Judgment Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 17.12.2001, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99. 2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1(a) to 1(g)-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiffs for the sake of convenience), namely, Krishan Lal has filed a suit seeking a decree of declaration that he was in possession of a parcel of land measuring 0-07-05 hectares, which was 5/16 share of the land comprised in Khata No. 57, Khatauni No. 113, Khasra Nos. 430 and 431, Kitas 2, measuring 0-22-57 hectares, situate in Mohal Paddar, Mauza Jadrangal, Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land). He has constructed three shops shown as No. 1, 2 and 3 in the site plan. The sale consideration of Rs.90,000/- regarding the suit land has been received from him by the defendants No. 1 to 5, as arrayed in Civil Suit No. 148/91 (RBT No. 18/93), namely, Shri Parveen Kumar, Shri Bansi Lal, Smt. Raman Kumari, Smt. Seema Kumari and Smt. Kamlesh Kanta and that the gift deed, dated 5th July, 1991, executed by these defendant in favour of defendant No. 6, i.e., The Deity in Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi, not being bonafide was null and void and, thus, not binding on his right to own and possess the suit land. According to the plaintiff, the defendants No. 1 to 5 had agreed to sell in his favour the land owned and possessed by them for a consideration of Rs.90,000/-vide agreement, dated 19th April, 1989, Ex. PW-5/A. He has paid the entire sale consideration and was delivered possession of the suit land. The vendor defendants agreed to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit land in his favour within a month of sanction of mutation regarding the revenue entries. However, they have failed to honour their promise. The mutation was sanctioned on 12th December, 1989. The defendants were called upon to execute the sale deed, but to no avail. He had requested them to do the needful. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. According to them, the sale deed could not be executed in view of the stay orders passed in Civil Suit titled ‘Ram Lal Vs. Parveen Kumar and others’. The defendants were called upon to execute the sale deed, but to no avail. He had requested them to do the needful. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. According to them, the sale deed could not be executed in view of the stay orders passed in Civil Suit titled ‘Ram Lal Vs. Parveen Kumar and others’. According to them, the Jamabandi obtained by the plaintiff was wrong. They have refuted the claim of the plaintiff for possession. According to them, the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by five of them, i.e., defendants No. 1 to 5 and many co-owners. They were approached by very important persons of the locality and they requested them to gift the suit land in favour of the deity Mata Chamanda Devi (defendant No. 6). Their request was acceded to and the suit land was gifted in favour of the deity. 4. The plaintiff filed the replication. The learned Senior Sub Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. decreed the suit partly on 31.03.1999 and a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff was in possession of an undefined portion of the suit land and that the gift deeds executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour defendant No. 6, are null and void to the extent they relate to the doners’ 5/16th share in the suit land that was agreed to be sold by them to the plaintiff was granted in his favour. A decree of specific performance of the agreement, dated April 19, 1989 was also granted in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants No. 1 to 5 were directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff of their 5/16th share in the suit land which they had agreed to sell in his favour vide agreement, dated 19th April, 1989. 5. Appellant-defendant, i.e., Diety Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant’ for the sake of convenience) has filed Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99 before the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala. The plaintiff also filed Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000. The learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99 as well as Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000 on 17.12.2001. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 6. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 21.05.2002: “1. The plaintiff also filed Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000. The learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 74-D/99 as well as Cross-Objections bearing No. 8-D/2000 on 17.12.2001. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 6. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 21.05.2002: “1. Whether the findings of the Court below are perverse and based on mis-reading, misconstruction of oral and documentary evidence and pleadings of the parties and a decree for mandatory injunction to defendants No. 1 to 5 to execute the sale of 5/6th share on the basis of agreement, dated 19.09.1989, Ex. PW-5/A is sustainable when the suit was brought after a long delay and the property already gifted to the appellant after the plaintiff had agreed to have refund of sale consideration? 2. Whether in view of the meteoric rise in the price of the suit property and the plaintiff having not been put in actual possession of the property, the discretionary relief of specific performance could be granted when the plaintiff was only entitled to damages? 3. Whether on proper construction of the provisions of Specific Relief Act and the well settled principle for the grant of specific performance enunciated in 1996 S.C. 2150 and 1997 S.C.1571, the decree for mandatory injunction and equitable relief of specific performance could be granted when issues No. 1 & 9 had been partly decided against the plaintiff? 4. Whether the gift deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of defendant-appellant could be decreed as null and void and decree for mandatory injunction enforced against the plaintiff without proper relief or foundation against the appellant? 7. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that during the pendency of these proceedings, the suit land has been acquired by the State Government and the award has been made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 10.06.2008. The total compensation for the acquired land and the other land which was acquired alongwith the land in dispute, amounting to Rs.25,79,870/-, has been deposited by the Land Acquisition Collector before the learned District Judge, Kangra on 13.08.2008/. Thus, his submission is that the agreement cannot be executed after the land has been acquired by the State Government. He also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. He also argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to damages. Thus, his submission is that the agreement cannot be executed after the land has been acquired by the State Government. He also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. He also argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to damages. He lastly contended that the gift deed, dated 08.07.1991 was validly executed in favour of the appellant. 8. Mr. S.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(g) has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 9. The plaintiff has died during the pendency of this appeal and his L.Rs. were brought on record vide order, dated 10.01.2012. 10. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence. 11. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, the agreement was executed with the defendants on 19.04.1989 for a consideration of Rs.90,000/- for the land measuring about 1 Kanal 17 Marlas. He was handed over the possession by the defendants. The defendants have agreed to execute the sale deed after one month of the correction of mutation No. 378. The same was attested on 19.10.1989. He has also served notice upon the defendants through his Advocate. He was ready and willing to execute the sale deed. The suit property was gifted without his permission. He was in possession of the suit land. He has constructed three shops on the same. He has also installed three electricity meters. He has constructed one shop in 1989 and two shops between March and May 1991. 12. PW-2 has deposed that he has supplied stones and bricks. PW-3, Shri Shiv Singh has deposed that he has undertaken the electricity fittings in the shops. PW-4, Shri Kishori Lal has deposed that he has undertaken the wooden work of plaintiffs’ shops. PW-5, Sh. K.S. Rajput, Advocate has deposed that agreement Ex.PW-5/A was scribed by Angat Ram at the instance of Parveen Kumar. He has read over the contents of the same to them and thereafter Parveen Kumar and others signed the same after admitting the contents of the same to be correct. He also signed Ex. PW-5/A. 13. PW-6, Sh. Angat Ram has deposed that he has scribed Ex. PW-5/A. He has read over the contents of the same. Sh. K.S. Rajput, Advocate and Shri Jagdish have signed Ex. PW-5/A as witnesses. He also signed Ex. PW-5/A. 13. PW-6, Sh. Angat Ram has deposed that he has scribed Ex. PW-5/A. He has read over the contents of the same. Sh. K.S. Rajput, Advocate and Shri Jagdish have signed Ex. PW-5/A as witnesses. He has made initials on 19.04.1989 at Sr. No. 129. The defendants have also put their signatures on the register. 14. Shri Krishan Lal has also appeared in rebuttal. According to him, he has constructed the shops and given the same to two different persons on rent. According to him, the defendants have never offered to pay back Rs.90,000/-. The defendants had no right to gift the land in favour of Chamunda Mandir. 15. One of the defendants, Parveen Kumar has appeared as DW-1. He has admitted the execution of agreement with the plaintiff. They were ready and willing to return the money to the plaintiff. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that they have received a sum of Rs.90,000/-towards consideration. He has also admitted that the sale deed was to be executed after one month of the attestation of mutation in the name of Shri Bishambher. He has also admitted that mutation No. 378 was attested. He also admitted that they have not informed the plaintiff in writing to execute the sale deed. 16. DW-2, Sh. B.L. Rana has deposed that he was the Temple Officer of Chamunda temple for two years. Three gift deeds were executed in favour of the temple. DW-3, Shri Rajinder Awasthi has deposed that he has signed the gift deeds, Ex. DW-2/A, Ex.-DW-2/B and Ex. DW-2/C as donee. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the gift deeds were scribed in the office of Sub Registrar at Dharamshala. 17. DW-4, Shri Bansi Lal has testified that he was working as Deed Writer at Dharamshala. According to him, the gift deeds, dated 05.07.1991 were scribed by him and these were registered at Sr. Nos. 38, 39 and 40. DW-5, Shri Shashi Sharma has deposed that he has signed Ex.-DW-2/A, Ex. DW-2/B and Ex. DW-2/C as a witness. DW-6, Kumari Shama Mehta has also identified her signatures on Ex. DW-2/A. 18. What emerges from the record as well as documentary evidence, is that a valid agreement was executed between the parties on 19.04.1989, whereby the defendants No. 1 to 5 have agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.90,000/-. DW-6, Kumari Shama Mehta has also identified her signatures on Ex. DW-2/A. 18. What emerges from the record as well as documentary evidence, is that a valid agreement was executed between the parties on 19.04.1989, whereby the defendants No. 1 to 5 have agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.90,000/-. The plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.90,000/- to defendants No. 1 to 5 and he was also put in possession of the suit land. He was always ready and willing to execute the agreement. He has also served a notice upon defendants No. 1 to 5 for executing the sale deed. The sale deed was to be executed after a period of one month after the attestation of mutation. The mutation was also attested, but even thereafter, the sale deed was not executed. The defendant, Parveen Kumar in his statement, has deposed that the sale deed could not be executed due to the pendency of Civil Suit titled Ram Lal Vs. Parveen Kumar and others and they were restrained from alienating the property. The defendants No. 1 to 5 have not placed on record the copy of the judgment/order, passed by the Court in case titled Ram Lal Vs. Parveen Kumar. The defendants No. 1 to 5, in order to frustrate the execution of agreement, dated 19.04.1989, have executed the gift deed in favour of Shri Chamunda Devi temple on 08.07.1991. The plaintiff has never agreed to receive back the money. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to do his part, but respondents No. 1 to 5 were reluctant to execute the sale deed and, in fact, have executed the gift deed in favour of the temple on 08.07.1991. The suit was filed within limitation. There was no delay in filing the suit on the basis of agreement, dated 19.04.1989. The plaintiff has been put in possession of the suit land, but not of a defined share. The Courts below have rightly held the gift deed, dated 08.07.1991 null and void. 19. The suit was filed within limitation. There was no delay in filing the suit on the basis of agreement, dated 19.04.1989. The plaintiff has been put in possession of the suit land, but not of a defined share. The Courts below have rightly held the gift deed, dated 08.07.1991 null and void. 19. The suit was partly decreed by the learned trial Court, as noticed above, on 31.03.1999 and the appeal preferred against the same by the appellant-plaintiff, was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. on 17.12.2001, but the operation of the judgment and decree were stayed by this Court on 05.04.2002 and the same was made absolute on 21.05.2002. The suit land, as per the averments contained in C.M.P. No. 1116 of 2011 filed by the appellant/defendant, was acquired on the basis of notification, dated 22.12.2005, issued by the Land Acquisition Collector. The award has been made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 10.06.2008. The defendants No. 1 to 5 were owners of 5/16 land, which has been agreed to be sold to the plaintiff vide agreement, dated 19.04.1989. The appellant has also placed on record the copy of award, dated 10.06.2008. According to this award, the appellant-Mandir has been awarded a sum of Rs.10,03,743.00/- by way of compensation. Since the suit land has been acquired by the State, the agreement, dated 19.04.1989 cannot be executed. 20. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Manjini Vs. Rajakumari, Madras Law Journal Vol. 2 1997 633 has held that the party cannot seek specific performance of the sale agreement due to reason of the acquisition proceedings. The Hon’ble High Court has held as under: “21. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Masilamani appearing for the appellant would again submit that even though there is an acquisition proceeding, the plaintiff is prepared to buy whatever is left over all such acquisition and that the plaintiff would be entitled to make a claim for the compensation for the extent acquired. Such an argument is not available to the plaintiff. Sec. 12© makes it clear that when the contract becomes either wholly or partly incapable of performance, specific performance cannot be ordered by the Court. The plaintiff was aware of the acquisition proceedings at the time when he filed the suit. Such an argument is not available to the plaintiff. Sec. 12© makes it clear that when the contract becomes either wholly or partly incapable of performance, specific performance cannot be ordered by the Court. The plaintiff was aware of the acquisition proceedings at the time when he filed the suit. A part of the property was acquired during the pendency of the appeal and some more portion of the property was acquired subsequently with the result, now the property available is about half of the originally agreed property to be sold. Therefore, the contract has to be held as one impossible of performance by reason of the acquisition proceedings. Moreover, it is not mentioned in the agreement about the proposed land acquisition. In fact, from the evidence available, we can infer that even on the date when plaintiff filed the suit he was aware of the land acquisition proceedings. In spite of it, he has not chosen to make a proper pleading to the effect that in the alternative he is prepared to buy the property whatever that is made available to him, after the acquisition proceedings, and for the same price. This Court cannot bring about a new contract or substitute it with a difference one not agreed to by the partners. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thiriveedhi Channaiah Vs. Gudipudi Venkata Subba Rao (D) by LRs. & Ors. AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2439 have held that the agreement for sale cannot be enforced after the acquisition notification has been issued. Their Lordships have further held that if there is no forfeiture Clause in the agreement for sale, the advance paid could not be forfeited and their Lordships have issued directions for the refund of the advance paid. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 02.01.1982. Appellant evidently was of the view that the respondent was aware of the intention of the State to acquire the said property, but despite his knowledge, he executed the said Agreement for sale. 11. The notice dated 4.3.1983 was issued on behalf of the appellant on the said premise that the respondent did not have any transferable title. It was on that basis refund of Rs.50,000/-, which was paid by way of advance, was sought for from the respondent. 11. The notice dated 4.3.1983 was issued on behalf of the appellant on the said premise that the respondent did not have any transferable title. It was on that basis refund of Rs.50,000/-, which was paid by way of advance, was sought for from the respondent. It is only at that stage, the respondent invoked the forfeiture clause. 12. The only question which arises for our consideration is as to whether in a situation of this nature, the respondent could exercise his right of forfeiture of the entire amount. It is not his case that he had suffered any damage. He did not deny or dispute that after the Agreement of Sale was executed, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act had been issued. He himself raised a contention that the Agreement stood frustrated. It may be true that he not only questioned the validity of the said notification, but had also filed a suit, but indisputably the parties were aware that unless and until, the notification was set aside, the Agreement for Sale, in the aforementioned situation, cannot be enforced by either of them. 13. In the aforementioned facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the respondent could not have forfeited the amount of advance. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in that behalf in arriving at the finding that the respondent was justified in forfeiting the said amount. We, however, agree with the High Court that enforcement of agreement for sale would be inequitable. 14. We, therefore, direct that respondents to refund the amount of advance paid by the appellant to him. Such payment should be made within a period of four weeks from date; failing which the same would carry interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the said date till the date of actual payment.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 134 have held that the person seeking specific enforcement of agreement, must approach the Court within a reasonable time, even if time is not of the essence of the contract. Their Lordships further held that “reasonable time” means, as soon as circumstances permit. Their Lordships have explained the words “Reasonable time” and “Reasonable” as under: “13. Their Lordships further held that “reasonable time” means, as soon as circumstances permit. Their Lordships have explained the words “Reasonable time” and “Reasonable” as under: “13. The word "reasonable has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means as soon as circumstances permit. In Law Lexicon it is defined to mean "A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstance will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea." 14. In the instant case the parties had agreed to complete the sale by 15.6.1980 despite the fact that the time was not the essence of the contract. The appellant-plaintiff is stated to have issued letters to the respondent-defendant calling upon to execute the sale deed and thereafter also issued notice. It was further alleged and held proved by the courts of fact that the nature of the property was wet land which continued to be such during the trial. As the appellant-plaintiff had contracted to purchase the land with a view to construct a residential house, the respondent-defendant had undertaken to remove the telegraph pole in one part of the property. The Trial as well as the First Appellate Court found that in pursuance of the agreement the said pole was got removed in the first week of November, 1980 and the appellant-plaintiff issued a notice (Exhibit A-4) on 11.11.1930 calling upon the respondent-defendant to execute the sale deed. The Trial as well as the First Appellate Court found that in pursuance of the agreement the said pole was got removed in the first week of November, 1980 and the appellant-plaintiff issued a notice (Exhibit A-4) on 11.11.1930 calling upon the respondent-defendant to execute the sale deed. The appellant-plaintiff also made a publication on 13.11.1980 in a daily newspaper intimating the people at large not to purchase the property of the respondent-defendant as the same was the subject matter of agreement to sell executed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. On the failure of the respondent-defendant to comply with the conditions of the Agreement, the demands made in the letters and the notice, the appellant-plaintiff filed OS No. 1249 of 1980 in the month of November, 1980 itself. The legal action initiated by the appellant-plaintiff was rightly held by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court to have been commenced without delay and definitely within a reasonable time. The High Court was not justified in disturbing the finding of fact arrived at on appreciation of the evidence, while disposing of the second appeal. 23. The purpose of executing the gift deed in favour of the temple on 08.07.1991, was only to deprive the plaintiff to get the agreement to sell executed. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to do his part. The mutation No. 378 was also attested and thereafter the sale deed was to be executed within a period of one month. The suit was filed on 27.08.1991 and, thus, it cannot be held that it was filed beyond the period of limitation. The plaintiff has also issued a legal notice to the defendants to execute the agreement, but to no avail. 24. The agreement to sell could not be executed in view of the interim order of this Court, dated 05.04.2002, which was made absolute on 21.05.2002. In the meantime, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been issued for acquiring the suit land on 22.12.2005. The award has been made by the learned Collector on 10.06.2008. In view of this, the decree for specific performance of the agreement cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and they would be entitled only to refund of sum of Rs.90,000/-, which was paid by their predecessor-in-interest at the time of entering into agreement, Ex. The award has been made by the learned Collector on 10.06.2008. In view of this, the decree for specific performance of the agreement cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and they would be entitled only to refund of sum of Rs.90,000/-, which was paid by their predecessor-in-interest at the time of entering into agreement, Ex. PW-5/A. The substantial questions of law are, thus, answered accordingly. 25. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case enumerated hereinabove, since the specific performance of agreement, dated 19th April, 1999 cannot be ordered after the acquisition of the suit land, the Regular Second Appeal is partly allowed, to the extent that the decrees passed by both the Courts below for specific performance of agreement, Ex. PW-5/A, are modified by ordering the appellant and respondents No. 2 to 6 to pay a sum of Rs.90,000/- to the plaintiffs with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit, i.e., 27.08.1991. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India and others (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 161 have held that a party cannot be allowed to take benefit of his own wrong. A stay obtained by unscrupulous litigant cannot confer a right on him and he cannot take undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of Court. Their Lordships have further held that the Courts should be careful and pass an order neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of interim orders passed by the Court. Their Lordships have held as under: “149. It is settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. Unless courts disgorge all benefits that a party availed by obstruction or delays or non-compliance, there will always be incentive for non compliance, and parties are ingenious enough to come up with all kinds of pleas and other tactics to achieve their end because they know that in the end the benefit will remain with them. 150. Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must being disgorged and paid to the judgment creditor and not, allowed to be retained by the judgment-debtor. This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court. 150. Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must being disgorged and paid to the judgment creditor and not, allowed to be retained by the judgment-debtor. This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court. In fact, it has to be looked from the position of the creditor. Unless the deprivation by reason of delay is fully restituted, the creditor as a beneficiary remains a loser to the extent of the un-restituted amount. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 151. Unjust enrichment has been defined as: "A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense." See Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (Bryan A. Garner) at page 1573. A claim for unjust enrichment arises where there has been an "unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." 152. `Unjust enrichment' has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 153. Unjust enrichment is "the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." A defendant may be liable "even when the defendant retaining the benefit is not a wrongdoer" and "even though he may have received [it] honestly in the first instance." (Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Delaware. 1999). USA) 154. Unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain. In the leading case of Fibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1942] 2 All ER 122, Lord Wright stated the principle thus: "... 1999). USA) 154. Unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain. In the leading case of Fibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1942] 2 All ER 122, Lord Wright stated the principle thus: "... Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution." 155. Lord Denning also stated in Nelson v. Larholt, [1947] 2 All ER 751 as under:- "It is no longer appropriate, however, to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the niceties of the old forms of action. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular frame-work. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders restitution if the justice of the case so requires." 159. Unjust enrichment is basic to the subject of restitution, and is indeed approached as a fundamental principle thereof. They are usually linked together, and restitution is frequently based upon the theory of unjust enrichment. However, although unjust enrichment is often referred to or regarded as a ground for restitution, it is perhaps more accurate to regard it as a prerequisite, for usually there can be no restitution without unjust enrichment. It is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 160. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 160. While the term `restitution' was considered by the Supreme Court in South-Eastern Coalfields 2003 (8) SCC 648 and other cases excerpted later, the term `unjust enrichment' came to be considered in Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd vs Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs ( (2005) 3 SCC 738 ). This Court said: "`Unjust enrichment' means retention of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequitable. `Unjust enrichment' occurs when a person retains money or benefits which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else." 161. The terms `unjust enrichment' and `restitution' are like the two shades of green -one leaning towards yellow and the other towards blue. With restitution, so long as the deprivation of the other has not been fully compensated for, injustice to that extent remains. Which label is appropriate under which circumstances would depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders. 162. We may add that restitution and unjust enrichment, along with an overlap, have to be viewed with reference to the two stages, i.e., pre-suit and post-suit. In the former case, it becomes a substantive law (or common law) right that the court will consider; but in the latter case, when the parties are before the court and any act/omission, or simply passage of time, results in deprivation of one, or unjust enrichment of the other, the jurisdiction of the court to levelise and do justice is independent and must be readily wielded, otherwise it will be allowing the Court's own process, along with time delay, to do injustice. 163. For this second stage (post-suit), the need for restitution in relation to court proceedings, gives full jurisdiction to the court, to pass appropriate orders that levelise. Only the court has to levelise and not go further into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether. 164. 163. For this second stage (post-suit), the need for restitution in relation to court proceedings, gives full jurisdiction to the court, to pass appropriate orders that levelise. Only the court has to levelise and not go further into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether. 164. This view of law as propounded by the author Graham Virgo in his celebrated book on "The Principle of Law of Restitution" has been accepted by a later decision of the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) reported as 136 Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Limited) v Her Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Another [2007] UKHL 34 = [2007] 3 WLR 354 = [2008] 1 AC 561 = [2007] All ER (D) 294. 170. This court in Grindlays Bank Limited vs Income Tax Officer, Calcutta (1980) 2 SCC 191 observed as under : "...When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. ..." 171. In Ram Krishna Verma and Others vs State of U.P. and Others (1992) 2 SCC 620 this court observed as under :- "The 50 operators including the appellants/ private operators have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in Jeevan Nath Bahl's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of grant after Sept. 29, 1959 they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending hearing of the objections. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of grant after Sept. 29, 1959 they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending hearing of the objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs Income-tax Officer - [1990] 2 SCC 191 held that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated Feb. 26, 1959. ..." 172. This court in Kavita Trehan vs Balsara Hygiene Products (1994) 5 SCC 380 observed as under :- "The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144. Section 144 opens with the words: "Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose,...". The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section 144; but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court." 173. This court in Marshall Sons & Co. The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section 144; but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court." 173. This court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Another (1999) 2 SCC 325 observed as under :- "From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favour of the appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant since the suit filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the other and on occasion become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes long time. In such a situation for protecting the interest of judgment creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate order so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In appropriate cases, Court may appoint Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation." 174. In Padmawati vs Harijan Sewak Sangh CM (Main) No.449 of 2002 decided by the Delhi high Court on 6.11.2008, the court held as under:- "The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where Court finds that using the Courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the Court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the Court. One of the aims of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using Courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the Courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person." We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the aforementioned case. 175. The Court also stated: "Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary to observe that one of the main reasons for over-flowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the Courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately loose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the Courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right and also must be burdened with exemplary costs. Faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the Court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years long litigation. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years long litigation. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts." 182. Graham Virgo in his important book on `The Principles of the Law of Restitution" at pp26-27 has stated and relevant portion is reproduced as under: "In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v London Borough Council 1996 A.C. 669 the issue for the House of Lords was whether compound interest was available in respect of all restitutionary claims. By a majority it was decided that, since the jurisdiction to award compound interest was equitable, compound interest could only be awarded in respect of equitable restitutionary claims. Consequently, where the claim was for money had and received the claimant could only obtain simple interest because this was a common law claim. The majority supported their conclusion by reference to a number of different arguments. In particular, they asserted that, since Parliament had decided in 1981 that simple interest should be awarded on claims at common law, it was not for the House of Lords to award compound interest in respect of such claims. But the Supreme Court Act 1981 does not specifically exclude the award of compound interest in respect of common law claims. Rather, it recognizes that the court can award simple interest for such claims. The equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest is still available in appropriate cases. In two very strong dissenting judgments, Lords Goff and Woolf rejected the argument of the majority. They asserted that, since the policy of the law of restitution was to remove benefits from the defendant, compound interest should be available in respect of all restitutionary claims, regardless of whether they arise at law or in equity. This argument can be illustrated by the following example. They asserted that, since the policy of the law of restitution was to remove benefits from the defendant, compound interest should be available in respect of all restitutionary claims, regardless of whether they arise at law or in equity. This argument can be illustrated by the following example. In the straightforward case where the claimant pays money to the defendant by mistake and defendant is liable to repay that money, the liability arises from the moment the money is received by the defendant, who has the use of it and so should pay the claimant for the value of that benefit. This was accepted by all the judges in the case. The difficulty relates to the valuation of this benefit. If the defendant was to borrow an equivalent amount of money from a financial institution, he or she would be liable to pay compound interest to that institution. It follows that the defendant has saved that amount of money and so this is the value of the benefit which the defendant should restore to the claimant, in addition to the value of the money which the defendant received in the first place. If it could be shown that, had the defendant borrowed the equivalent amount of money, the institution would only have paid simple interest, it would be appropriate for the interest awarded to the claimant to be simple rather than compound. Usually, however, the interest awarded in commercial transactions will be compound interest." 183. In Marshall sons and company (I) Limited v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Limited and another (1999) 2 SCC 325 this court in para 4 of the judgment observed as under: "...It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes a long time. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In appropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour the decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation. ..." 184. In Ouseph Mathai and others v. M. Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 this court reiterated the legal position that the stay granted by the court does not confer a right upon a party and it is granted always subject to the final result of the matter in the court and at the risk and costs of the party obtaining the stay. After the dismissal, of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. 185. This court in South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P. and others (2003) 8 SCC 648 on examining the principle of restitution in para 26 of the judgment observed as under: "In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. 185. This court in South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P. and others (2003) 8 SCC 648 on examining the principle of restitution in para 26 of the judgment observed as under: "In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word "restitution" in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P - (1984) Supp SCC 505) In law, the term "restitution" is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another." 186. The court in para 28 of the aforesaid judgment very carefully mentioned that the litigation should not turn into a fruitful industry and observed as under: "... ... ...Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation." 187. The court in the aforesaid judgment also observed that once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. The court in the aforesaid judgment also observed that once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. Such interest is not controlled by the provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 or 1978. 188. In a relatively recent judgment of this court in Amarjeet Singh and others v. Devi Ratan and others (2010) 1 SCC 417 the court in para 17 of the judgment observed as under: "No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the court. ... ..." 189. In another recent judgment of this court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others (2010) 9 SCC 437 this court in para 15 observed as under: "No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the court." 190. In consonance with the concept of restitution, it was observed that courts should be careful and pass an order neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of the interim orders passed by the court. Such express directions may be necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure the relief as an interim measure and then avoid adjudication on merits. 191. In consonance with the principle of equity, justice and good conscience judges should ensure that the legal process is not abused by the litigants in any manner. The court should never permit a litigant to perpetuate illegality by abusing the legal process. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorized or unjust gain for anyone by the abuse of the process of the court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic costs, which the respondent or the defendant has in fact incurred in order to defend himself in the legal proceedings. The courts would be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains or unjust profits. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation. 192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The courts would be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains or unjust profits. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation. 192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases. 197. The other aspect which has been dealt with in great details is to neutralize any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view. 1. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralize any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court. 2. When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. 3. Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of the Court. 4. A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early as possible but be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. 5. No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law. 6. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs. 7. Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 8. The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and others Vs. 7. Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 8. The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and others Vs. Nirmala Devi and others (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 249 have held that wrongdoer should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation and have recommended imposition of penal costs, mesne profits and prosecution for perjury. Their Lordships have held as under: “52. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials. A. Pleadings are foundation of the claims of parties. Civil litigation is largely based on documents. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the trial judge to carefully scrutinize, check and verify the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties. This must be done immediately after civil suits are filed. B. The Court should resort to discovery and production of documents and interrogatories at the earliest according to the object of the Code. If this exercise is carefully carried out, it would focus the controversies involved in the case and help the court in arriving at truth of the matter and doing substantial justice. C. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. D. The Court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The Court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing concerned parties appropriate orders should be passed. D. The Court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The Court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing concerned parties appropriate orders should be passed. F. Litigants who obtained ex-parte ad interim injunction on the strength of false pleadings and forged documents should be adequately punished. No one should be allowed to abuse the process of the court. G. The principle of restitution be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice. H. Every case emanates from a human or a commercial problem and the Court must make serious endeavour to resolve the problem within the framework of law and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and justice. I. If in a given case, ex parte injunction is granted, then the said application for grant of injunction should be disposed of on merits, after hearing both sides as expeditiously as may be possible on a priority basis and undue adjournments should be avoided. J. At the time of filing of the plaint, the trial court should prepare complete schedule and fix dates for all the stages of the suit, right from filing of the written statement till pronouncement of judgment and the courts should strictly adhere to the said dates and the said time table as far as possible. If any interlocutory application is filed then the same be disposed of in between the said dates of hearings fixed in the said suit itself so that the date fixed for the main suit may not be disturbed.” 25. The same principles have been reiterated by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 370 as under: “87. Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In case hwhile granting or refusing injunction, the court properly considers pleadings and documents and takes the pragmatic view and grants appropriate mesne profit, then the inherent interest to continue frivolous litigation by unscrupulous litigants would be reduced to a large extent. 88. The Court while granting injunction should broadly take into consideration the prevailing market rentals in the locality for similar premises. Based on that, the court should fix ad hoc amount which the person continuing in possession must pay and on such payment, the plaintiff may withdraw after furnishing an undertaking and also making it clear that should the Court pass any order for reimbursement, it will be a charge upon the property.”