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2012 DIGILAW 768 (PAT)

Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar

2012-05-11

NAVIN SINHA

body2012
ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. 2. There are no disputed facts. The application has to be decided only on questions of law. It is not considered necessary to adjourn the matter for a counter affidavit. 3. The petitioner was an applicant for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police under Advertisement No. 704/2004. On successful competition he was selected and called for medical and character verification on 11/12.2.2009. Column-7 of the character verification form contained a query if he had been an accused in any case and had suffered imprisonment. The petitioner answered “No”. On 14.2.2009 he gave an application to the D.I.G, Saran at Chapra that there had been some confusion in his character verification. He had been involved in a land dispute and was sentenced by the Lower Court. He was released by the High Court and the case set aside. He was therefore innocent enclosing copies of the Court order. On 16.2.2009, the D.I.G. forwarded his application to the ADG (Personnel). The ADG (Personnel) on 5.10.2009 held that the character verification revealed he was an accused in Daraundha P.S. Case No. 129/97 under Sections 379, 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Charge sheet No. 116 of 1997 was submitted on 31.10.1997. The character verification column was to be filled by the candidate. Prima facie he appeared to have concealed facts and given wrong information. His candidature was rejected. It may be noticed that the order did not deal with the subsequent events mentioned in a composite manner by the petitioner enclosing copies of the relevant Court orders. 4. Criminal Revision No. 978 of 2008 was preferred by the petitioner against his conviction before this Court. The order dated 24.11.2008 reveals sentence for 18 months only. The petitioner had no criminal history. The occurrence related to a land dispute. He was given the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. The sentence was set aside but conviction was affirmed. He was required to execute a bond for one year within 15 days, to maintain good behaviour. It would have expired in or around 9th of December, 2009. 5. The petitioner assailed the order dated 5.10.2009 in C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009. It was set aside by a discussion and the matter remanded to reconsider the candidature. It has been rejected again by order dated 16.9.2010/25.4.2011 and which is presently assailed. 6. It would have expired in or around 9th of December, 2009. 5. The petitioner assailed the order dated 5.10.2009 in C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009. It was set aside by a discussion and the matter remanded to reconsider the candidature. It has been rejected again by order dated 16.9.2010/25.4.2011 and which is presently assailed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009, the Court held on the facts that it may have been appropriate for the petitioner to make proper disclosure, but his defence that it was a bona fide error in a mistaken belief without any intentional concealment or fraud after the order in the Criminal Revision merits consideration. The respondents did not challenge the findings. The legal implication of his release under the Probation of Offenders Act was not relevant. It was his understanding of the effect which is relevant. The impugned order takes into consideration irrelevant issues not germane when it makes a distinction between a Constable and a Sub-Inspector. The respondents could not have arrived at a conclusion contrary to the finding of the Court that the petitioner had not committed intentional concealment and that it was a bona fide error. 7. Counsel for the State submits that on the date of police verification the conviction of the petitioner and the bond under the Probation of Offenders Act was both subsisting. Only the sentence had been set aside. The petitioner was a Graduate and was expected to disclose his conviction by the trial Court along with subsequent developments and leave the issue for final decision by the respondents. But for his release under the Probation of Offenders Act, the petitioner was apparently ineligible to be considered because of the conviction and consequent wrong disclosure. It was lastly submitted that the impugned orders draw sustenance from an order of the Court in C.W.J.C. No. 13845 of 2009. It has been held that if a person is seeking appointment in the police force, was an accused in a criminal case, withholding information with regard to his character verification, was a good ground to deny relief. 8. The petitioner had been called for police verification on 11/12.2.2009. He informed the respondents of the bona fide error committed by him as early as 14.2.2009. 8. The petitioner had been called for police verification on 11/12.2.2009. He informed the respondents of the bona fide error committed by him as early as 14.2.2009. He mentioned the earlier conviction and also explained the reason for his belief that he had not made any wrong disclosure in Column-7. His bona fides are evident from the fact that he enclosed copies of the relevant Court orders. If he had any foul intentions he would not have enclosed copies of the Court order and left the respondents guessing. The petitioner was not a Graduate in law or trained in law. He was an ordinary Graduate. Applying the standard of an ordinary reasonable person, he understood that the burden of the conviction was gone when he was released in the criminal revision application and believed that he was a freeman. It is not possible for the Court to hold that his belief as a layman, not trained in the law, was a conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have arrived at. 9. The theory that everyone cannot be presumed to know the law was noticed in (1979) 2 SCC 409 (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.) holding at Paragraph-6 as follows:- “6. It is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement: there is no such maxim known to the law. Over a hundred and thirty years ago, Maule, J., pointed out in Martindale Vs. Falkner: “There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law: it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so.” Scrutton, L.J., also once said: “It is impossible to know all the statutory law, and not very possible to know all the common law.” But it was Lord Atkin who, as in so many other spheres, put the point in its proper context when he said in Evans Vs. Bartlam: “… the fact is that there is not and never has been a presumption that every one knows the law. There is the rule that ignorance of the law does not excuse, a maxim of very different scope and application.” 10. In C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009, it was observed that the occurrence arose out of a petty land dispute and that he had continued in possession of the lands. There is the rule that ignorance of the law does not excuse, a maxim of very different scope and application.” 10. In C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009, it was observed that the occurrence arose out of a petty land dispute and that he had continued in possession of the lands. He was not a hardened criminal with more than one case of serious crimes against him. The discussion in A.I.R. 2008 SC 1083 (State of Haryana Vs. Dinesh Kumar) was noticed that the candidate stood before the Magistrate and was enlarged on bail. He bona fide believed that he had not been taken into custody because he did not go behind the bars and did not make the disclosure in the police verification form. It was held that there was no deliberate and willful misrepresentation and concealment by him. The ratio of the judgment was a bona fide mistaken belief and not deliberate concealment. In C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009 a finding was arrived at that there was no deliberate and willful misrepresentation by the petitioner. It was a bona fide error under a mistaken belief. The impugned order applies its mind wrongly to the same by taking into consideration an irrelevant issue that the judgment related to appointment on the post of a Constable while the petitioner was a Graduate candidate for Sub Inspector and was expected to be better aware. The order is held to be unsustainable as the consideration done by the respondents on an issue not relevant and germane was vitiated leading to a wrong conclusion. If the authority poses unto itself a wrong principle for determination, the conclusion has to be wrong. 11. If an administrative authority at the time of decision making poses unto itself the wrong question and thus the consideration itself is misdirected, the conclusion has to be wrong as observed in (2006) 11 SCC 67 (Indian Airlines Ltd. Vs. Prabha D. Kanan) holding as follows:- “46. We may notice that keeping in view the situational changes and, particularly, outsourcing of the sovereign activities by the State, this Court has been expanding the scope of judicial review. It includes the misdirection in law, posing a wrong question or irrelevant question and failure to consider relevant question. On certain grounds judicial review on facts is also maintainable. Doctrine of unreasonableness has now given way to doctrine of proportionality.” 12. It includes the misdirection in law, posing a wrong question or irrelevant question and failure to consider relevant question. On certain grounds judicial review on facts is also maintainable. Doctrine of unreasonableness has now given way to doctrine of proportionality.” 12. Once the Court had arrived at a finding in C.W.J.C. No. 16574 of 2009, that there was no intentional concealment or fraud by the petitioner, but at best a bona fide error, the respondents could not have arrived at a conclusion to the contrary in teeth of the findings of the Court that the petitioner had acted with intentional concealment. An order of an authority in teeth of an order of the Court is a nullity. The second ground mentioned in the impugned order also is therefore held to be unsustainable. 13. The supremacy of the judicial or quasi judicial orders was noticed in (2001) 1 SCC 582 (Union of India Vs. K.M. Shankarappa) holding:- “7………… Once a quasi-judicial body like the Appellate Tribunal, consisting of a retired Judge of a High Court or a person qualified to be a Judge of a High Court and other experts in the field, gives its decision that decision would be final and binding so far as the executive and the Government is concerned. To permit the executive to review and/or revise that decision would amount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions by a quasi-judicial Board. It would amount to subjecting the decision of a quasi-judicial body to the scrutiny of the executive…………………” 14. The reference in the earlier order to the Probation of Offenders Act was relevant only for the purpose of appreciating the bona fides of the petitioner. 15. The reliance by the respondents on the order in C.W.J.C. No. 13845 of 2009 is apparently erroneous. It related to a patent concealment and where there were no orders under the Probation of Offenders Act or a claim of bona fide mistake. 16. In matters relating to service especially promotion and appointment, the Court does not issue a mandamus to promote or to appoint. No one has a legal right to appointment or promotion. The right is only to be considered. Even if the findings are in favour of the petitioner the terminology used in service jurisprudence is a direction to consider. It is not a carte blanche to the respondents to reopen and reject matters at their discretion. No one has a legal right to appointment or promotion. The right is only to be considered. Even if the findings are in favour of the petitioner the terminology used in service jurisprudence is a direction to consider. It is not a carte blanche to the respondents to reopen and reject matters at their discretion. The consideration has to be done in light of the discussions and finding arrived at in the order of the Court. The Consideration that is required to be done can euphemistically be described as fettered and not free. 17. Though there is no indefeasible right to seek mandamus for appointment yet after the candidate is included in the select list it cannot be denied arbitrarily or for irrelevant reasons as held in (1991) 3 SCC 47 (Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India) holding:- “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons…….” 18. The petitioner was made an accused in Daraundha P.S. Case on 31.10.1997. The affidavit to the writ petition affirmed on 5.4.2012 states he was 32 years of age. On the date of occurrence he was approximately 18 years of age. The discussion in (2011)4 SCC 644 (Commissioner of Police Vs. Sandeep Kumar) may appropriately be noticed also:- “2. The respondent herein, Sandeep Kumar applied for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) in 1999. In the application form it was printed: “12(a) Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a court of law for any offence, debarred/disqualified by any Public Service Commission from appearing at its examination/selection or debarred from any examination, rusticated by any university or any other education authority/institution.” Against that column the respondent wrote: “No”. 19. 19. The appointment was subsequently denied due to character verification report. It was held as follows:- “8. We respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court that the cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but we wish to give our own opinion in the matter. When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.” “9. In this connection, we may refer to the character “Jean Valjean” in Victor Hugo's novel Les Miserables, in which for committing a minor offence of stealing a loaf of bread for his hungry family Jean Valjean was branded as a thief for his whole life. The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him as a criminal all his life.” 20. The impugned orders dated 16.9.2010 and 25.4.2011 are set aside. 21. The application is allowed. ?