’ possession of the suit premises was not determined there. It is alleged that plaintiffs’ mother Jahura Bibi filed a Money Suit being 41 of 1965 against Md. Jahur claiming arrear rents in respect of the suit premises but the same was dismissed. The certified copy of the judgment of said Money Suit 41 of 1965 was not filed during the trial. Without the certified copy of said judgment of dismissal it cannot be said whether it was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not proved or on any other ground. During trial the original plaintiff gave an explanation as to how the status of the defendants as tenants was written in the application under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. During trial the original plaintiff gave an explanation as to how the status of the defendants as tenants was written in the application under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In spite of having knowledge of all these court cases the appellant contesting defendants did not claim tenancy right in the suit premises either in their original written statement or in their additional written statement. Rather these Court cases were referred in their written statement and additional statement just to counter the plaintiffs’ claim of granting licence to Md. Jahur in the suit premises. There is no denial that it is a settled principle of law that a person is not permitted to make out a case beyond his pleadings. It is true that in Bhagwati Prasad’s case (supra) it was held that “if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact, that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence.” But said proposition of law is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this case I have already stated that those alleged averments of plaintiffs and his mother Jahura Bibi in Court proceedings regarding tenancy of Md. Jahur in suit premises were referred just to counter the specific plaint case of granting of license to Md. Jahur. Rather it was specifically asserted in the written statement as well as in the additional written statement that the contesting defendants from the time of their predecessor-in-interest Md. Jahur were in occupation of the suit premises for long and thereby acquired a title to the same by way of adverse possession. Said claim of adverse possession was, however, dismissed by both the Courts below. The plaintiffs gave explanation as to how the status of defendants in the suit premises was described as that of a tenant in the application under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither the original case record of Money Suit 41 of 1965 was called nor the certified copy of the judgment of dismissal was produced during trial. The plaintiffs gave explanation as to how the status of defendants in the suit premises was described as that of a tenant in the application under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither the original case record of Money Suit 41 of 1965 was called nor the certified copy of the judgment of dismissal was produced during trial. As defendants relied on said money suit they should have produced the certified copy of the judgment of the same in the Court during trial and an adverse inference may be drawn against them for non-filing of the same. As such it cannot be said that it was proved satisfactorily by evidence that occupation by the contesting defendants or their predecessor-in-interest Md. Jahur in the suit premises was that of a tenant or that said pleading was necessarily involved in the trial. When plaintiffs’ title to the suit property is well established and the defendants failed to establish any legal right of possession of suit premises then the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree of eviction even if they failed to make out the case of licence as made out in the plaint. In view of the discussion made above I do not find any perversity in the judgment of learned Lower Appellate Court justifying interference by this Court in this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result, the appeal is dismissed on contest. However, I pass no order as to costs.