Judgment In this application filed under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), the petitioner has prayed for a direction for appointment of Arbitrator. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are as under :- Petitioner is a Registered Partnership Firm having its registered office at Gwalior. Petitioner-firm is a fleet owner, transport and material handling contractor whereas the respondents are joint venture company of M/s H.P.C.L. Ltd. and Mittal Engineering Investment Private Limited. 3. The offers were invited from registered contractors including the petitioner on 4-6-2008. In turn, on 27-6-2008 the petitioner had submitted his bid. The petitioner wrote a letter dated 18-7-2008 to the respondent that his price offer was most competitive. Again on 23-7-2008, petitioner submitted certain clarification regarding the aforesaid bid. On 25-7-2008, the respondent sent a fax of acceptance accepting the tender of petitioner on the terms and conditions of the tender document and schedule of rates. The petitioner was requested to deposit security under Clause 6 of the general conditions within ten days. Petitioner was also requested to contact the concerned Manager, who is Incharge of the work. The petitioner sent letter dated 26-7-2008 conveying his gratitude for fax of acceptance dated 25-7-2008 and intimated that he has approached bankers to issue a bank guarantee of Rs. 3,79,150/-within the period as specified above. The petitioner deputed Shri M.A. Khan, Deputy General Manager for doing the needful. The bank guarantee was obtained by the petitioner and was submitted before the respondents. Subsequently, the respondents sent detailed letter of acceptance to the petitioner on 27-8-2008. Formal written agreement on the stamp paper was signed on 30-8-2008 between the parties. The respondents terminated the contract on 19-8-2011. The petitioner demanded appointment of an arbitrator. In absence of response, he filed present A.C. whereas the respondents filed a petition for the same purpose before Punjab and Haryana High Court, which is also pending. 4. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the contract was signed by the petitioner at Gwalior by way of correspondence. The letter of acceptance was also signed by him at Gwalior and, therefore, contract was formed at Gwalior, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders under Section 11 (6) of the Act. The letter of acceptance was also signed by him at Gwalior and, therefore, contract was formed at Gwalior, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders under Section 11 (6) of the Act. Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act) to submit that the communication of proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of a person to whom it is made. In the instant case, offer came to the knowledge of petitioner-firm for the first time when it received letter (Annexure A-1) in its registered office situated at Gwalior. By placing heavy reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. A. P. Agencies Salem, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 (Paragraph 15), it is stated that the acceptance of offer results into formation of a contract and hence a proceedings can be filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction, acceptance was signed. By placing reliance on Paragraph 16 of the said judgment, it is stated that in absence of specific words in the Arbitration Clause, which excludes or ousts the jurisdiction of the other Courts, the jurisdiction will always be with a Court within whose territory cause of action or part of cause of action has arisen. 5. Shri Arvind Dudawat also placed reliance on M/s Progressive Constructions Ltd. Vs. Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd., AIR 1996 Delhi Page 92. He relied on Paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 of the said judgment. To further support the said contention, he relied on American Pipe Company Vs. state of U.P., AIR 1983 Calcutta 186. He also relied on the following judgments on this subject :- (1) Indowind Energy Ltd. Vs. We scare (India) Ltd. and another, (2010) 5 SCC 306 . (2) R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 130 . 6. By relying on Clause 19 of the Arbitration Clause, it is submitted that this Clause does not contain any word like "only" etc., which ousts jurisdiction of the other Courts. 1. Per contra, Shri Harish Dixit learned Counsel for the respondents 'submits that this matter is arising out of a contract. In contractual matters, it is the term of the contract, which will-decide the jurisdiction. 1. Per contra, Shri Harish Dixit learned Counsel for the respondents 'submits that this matter is arising out of a contract. In contractual matters, it is the term of the contract, which will-decide the jurisdiction. The learned Counsel has relied on Sections 11 (6) and 11 (12) (b) of the Arbitration Act. By placing reliance on Section 2 (4) of CPC with Sections 15 and 16 of CPC, it is stated that the place of suing could be a place, where whole or part of cause of action has arisen. The Counsel further submits that a minute reading of various sub-sections of Section 11 read with the definition of "Court" will make it crystal clear that jurisdiction is not with the present Bench lie also relied on the following judgments :- (i) M/s. Progressive Constructions Ltd. Vs. Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd., AIR 1996 Delhi 92. (ii) American Pipe Company Vs. State of (U.P., AIR 1983 Cal 186. (iii) Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia Vs. M/s Giridharlal Parshottamdas & Co. and others, AIR 1966 SC 543 . (iv) Union of India and others Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and another, AIR 2002 SC 126 . (v) Aligarh Muslim University Vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710 . (vi) Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. Vs. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 2432 . (vii) Balaji Coke Industry Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Maa Coke Guj Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 403 . (viii) Mahendra and Mahendra Ltd. (M/s) Vs. Kishan Tractors, 1998 (2) JLJ 57 . 8. The contention of Shri Harish Dixit is that more receipt of 'letter of acceptance' by the petitioner at Gwalior does not constitute "cause of action". By placing reliance on the definition of "Court" mentioned in Section 2 (1) (e) of the Act, it is stated that the Chief Justice, or his Designate would have jurisdiction provided the Civil Court of that area has jurisdiction to deal with the subject matter of a suit. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that no cause of action has arisen in the territory of this Court and the Civil Court at Gwalior and, therefore, this Court as a Designated Court will also have no jurisdiction to entertain the present matter. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that no cause of action has arisen in the territory of this Court and the Civil Court at Gwalior and, therefore, this Court as a Designated Court will also have no jurisdiction to entertain the present matter. He submits that on a conjoint reading of Section 2(1) (e), which defines "Court" with Section 11 (12)(b) makes it clear that the intention of the Legislature is to confer jurisdiction to such Courts where the Civil Court would have jurisdiction in a subject matter of a suit. 9. Apart from this, Shri Dixit by placing heavy reliance on Para 8 of the judgment of Hanil Era Textiles (supra), submits that in the present contract even though the words "only", "alone" or "exclusive", etc., are not used to oust the jurisdiction, yet as per Paras 8 and 9 of the said judgment, the jurisdiction is not vested within the territory of Madhya Pradesh and it is the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which has the jurisdiction to deal with the problem. 10. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. 11. Following points emerge for decision :- (i) Whether any cause of action has arisen within the territory of this Bench ? (ii) Whether as per the scheme of the Arbitration Act and more particularly as per Sections 2 (1) (e) and 11 (12) (b), this Court will have jurisdiction to try the application ? (iii) Whether the clause dealing with the jurisdiction in the contract will confine the jurisdiction to Punjab & Haryana only ? As to Point No. (i): 12. This is settled in law that "cause of action" means a bundle of facts., Although the argument advanced by Shri Harish Dixit has force that out of the bundle of facts only those facts are relevant, which have a nexus or relation with the Us, the point needs determination is whether out of the bundle of facts, is there any fact, which gives rise to a cause of action or part within the territory of this Court. In other words, whether any fact, which brings the matter within the territory of this Court will constitute cause of action. It is not in dispute between the parties that the contract was signed by correspondence. 'Parties did not sign the contract at one place. In other words, whether any fact, which brings the matter within the territory of this Court will constitute cause of action. It is not in dispute between the parties that the contract was signed by correspondence. 'Parties did not sign the contract at one place. Annexure R-6 shows that the petitioner was sent a fax of acceptance and it was directed that in tune with Clauses 6 and 7, conditions of contract, he has to deposit an amount and at the bottom of this he was required to sign as a token of contractor's acknowledgment. This was faxed to the petitioner, which was signed by him at Gwalior. Thus, the contract was formed on accepting the fax (Annexure R-6), and on putting the signature by the petitioner. Clause 8 of general conditions of contract in Section-I defines "Acceptance of the tender" as under :- "8. 'Acceptance of the tender' shall mean the acceptance of the tender issued by EIL/Owner to contractor." Thus, even the general conditions aforesaid provide acceptance of the tender. Thus, on acceptance of the said tender at Gwalior the contract was formed. In the considered opinion of this Court, this fact has a direct nexus with the Us and it forms part of cause of action. Thus, cause of action has arisen within the territory of this Court. As to Point No. (ii): 13. Section 2(1) (e) of the Act reads as under :- "2. Definition.- (1) In this Part, unless the context-otherwise requires,- (e) "Court" means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes." (Emphasis Supplied) Relevant part of Section 11 of the Act is reproduced below in toto for proper analysis :- "11. Appointment of arbitrators.- (1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Appointment of arbitrators.- (1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. (2)*** *** *** (3) *** *** *** (4) If the appointment procedure in sub-section (3) applies and- (a) a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party; or (b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. (5) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within thirty days from receipt of a request by one party from the other party to so agree the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,- (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment. (7) A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him is final. (8) The Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to- (a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and (b) other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. (9) In the case of appointment of sole or third arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration, the Chief Justice of India or the person or institution designated by him may appoint an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties where the parties belong to different nationalities. (9) In the case of appointment of sole or third arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration, the Chief Justice of India or the person or institution designated by him may appoint an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties where the parties belong to different nationalities. (10) The Chief Justice may make such scheme as he may deem appropriate for dealing with matters entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to him. (11) Where more than one request has been made under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justices of different High Courts or their designates, the Chief Justice or his designate to whom the request has been first made under the relevant sub-section shall be alone be competent to decide on the request. (12) (a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an International Commercial Arbitration, the reference to "Chief Justice" in those sub-sections shall be construed as a reference to the "Chief Justice of India". (b) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6) (7), (8) and (10) arise in any other arbitration, the reference to "Chief Justice" in those sub-sections shall be construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose local limits the Principal Civil Court referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 is situate and, where the High Court itself is the Court referred to in that clause, to the Chief Justice of that High Court." (Emphasis Supplied) 14. In the opinion of this Court, a minute and microscopic reading of the definition of "Court" read with Section 11 (12) (b) would show that if the subject matter of arbitration would have been the subject matter of a suit, the concerned Civil Court, which would have jurisdiction to try it, the High Court under which that Civil Court of original jurisdiction is constituted, will have the jurisdiction to try the matter. In other words, if the subject matter of the present arbitration would have been a subject matter to be tried by Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction at Gwalior, this Bench will assume jurisdiction automatically because said Civil Court is situated within local limits of this Bench. In other words, if the subject matter of the present arbitration would have been a subject matter to be tried by Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction at Gwalior, this Bench will assume jurisdiction automatically because said Civil Court is situated within local limits of this Bench. At the cost of repetition, it may he noticed that since the contract formed on acceptance of the tender at Gwalior. part of cause of action has arisen within the territory of Principal Civil Court at Gwalior. A conjoint reading of Section 2 (1) (e) read with Section 11 (12) (h) of the Act would show that other than International Arbitration, the Chief Justice or his Designate would be those, within whose local limits the Principal Civil Court referred in Section 2 (1) (e) is constituted. Since the Principal Civil Court, as analyzed above, would have jurisdiction at Gwalior, had it been within its domain, the Chief Justice or his Designate will have jurisdiction to decide the present application. I am unable to agree with the contention of Shri Ilarish Dixit that no relevant part of cause of action has arisen at Gwalior. Part of cause of action did arise at Gwalior making it triable by a Principal Civil Court, had it been its jurisdiction and, therefore, giving rise to the jurisdiction to the Chief Justice/Designate of this Court. Thus, in the scheme of the Act this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the present application. As to Point No. (iii) : 15. It is apt to quote Clauses 15 and 19 of the Contract as under :- "15. Settlement of disputes by arbitrators : In case of any disputes or differences, which cannot be resolved mutually between EIL/Owner and the Contractor, it shall be referred to a sole arbitrator to be appointed by both the parties by mutual consent. The award of arbitrator shall be binding on both the parties. 19. Jurisdiction: The contract shall be governed according to the laws of State and Central Government in force in India. Contractor hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of the state where the project is situated." 16. The award of arbitrator shall be binding on both the parties. 19. Jurisdiction: The contract shall be governed according to the laws of State and Central Government in force in India. Contractor hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of the state where the project is situated." 16. The contention of Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned Counsel for the petitioner was that in jurisdiction clause there is no use of words "only", "alone" and "exclusive" and, therefore, it cannot be read to mean that jurisdiction of other Courts beyond the Court of the State where the project is situated is ousted. This contention was countered by placing heavy reliance on Hani Hira Textile (supra). It is profitable to quote Paras 8 and 9 of the said judgment :- "8. The same question was examined in considerable detail in A.li.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies (AIR Headnote D) and it was held as under :- (see SCC pp. 175-76, Paras 20 and 21) "When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arisen out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' -expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case, mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case, mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed. 9. Clause 17 says - any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai. This clause is no doubt not qualified by the words like "alone", "only" or "exclusively". Therefore, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other Courts except Courts in Mumbai is excluded. Having regard to the fact that the order was placed by the defendant at Bombay, the said order was accepted by the Branch Office of the plaintiff at Bombay, the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay, and as per the plaintiff's case the final payment was to be made at Bombay, there was a clear intention to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. The Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit." 17. The reliance placed by Shri Dixit is on Para 9 aforesaid. However, a careful reading of this para shows that in the facts and circumstances of that case it was inferred that the jurisdiction of other Courts except Mumbai Court was excluded. This decision was taken having regard to the fact that order was placed by the defendant at Bombay; the order was accepted by Branch Office of plaintiff at Bombay; advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay and final payment was to be made at Bombay. On the basis of this it was held that the intention of parties was to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. In the present case, the facts are totally different. All events have not taken place within the territory of Punjab & Haryana. The contract was signed by way of correspondence and it was accepted at Gwalior. The chain of correspondence between petitioner and respondents would show that part of cause of action did arise at Gwalior. In the present case, the facts are totally different. All events have not taken place within the territory of Punjab & Haryana. The contract was signed by way of correspondence and it was accepted at Gwalior. The chain of correspondence between petitioner and respondents would show that part of cause of action did arise at Gwalior. Delhi High Court in M/s Progressive Construction (supra), also opined same on the basis of peculiar facts of that case. In that case the contract was entered into at Calcutta (Para 21). Here the contract was entered into by way of correspondence and as per general terms and conditions, contract is formed on its acceptance. The acceptance is at Gwalior and, therefore, the present case is distinguishable on facts. This is also settled in law that a judgment is a precedent on the basis of facts and circumstances of a case. A singular fact may change the precedential value of a judgment. 18. The reliance is also placed at American Pipe Company (supra). However, in the said case the Apex Court opined as- under :- "Contract, in our opinion, takes place where the acceptance takes place." Applying this ratio, the contract took a shape at Gwalior, where the acceptance had taken place. In Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia (supra), it was held that if contract is not in presence of each other and no mode is prescribed for communication of acceptance, insistence upon communication of acceptance of the offer is found to be inconvenient when the contract is made by letter sent by post. This judgment has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the condition of contract does prescribe a mode of acceptance. The reliance is also placed on Adani Exports Ltd. (supra). This judgment deals with the proposition that only those facts, which have a nexus or relevance with the Us alone will be relevant for deciding cause of action. In view of finding of this Court that the fact has nexus with the issue and therefore forms cause of action, this judgment is of no assistance to the respondents. The last reliance is placed on Balaji Coke Industries (supra). In the said case, relevant clause of contract prescribed that "the clause of arbitration shall be Calcutta". In view of finding of this Court that the fact has nexus with the issue and therefore forms cause of action, this judgment is of no assistance to the respondents. The last reliance is placed on Balaji Coke Industries (supra). In the said case, relevant clause of contract prescribed that "the clause of arbitration shall be Calcutta". Considering the aforesaid, it was held by Supreme Court that the parties had knowingly and voluntarily agreed that the dispute would be subject to Calcutta jurisdiction. The judgments of Hanil Era Textiles and Balaji Coke (supra), are based on consideration of the basic judgment of Supreme Court in the case of A. B.C. Laminart P. Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 . It is profitable to note that the said judgment was again considered by Supreme Court in two recent judgments Rajasthah State Electricity Board Vs. Universal Petrol Chemicals Limited, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 107 and A.V.M. Sales Corpn. Vs. Anuradha Chemicals (P) Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 315 . A bare perusal of judgment of Rajasthan State Electricity Board, (supra), shows that the relevant arbitration clause contained a stipulation as under ':- "30......The contract shall for all purposes be construed according to laws of India and subject to jurisdiction only at Jaipur in Rajasthan Courts only......" After considering the A. B.C. Laminart (supra) and other judgments the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra), opined as under :- "In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions, which are referred to herein before would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. There is indeed an ouster clause used in the aforesaid stipulations stating that the Courts at Jaipur alone would have jurisdiction to try and decide the said proceedings, which could be initiated for adjudication and deciding the disputes arising between the parties with or in relation to the aforesaid agreements through the process of arbitration. In other words, even though otherwise the Courts at Calcutta would have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes, but in view of the ouster clause, it is only the Courts at Jaipur, which would have jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding." The same view was taken in A.V.M. Sales Corpn. (supra). The relevant Paragraphs 22 and 23 read as under :- "22. (supra). The relevant Paragraphs 22 and 23 read as under :- "22. As indicated herein earlier, in this case also the cause of action for Original Suit No. 519 of 1991, filed by the respondent before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, arose partly within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Courts and the Courts at Vijayawada. 23. Having regard to the provisions referred to hereinabove, though the Courts at Vijavawada would also have jurisdiction, along with the Courts at Calcutta, to entertain and try a suit relating to and arising out oj the agreement dated 23-12-1988, and the mutual understanding dated 15-5-1989, such jurisdiction of the Courts at Vijayawada would stand ousted by virtue oj the exclusion clause in the agreement. (Emphasis Supplied) 19. On the basis of aforesaid judgments of Supreme Court, it is clear that unless the words "only", "alone" and "exclusion", etc., are used or the entire contract proceedings had taken place within the territory of a Court as per the arbitration clause showing the intention of parties to confine it to a local jurisdiction, it cannot be held that the jurisdiction of other Courts despite availability of cause of action is ousted. Applying the aforesaid principle in the present case will show that there is no such word of exclusion used in Clause 19- "jurisdiction" nor the facts are like which show that the entire contract is formed within the territory of a State where the project is situated, hence it cannot be said that this Court will have no jurisdiction despite the fact that part of cause of action has arisen at Gwalior and contract is formed at Gwalior. Apart from this, Para 23 of the judgment of A.V.M. Sales Corpn. (supra), also makes it crystal clear that if cause of action has arisen at more than one place, the other Courts where cause of action has arisen will have jurisdiction. However, such jurisdiction is excluded only by virtue of exclusion clause in the agreement. In the present case, in absence of any such exclusion clause this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Thus, this point is also decided against the respondents. 20. However, such jurisdiction is excluded only by virtue of exclusion clause in the agreement. In the present case, in absence of any such exclusion clause this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Thus, this point is also decided against the respondents. 20. Section 11 (11) of the Act prescribes that in the event more than one request have been made for appointment of arbitrator, it is the first request, which needs to be entertained and the Court, where first request has been made shall alone be competent to decide the request. In the present case, first request is made to this Court and then to Punjab High Court. Admittedly, the present application is prior in time and, therefore, by virtue of sub-section (11) of Section 11 of the Act, this Court alone is competent to deal with the application. 21. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, the application deserves to be allowed. 1, therefore, allow this petition and appoint Hon'ble Shri Justice S.P. Khare (Retd.), presently residing at "A-l, 202, Sahanai Residency, A.B. Road, Indore (M.P.)", as a sole arbitrator. Learned arbitrator shall adjudicate upon the relevant claims and counter claims of the parties, if any. 22. A copy of this order be communicated to the learned arbitrator. The learned arbitrator is requested to proceed to decide the dispute at its earliest convenience. No costs.