JUDGMENT 1. This Appeal is preferred by Judgment Debtor No.4 whose application to set aside the sale under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC was dismissed by the executing Court. 2. The said application E.A.No.498 of 2002 was moved to set aside the sale held on 17.06.2002 by impleading the decree holder alone as a party to the application. Undoubtedly, the auction purchaser who has purchased the property and who deposited the sale consideration was not impleaded to E.A.No.498 of 2002. The executing Court has rightly noticed the same as a fundamental defect amounting to non-joinder of necessary party and the same is taken as one of the reasons for rejection of E.A.No.498 of 2002. 3. In order to get over the said defect, the C.M.P.No.30119 of 2003 is filed impleading the said auction purchaser as a proposed party-respondent No.2 in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. The application for impleadment in C.M.P.No.30119 of 2003, though coming up along with the C.M.A., was not ordered in the C.M.A. However, on the last date of hearing and as on today when the C.M.A. is heard, Sri R.N.Hemendranath Reddy, learned counsel representing the auction purchaser, was heard and as such the C.M.P.No.30119 of 2003 deserves to be ordered and is, accordingly, ordered. 4. So far as merits of the C.M.A. are concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the sale is vitiated on more than one ground and according to him, the sale price fetched at the auction namely Rs.2,45,000/-is far below the official market value of the property, which is shown as Rs.10,00,000/- as per Ex.A7-Valuation Certificate itself. The second ground raised is that the E.P. schedule property consists of seven different door numbers and the sale of all the seven door numbers was not necessary keeping in view that the decretal amount was about Rs.2,52,533/-as on the date of E.P. The further contention raised by the learned counsel is with regard to publication of the sale notice, which according to him is in an obscure newspaper which has hardly any circulation. All the said grounds were sought to be supported by placing reliance upon decisions of this Court in 1) J.MallaReddy v. Smt.I.Shantamma (2009(5) ALT 493 (DB), 2) ChirravuriVeerabhadra Rao v. State Bank of India ( 2010(1) ALT 770 )and 3) VemulaVenkateswarlu v. Vakati Prabhakara Reddy ( 2011(1) ALT 156 ). 5. I have considered all the said contentions. All the said grounds were sought to be supported by placing reliance upon decisions of this Court in 1) J.MallaReddy v. Smt.I.Shantamma (2009(5) ALT 493 (DB), 2) ChirravuriVeerabhadra Rao v. State Bank of India ( 2010(1) ALT 770 )and 3) VemulaVenkateswarlu v. Vakati Prabhakara Reddy ( 2011(1) ALT 156 ). 5. I have considered all the said contentions. But I regret my inability to accept any of the said grounds for the reasons as mentioned below. 6. It is born out by the record that when the sale proclamation was settled under Order XXI Rule 66 CPC notices to Judgment Debtor including the petitioner herein (Judgment Debtor No.4) were served and the petitioner was set ex parte. According to the petitioner, the said notice was not served on her but on her sons and based on that ground she filed application E.A.No.395 of 2002 seeking to set aside the said order setting her ex parte. That application, however, was dismissed by the executing court by order, dated 14.06.2002, and the same was questioned by the petitioner in C.R.P.No.2551 of 2002 before this Court. The said revision petition, however, was also dismissed confirming the orders of the executing court by holding that the petitioner and her sons (Judgment Debtor Nos.1 to 3) were duly served with the notice of proclamation of sale and all of them, being fully aware, have not raised any objection. The said revision petition was, accordingly, dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to make appropriate application as permissible under law. Thereafter the petitioner has filed the present E.A.No.498 of 2002 to set aside the sale. Though the other grounds on which the sale is sought to be set aside were considered by the executing court, the ground so far as non-service of notice to the petitioner, as alleged, at the time of settlement of sale proclamation, stands concluded against the petitioner by order in C.R.P.No.2551 of 2002, referred to above. 7. Though the other grounds on which the sale is sought to be set aside were considered by the executing court, the ground so far as non-service of notice to the petitioner, as alleged, at the time of settlement of sale proclamation, stands concluded against the petitioner by order in C.R.P.No.2551 of 2002, referred to above. 7. So far as the other grounds are concerned, since the value of the property is estimated in the said sale proclamation as well as the boundaries and description of the property, as shown in the proclamation, it cannot now be objected by the petitioner in view of Order XXI Rule 90 sub-clause (3), which provides as follows:- “No application to set aside a sale under this Rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up.” 8. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is any excess sale also does not appear to be correct in view of the fact that the auction sale fetched an amount of Rs.2,45,000/- whereas the decretal amount as shown above is even more than what is fetched in the said auction sale. Further, the allegation that there is any defect in the publication of the sale on account of the publication being in an obscure newspaper also deserves to be rejected as the publication was made in Eenadu Daily, Anantpur, which even otherwise has vide circulation for the State and Anantpur District in particular. 9. Learned counsel also contended that the sale was originally scheduled for 12.06.2002. As there were no sufficient bidders the sale was adjourned to 17.06.2002 and for the adjourned sale there was no fresh publication. Even that contention is not tenable in view of Order XXI Rule 69 sub-clause (2), which provides that an adjourned sale for a longer period than 30 days requires a fresh proclamation unless the judgment debtor consents to wave the said proclamation. Obviously, the sale in this case was not adjourned beyond 30 days from the date originally fixed and as such, fresh publication was not required in law. 10. Obviously, the sale in this case was not adjourned beyond 30 days from the date originally fixed and as such, fresh publication was not required in law. 10. The decision first cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly distinguishable on facts as in that case the auction purchaser had failed to deposit 25% of the bid amount from the date of sale apart from excess sale established on the facts of that case. The facts of the present case are quiet different than those facts which were subject matter of the decision aforesaid. Similarly, the decision 2nd cited is also distinguishable as in the said decision, it was recorded that not a single step contemplated under Order 66 was followed by the executing Court, which is again not so in the present case on hand. The decision 3rd cited also does not help as in the said case the valuation fixed in the sale proclamation was revised without notice to judgment debtor and the sale took place at a lesser price than was originally fixed. The facts of the case, as noticed above, being quiet different from the ones involved in each of the three decisions referred to above, reliance on the said decisions is clearly misplaced. 11. Apart from all these findings, which was also reached by the executing Court, the fundamental defect of non-joinder of necessary party namely auction purchaser in E.A.No.498 of 2002, to my mind does not get cured merely by impleading the auction purchaser in the present C.M.A. By not impleading the said auction purchaser, any orders passed in E.A.No.498 of 2002 would not bind the said auction purchaser and as such the relief of setting aside the sale sought for by the petitioner without impleading the auction purchaser is too fundamental defect, which is incurable. 12. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, therefore, is merit less and is, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous applications, if any, stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.