Judgment Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. This appeal would arise out of an order of the learned District Judge declining to interfere with the award published by the arbitrator. Facts would depict, the National Highway Authority of India, the appellant above named, entrusted the work to the respondent for construction of widening to 4/6 lanes and upgrading of the existing two lane roads in NH-60 in the State of West Bengal from Laxmannath to Kharagpur. The work would value rupees three hundred twenty nine crores. The dispute arose between the parties that were referred to Dispute Review Board where the same could not be resolved. It was thus referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the claims of the respondent save and except claim no.1 and 3. The Tribunal awarded rupees forty three crores fifty six lacs twenty nine thousand in respect of claim no.1 together with interest and rupees five crores twenty lacs one hundred forty against claim no.3 together with interest thereon. The National Highway Authority challenged the award before the Court of District Judge, Midnapur (Paschim) that was heard by the Additional District Judge (4th Court), Midnapur (Paschim). The learned Judge dismissed the application on contest vide judgment and order dated April 26, 2011. The Highway Authority challenged the said decision before us by the instant appeal that came up for admission before us on August 3, 2012. As a statutory appeal, the appeal was to be heard by us after admission. Since the appeal was in form that would attract the order of admission. The question was however, raised by the respondent, since the award would, in effect, a money decree that could be executed through the process of execution contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal would attract deposit of the awarded sum in Court as a pre-requisite under Order XLI Rule 1. Such contention was however, disputed by the appellant. The appellant contended that it was a statutory appeal and the Court would not have any other option but to admit it and dispose it of on meit. The provisions of Order XLI, Rule1 of Rule 5 would not attract. 2. We heard Mr. Jaydeep Kar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Jayantra Mitra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. Mr. The provisions of Order XLI, Rule1 of Rule 5 would not attract. 2. We heard Mr. Jaydeep Kar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Jayantra Mitra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. Mr. Kar relied on Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to contend that an award could only be enforced after reaching finality on the same. The provisions would make the award enforceable after three months of its publication or after the application for setting aside was dismissed. According to Mr. Kar, since the application for setting aside was dismissed, the appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding would attract embargo as contemplated under Section 36. 3. To support his contention he relied on the following decisions : i) Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur –VS-Swaraj Developers and Ors. (2003 Volume-VI Supreme Court Cases Page-659) ii) National Aluminium Co. Ltd. –VS-Pressteel and Fabrications Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. (2004 Volume-I Supreme Court Cases Page-540) iii) Centrotrade Minierals and Metal Inc. –VS-Hindustan Copper Limited (2006 Volume-XI Supreme Court Cases Page-245) iv) Malwa Strips Private Limited –VS-Jyoti Limited (2009 Volume-II Supreme Court Cases Page-426) 4. On the other hand, Mr. Mitra relied on Order XLI, Rule 1 and 5 to contend, since it was a money decree that would attract deposit of money as condition precedent. He would however, fairly concede as he does in all cases, such deposit would require, in case, this Court would stay the operation of the award. He however, conceded, in case deposit was not made, the appeal would not, by itself, attract order of dismissal. However, the respondent would be entitled to proceed with execution. He relied on the following decisions : i) Himachal Road Transport Corporation Shimla, -VS-Sushila Devi and Ors. (All India Reporter 1986 Himachal Pradesh Page-78) ii) ITI Ltd. –VS-Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. (2002 Volume-V Supreme Court Cases Page-510) iii) Sarkar and Sarkar –VS-State of West Bengal & Ors. (All India Reporter 2006 Calcutta Page-149) iv) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. –VS-J.A. Infra Structure Pvt. Ltd. (2006 Volume-III Arbitration Law Reporter Page-369 [Supreme Court]) 5. Since the question of law was raised we need not refer to the factual controversy and would keep the same at bay for the present to be decided at the final hearing of the appeal. 6. The provisions referred to above, are quoted below :- “Section 35. Since the question of law was raised we need not refer to the factual controversy and would keep the same at bay for the present to be decided at the final hearing of the appeal. 6. The provisions referred to above, are quoted below :- “Section 35. Finality of arbitral awards. -Subject to this Part an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. Section 36, Enforcement. – Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. Section 37. Appealable orders. – (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely :- (a)Granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (b)Setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal. – (a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” Order XLI Rule 1 : “(1) Form of appeal-What to accompany memorandum. (i) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment: Provided that where two or more suits have been tried together and a common judgment has been delivered therefor and two or more appeals are filed against and decree covered by that judgment, whether by the same appellant or by different appellants, the Appellate Court may dispense with the filing of more than one copy of the judgment. (2) Contents of Memorandum.-The memorandum shall set forth, concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative; and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively. (3) Where the appeal is against a decree for payment of money, the appellant shall, within such time as the Appellate Court may allow, deposit, the amount disputed in the appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof as the Court may think fit.” “5. Stay by Appellate court. – (1)An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order swtay of execution of such decree. (2) Stay by Court which passed the decree. – Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appellable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed. (3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied – (a)That substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made; (b)That the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (c) That security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. (4) [Subject to the provisions of sub-rule(3)], the Court may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application. (5)Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule(3) of rule 1, the 7. Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree.” To interpret the law, may we discuss the cases cited at the Bar. Mr. Mitra relied upon the decisions on the Civil Procedure Code. Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree.” To interpret the law, may we discuss the cases cited at the Bar. Mr. Mitra relied upon the decisions on the Civil Procedure Code. In the case of Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (Supra), the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court held, if there was any non-compliance of an order under Rule 1 Sub-Rule 3 the Court would have no power to reject a memorandum of appeal. The word “shall” as incorporated therein, would oblige the appellant to deposit the decretal sum, default of which would not by itself attract dismissal of the appeal. However, that would be relevant for the purpose of stay of the execution. In the case of ITI Ltd. (Supra), paragraph 11 and 13 would make the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in case of an appeal under Section 37 of the said Act of 1996. In the case of Sarkar and Sarkar (Supra), the Single Bench of this Court in paragraph 6 held that the appeal by itself would not automatically operate as stay against the award. In the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra), the Apex Court directed deposit of money as a pre-condition for hearing of the appeal. However, no law was decided. Mr. Kar cited four Apex Court cases. In the case of Sib Shakti Coop. Housing Society (Supra), paragraphs 16 and 17 would suggest, right of appeal is statutory as conferred by the statute. It becomes a vested right. An appeal is essentially continuation of the original proceedings. In the case of National Aluminium (Supra), the Apex Court in paragraph 10 and 11 observed, “an award when challenged under Section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable. There is no discretion left with the Court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein.” In the case of Centrotrade Mineralsand Metal Inc. (Supra), the Apex Court observed in paragraph 31, “the legal pursuit of successive remedies will make them all proceedings “connected by an intrinsic unity” and “to be regarded as one legal proceeding”. In the case of Malwa Strips Private Ltd. (Supra), the Apex Court clearly observed that non-deposit of money would not make the appeal vulnerable. (Supra), the Apex Court observed in paragraph 31, “the legal pursuit of successive remedies will make them all proceedings “connected by an intrinsic unity” and “to be regarded as one legal proceeding”. In the case of Malwa Strips Private Ltd. (Supra), the Apex Court clearly observed that non-deposit of money would not make the appeal vulnerable. It would only foreclose the chance of staying the operation of the execution. It clearly held that Rule-1 Sub-Rule-3 was not mandatory. Non-compliance of Rule 1 Sub-rule 3 would result in dismissal of the stay application and not the entire appeal. 8. On a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions and the precedents cited at the Bar our understanding of the law is as follows : i) Rule-1 Sub-Rule-3 of Order XLI was mandatory to the extent to obtain an order of stay that would be prerequisite to maintain an application for stay. However, the same was not mandatory to maintain an appeal from a money decree. ii) Section 35, 36 and 37, read together, would make an award enforceable only when it reaches finality and that event would occur only when an application for setting aside is dismissed or the appeal from the said order is also dismissed, as the case may be. iii) Appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding, would enjoy the same protection under Section 36 as a proceeding under Section 34 would enjoy. With great humility may we say, the decision in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra) did not settle any point of law that would be binding upon us. The decision in the case of Sarkar and Sarkar (Supra) was not a good law. We thus, do not find it obligatory to ask the appellant to secure the claim under the award. We thus admit the appal and direct expeditious hearing. Mr. Mitra would represent the sole respondent hence, Service of Notice of appeal upon the sole respondent is dispensed with. 10 The appellant would deposit Special Messenger Cost within a week from date for bringing the Lower Court Record. The department would examine the Lower Court Record and serve a notice of arrival of record upon the parties so that appellant may file requisite number of paper books incorporating all papers used before the Court below within two weeks thereafter, default of which would attract dismissal of the appeal. The department would examine the Lower Court Record and serve a notice of arrival of record upon the parties so that appellant may file requisite number of paper books incorporating all papers used before the Court below within two weeks thereafter, default of which would attract dismissal of the appeal. As soon as paper book is filed place it for hearing. The order impugned shall abide by the result of the appeal. We need not pass any specific order of stay of operation of the judgment and order as we have already held that the award is not enforceable as yet in view of pendency of the appeal. CAN 8545 of 2011 is, accordingly, disposed of without any order as to costs.