I. A. Ansari J.— 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order, dated 29.11.2007, passed, in ST.35(ST/B)/2007, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura, convicting the accused-appellant under sections 448 and 302, IPC and sentencing him to suffer, for his conviction under section 448, IPC, rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to suffer, for his conviction under section 302, IPC, imprisonment for life with fine of Rupees one lakh and, in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for a period of two years with further direction that the fine shall, if realized, be paid to the bereaved parents of the deceased child, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described, thus : On 24.6.2007, at about 9 a.m., when Sudha Mog, a young boy» aged about four years, was playing inside the kitchen of her aunt, Afaisi Mog (PW2), accused-appellant, Mongsajay Mog, came, with a dao, inside the kitchen and hacked the young child to death by giving him serval blows by means of his dao. Out of fear, Afaisi Mog (PW2) lost her senses and when she regained her senses, she saw her nephew, Sudha Mog, lying in a pool of blood, and on witnessing the scene, she cried out. On hearing her cries, her brother, Nithoi Mog (PW9), entered into the kitchen and saw the said child lying dead on the floor of the kitchen. PW2 reported the occurrence to her brother, Nithoi Mog (PW9). On being informed about the occurrence, Sudha Mog's father, Niulafru Mog (PW1), lodged a First Information Report ('FIR') and, on the basis of this FIR, Baikhora Police Station Case No. 58/2007, under section 448/302, IPC, was registered against the present appellant. During the course of investigation, police visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the said dead body, seized the dao, which was allegedly the weapon of offence and, on completion of investigation, laid charge sheet, under section 448/302, IPC, against the accused-appellant. 3. During trial, when charges, under sections 448 and 302, IPC, were framed against the accused, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether twelve witnesses including the Investigating Officer. 3. During trial, when charges, under sections 448 and 302, IPC, were framed against the accused, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether twelve witnesses including the Investigating Officer. The accused was, then, examined under section 313, Cr.PC and, in his examination aforementioned, the accused denied that he had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being that of denial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. 5. Having found the accused guilty of the offences charged with, the learned trial court convicted him accordingly and passed sentences against him as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences passed against him, the convicted person has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned amicus curiae, and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, Tripura. 7. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that though PW2 and PW9 were examined by the prosecution as eye witnesses to the alleged occurrence, it would transpire, as we would proceed further, that PW2 is the sole eye witness to the alleged killing of the young child by the appellant. 8. We, therefore, first, deal with the evidence of PW2 (Smt. Afaisi Mog). According to her evidence, on the day of the occurrence, at about 9 a.m., while she was cooking in the kitchen of her house, her nephew, Sudha Mog, aged about four years, came to her and requested her to give him rice and when she told him (Sudha Mog) to wait as rice had not yet been cooked, the said child told her to burn some jackfruit seeds and, so asking her to burn jackfruit seeds, the said child started playing in front of the door of the kitchen. At that point of time, PW2 heard the cries of the boy and when she turned her eyes, she saw a ghastly scene of the appellant, who is uncle of PW2, hitting the child by a dao. It is in the evidence of PW2 that out of fear, she lost her senses and when she regained her senses, she saw her nephew, Sudha Mog, in a pool of blood. PW2, then, cried out, whereupon her brother, Nithoi Mog (PW9), arrived there and he (PW9) went out to inform the father of the said child. It is in the evidence of PW2 that out of fear, she lost her senses and when she regained her senses, she saw her nephew, Sudha Mog, in a pool of blood. PW2, then, cried out, whereupon her brother, Nithoi Mog (PW9), arrived there and he (PW9) went out to inform the father of the said child. It is also in the evidence of PW2 that after killing the said child, the appellant went back to his house preparing 'khaini' (tobacco). 9. It is imperative to note that in her evidence, PW2 has deposed that she reported the occurrence to the father of the decease. In her evidence, PW2 has categorically asserted that the appellant was not mad, but why he had killed Sudha Mog, she had no idea. The assertion of PW2 that the accused was not mad had never been disputed at the trial. 10. In fact, from the cross-examination of PW2, nothing whatsoever was elicited by the defence to show that what she had deposed, describing the occurrence of assault on her nephew by the present appellant by means of a dao, is untrue or .false. We, therefore, see no reason to disbelieve her evidence and her evidence, having remained wholly unshaken, inspires confidence of the court. 11. It may, however, be pointed out that according to the suggestion, which the defence offered to PW2, but denied by her, was that the said child fell on a bati dao and suffered injury. If the suggestion, so given by the defence, is examined, in the light of the evidence of the doctor (PW12), who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the said child, it would become more than abundantly clear that the suggestion, so offered to PW2 and denied by her, has no substance inasmuch as the clear evidence of the doctor (PW12) is that he found incised ante mortem injury on the left side of the face, jaw was cut down, the mouth was also cut, and both, right and loft shoulders, had been cut down. The injuries, which the doctor claimed to have found on the said dead body and the opinion given by him that death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage, resulting from the injury sustained, remained unshaken by the defence inasmuch as nothing could be elicited by the defence from the cross-examination of PW12 to show that his findings, as regard the injuries found on the said dead body and his opinion with regard to the cause of death, were false or incorrect. This apart, we do not notice anything, in the evidence of the doctor, showing that findings, as regard the injuries found on the said dead body and his opinion with regard to the cause of death, were inherently improbable or untrue. More so, when we find that defence did nothing, while cross-examining PW12, except suggesting to him that the injuries as described by PW2, had not been found on the dead body of the said child. 12. In fact, the inquest report (Ext.PS) records the place, where the said dead body was found, as well as the injuries, which were noted by the Investigating Officer. The inquest report shows that the dead body of the child was found lying in the kitchen with both his hands having been cut from the shoulder joint and that there were injuries on his arm and his head was smeared with blood. Thus, the injuries, which were noted by the Investigating Officer, and recorded, in the inquest report, too, remained undisputed by the defence and the injuries, so found by the Investigating Officer and also by the doctor, completely tallied with the description of the occurrence given by PW2. Thus, the evidence of PW2 receives corroboration from the medical evidence on record and also from the inquest report as indicated hereinbefore. 13. So far as the other witnesses, namely, PW1, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6, are concerned, none of these witnesses was, admittedly, eye witness to the alleged occurrence. This apart, according to the evidence of Investigating Officer, the dao, which was allegedly the weapon of offence, had been found and seixed; but we may hasten to point out, in this regard, that there is really nothing, in the evidence on record, to show that the dao, which had been seixed, was the weapon of offence. 14. This apart, according to the evidence of Investigating Officer, the dao, which was allegedly the weapon of offence, had been found and seixed; but we may hasten to point out, in this regard, that there is really nothing, in the evidence on record, to show that the dao, which had been seixed, was the weapon of offence. 14. We do not, therefore, attribute any significance to the evidence so given by the Investigating Officer as regards the seixure of the said dao. Nonetheless, the evidence of PW2, which we have already discussed above, has, as we notice, remained, if we may reiterate, wholly unshaken and, therefore, cannot, but be regarded as trustworthy and reliable. 15. It needs to be borne in mind that it is not the number of witnesses, but the quality of evidence, which is relevant in a criminal trial. Even if a single witness is believed and his/her evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable, there is no impediment in law in founding conviction of an accused on such evidence. 16. In the case at hand, too, though PW2 is the only witness, who has been examined as eye witness to the occurrence, we do not find that her evidence suffers from any infirmity, legal or factual. Her evidence alone is, thus, sufficient to sustain conviction of the accused-appellant on the charges framed against him inasmuch as he entered into the kitchen room with a deadly weapon, such as, dao, and gave blows by means of his dao on the said child more than once causing his death. 17. Thus, the entry of the accused-appellant into the kitchen room, with intention to kill the said child, was an offence punishable under section 448, IPC. This apart, the nature of weapon, which was used by the accused-appellant, the number of blows, which were given on the said child and the vital parts of the body on which blows were given, are all indicative of, and lead to the conclusion, that the child had been put to death intentionally. 18. In the circumstances indicated above, the accused-appellant has been rightly held to have committed the offence of murder punishable under section 302, IPC. 19. 18. In the circumstances indicated above, the accused-appellant has been rightly held to have committed the offence of murder punishable under section 302, IPC. 19. So far as the sentences, passed against the accused-appellant are concerned, we find that the learned trial court has sentenced the appellant to suffer imprisonment for life with the rider that his imprisonment shall not be less than 20 years. Suffice it to point out here that imprisonment for life means imprisonment for whole of the life except.as may be commuted by appropriate Government in terms of the provisions of section 433, Cr.PC. This apart, the learned trial court has also sentenced the accused-appellant to pay fine of Rupees one lakh. The amount of fine, which has been imposed on the accused-appellant, is, in the context of the facts of the present case, highly unreasonable being so excessive that a person, situated in the circumstances as we have at hand, can never ever afford to pay as high a sum of money as Rupees one lakh. We, therefore, interfere with the sentence passed against the accused-appellant so far as his sentence, under section 302, IPC, relating to fine, is concerned and we hereby sentence him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of RK. 10,000 and, in default thereof, suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months subject to the condition that the fine shall, if realized, be paid to the parents of the deceased child. 20. With above modifications in the sentence, this appeal shall stand disposed of. 21. Before parting with this appeal, this court places on record the able assistance of Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned amicus curiae, and direct that he be paid Rs.3,500 by the High Court Legal Services Authority. 22. Let a copy of this judgment and order be made available to the accused-appellant. _____________