Judgment : This Writ Petition is instituted by a former driver of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) seeking a writ of mandamus for declaring the proceedings, dated 14.07.2006 issued by the Depot Manager, Banswada advising him to pay the amount of Rs.1,96,349.40 Ps. towards HBA (House Building Advance) and interest thereon as illegal. The petitioner has filed W.P. M.P. No. 29857 of 2012 for hearing the Writ Petition on out of turn basis. Hence, the Writ Petition is heard with the consent of the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. Sri V. Narasimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that when the writ petitioner was in service, he availed the facility of house building advance in the year 1989. He was granted as loan a sum of Rs.99,220/-by the Regional Manager of APSRTC at Karimnagar on 24.11.1989. The amount thus advanced on behalf of the Corporation is to be recovered in 192 installments, at the rate of Rs.800/-per month with interest at 8.5% per annum. There is no dispute that between 07.12.1989 and 17.08.1990, the total amount of house building advance has been made over to the petitioner and the recovery, as agreed to by the parties, has also commenced from the month of September 1990 onwards. The recoveries continued up to October 1992. It is alleged that a sum of Rs.80,020/-was recovered by the end of September 1992 itself. However, the services of the writ petitioner came to be terminated for an established misconduct committed by him. The case of the petitioner is that two other drivers of the APSRTC, namely Sri B. Ramulu and Sri Sd. Haneef stood as sureties for the loan amount. It is also stated that each of the two sureties have paid a sum of Rs.40,010/-and it is the specific assertion of the petitioner that he had repaid this amount to the aforesaid two sureties. When the writ petitioner applied for settlement of his terminal benefits, the impugned order came to be passed by the Depot Manager advising him to pay the balance amount of Rs.1,96,340/-to enable the Corporation settle his terminal benefits. When the writ petitioner applied for settlement of his terminal benefits, the impugned order came to be passed by the Depot Manager advising him to pay the balance amount of Rs.1,96,340/-to enable the Corporation settle his terminal benefits. This action of the respondent Corporation, according to the learned counsel, is offensive of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the respondent Corporation, being a State's instrumentality and thus, answering the description of the expression "State" for the purpose of Article 12, could not have acted in the manner in which it did and consequently, the impugned order requires to be set aside. As I could gather from the facts narrated supra, grant of house building advance by the APSRTC to its employees, is more in the nature of a concession or a facility for the purpose of securing better industrial relations. It is not part of any statutory obligation cast upon the APSRTC. Since grant of financial assistance to its employees to undertake either construction of houses or purchase of ready-built houses would go a long way in relieving them from the concomitant and related hassles and consequently, they can live in peace, harmony and with honour with their family members in such homes, this facility has been accorded by the Corporation. In my opinion, advancement of the house-building loan is purely a contractual matter between the two parties. There is no statutory flavour to such a contract. It is very well settled principle of law that terms of any ordinary or non-statutory contract entered into by and between a State or its instrumentalities with any third parties, cannot be sought to be enforced through the process of Article 226 of the Constitution. A State or its instrumentality is as much entitled to enter into contracts with third parties or for that matter, with their own employees, in the same manner as any other private citizen would do. So long as such contracts do not attract the provisions of any statute, enforceability of such contracts cannot be worked out through the mechanism of Article 226 of the Constitution of India (See Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E Kalathil ( (2000) 6 SCC 293 ). So long as such contracts do not attract the provisions of any statute, enforceability of such contracts cannot be worked out through the mechanism of Article 226 of the Constitution of India (See Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E Kalathil ( (2000) 6 SCC 293 ). In the instant case, the dispute as to whether the Corporation has properly recovered the money either from the petitioner, the principal borrower or his two other sureties or whether there was deliberate failure committed by the respondent Corporation in effecting such recoveries in accordance with the terms of the contract and whether the recoveries have been properly accounted for or not and as to whether penal interest on the defaulted amount could have been levied against the petitioner, are all matters falling within the realm of working out contractual obligations arising from out of a contract entered into by and between the parties. I therefore, do not consider this to be a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It would only be appropriate that such disputes should be got resolved through the process of ordinary Courts of law having competent civil jurisdiction. The Writ Petition is hence, dismissed, leaving it open to the parties to workout their remedies in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous applications, if any shall also stand dismissed.