JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—The petitioner Mangru (now substituted by his heirs and legal representatives) filed objection under Section 9(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming half share in Khata No. 80 situate in Gaurirai, Tappa Patna, Pargana Bansi Purab, Tehsil and District Basti. All the three Consolidation Courts have turned down his claim hence this writ petition. 2. Sri Dinesh Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Courts below have accepted the pedigree of the parties and since it was admitted that the land in question was ancestral the petitioner was entitled to half share. He refers to the pedigree reproduced below : 3. According to him, the land in question was recorded in the name of Shiv Dayal and Gherau hence the parties of both the branch had half share each. 4. He further submits that when there is co-tenancy then even if identity and continuity of the land changes from its original form the rights of co-tenancy remain unaffected. The rent receipts issued by the Zamindar prior to abolition of Zamindari clearly established the co-tenancy, hence the findings of the Consolidation Courts are perverse and require to be set aside. 5. Sri Shashi Prakash Misra, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 namely Bansraj and Adhare (now substituted by their heirs and legal representatives) has argued that once there is re-settlement of land amongst the co-sharers then the identity and continuity changes and co-tenancy rights stood extinguished. He states that there was a partition between the two branches and Shiv Dayal and Gherau acquired rights over their respective plots. He argues that Plot Nos. 99 and 256 were allotted to the petitioner hence the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 did not file any objection upon start of consolidation proceedings although even these two plots were coming from the common ancestor. According to him, the identity and continuity of the land had changed upon re-settlement between the parties hence the petitioner cannot claim co-tenancy rights in the land in question i.e. Khata No. 80. He clarifies that Khata No. 80 has several plots. 6. The Consolidation Officer vide his judgment dated 30.5.1974 has rejected the objection of the petitioner and has maintained the entries in the record as they existed. He clarifies that Khata No. 80 has several plots. 6. The Consolidation Officer vide his judgment dated 30.5.1974 has rejected the objection of the petitioner and has maintained the entries in the record as they existed. He had framed three issues for determination i.e. whether Mangru is co-tenant of the land, whether Bansraj and others are the sole owners of the land and what is the share of the parties in Khata No. 80. 7. Mangru the petitioner himself deposed as a witness and produced the khatauni 1324F, 1376F to 1379F, Khasra 1324F and receipt issued by the Zamindar evidencing payment of Lagan (Rent). On behalf of the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 only Motiram son of Bansraj deposed as a witness. He accepted the pedigree shown by the petitioner Mangru. On the basis of the evidence the Consolidation Officer found that the area of the land had changed due to a partition amongst the brothers and they were allotted separately numbered portions. In 1324F some plots were entered exclusively in the names of the ancestor of the respondents namely Gherau and some plots were jointly recorded in the name of the ancestors of both the parties namely Shiv Dayal and Gherau. The entry in 1376F to 1378F were also recorded separately in the names of the parties. Khata Nos. 99 and 256 were exclusively entered in the name of the petitioner Mangru. There was no evidence filed by the petitioner i.e. Mangru as to how these separate entries in his name and the name of the other branch came into being. Khata No. 80 was exclusively in the name of the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5. He, therefore, concluded that there had been a partition and the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were allotted Khata No. 80 hence the objection of the petitioner Mangru was rejected. 8. The petitioner being aggrieved filed an Appeal No. 390 before the Settlement Officer Consolidation who affirmed the decision of the Consolidation Officer and maintained the entry recorded at the stage of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The Revision No. 43 filed by the petitioner Mangru was also dismissed by the order dated 4.8.1976 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation, Basti. 9. The petitioner being aggrieved filed an Appeal No. 390 before the Settlement Officer Consolidation who affirmed the decision of the Consolidation Officer and maintained the entry recorded at the stage of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The Revision No. 43 filed by the petitioner Mangru was also dismissed by the order dated 4.8.1976 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation, Basti. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has cited a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Dharmraj and others v. Chintan and others’, 2007(102) RD 73 and has referred to paragraph 22 onwards. He has also referred to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of ‘Ruccha and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others’, 2007(6) ADJ 723 . 10. Upon going through the record of this writ petition, it is quite clear that concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the Consolidation Authorities that the land originally belonged to the ancestor i.e. Kallu of both the parties but subsequently a partition appears to have been effected amongst them which finds support from the revenue entries in the khataunis regarding various plots which came down from the ancestor. The fact that the revenue entries were in the name of different persons of the family indicated a partition. This is not a case where the name of one person as Karta-Khandan is recorded over all the plots. 11. Therefore, once the identity of the original holding is changed it is an indicator of a partition and also that the land is not coming down with an unbroken identity. The entries also indicate that there was no continuity in possession of the parties jointly since they were recorded in different plots separately. The continuity of the land in a joint set up was broken upon resettlement between the parties under a partition, therefore, to hold that the petitioners and Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 would have equal share in all the plots of Khata No. 80 would be incorrect since Shiv Dayal, the ancestor of the petitioner and Gherau, the ancestor of the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had separated and were holding their independent shares in Khata No. 80. 12. An indicator of resettlement between the parties is also seen from the fact that the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had separated and were holding their independent shares in Khata No. 80. 12. An indicator of resettlement between the parties is also seen from the fact that the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 filed no objection in the consolidation proceedings over plots which were recorded in the name of the petitioner or his ancestor of Khata No. 80 because if there had been no separation and settlement amongst the ancestors, the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 would also have share in those plots of Khata No. 80 which were coming from the ancestors but wherein only the petitioner or his ancestor was recorded. 13. A settlement between the original owners is a subject-matter of evidence. The revenue entries are not to be taken as a positive evidence of title. The Khatauni may reflect an incorrect state of affairs in case it is established that the entries have continued even though a partition was actually effected. In the event a partition is quite evident from the entries then entry in the khasra has to be looked into. If there is a case of no partition and the claim is on that basis then the entries in the khatauni have to reflect the names of all the co-sharers or in a representative capacity. In such circumstances the khasra entry in the name of only one co-sharer can be interpreted as an entry in a representative capacity because if there is no partition amongst the co-sharers then the possession of one is possession of all. This would also apply in the basic year entry. 14. The share of a co-sharer cannot be extinguished only on the basis of an entry of possession. The U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act deals with rights between the tenant-in-chief or the Zamindar on one side and the sub-tenant and his co-sharers on the other. The Zamindar can loose his rights with the enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and a tenant-in-chief can also be non-suited against the sub-tenant upon enforcement of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act but a sub-tenant cannot be non-suited by his co-sharer unless he proves a re-settlement with them. 15. In the present case a partition and re-settlement has been proved between the ancestors of both the parties and this is not a case under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act relating to rights of a sub-tenat against the Zamindar. 15. In the present case a partition and re-settlement has been proved between the ancestors of both the parties and this is not a case under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act relating to rights of a sub-tenat against the Zamindar. All the three Courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact on this issue. Therefore the identity of the land had changed in the hands of the ancestors interse and settlement had taken place between the co-sharers. To hold otherwise would be against the evidence and the facts of this case. 16. The entries in the khasra and khatauni are relevant evidence to record a finding that there was no continuity of joint possession or title. Hence the claim of share in the plot in question only for the reason that it was ancestral is quite misplaced. Definitely the entries were not in joint names or even in a representative capacity. Therefore the revenue entries over the plots would have evidenciary relevance to determine a separation and settlement amongst the co-sharers and since they were all recorded separately in the various plots a partition amongst the ancestors is glaring on the face of record. Shiv Dayal and Gherau were therefore not joint in the holdings of their ancestor Kallu when they made a resettlement amongst themselves. There was therefore no continuity of joint possession. 17. An entry in the khasra is an indicator of possession. This entry insofar as the State is concerned is only for the purpose of realisation of revenue. The person entered in the khasra is liable to pay the land revenue to the State. Therefore such an entry in the khasra is an indicator of possession only. The khasra entry cannot lead to a claim of title only on that basis. But it does reflect possession hence whether there has been continuous possession for a period of time can be ascertained from a khasra entry. 18. The khatauni is a record of title. If it is not forged or surreptitiously obtained it has great evidenciary value for determining title. But a khatauni entry cannot reflect possession in case the khasra records another person to be in possession and the khatauni records a different person to have title. Continuity of possession is therefore best judged by the entry in the khasra. If it is not forged or surreptitiously obtained it has great evidenciary value for determining title. But a khatauni entry cannot reflect possession in case the khasra records another person to be in possession and the khatauni records a different person to have title. Continuity of possession is therefore best judged by the entry in the khasra. Where different persons are recorded as owner in the khatauni and other persons are recorded in the khasra then insofar as possession is concerned the khasra entry is a relevant piece of evidence to record a finding on possession. Therefore continuity of possession can be established if the khasra reflects possession for a period in issue of a person and it is not a forged entry. There is no pleading in the present case that the khasra entry are forged or that they do not reflect the correct position. Hence in view of this relevant evidence on the issue of possession there was no continuity of joint possession over the land in question since the khasra entries do not reflect continuous joint possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute. 19. The identity of land is by it boundaries or by the number allotted to it with description of area or even by the name of the person recorded in possession or who is recorded as its owner. If the owner of the land changes then the identity of the land on that score changes. If the boundaries of the land change then its identity does not remain intact. If the number of the land is changed then its identity under the past number does not exist any further. If the area of the land changes then it is no longer the same land having the same area. In case possession over the land changes then the identity of the land under the name of the previous possessor ceases to exit. Re-settlement of land amongst its owners or possessors definitely changes its identity. That is what has happened to the land in question in the present case. The entries of possession have changed therefore the plea of partition has been rightly accepted. There was no continuity of joint possession and the identity of the land had changed. 20. Re-settlement of land amongst its owners or possessors definitely changes its identity. That is what has happened to the land in question in the present case. The entries of possession have changed therefore the plea of partition has been rightly accepted. There was no continuity of joint possession and the identity of the land had changed. 20. Under such circumstances, it has to be held that the identity of the land in question had changed upon resettlement and there was no continuity of possession in a joint set up. Therefore, co-tenancy could not be claimed by the petitioner Mangru on the plots in dispute in Khata No. 80, which were not recorded in his name. 21. There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Consolidation Authorities regarding re-settlement between the ancestors and there is nothing on the record of this writ petition to enable this Court to record a different finding. 22. No interference is required in the impugned orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities as contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 of this writ petition. The orders are therefore confirmed and should be given effect to forthwith. 23. This writ petition has no merits, it is accordingly dismissed. No order is passed as to costs. ——————