JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J.: (Oral) - This is second appeal by defendant no.1 M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., having remained unsuccessful in both the courts below. 2. Respondents no.1 and 2 Rajiv Chopra - as adopted son of Roop Rani and Raj Kumari - as daughter of Roop Rani, both claiming to be her natural heirs as well as successors-in-interest on the basis of registered Will dated 18.01.1977 executed in their favour, filed suit against defendant no.1- appellant and against proforma respondents no.3 and 4 as defendants no.2 and 3. The plaintiffs alleged that their predecessor Roop Rani leased out the suit land to predecessor of defendant no.1 for 20 years since 01.07.1961. Lease period was extended for another 20 years up to 01.07.2001. Plaintiffs served notice on defendant no.1 to vacate the disputed plot and to hand over vacant possession thereof to the plaintiffs on expiry of lease period. However, defendants failed to do so. It was pleaded that defendant no.1 had sub-let the disputed land to defendants no.2 and 3. Plaintiffs accordingly sought possession of the suit land and also claimed consequential relief of permanent injunction. 3. Defendant no.1 admitted that its predecessor had taken the suit land from Roop Rani and consequently, defendant no.1 stepped into the shoes of the lessee/tenant. It was admitted that initial lease period was for 20 years since 01.07.1961 and the same was extended by another 20 years up to 30.06.2001. It was, however, denied that plaintiffs are lessors or landlords of the disputed land. They are not admitted to be legal representatives of Roop Rani and they failed to prove so in ejectment petition filed by Roop Rani herself, who died during the pendency thereof. It was also alleged that defendants no.2 and 3 are licensees of defendant no.1. It was also pleaded that according to the lease deed, defendant no.1 could even sub-let the property. Defendants no.2 and 3 also pleaded similar version as that of defendant no.1. 4. Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pathankot, vide judgment and decree dated 20.04.2009, decreed the plaintiffs’ suit. First appeal preferred by defendants has been dismissed by learned Additional District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Gurdaspur, vide judgment and decree dated 20.09.2010. Defendants no.2 and 3 also pleaded similar version as that of defendant no.1. 4. Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pathankot, vide judgment and decree dated 20.04.2009, decreed the plaintiffs’ suit. First appeal preferred by defendants has been dismissed by learned Additional District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Gurdaspur, vide judgment and decree dated 20.09.2010. Feeling aggrieved, defendant no.1 has filed the instant second appeal bearing R. S. A. No. 4175 of 2010, whereas defendants no.2 and 3 have filed R. S. A. No. 4280 of 2010, which shall also stand disposed of by this common order. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file. 6. Counsel for the appellant contended that the suit land is situated within the municipal limits of Pathankot, and therefore, provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short – the Act) are applicable and jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the suit is, therefore, barred. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Hans Raj Bansal vs. Hardev Singh reported as AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 229. It was also contended that plaintiffs are not proved to be legal heirs of Roop Rani – original owner/landlady. It was pointed out that no adoption deed regarding adoption of Rajiv Chopra – plaintiff no.1 by Roop Rani was produced in ejectment petition filed by Roop Rani nor Will dated 18.01.1977, set up by the plaintiffs, has been proved. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents no.1 and 2/plaintiffs contended that the defendants have denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and therefore, only Civil Court had jurisdiction to try and the suit and defendants are not entitled to protection of the Act. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court namely Palani Ammal vs. Viswanatha Chettiar (dead) and others reported as (1998) 3 SCC 654. It was also contended that plaintiffs were impleaded as legal representatives of Roop Rani in the ejectment petition filed by her, and therefore, no further proof was required to depict that they are legal heirs of Roop Rani. It was also contended that plaintiffs were impleaded as legal representatives of Roop Rani in the ejectment petition filed by her, and therefore, no further proof was required to depict that they are legal heirs of Roop Rani. It was also argued that even in the absence of adoption deed or Will, plaintiff no.2, being daughter of Roop Rani, would be her sole natural legal heir and consequently, defendants are liable to ejectment from the suit property. 8. I have carefully considered the rival contentions. 9. It is undisputed that plaintiffs were impleaded as legal representatives of Roop Rani in the ejectment petition filed by her on the basis of their claim that Rajiv Chopra – plaintiff no.1 had been adopted by Roop Rani and that Roop Rani had executed Will dated 18.01.1977 in favour of both the plaintiffs. Defendants, in their written statement itself, have pleaded this fact that plaintiffs were impleaded as legal representatives of Roop Rani in the ejectment petition. Consequently, no further proof was required regarding the said fact. Moreover, even if adoption of plaintiff no.1 by Roop Rani and Will allegedly executed by Roop Rani in favour of both the plaintiffs is ignored, even then plaintiff no.2, as daughter of Roop Rani, would be her only natural legal heir. Thus, examined from any angle, it cannot be said that plaintiffs are not owners of the suit property. On the other hand, plaintiffs having stepped into the shoes of Roop Rani as her legal heirs, are owners of the suit property and are, therefore, entitled to seek possession of the suit property by ejectment of the defendants therefrom. 10. As regards jurisdiction of Civil Court in view of provisions of the Act, judgment in the case of Hans Raj Bansal (supra) is completely distinguishable on facts. In that case, in ejectment petition filed by the landlord under the Act, the landlord alleged to have purchased the demised property from previous owner/landlord and filed ejectment petition, wherein the tenant denied the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties. Thereupon, the landlord, without adjudication of the said question, withdrew the ejectment petition and filed Civil Suit. In the Civil Suit, it was held that since tenant continued to be tenant, he was entitled to protection of the Act and jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. Thereupon, the landlord, without adjudication of the said question, withdrew the ejectment petition and filed Civil Suit. In the Civil Suit, it was held that since tenant continued to be tenant, he was entitled to protection of the Act and jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. However, in the instant case, defendants have denied relationship of landlord and tenant in the Civil Suit instituted by plaintiffs and not in the ejectment petition. Consequently, defendants having themselves denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in the Civil Suit itself, cannot claim the protection of the Act, which is available to a tenant. The case of Hans Raj Bansal (supra) is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. On the contrary, judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Palani Ammal (supra) is fully applicable to the instant case. In that case, plaintiff no.3 had purchased the land in question from original landlords – plaintiffs no.1 and 2. The defendant did not accept plaintiff no.3 to be landlord. In these circumstances, it was held that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to protection of the concerned Rent Act i.e. Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. The said judgment is fully applicable to the facts of the case in hand, and therefore, in the instant case, defendants are not entitled protection of the Act and consequently, jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the suit is not barred. 11. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes crystal clear that suit of the plaintiffs has been rightly decreed by the courts below. The lease of defendant no.1 has come to an end, and therefore, plaintiffs being owners of the suit property, became entitled to possession thereof by ejectment of defendants therefrom. There is no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality in the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below to decree the suit of the plaintiffs. The said finding is also not shown to be based on misreading or misappreciation of evidence. On the other hand, in view of almost admitted factual position, the plaintiffs’ suit has to be decreed. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for adjudication in both these second appeals. The appeals are meritless and are accordingly dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------